Identification and Analysis of Terrorism Metaphors

تعيين مجازات الإرهاب و تحليلها

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يُناقشُ البَحثُ الحالي تعيينَ مجازات الإرهاب وتحليلها.هي المجازات المُتعرَض ُ لها في خطابات رئيسِ الوزراء البريطاني الأسبق توني بلير و المُقابلات التي أُجريت معه حَولَ الإرهاب بعدَ هجماتِ أيلول.يجري البَحثُ بتبني المُقاربة الادراكية كما طَورَّها ستين (١٩٩٩) لتحديد المجازات الذهنية الناتجة من تعابيرٍ لغويةٍ.يتَضمنُ البَحثُ قضايا مثلَ التمييزَ بين ما هو حرفيٍ و بين َ ما هو مجازي لغرضِ تعيينَ شواهد المجازات اللغوية،ومثلَ التعيينِ التقليدي لدلالة المجاز اللغوي و وسيلتها،و مثلَ كيفية التوصل الى المجازات الذهنية من أخرى لغوية، و أخيرا يشمل البَحث أعطواصفًا شَرحياً لكل شاهدَ مجازٍ ناتجو.الهدف من البَحثِ يتضمنُ الأشارةَ إلىأماكنِ السهولة و الصعوبة في هكذا أنتَاجٍ للمجازاتأي أن الهدفَ هو معرفُ مدى امكانيةِ هذا المَنهج في تعيين المجازات الذهنية.

Identification and Analysis of Terrorism Metaphors

1. Introduction

Hereunder, identification and analysis of metaphors occurring in the British Prime Minister Toni Blair's speeches and interviews on terrorism are carried out. These are tackled by taking as a tool of analysis the cognitive approach developed by Steen (1999). A number of speeches and interviews have been chosen, all dealing with terrorism post to 11th of September attacks. As all agree that terrorism is a way of killing and destruction, the different ways such a stream of thinking had been seen by Toni Blair are investigated so as to arrive at the way they are worked out as metaphorical from linguistic expressions.

Prior to scrutinising and applying Steen's (1999) model for the arrival of conceptual metaphors, a survey of the different approaches to the study, analysis, and perception of metaphor is put forward. Such a survey will have a bearing on the way Steen's model distinguishes between the literal and metaphorical in respect to the identification of tenor and vehicle. After that, Steen's model is worked out on those linguistic expressions of terrorism which involve a metaphorical association.

By so doing, the investigation will reveal how terrorism is conceptualised, via specifying the recurrent conventional metaphors, and then what implications these conventional metaphors have for the speaker, the Prime Minister Toni Blair. And, the account will further add to the way terrorism metaphors are understood and processed.

2. Defining 'Terrorism'

The model adopted here is that which makes some sort of a movement from a linguistic expression so as to arrive at the conceptual metaphor achieved thereby. Thus, working out a definition of 'terrorism' in respect to its literal denotation will help achieve the goals proposed above. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (OALD, henceforth) (2001, s.v. **terrify)** writes the following as a definition to the verb 'terrify': *make somebody feel extremely frightened*; but 'terrorism' is seen to be "*the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act*" (ibid, s.v. **terrorism**). As such, the noun 'terrorism' is considered as though it were having no relation with the basic verb 'terrify' which seems to be its derivative. This is because of the suffix 'ism' which indicates nothing but 'a set of ideas or system of beliefs or behaviour' (ibid, s.v. **ism**). As such, it is the theory along with its

application which is provoked by the literal denotation, a situation which is so clear in the consequences discernible in the achievement by the terrorism-proponents of political aims or the government acting according to their wishes.

As far as UN is concerned, a definition of terrorism is a matter of controversy. But, in general, the UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 contained a description of terrorism as the following:

> *Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.*

As essential components of the above definition are the following:

1- The perpetration of violence by whatever means;

2- The targeting of innocent civilians;

3- With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for its consequences;

4- For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an enemy;

5- In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious goal.

(See Tiefenbrun 2003, 362)

In terms of these five components, a discussion is held so as to see the different ways terrorism has been conceived of by the Prime Minister Toni Blair. But, as a beginning, a brief account of what metaphor is and how it has been approached by different theories is presented.

3. Theories of Metaphor

Originally, the word metaphor is taken from the Greek word *metaphora* which is derived from *meta* (beyond) and *pherein* (to carry) (WNWDAL 1960, s.v. *metaphor*). By metaphor is meant that some distinguished aspects of one object are carried over or applied to another different thing, so that the second is apprehended and spoken of as though it were the first. It has been regarded as a special phenomenon of language where a kind of movement is involved from one thing to another. The idea that two aspects are involved in metaphor has remained important in many theories, and is often explicitly formulated in terms of a 'from … to …' expression. This is clearly manifested in the cognitive conceptual theory of metaphor, within which the present approach works, where there is a movement from the source domain to the target domain. Right below is a brief exposition of the various theories of metaphor in relevance to the way it is explained or processed.

3.1 Interaction-organisation Theories

One type of theory of metaphor, which is not strictly linguistic but which needs to be mentioned in this brief overview because of its foundational role in twentieth century metaphor-approaches as a whole, is Richards' and Black's "interaction-organization theory". As has been indicated in the introduction to the present section, a metaphor necessarily involves 'two aspects'. The philosopher Ivor A. Richards has been the first to name these two aspects: he called the word/expression indicating the metaphor, or the word which is used with a metaphorical meaning, the *vehicle*, while the "underlying idea" was termed the *topic* of the metaphor (1936). In the example,

- All the senior managers will be *swept out.*

the expression used metaphorically, i.e. *sweep out* in its metaphorical sense, is the vehicle, whereas the new sense of the expression, viz. the meaning of 'dismiss' as represented in a new way by the vehicle *sweep out*, indicates the topic of the metaphor. Richards' ideas were further developed by Black (1962), who further emphasised the (conceptual) interaction between vehicle and topic. Conceiving of both aspects in a broad way as systems of ideas and associations, Black (ibid) specified this interaction as a projection of the vehicle onto the topic, by which the topic comes to be "seen through" a mirror set up by the vehicle, and by which a similarity is created between topic and vehicle.

The specification of the two aspects of metaphor, and furthermore the conception of the relation between topic and vehicle as dynamic, opened up various possibilities for further theorising this relationship in subsequent theories of metaphor developed in the latter half of the twentieth century.

3.2 Semantic Theories

The first linguistic theories of metaphor which emerged in the 1960s were semantic theories. In the initial proposals for a linguistic treatment of metaphor developed in the framework of generative grammar, metaphor was accounted for in terms of *componential semantics*: it was seen as being based on a transfer of semantic features from a vehicle to a topic (Matthews 1971). A more recent theory of metaphor which takes a componential semantic approach is Levin's (1988).

Outside the framework of componential semantics, the semantic properties which are seen as being transferred from a vehicle to a topic in a semantic view in general can be defined in different alternative ways, viz. as aspects of the *intension* of an expression (including *connotation*),

aspects of *gestalts* , and aspects of the *extension* or *reference* of expressions. Kittay (1987) proposes a semantic account of metaphor which is based on the theory of *semantic fields*. Accordingly, aspects of the semantic field of a vehicle term are transferred onto a topic term, and in this way, a second-order meaning is created.

3.3. Pragmatic Theories

In pragmatic perspectives on metaphor, the creation and interpretation of metaphor is defined and explained in terms of the interactants' communicative intentions. In pragmatic approaches in general, metaphor is accounted for at the level of utterance meaning (or speaker's meaning) as opposed to sentence meaning. The nature of a metaphorical utterance meaning has however been explained in various ways. A number of authors (e.g. Mack 1975, Loewenberg 1975) deal with metaphor in the framework of *speech act theory*, and propose to conceive of metaphor as a type of *speech act*. In the framework of Grice's theory of the *Cooperative Principle*, metaphor is treated as a specific type of *conversational implicature* (Grice 1989, 34), whereas in the framework of Sperber & Wilson's *Relevance Theory*, metaphor is perceived theoretically as a type of *loose language* use (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 170).

3.4 Cognitive Conceptual Theory

The cognitive (or conceptual) theory of metaphor, which was launched in 1980 by Lakoff & Johnson and which has come to be referred to as the 'conceptual metaphor theory', focuses not on the linguistic expression of metaphors, but rather on the conceptual-semantic metaphors underlying such metaphorical expressions. Conceptual metaphor, in this framework, is defined as a mapping of the conceptual

structure of a donor domain (or source domain) onto that of a recipient domain (or target domain). Three major premises of the cognitive theory of metaphor are:

1- the belief that all human meaning is embodied in experience (experientialism),

2- the view of conceptual metaphor as a type of gestalt structuring, and

3- the postulate that the majority of conceptual metaphors are highly systematic in nature.

Lakoff (1993, 203), in a latter development of this conceptual theory, presented a definition of 'metaphor' as denoting "a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system". As regards such a definition, metaphor is seen working in distinct domains of thinking, or simply in concepts, i.e., an instance of one domain is perceived as similar to the other. In other words, a correlative mapping is achieved between the two distinct domains. Also, Lakoff (1993, ibid) defined a metaphorical expression as "a linguistic expression (a word, a phrase, or a sentence) that is the surface realisation of such a cross-domain mapping". For example, metaphorical expressions such as,

1- Your claims are *indefensible*.

2- He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.

are surface realisations of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, a case in which a mapping is achieved between the domain of ARGUMENT and that of WAR, i.e., the first is seen as the other. By so doing, one may come closer to the conclusion that some everyday life conventional linguistic expressions could be markers of the existence of a system of conceptual metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, and so on and so forth. Lakoff (1993, 210) goes on to emphasise the importance

of the existence of systematic linguistic correspondences as a starting point for claiming the existence of conceptual metaphors.

4. Steen's (1999) Model

Despite the fact that there exist cases of conceptual metaphors working by detected analogy between separate domains, there still problems come to surface in making all linguistic expressions apply easily from one domain onto another. Such a state of affairs stems from the fact that conceptual metaphors were worked out from decontextualised utterances whose aspects would on many occasions differ greatly if they were functioning in real discourse. This problematic identification of conceptual metaphors from linguistic metaphorical expressions led Steen (1999) to propose his five-step procedure 'from linguistic to conceptual metaphor'.

So, Steen's (1999) procedure was meant to determine the sort of relationship holding between linguistic and conceptual metaphor, for such a relationship should never be believed, as it has been made so, that specific instances of linguistic metaphor would reflect specific instances of conceptual metaphor. In this way, Steen aimed at analysing metaphor not at its mental processing or understanding, although he noticed that "it would be odd if there were no connection between understanding and analysis" (1999, 59). With the help of two metaphorical expressions, the five steps of the procedure, as they are summerised by Semino et al (2004, 1274-7), run as follows:

i- step 1: identification of metaphor focus

Steen introduces the first step of his procedure as the identification of linguistic expressions used metaphorically in the discourse, which he refers to as the 'metaphorical foci' which are expressions that activate concepts literally inapplicable to the referents in the world created in the text. Consider for instance Eliot's line,

    3- I have seen them riding seawards on the waves,

where '**them**' refers anaphorically to **'mermaids'**. Here, '*riding on*' is the metaphorical focus in so far as the concept it refers to is *literally* inapplicable to the relationship between the referents of **'mermaids**' and **'waves**'. Similarly, if the expression,

4- *The royal court* is going to hunt,

is used in relation to a group of lions, the expression '***The royal court***' is the metaphorical focus, since the concept it refers to cannot be literally applied to the entity it highlights in the text world (i.e. the lions).

ii- step 2: identification of metaphorical idea

Here, Steen uses a technique for a propositional analysis in order to specify exactly the relationship between the metaphorical focus and the tenor or topic of the metaphor, which he refers to as the literal part of the metaphorical idea. The propositional analysis of instance 3 is as follows (where P is a proposition):

I have seen the mermaids riding seawards on the waves
P1 (SEE P2)
P2 (RIDE-ON MERMAIDS WAVES)
P3 (DIRECTION P2 SEAWARDS)
The metaphorical idea is captured by P2, which involves not words but concepts (represented in small CAPITALS) activated by the words of the original expression. Such a propositional analysis is useful in the case of implicit metaphors, as is in the case of instance 4 above, where the literal referent is not mentioned in the surface realisation of the text:

The royal court is going to hunt
P1 (REF COURT LIONS)
P2 (HUNT COURT)
P3 (MOD COURT ROYAL)
Here, P1 is an identification of the metaphorical idea: the concept COURT names non-literally LIONS. As is being explained, the output of step 2 is a proposition containing a non-literal use of a concept (expressed by the

linguistic focus identified in step 1) that is related to one or more literally used concepts identified in step 2 which evoke the relevant literal referent.

iii- step 3: identification of non-literal comparison

Within this step, the metaphorical propositions resulting from step 2 go into a procedure whereby they are changed into comparative structures. To Steen, this is an important step because it is here that the sets of correspondences are identified across the different domains which constitute metaphorical mappings in the cognitive paradigm. The application of this step is ''highly mechanical'' and involves a bundle of three re-write rules relevant to the status of the metaphorical expression, whether it is nominal, verbal or sentential. As an explication, consider how this works on instance 3 above:

(RIDE-ON MERMAIDS WAVES) → (F) (y, y) {SIM[F(MERMAIDS, WAVES), RIDE-ON(y, y)]}

This may be paraphrased as follows: ''there is an activity (or relation) **F** and two entities **y** and **y** such that there is a similarity between **mermaids** and **waves** doing **F** on the one hand and **y** riding on **y** on the other'' (Steen 1999, 67).

iv- step 4: identification of non-literal analogy

While step 3 is mechanical, step 4 is interpretative: it involves filling in the empty slots from step 3 output in order to arrive at a full non-literal similitude. Here is how step4 works for our instance:

(RIDE-ON MERMAIDS WAVES) → SIM [FLOAT (MERMAIDS, WAVES), RIDE-ON(JOCKEY, HORSE)]

In step 4, there are two parts: the focus interpretation and vehicle identification. The first part consists in having a literal expression replacing the metaphorical focus (in instance 3, FLOAT replaces F as the literal counterpart of RIDE ON). As for the second part, it involves having some elements of the source domain, being evoked by the metaphorical focus, selected to fill in the second incomplete proposition from step 3 (in our instance, JOCKEY and HORSE replace y and y above). The interpretation in this step might go uncontrolled. Such a loss of control may be ascribed to the fact during the process of vehicle interpretation, which relies on the source domain, different source domains, or different elements of the same source domain may be equally called upon in the interpretation of the second proposition. However, the focus interpretation is constrained to a great extent by the context in which the metaphor occurs.

v- step 5: identification of non-literal mapping

In step 5, the identification is made of the total non-literal mapping via making out the conceptual structure seen as holding between the two sides of the non-literal analogy, the source and target domains. That is, step 5 makes a move from the resulting output of step 4 to the cross-domain correspondences normally proposed in cognitive metaphor theory (e.g. the one for ARGUMENT IS A WAR given above). Unexpectedly, Steen does not explain how this step works in relation to the instances 3 and 4 as was done in the foregoing steps. Rather, the explication is made by providing correspondences between a watchdog and a committee that might be evoked by the metaphorical expression **a watchdog committee.** As such, mapping together the source and target domains brings forth the set of correspondences stated just below:

THE COMMITTEE-AS-WATCHDOG MAPPING.

The committee corresponds to the watchdog.

The organisational domain corresponds to the yard.

The interest or activity at risk corresponds to the property.

Malpractice corresponds to trespassing.

Monitoring corresponds to watching.

Warning the public corresponds to barking.

Admittedly, Steen announces that ''the last two steps of the procedure form the weakest part of the chain, with step 5 being the weakest of all'' (1999: 73). Such an announcement is corroborated by the fact that Steen himself did not provide an explication based upon the previously analysed instances. And therefore, he believes necessary that analysts have a further step that would be useful in determining whether a metaphorical expression represents a conventional conceptual metaphor, or it simply is a one-occasion use metaphor. In other words, this sixth step would be the appropriate rule for deciding on the conventionality of metaphorical expressions.

Hereunder, a scrutiny is carried out of a number of metaphorical expressions used in the speeches and interviews of the British Prime Minister Toni Blair as descriptive of terrorism. These are made through Steen's (1999) five-step-procedure so as to arrive at the identification of their source and target domains, and then at the corresponding aspects of analogy via the process of mapping. Lastly, by following this same procedure, being conventional-and-conceptual will be decided. Else, reference is going to be made in relevance to the nature of difficulties encountered in such decision-making process.

5. Metaphors of 'Terrorism'

5.1 Linguistic Expressions on 'Terrorism'

The researchers examined thirteen texts involving a number of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speeches and interviews (see Appendix I) which either dealt with terrorism in specific or discussed it as a secondary subject. The choice was made of such a type of texts so as to avoid the issue of tackling de-contextualised linguistic instances, a situation that had been of much discussion. In the appendix, the texts are ordered chronologically. From among these, only four speeches and one interview manifest the linguistic expressions showing tendencies towards serving metaphorical concepts on terrorism.

As for now, the various linguistic expressions as to the way 'terrorism' has be seen, by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as revealing of its nature are listed under three general headings as follows:

(A) Terrorism as a virus

    i- " … a new and deadly virus has emerged."

    ii- "The virus is terrorism…".

    iii- "… whose (the virus) capacity to inflict destruction…is enlarged by technology."

<div align="right">(Speech 5)</div>

(B) Terrorism as a plant

    i- " How do we partner with Pakistan in trying to deal with some of the root causes of these issues, this growth of extremism (terrorism)?

<div align="right">(Interview 2)</div>

    ii- "We must pull this (terrorism) by its roots."

<div align="right">(Speech 8)</div>

iii- "The roots of the current wave of global terrorism and extremism are deep."

(Speech 11)

iv- "But the fact is that they are loosely linked by an ideology. They have very strong links with each other, right across the national boundaries".

v- "I mean, it's absolutely clear they're financing and arming (these terrorists)".

(Interview 2)

(C) Terrorists as birds (or animals) of prey

i- "Therefore we must be relentless …in resolving the conditions and cause on which terrorists prey."

(Speech 6)

5.2 Steen's Model (1999) Applied

5.2.1 Terrorism as a Virus

Traditionally, metaphor has been described as involving some sort of ambiguity as to the number of explanations or interpretations it may raise in the minds of hearers\readers. Here, in the present concept of terrorism as a virus, the ambiguity exists naturally. OALD (2001, s.v. **virus**) writes the following definitions for 'virus':

(1) "a living thing, too small to be seen without a microscope, that causes infectious disease in people, animals, and plants";

(2) " a disease caused by a virus"; and

(3) " instructions that are hidden within a computer program and are designed to cause faults or destroy data".

The first sense is directly judged literal, and the second is by metonymy also literal; the third, however, is by extension metaphorical!

The application hereunder has to go through both, the literal and non-literal (figurative) senses, as long as both will result in non-literal reference to terrorism. The outset is with the literal.

(Step 1): The metaphorical focus here is accomplished by the idea that '*terrorism*' is a '*virus*'. The concept of 'virus' does not apply literally to 'terrorism'.

(Step 2): The identification of the metaphorical idea may be captured by the following propositional analysis:

whose (the deadly virus) capacity to inflict

P1   (REF VIRUS TERRORISM)

P2   (INFLICT DESTRUCTION VIRUS)

P3   (MOD DEADLY VIRUS)

P1 clarifies the metaphorical idea, via realising the concept VIRUS as applied non-literally to TERRORISM.

(Step 3): The metaphorical propositions resulting from step 2are put in a procedure to be transformed into comparative structures in the following way:

(INFLICT VIRUS TERRORISM) → (F) (y, y) {SIM[F(VIRUS, DESTRUCTION), INFLICT(y, y)]}

This can be re-written as follows: there is an activity or relation F (which is INFLICT) holding between two entities y and y (VIRUS and TERRORISM).

(Step 4): After the mechanical representation of similitude between entities in step 3, step 4 involves the identification of a non-literal

analogy via filling in the empty gaps contained in the output result of the previous step. This is achieved in the following way:

(INFLICT VIRUS DESTRUCTION) → {SIM[DESTROY (VIRUS, LAND), INFLICT(DISEASE, BODY)]}

Step 4 above went through two stages: the interpretation of the focus, whereby a literal linguistic expression is used to replace the metaphorical focus (here, DESTROY replaces F as the literal counterpart for INFLICT); and the identification of the vehicle, whereby some elements from the source domain provoked by the metaphorical focus are selected to fill in the empty slots in the incomplete proposition of step 3 (here, DISEASE and BODY replace y and y).

Before any further step to proceed, a point of caution has to be put forward here. Notice that from the very beginning, it has been declared that when 'terrorism' is seen as a 'virus', any analogy in this respect has to be in line with what type of 'virus' is intended: is it that of diseases, or of computers? The foregoing above was associated with the former intention. As for the latter, we have to say that the interpretation has to be under control. Steen (1999, 68) stresses the need to keep interpretation ''under firm control'' during this step. However, he points out that, whereas focus interpretation (i.e. finding a literal equivalent for the metaphorical expression) is a matter highly limited by the context in which the metaphor occurs, vehicle identification has to rely on ''prototypical or default knowledge about the source domain''(ibid, 71) (in our case, the domain provoked by 'inflict'). This is something very relevant here. If we say that 'terrorism' is a 'computer virus', we have to let down the idea of 'body' and 'disease'. We have to think of 'files' and 'destruction'. Consequently, when two source domains are provoked at

once, different interpretations will come out. Consider the following two interpretations yielding from the two distinct source domains in step5:

(A) Interpretation of 'terrorism' as a 'disease virus'

- Terrorism corresponds to virus.
- The land on which terrorism operates corresponds to the human body.
- Humans correspond to body organs.
- Terrified and killed humans correspond to affected organs.
- Measures taken against it correspond to medicines and treatment.
- Enlarging the efficacy of both terrorism and disease virus can be made easier and even achieved by technological facilities, such as genetic engineering.

(B) Interpretation of 'terrorism' as a 'computer virus'

- Terrorism corresponds to virus.
- The land on which terrorism operates corresponds to a computer.
- Humans correspond to hardware and software.
- Terrified and killed humans correspond to affected files and programs.
- Measures taken against it correspond to anti-virus programs.
- Enlarging the efficacy of both terrorism and computer virus can be made easier and even achieved by technological facilities, such as more advanced software.

It is important to notice in this respect that both interpretations involve the ability of complicating the effects of terrorism 'virus' by

technology, a point that has to be seen as a common ground between the two types of 'virus'.

5.2.2 Terrorism as a Plant

The various ways in which a certain thing behaves and shows itself to the public will lead the audience to think of it differently as to the differences in its behavior. As such, Tony Blair sees 'terrorism', because of its extended activities and deep-rooted beliefs, as a something growing and having deep roots. OALD (2001, s.v. **plant**) writes: "a living thing that grows in the earth and usually has a stem, leaves and roots". Below is an examination of detecting a metaphorical concept out of a linguistic expression in Steen's terms of model:

Step 1: The metaphorical focus here is accomplished by the idea that '*terrorism*' has '*roots*'. The present perception of 'terrorism' in these terms does apply literally; this is because of the simple fact that 'terrorism' is not a plant. This is the metaphorical focus: terrorism is a plant and has roots.

Step 2: By way of a propositional analysis, the arrival at the metaphorical idea is achieved. Consider:

P1: (REF PLANT TERRORISM)

P2: (HAVE-ROOTS PLANT)

P3: (MOD PLANT)

This is to say that the metaphorical idea is explained by the non-literal application of growing PLANT to TERRORISM.

Step 3: The identification of the non-literal comparison is as Steen's model directs is carried out mechanically by the re-write rules as follows:

(HAVE-ROOTS PLANT TERRORISM) → (F) (y, y) {SIM[F(PLANT, TERRORISM), HAVE ROOTS(y, y)]}

An explanation of the above mechanical formula is that there is a relation F involving together two entities y and y̅ in respect to their being similar as to their association with F.

Step 4: By filling in the empty slots resulting from step 3, the following yields:

(HAVE–ROOTS PLANT TERRORISM) → {SIM[EXTENDS (TERRORISM, BELIEFS),GROWS (PLANT, EARTH)]}

This is interpreted usually in two stages: the interpretation of the metaphorical focus, when the F is interpreted literally as EXTENDS for the metaphorical GROWS; and the interpretation of the vehicle takes place when the incomplete proposition in step 3 is completed by the bringing to the explanation PLANT and EARTH.

Again, the pictorial interpretation has to be monitored in so far as no specific plant is meant. Any plant should have roots and be extended either vertically or horizontally, a state of affairs identical to that of terrorism in all its forms.

Step 5: The non-literal mapping has to pay attention to the potential features of the two entities in question so as to give a full picture of how they are being seen on a common ground. The full mapping is tried right below:

The interpretation of terrorism as a plant

- Terrorism is a plant.

- Terrorism operates on earth and a plant lives on earth.

- Beliefs of terrorism correspond to the roots of plants.

- Firm beliefs correspond to deep roots.

- The internationally-interrelated beliefs of terrorism correspond to the interwoven roots under earth.

- Terrorist groups correspond to branches.

- Terrorist individuals in a group correspond to leaves on a branch.

- The distribution of terrorist groups in different countries corresponds to branches and leaves going into different directions.

- Demolishing the terrorist beliefs and people correspond to pulling out plants by the roots.

- Financing terrorism corresponds to watering plants.

5.2.3 Terrorists as Birds (or Animals) of Prey

There seems to be a great extent of commonness between 'terrorists' and 'birds (or animals) of prey'. *Prey on/upon somebody/something* , as a phrasal verb is seen by OALD (2001, s.v. **prey**) to be a description of an animal or a bird when it hunts and kills for food.

When such a description is applied to 'terrorists', it is judged readily to be non-literal and hence the metaphorical focus is identified: the linguistic expression 'prey' involves an action which does not apply literally to the referents (terrorists) evoked in the text. This is how step1works. As for step 2, it has a scheme of a propositional analysis whereby the metaphorical idea is given identity. Examine the following propositional analysis of the instance in question:

the conditions and causes on which terrorists prey

P1 (PREY   BIRDS "ANIMALS" OF PREY   TERRORISTS)

P2 (TERRORISTS PREY)

P3 (BIRDS "ANIMALS" OF PREY)

P1 clarifies the metaphorical idea, via realising that the action of 'preying' is being applied non-literally to 'terrorists'. P2 and P3 show the two ends at which 'prey' works. The resultant propositions are then put into the mechanical equation in step 3 for the purpose of identifying the non-literal comparison. The equation runs as follows:

(PREY-ON TERRORISTS   CONDITIONS-AND-CAUSES) → (F) (y, y)
{SIM[F(TERRORISTS, CONDITIONS-AND-CAUSES), PREY-ON(y, y)]}

Then comes step 4 where the interpretation of the elements is given in full by filling in the empty slots in step 3. Consider:

(PREY-ON TERRORISTS CONDITIONS-AND-CAUSES) → SIM [BENEFIT-FROM (TERRORISTS, CONDITIONS-AND-CAUSES), PREY-ON (BIRDS "ANIMALS", PREY)]

In this, the F is replaced by "benefit-from" to interpret the metaphorical focus, and then, the vehicle is identified by selecting some of the elements form the source domain so as to complete the empty slots yielding form step 3. So, (y, y) are replaced by BIRDS "ANIMALS" and "PREY".

The interpretation of the elements from both the source and target domains is presented fully, and the non-literal analogy between the two is drawn. Thus, what remains is the final step 5 where the non-literal mapping is identified:

Interpretation of Terrorists as Birds (or Animals) of Prey

●Terrorists correspond to Birds (or Animals) of prey

● Conditions and causes correspond to prey

●Benefiting from conditions and causes correspond to cutting and eating prey

- Terrorist benefiting from conditions and causes to satisfy their non-humane needs correspond to birds (or animals) preying to satisfy their needs for food
- Terrorists lawless and illegal ways of living correspond to birds (or animals) of prey jungle-law

The control of the interpretation has to be harnessed by force of context alone, otherwise the lexical item "prey" would call for another image which is that of having "terrorists" having pleasure in shedding the blood of innocent people (being killed) as is the case with 'birds or animals' of prey which cut and eat savagely their prey-animals. This full image interpretation was out of thought because of context which helped give the interpretation presented above.

Finally, it remains a matter of subjective judgment as to the acceptability of such conceptual metaphors. This is because of the personal perspective working. Angles may vary even with the same viewer.

6. Conclusions

Many approaches have been devised for the differentiation between what is literal and what is metaphorical. The dispute is there always. Steen's model (1999) is but one attempt. It has the potentiality of beginning with a linguistic (supposedly literal) expression and eventually ending with a metaphorical concept. The steps are easy to handle, superficially. But points of uncertainties arise: the expression may evoke at once more than one source domain, a situation which would call for different endings for the same linguistic expression.

Again, when specific source and target domains are in question, still points of difficulty come to the surface readily. No specific category of

features (such as that of shape, or function for instance) is summoned to be present in the last two steps of the approach in whole. The requirement of a full systematic interpretation should be accomplished by calling for all those features that might be common to both domains. And therefore, it was Steen himself who required the process to be in control. Consequently, the interpretation is sometimes felt to be at loss, a case which could only be delimited by the addition, for instance, of more sub-steps designed for avoiding redundancy of application to more than one source domain.

Furthermore, it has to be made obvious how context would help control the interpretation of a concept. Without such a context-harness, the interpretation would be rather messy and ambiguous: two or more directions would be ahead of one's thinking.

Appendix I: Chronological order of the texts examined

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Speeches

1- A speech delivered at the Labour Party Conference on 2/10/2001, provided at: www.angelfire.com.
2- A speech delivered to Parliament on 4/10/2001, provided at: www.angelfire.com.
3- A speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on 11/11/2002, provided at: www.biogs.com.
4- A speech to the nation delivered on thursaday evening when British forces went into action in Iraq on 20/3/2003, provided at: www.bbbnews.com.
5- A speech to a joint meeting of the US Congress on 17/7/2003, provided at: www.cnn.com.
6- A speech from 10 Downing Street congratulating George W. Bush on his re-election on 3/11/2004, provided at: www.biogs.com.
7- A speech at Prime Minister's Mansion House on 15/11/2004, provided at: www.polemics.wordpress.com.
8- A speech on explosions in London on 7/7/2005, provided at: www.biogs.com.
9- A speech to Labour Party Conference on 27/9/2005, provided at: www.biogs.com.
10- A speech at George Town (The Moment for Reconciliation) on 27/5/2006, provided at: www.biogs.com.
11- A speech on Global Values on 1/2/2007, provided at: www.wordpress.com.

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Interviews

1- The Observer interview with Tony Blair on the war, on 14/10/2011, provided a: www.gaurdian.co.uk.
2- An interview on Middle East, Iran, Terrorism on 11/9/2008, provided at: www.cnn.com.

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Abstract

In the present paper a discussion is made of the identification and analysis of metaphors encountered in Toni Blair's speeches and interviews on terrorism post to the September-attacks by the adoption of the cognitive approach as is developed by Steen's (1999) procedure for developing conceptual metaphors out of linguistic expressions. The investigation involves such issues as the distinction between literal and metaphorical in identifying instances of linguistic metaphor, the traditional identification of tenor and vehicle in each linguistic metaphor, the arrival at conceptual metaphors out of linguistic ones, and, finally, giving a full explanatory account of each worked-out metaphor. The aim here is to pinpoint areas of easiness or uneasiness as to such working out of metaphors, i.e. to see to what extent this model of identification of conceptual metaphors is applicable.