

Turkey's strategic motives for Iraq after the changing of the political system in 2003

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Abstract. This research deals with aspects related to the strategic reasons of Turkey, which exploit the basic components of the power factors in Iraq and its objectives after 2003. This strategy is somewhat characterized by interest in the Middle East, especially Iraq, as well as the Turkish economy and the strategic and democratic interests in the region. The State has adopted a strategic doctrine that is embodied in the diagnosis of risks and the identification of ways of coping with them, as well as the choice of means to achieve them by providing an appropriate approach to behavior in normal circumstances and measuring the usefulness of this approach.

Therefore, Iraq remains important in its basic components, which determine the impact on the process of international reaction, political and economic, which is a catalyst for the strategies of neighboring countries to achieve their strategic ambitions, including Turkey in particular.

Turkey began after changing the political system in Iraq to seek to exploit these conditions to achieve its ambitions and goals set in its general strategy to achieve the interests of Great Turkey. The interest in all elements of Iraqi power became a target of the Turkish strategy to achieve its ambitions. The Iraqi politician who exploited him to

intervene in political affairs and exploit them to achieve their strategic interests.

ملخص البحث

يتناول هذا البحث الجوانب المتعلقة بالأسباب الاستراتيجية التركية التي تستغل المكونات الأساسية لعوامل القوة في العراق وأهدافها بعد عام 2003. وتتميز هذه الاستراتيجية إلى حد ما بالاهتمام بمنطقة الشرق الأوسط ، وخاصة العراق ، وكذلك بالاقتصاد التركي والمصالح الاستراتيجية والديمقراطية في المنطقة. فتبنت الدولة عقيدة إستراتيجية تجسدت في تشخيص المخاطر وتحديد طرق مواجهتها ، وكذلك اختيار الوسائل لتحقيقها من خلال توفير نهج مناسب للسلوك في الظروف العادية وقياس مدى فائدة هذا النهج . لذا يبقى العراق مهما في مكوناته الأساسية ، وهي العوامل التي تحدد التأثير على عملية رد الفعل الدولي والسياسي والاقتصادي ، وهو حافز لاستراتيجيات الدول المجاورة في تحقيق طموحاتها الاستراتيجية ومنها تركيا على وجه الخصوص.

فبدأت تركيا بعد تغيير النظام السياسي في العراق الى السعي في استغلال تلك الظروف لتحقيق طموحاتها واهدافها المرسومة ضمن استراتيجيتها العامة لتحقيق مصالح تركيا العظمى ، فبدأ الاهتمام بكل مقومات القوة العراقية واصبحت هدفاً للاستراتيجية التركية لتحقيق طموحاتها ، فأهتمت باستغلال الموقع الجغرافي والجذور التاريخية المشتركة والفوضى في تغيير النظام السياسي العراقي الذي استغلته في التدخل في الشؤون السياسية واستغلالها لتحقيق مصالحها الاستراتيجية.

Importance of research

The importance of research is to know the variables affecting the Turkish strategy which contributed to stimulate their aspirations and interests to achieve their goals and objectives through the exploitation of those circumstances and the basic elements of the sources of Iraq from the other hand the Turkish decision-maker looked to exploit the circumstances of Iraq after the political change in 2003 to exploit the Turkish economic and military capabilities and all the sources of its power in the recruitment

and serve interests by diagnosing the weaknesses of Iraq after the change of the political system in 2003.

the problem

There is a problem of uncertainty as to the strategic dynamics of Turkey towards Iraq and the driving drivers of Turkish political behavior after the political system changed after 2003

From this problem we ask a set of questions:

-1 What are the dynamics of the Turkish strategy towards Iraq after 2003 ?

-2 What is the status of the geographical variable in the Turkish strategy towards Iraq?

-3 Has the turbulent political process contributed to motivating the Turkish decision-maker to intervene in the affairs of Iraq ?

-4 Has the ethnic and national variable been used in the Turkish strategy to achieve its objectives and interests ?

Hypothesis

The Turkish decision maker has several incentives through which he seeks to employ all the political variables and Economic, ethnic and geopolitical factors as the main drivers of the Turkish strategy towards Iraq after 2003.

Introduction:

Every state builds strategies from a number of alternatives and choices, but their crucial choice and the final decision depend on the adopted strategic doctrine and on the nature of the goals that deal with it. Turkey has adopted an independent policy during the events that preceded the occupation of Iraq by the United States of America, an independent policy although their linked by military strategy, as well as the two parties worked together to abide by the necessities of the partnership agreement in addition to their link within the NATO. Although turkey's long-time membership in the NATO, but it has developed its relations with the Arab countries for its economic interests and its correlation with the religious heritage as it adopted part of its decision independency

relating to the religious heritage such as its stand in the nonparticipating in the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

But, after the risk of the Iraqi political as a result of the occupation and the controlling of the US on the events in Iraq, Turkey endeavored to follow a new policy characterizes by the political, economic and military cooperation in order to achieve its interests and purposes. Throughout the past decade, Turkey became more vital regional activist and a large part of this vitality focused on the Middle East not as a main choice in the directions of the Turkish political policy but likely as response to the realized security challenges and the economic need and also the future regional role, as well as the Turkish decision makers see that the middle east is a region for gaining expected opportunities an achieving its strategic motivations through the new political policy of the Development and Al-Adalh Party as it came to treat the security issues and the challenges that surround its national interests.

whether these challenges are inside Turkey; such as the Kurds; or those resulted from the nature of the problems in the region which, by their results, the cast shadows on the Turkey's interests and its political future as the disputes among the neighboring countries as well as the growing of the separation tendencies of national nature that affect its security and national stability.

Therefore, the Turkey's strategy featured, to some extent, towards the Middle East region, especially towards Iraq, by the Turkish self motivations and outcomes to crystallize its aims and interests in the region.

Every state when makes its strategy have number of alternatives and choices to make that strategy, but its crucial choice and the final decision depend on its adopted strategic doctrine and the nature of the goals that deals with. The role of this doctrine embodied in the diagnosing the whole risks and defining the techniques to face them as well as choosing the instrument to achieve them by providing the suitable approach to conduct in the normal conditions and measuring the benefit

range of this doctrine through studying the events and their expectations and the range of the sufficient and active readiness to fulfill their aims , and determining the possible reaction factors to build the strategic track towards the factors of the opposite power and hire them to serve the state's strategic doctrine and achieving its goals as well.

The importance of Iraq is in its essential constituents, which define the nature of the changeable circumstances that affect the process of the international, political and economic reaction and others through make it as an incentive for the motivations of the neighboring countries in achieving their strategic ambitions.

Through the development of the Strategy concept from the military to the geopolitical, economic and political aspect, Iraq acquires its significance from these aspects, which rarely are existed in one country. But this significance remains worthless without the sufficient harnessing to support the state's policy and strategic ambition. Although, the changes after 2003 and the new orientation for the Iraqi state, but it did not use sufficiently all the state's important constituents to maintain it and to limit the motivations of the other countries including the neighboring geographical countries, including Turkey, that exploited the changes and their consequences as a base for their interventions and endeavoring to achieve their ambitions through exploit and use the power factors for their self directions.

As Iraq has large and essential constituents of power factors, from one side, and the events consequences, from another side, to be as incentive for the motivations of the Turkish decision maker to exploit and employ them for his strategic interest, which are the Iraq's geographical location, Iraqi power factors and the Kurdish issue and its effects on the Turkish strategic thinking to be one of the important motives towards Iraq as well as the motives of the historical and ethnic issues as issues of Kirkuk and Mosul, in addition to Iraq's important economic aspect and the high need to take care of it and to react with it as it has effective force; such as the oil; and a factor of exploitation for the destructed infrastructure in all the Iraqi

sectors following 2003, which constituted an active factor for the Turkish motives to exploit and use it to serve its future goals, moreover, the political stand after the events of 2003 and its large influence in determining the nature of the political relation with Turkey that has made the decision maker rushes to be interested in it and react with it.

The first topic : *Geographical Location and Iraqi Power Factors*

The power and significance of the state emerge from two sides, the first side is out of the human will, which relates to geography, wealth and the natural sources. The second side is made by human being, which relates to the economics, politics and the military capabilities. As geography studies the earth as it is the home of the human being, hence it studies the reaction with human beings and the way which it conduct to be supporter or hinder to the other power factor of his made⁽¹⁾. This make us understand that the geography is a factor of the state's power factors, and this power established on the base of fundamentals fed the geographical factor with the significance, which in its turn reflected on the strategic significance of the state to Iraq as geographic description for it and as analyzing the factors of its geographic power that give it the importance.

Iraq is situated in the south-west of Asia in the area comprising the Arabian Peninsula, which is the midpoint of three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa. The location is a constant factor of the geography, but its importance is changing, either to lose its importance or acquired a new importance according to the ongoing events⁽²⁾.

In terms of the location of Iraq for neighboring countries, the strategic importance of Iraq, which gave it this location, stems from two points, first, the nature of the relation with the neighboring countries, and second, the nature and sensitivity of the region. For the first factor, Iraq lies between two circles, the first is the direct neighborhood countries, namely Iran, Syria,

¹²⁻ Mohammed Azhar Saeed Al-Samak, *Gwopolitics, Basics and Applications*, Directorate of Dar Al-Kutub for Printing and Publishing, Iraq, 1988, P. 69.

²³⁻ Taha Al-Hashimi, *Geography of Iraq*, Al-Kashaf Press, Beirut, 2nd Edition, 1939, P. 4.

Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as Iraq is the center of these States, the Second is the regional circle, which represents the rest of the Gulf States and Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen⁽³⁾. The importance that reflected on the political side, is that Iraq could for a period of time to be a balance factor in the region between countries diverse in their force within political competition between the two circles and even among the parties of the same circle. Iraq had played the role of the barrier to the expansion of states at the expense of others, for example, the difference factor between the Arab Gulf states and Iran, gave Iraq; in terms of his location; an advantage in imposing itself, since it is in contact with Iran as the driving force in the region, so, Iraq was a counterbalance to the region⁽⁴⁾. In terms of the second point, the sensitivity of the region was because of the attitudes and political ambitions for the countries of the region, particularly that the location of Iraq its neighborhood to countries with different nationalities, making the existing policy, whether to the Arab countries or non-Arab based on the basis of no confidence, and thus the conflict been going on in this area about the interests of those States and other countries outside the region.

In respect of the marine location, it helps to determine the nature of the interests of the State and the economic and political situations. The states that overlook the seas or bays, their importance are based on the importance of the coast of a state, as not all of the seas or bays are of equal importance. But for Iraq, despite being a semi-confined, but its view of the Arabian Gulf has earned strategic importance stems from the importance of the Arabian Gulf which has geo-strategic advantages, such as having the largest reserves of oil in it, the communication link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the nature of the states littoral and near of it, and their political,

³⁴- Mustafa Ulwi, *The Strategic Position of Iraq, Overall Strength of Iraq in the Light of Current Development*.

⁴- Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud, *Strategic Competition Between Iraq and Iran in the Region*, *International. Policy Journal*, No. 136, 1999, Pp. 118-119.

economic and military activities, which added special importance to the Arabian Gulf in the International Strategies⁽⁵⁾. Moreover, Iraq has won such importance stemming from the importance of the Arabian Gulf. Iraq also benefited from its commercial ports, which are main source of import, as well as major center for export of oil and Iraqi raw materials⁽⁶⁾.

Iraqi Economy and Turkish Strategic Motives

Torkut Ozal, the former Turkish Prime Minister, and many Turkish politicians emphasized that (the Turkey's openness to the Arab countries at this time came to purely economic motives, because the Arab countries is primarily a consumer market). It is clear that Turkey launched in its orientations towards the Arab region and Iraq in particular for many reasons, including, that the Arab region represents a large market could export its food, consumptive and industrial products, as well as the dynamic of the region in terms of its oil resources and the abundance of financial returns, which will enable Turkey to hold numbers of diverse projects and investments, particularly reconstruction projects in Iraq that achieve for Turkey; under the government's plans of the Al-Adalh and Development Party; an opportunity to develop its economy that is growing from inflation and unemployment and economic stagnation, which resulted in social and political pressures as well as to the Turkey's inadequacy of mineral resources, especially the lack of oil, which led Turkey to import them and Iraq is a vital part of that for its importance in the Turkish strategic realization because Iraq provides many factors enables Turkey to achieve its economic interests.

The Turkish economy suffering from the energy crisis, which depends on 84% of the oil entering from abroad⁽⁷⁾. And any one who is familiar with the details of the economic cooperation between Turkey and Arab countries including Iraq,

⁵ - Sabah Mahmoud, *the Goo-politic Conflict in the Arabian Gulf*, Al-Saadoun Press, Baghdad, 1986, Pp. 9-11.

⁶ - Dr. Taha Al-Hashimi, *Op.cit*, Pp. 29-31.

⁷ - D. Fadhil Al-Chalabi, *Arab-Turkish Dialogue*, Al-Muntada Journal, Ref. 128, Amman. Jordan.

will see that turkey tries to exceed one of its most important economic crisis, namely getting the oil, and is seeking to take advantage of the Arab oil which is characterized by many advantages. Therefore, the officials in Turkey attempt to make the term "Water State" is equal to the term "Oil State" and they proposed and planned to swap water with oil as well as marketing the water and make it a commodity which they exchange with the rest of the Arab countries and the neighboring countries, including Iraq, the matter which will result in economic and political influences at the same time.

In addition, Iraq has huge wealth and oil is first of them, which is about (11%) of the total world's oil reserves, and this rate is increasing due to due to suspension of drilling for oil since 1991. as well as, Iraq's oil reserve alone represents fourfold of the American oil reserve, furthermore the Iraqi oil is, in accordance with the technical standards, the best oil types in the world and the average of its production cost is the lower in the world which it between (1-2) Dollars, in addition, the rate of the Iraqi oil production to the oil reserve is the lowest rate in the world which reflects the huge potential abilities for this oil which regards source for production and export to the consumption markets that are increasingly asking for oil. Moreover, Iraq's oil reserve is (113) billion barrels, which makes Iraq the second state after Saudi Arabia in terms of the oil reserves bulk. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates the Iraqi oil reserve at (220) billion barrels, which is equal to 10% of the world's total oil reserve, and these reserves made Iraq the focus of many countries, including Turkey, which began to compete with each others in order to ensure a stake in the Iraq's oil.

Turkey is one of the oil-poor countries in the middle east which indicates the weak point in the Turkish power factors. In general, Turkey imported the oil from other countries within the 1990's during the economic sanctions on Iraq which constituted huge financial burden on the Turkish budget, for example, we note that the Turkish oil bill in 2006 reached (29) billion dollars

and its consumption of gas reached (30) billion M³, which indicates that turkey imports all its needs of oil and gas.

Of all, it is clear that oil is a top priority for Turkey to achieve its strategic goals through the transition to developing economy and changing the economic structure by investing all the potential opportunities in the Arab region and particularly Iraq after 2003 and the relating changes in the infrastructures and the imbalance in the economic structure in Iraq which will be a real motive for the Turkey's strategic attention.

Therefore, in the Turkish strategic doctrine, Iraq has large importance through providing Turkey with oil in addition to minimize the financial burden due to importing the oil from countries far away from Turkey.

The states attempt to acquire markets, because in the disadvantage of the price competition, their share in the international trade will increase and this is regards the base of their active and effective survival in the competition with the other countries. This is mean, that the strength of the state is measured through the market position besides the technological advance. So, the turkey's Endeavour to gain position in the European and Arab markets, especially in Iraq after the occupation, is a clear goal for its motives to back up its competitive position and also a strategic demand for the Turkish decision makers. Therefore, the Iraqi markets became an important part in the Turkish future realization, because Iraq's market is large and consumptive one.

Therefore, we can say, that Iraq represents an important state to the turkey's economy, especially if we know that the trade bulk before 1990 represented half of the trade bulk with all the Arab countries, because Iraq has the first grade to the relative importance of the Turkish imports with the Arab countries, which was between (43.4%) and (33.8%) within the period 1981- 1984. this rate increased to its higher level by (51.5%), but

it decreased during the war in 1991 and then during the economic sanctions on Iraq⁽⁸⁾.

But, after the collapse of the political regime in Iraq after 2003 as a result of the American occupation which issued a resolution to lift the economic sanctions on Iraq, in addition to the large need of the Iraqis markets, turkey returned again to play a significant economic role in Iraq.

The devastation of the Iraq's infrastructures after the war in 2003 and the disability of its economy in recover the needs of markets, in addition to the geographical nearness of the Iraqi's market to turkey which attempted to give attention to these markets through its many goals as:

1. Turkey's willingness to provide the Iraqi markets with the industrial commodities and the production technologies as wells to encourage the Turkish agricultural exports as a result of Iraqi's disability to achieve the self-sufficiency of foods in future. In addition to the turkey's ambition to be the food basket for the region after the completion of its giant agricultural and water projects⁽⁹⁾.
2. Turkey is try to be bridge to transport the European goods to Iraq and the Arab gulf or a commercial center to re-exporting the European products, which leads to a type of exchangeable link between the Turkish imports from the European union and its exports to the Arab region and vise versa.
3. The real lacks in the economic supports and financial loans to turkey from the western countries and the international finance institutions, in addition the European group imposed, since the mid seventies of the last century, big limits on its markets to face the Turkish agricultural exports for technical considerations and

⁸ - Rawaa Zaki Al-Taweel, *Turkey's Trade between Europe and the Arab Homeland*, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Ref. 113, 2004, P. 153.

⁹ - Abduljabar Abed Mustafa, *International Changes and the Future Horizons to the Arab- Turkish Relations*, Turkish Studies Center, University of Mosul, 1995, P. 168.

proprietary commercial reasons directed basically to the interest of the group of the European states group⁽¹⁰⁾. Moreover, if the subject of the economic supports from the western countries link to the political aspect, so, this direction is not exist with Iraq or the Arab Gulf countries, therefore, Turkey has attempt to strengthen its relations with the Arab countries and to push towards employing all the opportunities that serve the Turkish economy.

4. From the Turkey's view, the Iraqi markets are a suitable place for the Turkish exporting industries, because these markets are near and high consumptive as well as they depend on the import for the non-integration of the Iraqi economic infrastructures since 2003 till now and they are enlarging due to the oil prosperity.

5. Turkey is attempt, through activation its foreign trade with Iraq, to find additional entry point across the Arab Gulf countries enhancing its economical programs, namely, the amortization of loans and inflation, deficit in the trade balance and unemployment, which the Erdogan's government succeeded in recover the failures of the Turkish economy through those programs.

6. Turkey endeavors to go out of the traditional to the modern economy based on industry, so, the important industry requirements are in Iraq by its oil and markets.

The basic point to the direct foreign investment is its roll in technology transition and skills development. then, the efforts of the growing countries that encouraging the investment flow aiming at benefit from the technology and administrative knowledge of the foreign companies⁽¹¹⁾. the Iraqi economy is distinguished by the lowness of technical and administrative

¹⁰ - Mani' Habash & Abduljabbar Aboud, Turkish Economic Direction, The Economist, Ref. 06, Gulf Studies Center, University of Basra, 1993, P. 6.

¹¹ - Omar Al-Beili, Direct Role of the Foreign Private Investment in Supporting the Technology Ability for Arab Countries, Arabic Affairs Magazine, Ref. 79, none, 1994, P. 126.

levels in drawing and carrying out the development policies, which affected the bureaucracy occurrence and flubbing the administrative cadre as well as to the weakness of the productive level. So, the technology can be entered to Iraq by the investment that increasing the skills and efficiency of the labor force throw the contact with the foreign companies ,this matter will lift the prosperity of the Iraqi citizens and its turn on the development of the eternal commercial exchange. As the foreign investment helps improving the production quality and interring new products, which will motivate the local markets towards the growth which motivating the national investment for the competition⁽¹²⁾. Moreover, the Iraqi economy greatly depended on the foreign treaty, which is more affected by the international changes. In addition, if the local markets prospered, they will encourage additional investors to come to Iraq with there capitals⁽¹³⁾.

For the direct foreign investment, it has big benefits to the Iraqi economy, lift the level of the labor force and enhance the technological innovation operation which lift the production rate and the competition among the local companies⁽¹⁴⁾. As well as speeding the skills and expertise of the foreign companies .the foreign investment ,throw its characteristics⁽¹⁵⁾,can participate in recovering the Iraqi economy which is depend on the oil in gaining financial surplus to develop the other sectors that make the economy subject to the changing in oil prices, as well as to the increasing the production and grow the levels of the economy especially in the agriculture and industrial economy which make it an important throw the lack of the agricultural sector to its

¹²- Global Investment Report, Non-National Companies and the Market Structure and Competition Policy, INUNCTAD, U. N., New York, 1996, Pp. 53-55.

¹³- Atif Sabri, *Ibid.*, Pp. 47-48.

¹⁴- William M. Lberg, Foreign Direct Investment and Development Balancing costs and Benefits, INUNCTAD-International Monetary and Financial Issuer Ror the 1990s, volune XI, U. N. Geneva-Newyork, 1999: P. 100.

¹⁵- Hanaa Abdulghafar, Direct Foreign Investment and the International trade-(China as example)-, Beit Al-Hikmah, Baghdad, 2002, P. 255.

features to export some products and the rezone is the weakness of the finance resource.

The second topic :Historical and Ethnic Motives in Turkish Strategy towards Iraq

First : Historical Motives to Mosul Issue

The looking forward and the adherence with it, is one of the strategic motives priorities to the Turkish decision makers in the behavior of the Turkish state towards the neighboring Arab countries and Iraq in particular. So, since the establishment of the modern Turkish state after the world war I, that issue became serious and important problem facing Iraq and Syria as it is a pressure point always ready whenever turkey wants, or its placing be subject to the regional and international conditions, as well as it constitutes a threat from a non-Arab state. this is what we see as regards the issue of Mosul, which started after collapse of the Ottoman Empire and establishing the modern Turkish state as well as the establishment of the Iraqi kingdom under the British mandate on the wake of the war which ended by signing the Mortdos Truce on the 30th of October 1918⁽¹⁶⁾, as the allies states dictated their conditions on the collapsed state to evacuate all of the strategic points in the region such as the ports and some cities in Iraq, Syria and North Africa. Indeed, the allies intervened in all the important areas and signed agreements, first of them was Sykes-Picot Agreement, which signed by the allies' representatives to divide the areas of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, these areas were divided as follows: whereas France took Syria and south of Anatolia including Mosul, while Jordan and Palestine plus Baghdad and Basra gone to Britain. But, when these agreements approved, Britain was thinking to make France as a barrier between the Russian and British empires the latter agreed to give Mosul to France, but the break out of the Bolshevik revolution and the withdraw of Russia from the affairs of the Middle East made Britain controlling to compose alone

¹⁶- Dr. Fadhil Hussein, *Mosul Problem-Study in the Iraqi-British-Turkish Diplomacy*, Baghdad, Ashbilia Press, 1997, p.2.

the east empire a matter that gave Mosul great attention as a result of the exploration of oil.

Thus, the allies with their great efforts tried to singe agreement with the modern turkey responding to the requirements of new stage, which is the modifying the northern borders line of Mosul and make it pass south Amadiya district. Then, the treaty of Lausanne had been signed,1923, between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey, and that some of points in the treaty stipulated to solve part of the issue of Mosul. But, the conference did not defined the belonging of this city although the direct negotiations between the foreign affairs ministers of Britain (Kozon) and Turkey (Esmat Inonu) which led to put that issue before the conferrers committee to give the two parties an opportunity to express their view points. Thus, the Turkish delegation representative (Esmat Bash) said “If we failed in this negotiation, then we directly offer the problem on the specialized regional committee of the League of Nations. Moreover, Turkey was concerned of losing the city of dispute; Mosul; which has geostrategic importance in addition to its fertile soil that rich in oil and agricultural features as well as it constitutes a bridge to control the Kurdistan region, for that, Turkey insisted on its view point and its attempt to control Mosul. Britain as well, give its practical deep attention to Mosul in the light of Turkey’s bad economic conditions, and its realization of the necessity to expand its controlling areas to include the Kurdistan region. In the other side, that the searching for a solution to the issue of Mosul was for Britain Interests because the British minister of foreign affairs was the main shareholder in the Turkish Company of Petroleum (TCP), which was the investor company in Mosul’s oil fields, as he attempted to recover this city to Iraq which was under the mandate of his government.⁽¹⁷⁾

Finally, the committee of the league of Nations concluded that “all the territories of Mosul which lies on the Brussels Line

¹⁷ - Jarjees Hassan, *Turkey in the American Strategy After the Overthrow of the Shah*, University of Mosul, 1990, P. 88.

have geographical features and can be added to Iraq, as well as if the national constituents are taken into consideration, then they must be as the critical factor to establish an independent Kurdish state". But, the Turkish government rejected such result, hence, the issue finally was referred to the International Court of Justice in Hague which decided in one consent to fix the borders to ensure the national sovereignty, but Turkey also rejected the court's decision, the , as a result, the court cancelled the tri-member committee headed by (a Swedish) to fix the Brussels Line formally⁽¹⁸⁾.

The tri-talks were held by England, Iraq and Turkey on July 1926. In this treaty, Turkey recognized of the borders line drawn by the League of Nations on December 1925, as well as, Turkey agreed to receive 10% of the Mosul's oil revenues for 25 years. So, the problem had been resolved in this way by the consent of all the disputed parties.

From all the above mentioned, we are see clear explanation about the Turkish goals since the international dispute on Mosul in 1923 till the present and at deferent levels ⁽¹⁹⁾, which is renewing the old pretensions to add Mosul and Kirkuk to the Turkish Territories.

So, the year 1990 was a standard to demonstrate clearly the Turkish goals which led to confused tension in the Iraqi-Turkish relations till the present time ⁽²⁰⁾. In general, these tensions are about the following points ⁽²¹⁾:

- 1- The Turkish Triangle Region is one of the distinguished regional factors in respect of the American aggression on Iraq.

¹⁸- Jarjees Hassan, *Turkey in the American Strategy After the Overthrow of the Shah*, *Ibid.*, P. 88.

¹⁹- Dr. Abduljabar Abd Mustafa: *Regional Turkish Policy and its Reflections on the Iraqi National Security*, *Strategic Studies Magazine*, Baghdad, Ref. 4 & 5, 1988, P. 7.

²⁰- (Ansar): *Ankara stresses "that it has historical interests in the north of Iraq"*- quoted from *Babel New paper*, Baghdad, Ref. 3433, 24 August, 2002, P. 8.

²¹- Ibrahim Khaleel Ahmed: *Military Intervention o f Turkey in the North of Iraq-its Goals- Stands of the States of it*, *Rafidain Magazine*, Mosul, Ref. 27, 1988, P. 19.

2- Using the minority subject on the level of the international political systems to obtain political and strategic acquisitions as part of the Turkish pressure on Iraq.

3- Dedicating and supporting the division of Iraq to establish a buffer security region.

4- Stressing the historical allegations which flashed back to the events of the world war I.

Second : Turkey and the Intervention in the North of Iraq:

The Turkish prime minister; Turkut Ozal; stressed that “the Turkish lands are enough, and we are not seeking for ventures, as that will make us lose our economic interests there”, he replying on the allegations of the Turkish newspapers of that turkey has intentions and plans to move militarily towards north of Iraq and occupy it in order to not fall totally in the hands of the Iraqi Kurds and the Iranian forces who gained some victories in March 1988 over the Iraqi forces ⁽²²⁾, and controlled (1400 Km.) of the Kurdistan region, about (120 Km.) from Kirkuk⁽²³⁾. Moreover, the news about the probability of Turkish moving towards north of Iraq had repeated in a less degree, as well as the Turkish formal denial of these news also repeated with keenness of turkey on the safety and integrity of the Iraqi territories, when Turkut Ozal stressed the denial of the trueness of these news in 01/04/1988, saying “Turkey has no intentions to involve in any way in the dispute between Iraq and Iran, and these news are absolutely not true because the turkey’s territories are enough, as well as we do not seek on adventures because this will make us lose our economic interests there, then thrown turkey in such adventure will be worse from losing these interests”. Meanwhile, the security and secret meetings were held continuously, such as the meeting; in (Eye Braga Airport) at the end of 1980; between

²²- Nabeel Mohammed Saleem: *Iraqi- Turkish Relations*, Op.cit., P. 37; Compare with Abdulkareem Ali Jaber: *Turkish Press and the positions towards Iraq during Umm Al-Ma’arik*; unpublished M.A. Thesis in Information, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1992, Pp. 103-104.

²³- Jalal Abdullah Mo’awadh: *Turkey and the Arab National Security*, Op.cit., P. 100; See also: Jalal Abdullah Mo’awadh: *Decision Making in Turkey*, Op.cit., P. 58.

(William Tafft), National Security adviser, during his visit to turkey, and the Turkish National Security minister (Ibrahim Turk) by the presence of the American ambassador to Ankara. That matter was cleared through the Turkish press statements which mentioned that (William Tafft) was carrying plan to occupy Kirkuk and Mosul⁽²⁴⁾. In addition, the International and Herald Tribune Magazines printed the Turkish map included Kirkuk and Mosul, as well as some of the Torranic Turkish levels printed new maps for Turkey also included Kirkuk and Mosul as part of the Turkish territories, even some of the Turkish Generals, such as Farouk Gossoon Turk, in an interview with Turkish magazine in March 1988, said “That America attempts to push turkey to occupy Kirkuk and Mosul for keeping its interests in the region and the Gulf, but turkey will pay expensively for such movement⁽²⁵⁾. And in first half of 1988, (Pal Hanz), one of the American intelligence officials, visited Turkey and made clear the Amerces attention of this matter when he mentioned “that Kirkuk's issue do not relate only to Turkey, but it is the issue of NATO, and Turkey must not move alone in this matter”⁽²⁶⁾.

Therefore, Turkey encouraged to intervene military in the north of Iraq attempting to achieve its dream by American support, but after August 1991, the Turkish government abandoned its obligations to Iraq and announced its totally support to the western only against Iraq launching from the Turkish dream of regaining what the Kamalism loose and renewing the old allegations of that Mosul is part of the Turkish homeland according to the Turkish national convention in 1920⁽²⁷⁾.

Therefore, Turkish did not wait to expose its future projects about the old designs, and starting types of threats from line to

²⁴- Jarjees Hassan: Turkey in the American Strategic after the Fall of Shah, Op.cit., P.8.

²⁵- Ibid., P. 108.

²⁶- Iranian News paper of “Kihan”, 25/05/1988.

²⁷- Raad Abduljaleel, National Unity and the Minority Problem in the Third world, Op.cit., p. 19.

time, to cut off this city from Iraq and add it to the Turkish state in the likeness of the Syrian territory of Eskandarona; currently Hatai; so, the problem of Mosul is a new serious crisis occurred in the middle east on the wake of the world war I.

The Turks had showed their motives to control the region of Mosul-Kirkuk although their acceptance the resolution of the Nations League in 1926 which stipulated to keep this region with the orders of Iraq, and the events proved that they did not forget the subject and waiting for the opportunity to find the instrument that help them to achieve their pretentions as well as to ruin their relations with Iraq and its higher national interests. perhaps, the recent developments in this respect is the promises of the former Turkish president, Suleiman Demirel, in the consideration of that "the region of Mosul-Kirkuk is still as a property of turkey and the security necessity depends on re-defining the borders with Iraq⁽²⁸⁾ by declared pretext, to pursuit the PKK members up to Iraqi strategic regions, namely, Mosul and Kirkuk, which means the turkeys practical Endeavour to revive and through using the negativity of the international community towards repeated aggressions on the north of Iraq, which will give it legal right to continuo its military operations in expandable size and transferable goal from the purchasing operations into new geopolitics fact within the Iraqis borders. In another world, these aggression warn the probability of Turkish moving if finds, regional and international suitable conditions in future to cut off the region of Mosul-Kirkuk which rich in oil and contains the Turkmen minority, without much caring of the consequences and potential reaction to the movement in the likeness of what it made during its intrusion north of Cyprus in 1974. the political Turkish behavior reflects against Iraq by series of positions and acts of crossing and contrary not only with the correct march of what should be the Iraqi-Turkish relation, but also with the defined fundamentals of the Turkish foreign policy which

²⁸- Abdullah Moawadh, *Decision Making in Turkey*, Op.cit., P. 182.

established on the base of the six principles of the Turkish leader (Mustafa Ataturk, at the beginning of 1920s⁽²⁹⁾).

This trueness was admitted by the Turkish professor (Arseen Keijo Oglo); in University of Biosphere–Istanbul; verifying that through the development in 1990s as he said "That the recent development forced turkey to decline from some its principles, first of all the Turkish involvement in north of Iraq which is a violation of one of its principles of foreign policy that stipulated not to intervene in the internal policy of Arab countries, and second, to exploit its intervention in the north of Iraq to achieve its strategic goals represented by thy historical designs, namely, Mosul and Kirkuk".

Therefore, we can draw the Turkish strategy about that as follows⁽³⁰⁾:

1. To intervene in the pretext to support on of the Kurdish group in the north of Iraq by mobilizing the army of the Iraqi borders as a clear signal to invade the north of Iraq and achieving its strategic goal of cut off Mosul and Kirkuk.
2. The military leadership put a strategy through preparing the army to high in training operations threat, which defined its axis in order to achieve its goal easily.
3. Prepare an operations theatre in terms of roads building ,bridges erections and define the axis and ways to use them in any invasion operation to add and occupy the north of Iraq⁽³¹⁾.
4. To review the military force in front of the Kurdish group to show them the necessity to follow in the direction of the Turkish policy and do not opposite it.

²⁹- Jalal Younis Al-Jaleel, *Turkish National Security Council and the Political Decision*, Afaq Arabia Journal, Baghdad, Ministry of Culture and Information, Dar Ashou'oun Athqafiyah, Ref. 1 & 2, 1999, P. 34.

³⁰- *Strategic Estimations: the Kurds and their Role in Division Scheme*, Cairo, Addar AlArabiyah for Studies and Publication, Ref. 11, 1995, P. 10.

³¹- Saleh Ahmed Khalaf: *the Intervention in the North of Iraq- the Goals and Dimentions*, Op.cit., P. 101.

5. Margining militarily the role of Kurdistan labor party (PKK) in the north of Iraq and minimize its threat on the Turkish security in the north of Iraq⁽³²⁾.

6. Plans of the Turkish institution to occupy north of Iraq in order to occupy the oil sources in Kirkuk and Mosul.

Moreover, the Turkish newspaper of Huriyat, mentioned on 04/02/1991 during the aggression on Iraq, that "Ozal's Confederal Map according to the Turkish imagine is basically contains three regions of equal right, namely, Arabic – Turkish – Turkmens.

The Kurdish region contains Sulaimaniyah and Erbil, and the Turkish regain includes Kirkuk and Mosul, while the Arabic region has the rest of Iraq⁽³³⁾.

Since, there is conformity between the American and Turkish strategies do not prevent such that, as their dividing strategies restrict to grasp the rich of oil north region whether directly or indirectly by establishing minor state of Turkmens ,which their plan described as the north Cyprus model⁽³⁴⁾.

Whereas the announced goal for any military operation is allegations of emancipation of the Iraqi Turkmens from the hands of states under the justifications of the real purpose is dividing Iraq and make a new region contains oil wealth, and, in the same time, to blow fatally the Kurdish antinomy project before it be strong and became as a postulate. So, the Kurdish movement is the spearhead of the imperial–Zionist invasion after the Turkish–Israeli alliance in respect of the middle east region, as well as it is regarded on essential factor in the American military strategy,

³²- Ibid., P. 101, for more details,, See: Ouni Abdulrahman Al-Sab'awi: the Influence of the Kurdish Issue on the Iraqi-Turkish Relations, book of Khalil Ali Murad & Others, the Kurdish Issue and its Influence on the Neighbor Countries, Turkish Studies Center, University of Mosul, 1994, P. 75.

³³-Strategic Estimations: Turkish-American Conspiracy for Dividing of Iraq, Cairo, Addar AlArabiyah for Studies and Publication, Ref. 124 & 125, 2000, Pp. 63-64.

³⁴- Strategic Estimations: Turkish-American Conspiracy for Dividing of Iraq, Ibid., P. 43.

and showing the turkeys expanding designs towards Iraq and aiming at control the two oil cities ,Mosul and Kirkuk⁽³⁵⁾.

Consequently, we see that Turkish strategy built its motives on implied aviaries based on historical allegations about the belonging of Mosul and the attempts of abiding by the projects of imposing the guardianship on the Iraqi Turkmen. As we see that the Turkish officials demonstrate themselves not abiding by this allegations but in the same time they over looking and encouraging these projects in the north of Iraq as it uses this subject from time to time sometimes through the journal interviews and sometimes through the officials Toranic statements after the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

Third : Issue of Kirkuk

Kirkuk is known as it is a city of multi ethnic regions and nationalities, Kurdish, Arabic, Turkmens and Chaldeans, and the information called (Minor Iraq). After 2003, Kirkuk became the polarization center to the national and international aspirations and the core for internal political conflict as well as an external ambition in the strategy of the neighboring countries including turkey through different allegations as part of the Turkish state safety through it became accepting the thought of independent Kurdish entity in the north of Iraq, but it can not accept the existent of independent Kurdish state dominating the energy sources, adding Kirkuk because turkey regards Kirkuk part of its historical heritage was from it after the world war 1and the collapse of the ottoman empire. Moreover, the Kurds insistence to add Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region is a source of great concern for turkey, where the Kurds politician insist on that through their repeated statements and political stands towards the government in Baghdad, whereas, Masoud Barazani during his visit to Ankara mentioned that (“if any one, any regime or any system wants to continuo The Arabization or suppressing against the people of Kirkuk, then we will defend and light for their

³⁵- Jarjees Hassan: Turkey in the American Strategic after the Fall of Shah, Ibid., P. 116.

rights”, and he added “our stand is that Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan but it is not Iraqi city, and the encouraging of coexistence and brotherhood must be priority forever and we work in this way, as well as that Kirkuk is the heart of the Kurdish identity and we relate it to the end ,now we depend on the negotiation and if the installed Arabs did not leave the city, then we will drive them away by force)⁽³⁶⁾.

In addition, the prime minister, Erdogan, said that "Kirkuk is a city in which all the ethnicities can inhabit there, and we with the unity of the Iraq's territories but against any ethnic group plans to dominate the other ethnic group"⁽³⁷⁾.

Turkey has used the Turkmens as main intervention pretext to protect its vital interests in the north of Iraq exploiting the anger and anxiety of the Turkmens from the Kurdish invasion to excite the leavings inside turkey which support the military intervention.

Further more, turkey started its attention about the Turkmen issue ten years ago after the civil war in Kurdistan, and this attention took ideological range for the right forces in the country, and this dos not mean that turkeys attention is artificial, but it was used, and the Turks kept silent about the Turkmens during Saddam’s regime and the Arabization period, as they did not take any distinguished action, but today, the matter has respond to the Turkish people and there is real pressure for this. moreover, the Turkmen front was the main instrument in the turkeys hand to open the Turkmen file and intervене through it, as it is an organization was established by the Turkish Security Systems in the mid of 1990s with finance of the Turkish government. The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)^(*) attempted to gather the Turkmens under one roof through expressing their

³⁶- Translated by: Creiz Group from French, Article of Oliver Weber, 23 Dec., 2004.

³⁷³⁷- Turkish news 22 October, 2002

³⁸- Translated by: Creiz Group from French, Article of Oliver Weber, 23 Dec., 2004.

[®] The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) established on May 1995, and Transformed to an Alliance, during the International Turkmen Conference in Erbil on October 2002, which included four Turkmen parties, and its obtain the financial and moral support from the Turkish security systems till the present.

fears and calling for Turkey to intervene. As well as, the supporters of the ITF have an ambition to take position, at least as the Kurds position, in the frame of the Iraqi permanent government, whereas, if the Kurds gained a region, then the Turkmens also have to gain the same thing⁽³⁸⁾.

Even before the war, there was Turkish Military existence in the north of Iraq, as it was a source of much resentment from the two parties as regards the separation between the Turkish parties or following the Kurdistan Labour Party and stopping its activities. As well as, and during October 2003, a new opportunity appeared when the security situation in Iraq deteriorated and the United States endeavored with the neighbor countries to send troops to help the stability so the Turkish parliament agreed to send

(15.000) troops, but this suggestion angered the Kurdish leaders including the foreign affairs minister, Hoshiar Zibari, who accused Turkey of planning for occupy the oil fields in Mosul and Kirkuk⁽³⁹⁾.

The price for the existence of the Turkish special forces in the north of Iraq; which send to protect the Turkmens; is indeed aim to prevent establishing a Kurdish state and limits the activity of the PKK which is supports by the north of Iraq. The other side is that, the important changes in the Turkish international stance; in the light of the developed relations with the European Union and the middle east states; seem non-encouraging for wide Turkish military involvement unless the Iraqi government demands that; which is unlikeable to be; so, the resolution of sending troops to Iraq would anger the Turkey's ally, the U.S.A., through the resentment of the Kurdish leaders and also threatening the Turkey's growing relations with the European Union. Nevertheless, the Turkish troops and usage of Turkmens and Kirkuk's issue give justification to the threats of the military intervention, as well as achieving the strategic motives about the

³⁸- Interview of Creiz Group with Omet Ozdag, Ankara, 28 Oct., 2004.

³⁹- Economist Magazine, 09 Oct., 2004.

Kirkuk's issue and the endeavor to add it as the future capital to the Kurdish state which is rejected by Turkey for its fear of the Kurdish issue future and its influence on Turkey.

Fourth : Kurdish Issue and the Turkish Strategic Motive

The Kurdistan region had acquired special importance since the end of the world war I 1918 due to its geographical location among turkey, Iraq and Iran. And its importance increased after the world war II. While, the colonial forces used the Kurds for their interests in the region. So, the states; where the Kurds inhabit in; were adhered to that the Kurdish issue do not become as a threatening factor to their security and stability, although, all of these states agreed that the Kurdish areas are part of their national territory, but they differ in their view to the Kurds and in the way of dealing with them.

As regards Turkey, it worked to erase the national personality of Kurds, denied their rights and it called the Kurds in turkey as (Turks of mountain), as well as preventing them of using their Kurdish language ... etc., which are enough indicators to expose the real view to the Kurds in Turkey. So, turkey was and still looking in sensitivity at all the matters that give the Kurds any national rights in any country especially the neighboring countries.

The Kurdish problem was one of incurable problems to the regime in turkey. The historic root for the problem as it is accompanied the modern history of turkey and the suppression of the regime to the demand of Kurdish nationality by the military force, has complicated the problem and finishing the capability of polarizing of national unity in the country through the endeavor of the Turkish regime to maintain the political and geographical unity of turkey.

The Turkish regime could till now and by force, resisted the Kurdish movements demanding for separation, especially the PKK. Moreover, the Turkish Kurds still influence by the situations of Iraqi Kurds especially after the declaration of the autonomy law for Kurdistan of Iraq in 1970, as there was clear increasing in the activity of the Turkish Kurds led to including

three territories of the Kurdish inhabitants majority out of 11 territories governed by the marshal law on 26 April 1971 after the military coup in turkey in march 1971. The same thing happened when the marshal law announced in April 1979, as included 13 territories, contained 11 territories in east of turkey where the Kurdish majority⁽⁴⁰⁾.

Yet, the western ally hostile on Iraq in 1991, which followed by the intervention in the north of Iraq under the pretext of establishing a security zone for the Kurds, had clear reflection on the Turkish Kurds activity especially as regards the operations of the Kurdistan Labour Party, may be for their believe in benefiting from the situation and pull the same states to back up their separation demands just like the Iraqi Kurds.

From the other side, we find the rapid political activity in turkey to embrace the situation in the north of Iraq, and turkey regarding itself concerned of this situation and of the Kurds in general to reveal that it depend son them in order to perform its role in the region, therefore, turkey offered itself as a guardian to them, but it suppressed apparently every Kurdish movement in turkey. Indeed, the turkey's activity was aiming at achieve more than one goal; although all of these goals lead finally to one essential and important goal which is the not allowing for the Kurds to separate and then establish their own state on turkey's territories. This is what Suleiman Demirel expressed when he said "If the Kurds separate, then the Turkish state will collapse"⁽⁴¹⁾.

We can say, that the turkey's endeavor to unsettle the north of Iraq, came through three motives, first, to end the situation of autonomy in order to not be the same thing in turkey, second, turkey wanted to contain the Iraqi Kurds to be under its control and influence just like what it wanted about the problem of Mosul, and third, turkey could be benefited from the power exhaustion to booth Iraq and Kurds at least if it failed to achieve

⁴⁰- Berch Prerero: *Turkey in Crisis*, Zed Press, London, 1982, P. 119.

⁴¹- Salah Saadallah: *Kurdish Issue in Turkey*, Al-safer PRESS, Baghdad, 1991, P. 70.

the first two goals partly or to totally. Third, turkey must realize the dimension of the globalization of the Kurdish issue. because it will not be for its interest neither in the short term nor in the long time. It is, in the short term will raise increasing and continuous problem to turkey, and such problems have started indeed, and they had further ranges due to the nature of confrontation with the regime, as well as, these problems became wider than before in terms of their spreading in deep regions inside turkey not to mention the eastern regions which became lacking for the stability other than what the Turkish authorities planning for these regions. More over, for the long term, that the globalizing of the issue could be wider to include the Kurdish issue in turkey or use it to exert pressure on turkey by the major states at least, or to intervene in its internal affairs.

As regards Iraq, the security considerations to turkey are of compound nature, as they imply dimensions related to Turkish Kurds and their regional ambitions a well as the military activities to the PKK⁽⁴²⁾ as effective factor on the Turkish decision maker whether in respect of the internal changes and the goals that must be achieved by the Turkish elites for the stability of the political secular regime in turkey, and developing its community to the European standards, or what are regarded as limits to the Turkish foreign policy in its regional movement towards the region, or the implied problem concerning the human rights and the non-respect of the minorities in turkey as one of the obstacles which it faces to complete its march towards the European membership.

From the other side, the Kurdish issue in Iraq also affected and still affects the Turkish decision maker⁽⁴³⁾.

Therefore, Turkey; after the cooperation and agreement signed with Iraq in 1980s to prevent the separation of Kurds from Iraq and turkey, and then establishing their political entity;

⁴²- Wesal Najeeb: Turkish Kurdistani Labours Party (PKK), *Strategic Studies, International Studies Center, Baghdad, 2007, P. 88.*

⁴³- About the expansions of the Kurdish influence in the two states, See: Salah Saadallah, *Op.cit., P. 57. and the following*

started to change its manner of dealing with the Iraqi Kurds, when the central government in Baghdad lost its control over the north of Iraq, whereas Turkey engrossed in the Iraqi Kurdish matter partly or totally driven by number of considerations, which are⁽⁴⁴⁾:

1. To find political mechanisms through the understanding between Ankara and the Kurdish groups to surround the PKK members and prevent them from crossing inside Turkey as the north of Iraq became an important base for training and existence of the PKK members.
2. To monitor the changes in the north of Iraq especially what regards the two main groups by switching the cooperation with them, once with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, and once with the National Union Party, and sometimes plays the mandatory role between them.
3. To intervene at any time to prevent the establishing of a Kurdish political entity because that is regarded as nucleus of Kurdish state in the heart of the Turkish state.
4. To possess pressure factor on Iraq to achieve its goals, some of them related to the Kurdish issue to prevent carrying out a political agreement between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish groups⁽⁴⁵⁾, or what are related to other points such as the intervention for the Iraqi Kurds' interest especially that Ankara was shelter and support their political organizations, and also to gain assignments in the issue of Tigris and Euphrates water or

⁴⁴- Dr. Ibrahim Khalil Al-Alaf, "Turkey between the PKK and the Foreign Hammer Forces", in: a Group of Researchers, "Kurdish Issue in Turkey and its Influence on the Neighboring Countries", Turkish Studies Center, University of Mosul, 1995, P. 145.

⁴⁵- Jalal Talbani, Leader of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, referred to that Tareq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister, informed him that the reason behind the non-achieving of the agreement of 1984 between the Kurdish groups and the Iraqi Government are the Turkut Ozal's pressures to prevent this agreement. See: the Interview between Tareq Aziz with Ghassan Sherbel, Alwasat Magazine, Ref.: 25, 23/11/1998, P. 29.

to obtain oil supplies and commercial cooperation with low conditions from Iraq.

Although Demirel's efforts as (the protector) of Kurds and a mediator between Talabani and Barazani especially in the negotiations which led to sign Slobby's Agreement, when Demirel intervene personally at the last moment to abort this agreement between them on 23 July 1994 which stipulated the approval of the draft constitution for independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq, as the Turkish foreign affairs minister said about that "That this draft will lead to the end of every thing"⁽⁴⁶⁾.

Indeed, that the Turkish stand rejecting the idea of Kurdish state is emerge from the disability of the Turkish leaders and elites to accept the coexistence idea with an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq, which will complicate the Kurdish issue for Turkey, and threatens the positions and rights of the Iraqi Turkmens as well as to the economic damages.

Moreover, that the establishment of a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq; including Kirkuk as its economic center; will lead to ten years of instability due to the oil possessing and the economic success to such entity, and will be an attraction point to the Turkish Kurds because they; some of them support Masoud Barazani, leader of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan; will increasingly tend towards their Kurdish brothers in Iraq when the economic significance for them increases through the trade and investment of oil, as well as, the prosperity in the north of Iraq will constitute clear contrast with the poverty in the south of Turkey. In other words, the fear is, that the Kurdish success will raise feelings of separation in south of Turkey.

Consequently, for all the above-mentioned reasons, the establishment of Kurdish state, including Kirkuk, is regards a red line to Turkey because it in conclusion will lead to emancipation demands in the Turkish regions of Kurdish inhabitants majority

⁴⁶- Kemal Kirisci: *Between Egypt and Middle East, the Traces for Nation of Turkish Policy, International Affairs, Vol.: 8, No. 1.*

or may encourage some of Turkey's Kurds to be more insistent in their demand for in dependency.

The third topic : Political Turkish Motives towards Iraq after 2003

The Turkish foreign policy which dealing with the Arab world; especially with the neighboring countries; during the second half of the past century, launched through several principles constituted, in total, the general characteristics of the Turkish foreign policy from the view point of the Turkish supreme interests in peace adopting and the stability in the middle east. These principles are⁽⁴⁷⁾:

1. To refrain from involving in the conflicts of the region countries.
2. To give attention to the Arab interests especially the security matter. So, Turkey, seeks to not hit the Arab security interests in its alliance with the west.
3. The nonintervention in the internal affairs of the Arab states such as the political developments and changing their political systems.
4. To give the priority to its dual relations wit the Arab countries, and to avoid the collective dealings with them.
5. To break the inconsistency between the constitutional secularism of the Turkish state and the positive involvement besides the Arab countries in the international Islamic activities as the Islamic Conference Organization.

But, at the end of the cold war, the adherence in these principles began to be gradually sluggish, and the Turkish policy tended to achieve attention towards the Arab countries.

In the mid of these circumstances and the historical changes, Turkey witnessed, internally at least, important events represented by the winning of the Al-Adalh party in the parliamentary elections which took place on the 03rd of

⁴⁷ - Hameed Faris Hassan: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Baghdad, 2006, P. 223.

November 2002, and assuming the political authority alone in the parliament and the government as well. The maker of this victory was the party's leader, Rejeb Tayyip Erdogan.

In addition, the arrival of the Al-Adalh party alone to the government, was not an ordinary event, because its ruling period achieved crucial constitutional and social and external transformations revised the arrangement of the Turkey's priorities and defined its options, which constituted coup on the internal equilibriums and the foreign policies.

Moreover, basic change had happened, not only in the tactical directions, but even in the fundamentals of the adopted policy. And, this is the first time in turkey a party assumed the power bears, in previous, different visions on the turkey's position and estate in the regional and international levels. From that, Iraq entered into the priorities of the new Turkish policy, because the occupation of Iraq made new proceeded reality in the middle east region, which have two conclusions; First, the destruction of a central state; Iraq; for the first time in the middle east, and since the establishment of the state-nation after the world war I, so, turkey is regarded as a model of central state in the region and it feels of dander from the expanding of this tend.

Secondly, is the establishment formally of a Kurdish federal entity northern Iraq, which has been stipulated in the constitution of Iraq, and this entity has all the recitals of the independent state which represents, according to Ankara's strategies, a vital danger on its integrity exceeds the risk of PKK, even that Rejeb Tayyip Erdogan announced, on the 09th of January, 2007, that dividing of Iraq is very dangerous matter and unacceptable, and Iraq has priority for the Turkey and the European Union too⁽⁴⁸⁾.

For the political developments in Iraq ,although the turkeys welcoming of the political operation developments and the participating of the political powers in it, especially the parliament elections in 2005 and the referendum on the

⁴⁸- Ahmed Al-Nu'eimi: *Iraqi-Turkish Relations and the Motive and Future*, Political Sciences Journal, Baghdad, Ref. 29, 2007, P. 41.

permanent constitution on 15 November 2005, but they made what turkey consider, unfair for the Turkmen rights and their role in the political operation whether in the government or in the constitution wording especially the excluding the Iraqi Turkmen front that supported by turkey. in addition to the repeating warnings on Kirkuk and the Kurds at tempts to change its demographic situation for wording nor adding it to Kurdistan region⁽⁴⁹⁾. Moreover, the Turkish government criticized the new constitution implications about the federalism based on ethnic and sectarian differences, which was rejected by turkey, as it is represent allocation to allow crystallizes to a nucleus of independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq enhancing the ambitions of the Turkish Kurds to gain their national rights.

From the mention above, it is clear that the Turkish stand about the gulf war II and the occupation of Iraq and its consequences has governed by several considerations as mentioned in previous but the important thing is the absence of realization to the Turkish decision makers for the trueness of that the united states can fight Iraq without turkeys support. But, when the American existence in Iraq became a matter of fact, turkey started to repair its alliance relation with Washington attempting to be near from the Iraqi issue by different mechanisms such as responding to the American administration request to send Turkish troops for security keeping in Iraq, which is did not be, and rendering the logistic support to the American forces by the Turkish companies in Iraq, in addition to support the Turkmen organizations (Iraqi Turkmen Front) and embrace the Turkmen in general.

In the wake of the American can statement on the end of the main military operations in Iraq. and after what was clear that the armed resistance increasing was in force and in organizing, the united state began searching for allies bear consequences of war with it. So, the U.S.A. endeavored to repair its relation with turkey after the latter letting down during the war. In this regard,

⁴⁹- *Ibid.*, P. 42-43.

the American forces leader in the middle east, John Abi Zaid, visited turkey on July 2003, who talk to the Turks, saying “since the Korean war, we are together, so let us be so now, we committed faults in Iraq and Turkey is an essential element in the region, in addition, we need for turkey, and welcome not succeed without it, we call you to sit and negotiate about Iraq”⁽⁵⁰⁾, as well as during Abdullah gulls visit to Washington, the American administration requested formally for turkey to provide troops in the international peace keeping force by (12.000) soldiers to control the region of Sunni majority situated at the north of Baghdad, referring that this will give a last opportunity to Ankara to prove its reliability.

In that regard, and on august 2005, the Turkish's parliament approved to send (15.000) Turkish troops to Iraq according to the American offer against financial supports of about (8.5) billion dollars in the way of banking securities to help turkey facing its economic crisis ,as well as giving it a vital role in drawing the political future in Iraq. Consequently, Abdullah gull asserted that “our troops are not occupation forces, when we want to Kosovo and Afghanistan, we carried out our mission, we want to render humanitarian services in the field of electricity and water, and not to perform the Jendarme role in Iraq.

It seems that the Turkish leaders enthusiasm, whether they are in the government or in the military institutions, has the desire to achieve the following goals:

1. To repair the cracks of the Turkish– American relations following the refusal of the Turkish General Assembly to allow to the American forces to deploy in the Turkish land during the invasion of Iraq.
2. To ensure huge portion in the operation of reconstruction of Iraq.
3. To give turkey (a word) in the current and future authority in Iraq.

⁵⁰ - Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies: Ara-Turkish Relations, Ref. 4, Cairo, P. 5.

4. To enhance the Turkish international and regional influence by existence of Turkish forces in the north of Arab Gulf.

But, the Turkish resolution to involve in the so –called (international peace keeping force in Iraq) raised heavy Turkish–Iraqi and regional critics to turkey, as follows:

- *In Turkey*: The resolution in contrary with the Turkish public opinion, when the Turks refused, through demonstrations which included the cities, sending the Turkish forces to Iraq, and these critics came from different political streams.

- *In Iraq*: the resolution faced total rejection from the Transitional Governing Council as well as the Kurds who saw that the existence of the Turkish forces in any where in Iraq, even far away from their regions, enabling the Turkmen minority at their expense in the north.

- *In the Region*: the Turkish resolution, which identical to the American request, seemed that Ankara would be an axis in the regional polices, a matter which raised regional rejections most of them the Iranian rejection to the existence of Turkish forces in Iraq, which means the existence of another competitive part in the political arrangement in Iraq. Aw well as the Iranian demanded from the Turks to not adopt this step unless the consultancy with the neighboring countries to Iraq, and Hussein Mosawi, secretary of the Iranian Security Council, warned that “the integrity of Iraq is a red line to Iran, an it is ready to fight for preventing the division of Iraq. For Syria, it refused any foreign intervention in Iraq whether it is Turkish or other one, as well as it requested from Turkey to stop thinking in this subject because it will enlarge the problems in Iraq rather than resolves it and threatening the its regional unity and prolonging the period of occupation.

In the light of that, and due to that the political risks, after the internal and external refusal to send Turkish troops to Iraq,

became more realized to the Turkish decision maker, which forced turkey to suspend its resolution about its military participating in Iraq, then to cancel it in total.

Although turkey lost the historical opportunity to exist militarily in Iraq, so, it did not lost the instrument to approximate the Iraqi Subject regionally. As Turkey worked with its partners, neighboring states to Iraq, to revive and activate the meetings mechanism of the Iraq's neighbor countries, as Ankara participated in Damascus's meeting with the participation of Egypt in 2003, which held after Turkey pulled its resolution to send forces to Iraq and the increasing of the security chaos and the instability, as well as to the fears of that Iraq had became the base for Alqaeda Network and the other groups. From here, the role of the countries that they must take has emerged to prevent the enter and exit the infiltrators from and to Iraq. Turkey has keened; such as Iran for the People's Mojahedin Organization; to ensure that the final statement of Damascus's meeting should refers to the PKK Organization within the condemnation to the organized role to some of the terrorist groups in Iraq and the neighboring countries.

Turkey also participated in the fifth consultative meeting for the Iraq's neighbor states held in Kuwait in 2004 to discuss the situation in Iraq. In this meeting, Turkey aimed to confirm its commitment to a regional mechanism that will allow it to contribute in setting the standards for dealing with the Iraqi situation and developments.

Iraq is, without doubt, one of the core files to determine the nature of the relation between Turkey and Iraq's Arab neighbors and Iran. Everyone now knows that one of the reasons why Turkey not to take part in the occupation of Iraq is that the war will not occur without it, because Ankara was fear of the change the map of Iraq actually, in the case of occupation. Indeed, an event of what Turkey feared occurred and the federal Kurdish has become true for the first time as a reference to the Kurds of the region, as that the Turkish Kurds demand a system resembles

the U.S. system, which is not up to the federal level but no less the self-government.

In the frame of the rejection of ethnic and sectarian division, Turkey identified its political position from Iraq, it called first to the reconsidering to the central of state, and the government in Baghdad must be the central referent to the State and not the government of provinces, also stresses the territorial integrity of Iraq. In this context, Turkey stood with all those opposed to federal or completion of the Kurdish state by annexing Kirkuk to it. Hence the great Turkish opening emerged on the political forces and Iraqi forces, for example, Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr and the former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and Tareq al-Hashemi, present Vice-President of the Republic.

The motives of foreign policy of Turkey towards Iraq has become of great importance in their direct impact on the Turkish aspiration strategist and its domestic, regional and international goals. It may be noted the level of relation that arrived in recent years to the highest levels, such as the latest visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Davut Oglu that attest on the strategist cooperation in all areas such as combating terrorism, eradicating the PKK, strengthening of economic relations, developing the cooperation in energy and Turkey's role in the transfer of Iraqi natural gas to the world through the Nabucco project, as well as to the oil exploration and deepening of the political cooperation, which has become evident from the frequent visits from both sides.

Conclusions

1. The choice with regard to the intervention in respect of the international relations has always been between a solo intervention and the group intervention Or between find the circumstances in which intervention is less acceptable or to work to stop the conditions of the intervention is more acceptable, and the key differences between these cases is the nature of the international system and the international circumstances and the issue of intervention. Since the principle of the prohibition of

the intervention in the internal affairs of the States is still one of the basic and stable principles in the international law and the UN Charter, despite what is the reality of international relations witnessing of contradiction with those principles, and because the current situation underlines the increasing intervention of the United States in the affairs of other countries, especially after the international changes that the world has seen, which encouraged some countries including Turkey to stimulate its motives by exploitation of the events in Iraq and over its change in the political system by the hands of the United States through seeking to intervene in the political and internal affairs of Iraq to serve its international and regional aspirations and interests.

2. the developments progressing of the Kurdish current events in Turkey is an example on the, failure of the policies and procedures of successive political regimes in their attempts to dissolve and absorb the ethnic minorities. And the enforcement of the Turkish political system to recognize the Kurdish identity and give them the right to self-determination may be difficult for the authorities to take it, and the main constraint is the political ideology adopted by the Turkish Constitution that all citizens are Turks, regardless of their ethnic or religious or sectarian belongings. As well as, The Turkish system sees that any simple national rights of the minorities (especially the Kurds); similar to Kurds in Iraq and rights they gained in the Iraqi state; is a split in the unity of the Turkish nation or separation stimulates the fragmentation of the State.

3. The attention of the Justice and Development Party in its new strategy focused on the revitalizing the Turkish economy and maximizing the Turkey strategic weight within the Western alliance and about the Arab world and the geographical neighbors countries. As well as, it focused on the damage of the hostility with Iraq

before the occupation which delivered a burden on Turkey and led to economic losses currently estimated at 60 billion dollars as well as the social cost of the boycott and its negative effects, also the loss of crucial gains from a pipeline Kirkuk oil-Iyomr Tallec with a capacity of 70.9 million tons, and this line ensures revenues to Turkey up to 350 million dollars a year in addition to obtain low-price oil, which encouraged the Turkish decision-maker to direct and rush to interest in Iraq's affairs and take advantage of current circumstances.

4. Turkey attempted to ensure a wide participation of Turkish companies in Iraq's reconstruction after the normalization of relations with it and the achieving the security and stability there. And part of this aspiration has fulfilled through the participation of Turkish companies in Kurdistan region.

5. The removal of the Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) from the equation, which is the source of instability, would boost the confidence between Ankara and the various Kurdish parties in visions and aspirations and this will give the Turkish government the confidence they need to develop political and economic ties followed with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq. Through that relation, Turkey become in a better position to exercise a positive role in what happens to the issue of Kirkuk, and this will protect Turkey's interests more effectively and better than the threats of military intervention which would not only lead to instability.

6. The Turkish policy towards the Kurds appears contradictory and always putting its interests and aspirations in any solution. Whereas Turkey fights the Turkish Kurds and calls them the terrorist groups, but it deals with Iraq's Kurds and establish ties with them in a way that serve their interests in economic and political

aspects as well as assists them to eradicate their Kurdish brothers of the PKK.

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