Pragmatic Presupposition: An ExtraLinguisitic Concept

الافتراض المسبق التداولي: مفهوم ما بعد اللغوي

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Abstract

Presupposition, which indicates a prior assumption, is a vital notion in both semantic and pragmatic disciplines. It refers to assumptions implicitly made by interlocutors, which are necessary for the correct interpretation of an utterance. Although there is a general agreement that presupposition is a universal property of Language, there are various propositions concerning its nature. However, this research work proposes that presupposition is a contextual term, thus, is more pragmatic than semantic in its nature.

Although Semantics and Pragmatics are two distinct disciplines, they are interrelated and complementary to each other, since meaning proper involves both, and since there is no clear borderline between the two disciplines. However, due to the limitations of the research paper, presupposition is dealt with as a contextual notion, thus pragmatically.

Moreover, since this study proposes that presupposition is a pragmatic notion, thus semantic analysis is deemed as inadequate, due to the fact that a sentence is uttered in a context, which necessarily involves interlocutors, background knowledge and knowledge of the world, relative-well-formedness, etc., all of which fall within the domain of Pragmatics.

The research paper is formed of four sections. Section one deals with the pragmatic notion of presupposition. Section two discusses pragmatic presupposition as information – based. Section three is devoted to the interpretation of presupposition. Section four deals with pragmatic presupposition as culture- based.

The study ends with the conclusions reached, followed by the bibliography.

1.0 Pragmatic Notions of Presupposition

Semantic presupposition is defined ultimately as a relation between base sentence structure and the world. However, this semantic concept of presupposition is originated for restricted purpose, that is, to facilitate the computation of true and false information from a given set of sentences. Yet, there are other types of information deducible from a given sentence which has to do with the relationship between the sentence uttered and the context in which it is used. This information is neither asserted, entailed nor presupposed in the semantic sense, because it is not a property of the sentence itself.

One of the pioneer advocates of this pragmatic fact is again, not a linguist, but a philosopher, Stalnaker, who introduces the term 'pragmatic presupposition' in an influential early article (Stalnaker 1974) where he establishes the fact that in order to correctly interpret an utterance, with respect to its truth and falsity, a context is needed, e.g., example (1) (cited in Mey, 1993:202) is illustrative.

1) <u>The cat is on the mat.</u>

This utterance, regardless of whether it is true or false (whether or not there is a certain cat on a certain mat), presupposes that there is some cat and some mat, the addresser is referring to. The context in which the sentence is uttered, might be the pragmatic presupposition that the addresser is complaining about the cat's dirtying that mat.

Finch (2000: 175) contends that in any communication there is a certain amount of presumed knowledge, independent of purely semantic knowledge. The degree of this assumed knowledge is sensitive to contextual features. He (ibid) states that if one asks a friend whether he wants a cup of coffee and receives the reply It will keep me awake, it is assumed that the addresser knows whether or not his friend wishes to stay awake. So, this background presupposition can not be recovered from the form of the answer itself, but must necessarily be there for it to account for an appropriate reply.

Other examples of presupposition's sensitivity to context are found in Bates (1996: 22). Consider the following:

2) Mr. Smith, can I get your coat?

This utterance indicates that the addressee is an adult male, and may also suggest that the addressee is either socially superior or distant acquaintance of the addresser. If this sentence is used with a child or a close friend, it would probably be for the purpose of humour. Similarly, consider the following sentence:

3) Do you want your din-din.

It suggests that the addressee is a child or possibly a pet. However, none of these conditions in any way affect the truth or falsity of the propositions contained in these sentences. Instead, they are pragmatic presupposition.

Accordingly, Keenan (1971) in Fillmore and Langendoen (1971:49) defines pragmatic presupposition as "a relation between the utterance of a sentence and the context in which it is uttered". By an utterance of a sentence, he refers to an actual act of speaking and by

the context of an utterance he refers to the interlocutors involved in the speech act, as well as the physical and cultural setting of a speech act. More specifically, he defines the context of an utterance as consisting, at least of the addresser, the addressee if any, the audience if any, the physical environment of the utterance, and the cultural environment of the utterance. More precisely, Tyler (1978: 32) argues that pragmatic presupposition (sometimes called Utterance Presupposition) depends on the extralinguistic information. He (ibid) characterizes the contextual factors which affect the interpretation of Utterances into two types: linguistic and extralinguistic. The former specifies a sentence's relation to other sentences in the context of discourse, and the relation between what a sentence states and what it implies. Extralinguistic context is concerned with how understanding is facilitated by taking into account not only what is said, but who said that (the addresser) and to whom (the addressee), how, when, where, and why. In other words, it should contain enough information about the conversational situation to determine what is expressed by a sentence as well as enough information about what the interlocutors in a speech situation commonly assume about the subject matter of the conversation to determine whether or not what is said by an addresser is appropriate.

Thus, many sentences require that certain culturally defined conditions or contexts be satisfied in order for the proposition of that sentence to be understood according to its intended meaning. These conditions make it possible for the presupposition of the sentence to be captured, if they are not satisfied then the proposition is either not understandable or is understood in some non intended way, i.e., insult or jest. For instance, Levinson (1983: 177) notes that in uttering **Tu es Napoleón** (you are Napoleon) the use of the pronoun 'tu' in French makes one presuppose that the addressee is socially inferior or equal to the addresser, or personally intimate with him. Hence, this sentence is appropriate in case the addressee is Napoleon and inappropriate otherwise, or may be uttered by the addresser for the purpose of jesting.

Accordingly, Keenan (1971) (cited in Fillmore and Langendoen, 1971: 49) proposes that these conditions include among many others: (a) status and kind of relation among participants, (b) age, sex, and generation relation among participants, (c) presence or absence of certain objects in the physical setting of the utterance, and (d) relative location of participants and items mentioned.

Robins (1975: 27) points out that presupposed meaning in language is, therefore, not a single relation between the utterance and its parts but a set of various relations holding between the utterance and the relevant features and components of the environment, both cultural and physical.

Alston (1964) (cited in Tyler, 1978: 33) states that in ordinary circumstances, if someone says **Please pass the cake,** it seems obvious enough that there might be a cake somewhere in the vicinity of the addresser, that the addresser is addressing someone who could understand him, someone he thought capable of passing the cake, and he actually wants someone to pass it unless there are other reasons to believe that some or none of these conditions are applying, i.e., the addresser is joking, he is mad, he is reciting a line from a play, he simply wants to inform that he is there, i.e., **Please pass the cake** is a code for **there are enemies among us,** etc.. Obviously, it seems that the understanding of this sentence comes from the fact that interlocutors have certain presuppositions not only about the content of the sentence, but more precisely about the addresser and his intentions. A relevant contextual feature of meaning, then, is the pattern of things interlocutors normally assume to be the case unless they have other reasons to believe other-wise, that is, if someone says **Please pass the cake** and there is no cake, the addressee may say **There's old Ron, drunk again,** inventing an appealing circumstance to his common knowledge about how Ron behaves when drunk. Thus, Chaff (cited in Lamarque and Asher, 1997: 438) relates pragmatic presupposition to knowledge which is not grammatical but encyclopedic, i.e., it is not concerned- with knowledge about something which is already known, but something that is given and assumed as such by the addresser.

To sum up, a pragmatic presupposition, then, is some set of propositions that interlocutors believe is appropriate background for an utterance.

1.1 Some Salient Definitions of Pragmatic presupposition

Pragmatic presuppositions, as the label indicates, are conditions on the appropriate use of sentences and lexical items. Keenan (1971) (cited in Fillmore and Langendoen, 1971: 49) proposes a general definition of appropriateness of an utterance in a context by sating that "an utterance of a sentence pragmatically presupposes that its context is appropriate." This means that pragmatic presuppositions are necessary for a sentence to be interpreted as appropriate in a given context. However, this kind of definition would certainly cover everything that has been classified in recent literature as presupposition. It covers much, including everything in the context that determines the form of interpretation of an utterance.

Levinson (1983: 217) states that the difficulty of pragmatic presupposition arises from the fact that it is a quite varied, and actually a heterogeneous collection of quite distinct and different phenomena. To simplify matters, Akmajian, et al (1997: 383) and others identify three main types of phenomena that go by the label of pragmatic presupposition: (1) it is a kind of addresser's attitude (belief) on a proposition, (2) it gives a sentence or a proposition a condition to achieve felicities, and (3) it is a mutual understanding between the addresser and the addressee.

1.1.1 Addresser's Belief Concept

Since pragmatic presuppositions vary according to the context and the beliefs of the interlocutors, they cannot be defined by reference to the sentence alone. Thus, one way of narrowing the definition is by talking of propositions to whose truth the addresser is committed, rather than of conditions that the utterance must satisfy.

Yule (1996: 25) defines pragmatic presupposition as "something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions". Consider Yule's (ibid) example:

3) **<u>Mary's brother bought three horses.</u>**

In producing this utterance, the addresser is normally expected to have the presuppositions that a person called Mary exists and that she has a brother. The addresser may also hold the more specific presuppositions that Mary has only one brother and he has a lot of money. All of these presuppositions are the addresser's and all of them can be wrong. Thus, a presupposition is some set of propositions that addressers believe to be appropriate background which is drawn from the context of discourse itself or from their commonplace knowledge which varies from one person to another.

Stalnaker (1973: 447) introduces the notion of addresser presupposition in the familiar terms of background information: "a person's suppositions are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted... in a conversation.... They are the background assumptions that may be used without being spoken". For Stalnaker, presupposition is primarily a property of addresser, not of sentences. Therefore, he states that an addresser's presuppositions are, roughly, those propositions which he/she believes to constitute the accepted background information for the conversation in which he/she is engaged. Moreover, he adds that "to say [that a sentence has a presupposition is to say that the use of that sentence is normally appropriate only if the addresser's presuppositions entail p." 'However, this is just the rough and ready version of Stalnaker's view. In fact, the definition of addresser presupposition has undergone a number of revisions in the course of his work, and the relation between addresser and sentence presupposition is not straightforward.

Simons (2002: 4) states that this definition which Stalnaker explicates in the course of his paper, presents addresser presupposition as a kind of disposition. Stalnaker (1973: 448) revises this definition by stating that the best way to look at pragmatic presupposition is as "dispositions which are

manifested in linguistic behavior". He (ibid) defines pragmatic presupposition as follows: "A speaker pragmatically presupposes that P at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his linguistic behavior, as if he takes the truth of p for granted, and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so".

What Stalnaker means by "taking the truth of p for granted" is not simply "taking p to be certainly true" but rather to mean something like "taking p to be common belief, i.e., a proposition that is commonly believed by the addresser and addressee.

Keenan (1971) (cited in Fillmore and Langendoen, 1971: 51) states that addresser presuppositions are not necessarily belief-dependent. He (ibid) states that there are two kinds of cases in which the addresser does not believe the presuppositions of what he has said. First, an addresser needs not believe the presuppositions of what he is saying if he is speaking with intent to deceive, or speaking in jest or simply does not understand what he is saying (i.e. Presupposing). Second, there are many instances in which one accepts something for the sake of argument, precisely to show that it is false or unacceptable.

Allwood (1975: 3) suggests that there is a distinction to be made between what an addresser really believes and what he acts as if he believes. For instance, if someone says: "it is snowing" while believing it is not, he has acted as if he believes that it is snowing even though he actually does not. Similarly, if that person says: 'the Pope is outside', he has acted as if he could identify a person who could be characterized as the Pope, although he might in fact not be able to identify such a person.

In other words, addressers need not themselves believe the presuppositions of their sentences, and need not really believe that these presuppositions are actually taken for granted or are common beliefs among the interlocutors in the discourse. This is because an addresser needs not actually believe that the presuppositions of the sentences he/she utters are parts of the accepted background information at the time of utterance. Addressers can, under certain circumstances, "use presupposing

sentences to inform their addressees that the presuppositions are true (or at least that they believe so, or intend to make their addressees believe so).

More recently, Stalnaker (1999: 8) offers an extension to the definition of addresser presupposition by reference to sentence presupposition. "A sentence has a presupposition p just in case the use of that sentence would   for some reason normally be inappropriate unless the speaker were disposed to act in his linguistic behavior as if he took the truth of p for granted and as if he assumed that his audience recognized that he was doing so".

Stalnaker means that there is an important interaction between sentence presupposition and addresser presupposition in order for that sentence to be interpreted as appropriate. For example, the sentence **I have to pick up my sister at the airport** presupposes that the addresser has a sister. This sentence will be interpreted as inappropriate unless the addresser who utters this sentence presupposes that he has a sister or disposes himself to act as if he has a sister.   Hence, in such a case, a sentence requires presupposition, and the appropriateness of that sentence is determined only by the internal state of the addresser.

1.1.2 Felicity Condition Concept

To presuppose something is to assume something, or take it for granted in advance, but not to say it. Since assuming something is normally considered not an act but a state, presupposing is best viewed as a state and not an act. However, Akmajian, et al (1997: 383) point out that although presuppositions are not acts, they are related to them. Lamarque (1997: 438) agrees with Akmajian, et al. (ibid), by stating that pragmatic presuppositions, unlike semantic presuppositions, are not directly linked to the lexicon, to the syntax, or to prosodic facts, but more likely to the speech act of an utterance. Hence, it is beyond dispute that presupposition plays an important role in the production and comprehension of speech acts, (Falk, 1973:268).

Traugott and Pratt (1980: 229) state that speech act theory, which was developed in the 1960s by a group of British language philosophers, including Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), treats an utterance as an act performed by an addresser in a context with respect to an addressee. They (ibid) point out that performing a speech act involves performing locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. A locutionary act is the act of uttering a well – formed sentence in a language. Illocutionary act involves the communicative value of an utterance for a particular communicative purpose through the medium of language, including the intended or the implied meaning of the addresser. The perlocutionary act is performed as a result of the effect of the illocutionary act on the addressee. The more convincing the illocutionary act, the more successful the perlocutionary effect. The perlocutionary effect is the pragmatic force, (Mey 1993: 177)

Speech act theory tends to concentrate largely on illocutions due to the fact that locutionary acts, from a speech point of view, are not very interesting because an utterance is not communicative; it can be performed by a parrot, tape recorder, etc., whereas pelocutionary acts can not be performed without performing illocutionary acts, (Leech, 1983:177).

Palmar (1976:177) refer to Austin (1962) who distinguishes between a class of utterances which he calls 'performatives' and those which he terms 'constatives'. Performatives are a special group of utterances which form the action named by the verb. For example, Finch's (2000: 181) utterance **I pronounce you man and wife** performs an act of marriage and **I apologize** performs an act of apology, etc. Constatives, on the other hand, consist of all those other utterances, such as, statements and questions, e.g., **I cooked the cake** and **Can you cook the cake?** The main difference between performatives and constatives is that the latter could be evaluated in traditional terms of true and false, while the former are neither true nor false. Instead, they are classified as felicitous and nonfelicitious. Finch (ibid) states that the test of whether or not an utterance can be classed as performative is whether the word 'hereby' can be inserted before the verb, e.g., **I hereby pronounce you man and wife** is unproblematic, whereas **I hereby cooked the cake** or **Can you hereby cook the cake?** are not. However, Austin

quickly realizes that the distinction between performatives, and constatives is artificial since even constatives perform some kind of act, e.g.,, **I cooked the cake** is performing the act of stating, and hence one can say **I hereby state that I cooked the cake,** and similarly, **Can you cook the cake?** is performing the act of inquiring, and, thus, recast this as **I hereby enquire whether you can cook the cake.**

Consequently, Austin, as stated by Finch (2000:181), abandons the distinction between 'performatives', and 'constatives' and distinguishes, instead, between two types of performatives: 'explicit' and 'implicit'. Explicit performatives are those which have a perfomrative verb, that is, a verb which names the action being performed in the first person singular, e.g., **I promise to go to Como,** whereas all other forms of utterances such **as I will go to Como** are implicit performatives. Obviously, although the verb 'promise' is not found in the example mentioned above, the same promising meaning can be deduced implicitly from it. Thus, **I will go to Como** implicitly means I promise to go to Como, (Al-Duleimi, 2003: 5).

Thus, one can infer that all utterances constitute speech acts of one kind or another. In some cases the type of act is explicitly marked by a speech and verb, whereas in others, it is more implicitly signalled, (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 41). Accordingly, Austin (cited in Finch, 2000:182) categorizes speech acts into three distinct types. 'Declarative' sentences are used for the act of stating, 'interrogative' sentences for asking questions, and 'imperative' sentences for giving orders and making requests. Yet, the most useful classification of speech acts is Searle's who classifies them into six types (cited in Levinson, 1983: 240).

1. Representatives are speech acts that represent some state of affairs (assertions, claims, descriptions, conclusions)
2. Commisives are speech acts that commit the speaker to some future course of action (promises, threats, vows, offers).
3. Directives are speech acts whose intention is to get the addressee to carry out some action (commands, requests, dares, entreaties).
4. Declaratives are speech acts that themselves are about a state of affairs (marrying, naming, blessing, arresting).
5. Expressives are speech acts that indicate the addresser's psychological

state or mental attitude (greeting, congratulating, thanking, apologizing).

6. Verdicatives are speech acts that assess or pass judgments (judging, condoning, permitting)

In all these types of speech acts, the illocutionary act is either direct or indirect. Hudson (2000: 319) states that direct illocution is making the intent of speech evident in the overt form of sentences. He (ibid) illustrates that there are two ways to make overt or direct illocutions as in the following:

a. By use of special grammatical forms which directly express the intent, as in English yes/no questions in which an auxiliary verb precedes the subject as in **Can I go now?** (vs. I can go now?), or in imperative sentences in which the subject pronoun 'you' is absent as in **Have it on my desk by Monday morning,** (vs. You have it on my desk by Monday morning).

b. By use of a performative verb, the main verb of a sentences of which the rest of the sentences is the direct object, as in:

I warn you not to do that again.

I promise that I'll be there.

We request a booth in the back.

Warn, promise, and request are the performative verbs in the above examples.

Meanwhile, Hudson (ibid: 320) indicates that illocutions leave the intent of speech unexpressed or covert in the form of sentences. Consider his example of the common English question **Do you know what time is it?** This has the form of a Yes/No question, but it is common knowledge that it is an information question. An appropriate answer to this question is not 'Yes' or 'No' but stating time. Other examples which are cited in Hudson (ibid) are the following:

(5) **Don't do that again,** (an indirect warning)

(6) **I'll be there,** (an indirect promise)

(7) A booth at the window would be nice, (an indirect request)

(8) Ok, team, let's get started, (an indirect command)

Moreover, whether speech acts are direct or indirect, they are defined in terms of felicity conditions (henceforth FCs) also termed appropriateness or success conditions which validate an illocution. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) propose that for speech acts to be performed, they must satisfy four felicity conditions, (cited in Levelt and d'Arcais, 1978: 300):

1. Preparatory condition. (The addresser believes the addressee is able to carry out the requested act).

2. Sincerity condition. (The addresser wants the addressee to carry out the requested act).

3. Propositional content. (The addresser predicts a future act, the one requested of the addressee).

4. Essential condition. (The addresser counts his utterance as an attempt to get the addressee to carry out the requested act).

So, when any condition is not satisfied, the speech act goes wrong. For example, **Julia could not felicitously ask Ned to fly to the moon, because that it is not something she believes he is able to do.** The preparatory condition would not be satisfied.

Accordingly, Most of the definitions of presupposition found in the recent literature take the presuppositions of an utterance to be a set of conditions that have to be satisfied in order for the intended speech act to be appropriate in the circumstances, or to be felicitous. Keenan (1971) (cited in Akmajian, et al, 1995: 384) states: "Many sentences require that certain culturally defined conditions or contexts be satisfied in order for an utterance of a sentence to be understood... these conditions are naturally

called presuppositions of the utterance…. An utterance of a sentence pragmatically presupposes that its context is appropriate".

The identification of presupposition with appropriateness or felicity conditions is also echoed by Allwood (1975: 2) who states that "a sentence (proposition) presupposes another sentence (proposition) if that sentence (proposition) expresses a condition necessary for the felicitous utterance of the presupposing sentence". Keenan (1971) (in Fillmore and Langendoen, 1971: 276) points out that "by the presupposition aspect of a speech communication I mean those conditions which must be satisfied in order for a particular illocutionary act to be effectively performed in saying particular sentences"

Leech (1974: 292) points out that felicity conditions of an utterance need not be described as propositions to whose truth the addresser subscribes. For instance, if someone says Turn off the television, he commits himself to the felicity conditions of the sentence that the addressee is able and willing to provide a perlocutionary act. However, if the television is already off, one could not say that the utterance is false (since commands in any case can not be true or false), but it is in some way inappropriately spoken or infelicitous condition).

Therefore, Karttunen (1973: 170) suggests that presupposition failure often leads to infelicity. An utterance with presupposition P is felicitous in context C if C entails P. If one utters Marcia has a bicycle, too in a conversation whose interlocutors do not have in their common ground the information that someone besides Marcia has a bicycle, then it will sound distinctly odd, and hence, seems infelicitous. Presupposition failure does not always lead to infelicity. Sometimes a cooperative addressee is willing to accommodate the addresser by assuming the truth of the presupposed proposition after the act, as if it had been true all along, (Kamp and Uwe 1993: 53). In such a case, the addressee has accommodated the failed presupposition, saving the conversation from infelicity.

1.1.3 Shared Knowledge Concept

A final and more familiar concept of pragmatic presupposition is that of shared knowledge which is one of a number of different terms (such as common ground, background information, given information). This concept of presupposition concerns knowledge which an addresser does not assert but presupposes as part of the background of a sentence, knowledge presumed to be already known to the. addressee. Jackendoff (1 972) (cited in Akmajian, et al, 1997: 384) proposes the presupposition of a sentence to denote "the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer". The following examples illustrate the notion:

(9) a.Betty remembered to take her medicine.

b. Betty did not remember to take her medicine.

c. Betty was supposed to take her medicine.

Sentence (9a) and (9b) are said to presuppose (9c) in that the condition mentioned in (9c) must be shared information between the addresser and addressee.

Yule (1996: 132) suggests that what an addresser assumes is true or is known by the addressee can be described as presupposition. For example, when addressees are confronted with a reference expression, e.g., **the woman, the knife, this, he,** etc., they assume not only that such a woman or knife exists in some possible world, but also that the addresser expected them to identify the one he had in his mind, (Searle, 1977: 82). In a more general way, addressers continually design their messages on the basis of assumptions about what their addressees already know or likely to accept without challenge. Yule (1983: 28) provides the following example:

(10) a. **My uncle's coming home from Canada on Sunday.**

b. **How long has he been away for or has he just been a way?**

In this exchange addresser (A) treats the piece of information that he has an uncle as presupposed, and addresser (B), in his question, indicates that he has accepted the presupposition. Toolan (1988: 242) states that "presupposition is the term used to describe an addresser's back- grounding , in his utterance, as certain of his assumption ". He (ibid) provides the following example:

(11) <u>Is the choir practice on Tuesday?</u>

The addresser presupposes and assumes that his addressee accepts or knows that there is a choir and there is a choir practice as background knowledge, and he just wants to know on which day the practice will take place.

Urban (1951: 232) points out that the addresser and addressee can not understand each other unless they mutually acknowledge the presuppositions which constitute and determine the interpretation of utterances. Considering this assumption, Clark and Marshal (cited in Joshi, 1981: 27) pose a question of how knowledge is shared between the addresser and the addressee. As an attempt to answer this question, they propose that in order for successful communication to take place, it is not only necessary that both addresser and addressee know some proposition (p), but that each knows that the other knows that (p). Such knowledge is termed, 'mutual knowledge'. Blackmore (1987: 29) defines it more formally as:

A speaker S and a hearer H mutually know a proposition P if:

(I)   **S knows that P.**
(II)   **H knows that P.**
(III) **S knows (II)**
(IV) **H knows (I)**
(V)   **S knows (IV)**
(VI) **H knows (III) and so on an infinitum.**

However, although such a knowledge is not reality due to the fact that interlocutors may impose different interpretations of pieces of information that they are jointly given, interlocutors will behave as if they have

mutual knowledge in order to avoid misunderstanding whenever possible. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 19) Contend this fact by stating that communication obviously requires co-ordination between addresser and addressee in that misunderstanding occurs when there is a mismatch between the context envisaged by the addresser and the one selected by the addressee. Thus, it is assumed that when communication does fail the fault lies equally with the addresser and addressee: both participants must take equal responsibility for establishing a sufficient degree of mutual knowledge before they proceed. Hence, the notion of mutual knowledge is introduced to achieve successful communication.

Accordingly, Levinson (1983: 205) defines pragmatic presupposition in terms of mutual knowledge as follows: "An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B if A is appropriate only, if B is mutually known by participants".

This definition suggests that there are pragmatic constraints on the use of sentences such that they can only be appropriately used if they are assumed to be shared by the addresser and addressee. So, to utter a sentence whose presuppositions are known to be false (i.e., not shared), it would merely be to produce an inappropriate utterance, rather than, from the semantic view, to have asserted a sentence that is neither true nor false.

To sum up, presuppositions ultimately are what is taken by the addresser to be the common ground of the participants in the conversation. Presuppositions are also seen as conjunctures made by the addressee to arrive at a full understanding of what the addresser assumes by his utterance. Then, it is possible to talk about this pragmatic concept of presupposition from one of two ways: either from the addresser's point of view as part of the task of packaging an utterance, or adopt the addressee's view point and regard the presupposition as one of a number of inferences that the addressee might make on the basis of what the addresser has just said.

1.1.3.1 Uncontroversial and Controversial Presupposition

In discussing this concept of pragmatic presupposition, Beaver (1997) (cited in Bethem and Termeuton, 1997: 939) distinguishes presupposition as being either uncontroversial (fair) or controversial (unfair).

Fair presuppositions (true or factual) are based upon knowledge which is common to all participants, and their agreement on an observable fact. Therefore, they are based on an unconsidered assumption by the addresser, i.e., he/she takes it for granted as something already known and shared by the addressee. On the other hand, unfair presuppositions (false or nonfactual) are formed upon the basis of covert knowledge by a communicator for certain purposes, i.e., based upon knowledge which is not shared innocently by the addressee, i.e., that is used by the addresser to make the addressee presuppose or assume this sentence to be true or a matter of fact. Consider Beaver's (ibid: 940) examples:

(12) The sun shines.

The sentence assumes the existence of singular object commonly known as 'the sun', and, further assumes that one of the attributes of this object is that it shines, and is doing so now (by the tense of the verb). By common knowledge and agreement, these facts are true, hence the presuppositions made in the sentence are fair, accurate, and factual.

(13) Why did you steal the money?

This sentence assumes the existence of a sum of money, that the money has been stolen and further that someone has stolen it, and that he has reason for doing so. Four assumptions in six words, there are more if a complex analysis is carried out (e.g., that a sum of money had a rightful owner, that a sum of money exists, that there are notions of property, etc.). Thus, the assumptions, true as a matter of widely agreed fact and evidence, are fair, and reasonable. If non-factual, in total or in part, then the series of assumptions are unfair and inaccurate presuppositions.

Mercer (1991) (cited in Pustejovsky and Bergler, 1991: 226) states that the addressee's test for the acceptance of assumptions or supposed factual elements depends on his practical experience, knowledge of the language, knowledge of the situation in which he finds himself, or more precisely knowledge of the world. This means that no communication between two interlocutors is possible unless they share a background knowledge which is formed from the knowledge of the world and experience both of which are essential in determining the meaning of an utterance.

1.1.3.2 Knowledge of the World

Allertoon (1979: 266) points out that an addresser depends, in carrying the addressee with him, on the common beliefs and knowledge he shares with the addressee, which allow him to leave certain unsaid things that have been said, or at least hinted at, earlier. For him, shared knowledge includes knowledge of the language, knowledge of a particular fact, i.e., knowledge of the world.

According to El-Samir (1999: 181) knowledge of the world constructs one component of the extralinguistic level of language (pragmatics in its broad sense) along-side with truth values. El-Samir (ibid: 185) divides knowledge of the world into two components: ecological and institutional knowledge where the first covers individuals' natural surroundings which affects addressers understanding and classification of objects in the world. Ecological knowledge is determined by the sociocultural aspects, phenomena and objects in their natural environment of society which have influence on understanding of utterances. The ecological component includes cultural and social subcomponents. The second component of knowledge of the world is the Institutional components which are man-made rules, systems, terms, labels, etc. They are proper nouns, historical institutional, international terms. They can also be national or cultural labels, (El-Samir, ibid: 187).

Figure (1): The Components of the Extralinguistic Level. Adopted from El-Samir (1999: 181)

Glucksberg and Danks (1975: 115) observe that knowledge of the world is required to help interlocutors comprehend and interpret what they hear. Yet, Brown and Yule (1983: 233) add that this general knowledge about the world underpins interlocutors interpretation not only of discourse but of virtually every aspect of their experience. It is formed of various factors including linguistic knowledge, value judgments, sociocultural, political and religious beliefs, age, sex, etc. It presents each person accumulated experience which determines his/her comprehension of things, classification of objects in the world, use of language, and forming associations. Suppose someone says **I believe in witches, but I don't believe in the devil.** An addressee would think how can there be witches if there is no devil, the meaning of witch, thus, is dependent on the meaning of devil for one cannot properly speak of witch without implying something about the devil. So, what interlocutors judge as appropriate talk reflects what they know about the world. Hence, to say a sentence is meaningful is to say that it is consistent with interlocutors' presupposed knowledge of the world, (Tyler, 1978: 33).

Caffi (1993) (cited in Mey 1993: 203) argues that "pragmatic presuppositions not only concern knowledge, whether true or false; they

concern expectations, desires, interests, claims, attitudes towards the world, fears, etc" which are supposed to be shared between the addresser and addressee.

Thus, for the success of any communication there must exist a shared knowledge, and the ability to make judgments about the capacities, and needs of interlocutors in different social situations. As a result there is a considerable variety in the forms of addressers' messages according to what they presuppose the addressee needs to know in order to understand and respond, (Bloom and Lahey, 1978: 216).

2.0 Pragmatic Presupposition as Information – based

Unless there are utterances, which form messages there is no interlocution, thus there are no presuppositions.

2.1 The Pragmatic Dimension of Given-New Information Dichotomy

In linguistic literature, given-new information is a distinction used in the analysis of utterances in terms of information structure of messages within an overall theoretical framework known as Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP). Related distinctions are topic-comment, theme-rheme, and presupposition-focus. Prominent linguists, are associated with this notion, including Cafe (1970, 1972), Halliday (1967), Chomsky (1971), etc., form a general notion of given-new information as that information which is shared by the addresser and addressee, whereas new information is that which is not shared by the addresser and addressee, (Noordman cited in Camphell and Smith, 1978, 289).

Traditionally, the Prague school (founded in 1926 by Mathesius) sets up a correspondence between the theme and rheme and given - new information. Lyons (1968: 334) states that by the theme of the sentence Mathesius refers to that part which is already known or given in the context (what is talked about), whereas by the rheme refers to that part which conveys new information (what is being said about it). Accordingly,

Mathesius distinguishes between theme and rheme, a distinction which has been closely associated with the distinction of subject and predicate where a subject is defined as a person or thing about which-something is said (referred to as a topic), and the predicate as the statement made about that person or thing (referred to as the comment).

Noordman (cited in Camphell and Smith, 1978: 289) points out that the psychological implications of new and old information have especially been studied by Clark (1973); Clark and Haviland (1976) who have developed a theory about communication and comprehension in terms of the given new contrast elaborating upon Grice's cooperative principle (1967). According to Clark, Comphell and Smith (1978:289) state that the addresser is cooperative if he communicates information he thinks the addressee already knows as given information and information he thinks the addressee does not yet know as new information. He can do this by using a certain syntactic construction or a certain stress pattern.

Akmajian, et al (1997: 427 - 28) state that to mark this distinction between given and new information, addressers often use the definite article (the), passive voices, repeating adverbs like (again), cleft constructions, and various topicalization constructions to make the focus of their thoughts clear, e.g., (ibid):

(14) a. **A boy came for the money.**

   b. **The boy came for the money.**

(15) a. **A friend of ours met Sam at the airport.**

   b. **Sam was met at the airport by a friend of ours.**

(16) a. **This Christmas Eugene got drunk.**

   b. **This Christmas Eugene got drunk again.**

(17) a. **Eugene got drunk at Christmas.**

b. **It was Eugene who got drunk at Christmas.**

c. **What Eugene did was to get drunk at Christmas.**

d. **As for Eugene, he got drunk at Christmas.**

Thus, in (14b) the addresser may take the identity of the boy as known. In (15b) Sam is already a topic of conversation. In (16b) it is assumed that Eugene has been drunk at Christmas before. In (17b) it is assumed that someone got drunk at Christmas. In (17c) it is assumed that Eugene did something, and in (17d) Eugene is a topic of conversation.

Unlike the traditional dichotomy of given-new, Karttunen and Peters (1979) (cited in Ghazal, 2001: 49) deal with this distinction from a pragmatic angle. They (ibid) state that there are some aspects of meaning that an addresser need not overtly mention, but which are established prior to the utterance of the sentence in order for communication to go smoothly. These are called presuppositions as appropriate conditions that the world must meet, in order for the sentence to make literal sense. Accordingly, such a kind of given shared knowledge between the addresser and addressee is required for the success of individuals' communication

2.1.1 Pragmatic Presupposition as Given Information

The notion of pragmatic presupposition can be extended in many ways through integration with other traditional discourse notions like given and new information and focus. Thornborrow and Wareing (1998: 136) state that when interlocutors communicate they constantly assume the kind of knowledge available to their addressers and what should be made explicit in their utterances. Sometimes this shared knowledge is described in terms of given and new information, i.e., what is already known, and what has to be made known to the addressee.

Bornstein (1977: 131) defines pragmatic presupposition as "the stored knowledge used to interpret utterances, and normally contain information that the speaker assumes he and the hearer can both take for granted at that point in the conversation. They are old, shared information".

Langacker (1972: 181) and Roberts (1996) (cited in Yoon and Kathol, 1996: 19) agree that there are two principle aspects of the meaning conventionally conveyed by a linguistic expression; its presupposed content, and its proffered content. The former is ostensibly old information. It is information that the addresser assumes is already known in the context of the discourse in progress. Hence, a presupposition imposes a requirement on the context in use, i.e., the requirement that the presupposed information should be included. The latter is what interlocutors usually think of as the literal content of the expression. It is the information that is explicitly communicated and treated as new by the addressee.

Camphell and Smith (1978: 289) confirm this, by arguing that every meaningful message contains new information or at least information meant by the addresser to be new for the addressee, embedded in old information. Thus, every message aims at communicating something new. For example, the sentence **John's brother has just got back from Nigeria** contains new information that someone has come back. There is also old information: knowledge shared by the addresser and addressee which is presupposed to be true. The presupposed information in this case is that the addressee has a brother, (Saeed, 1997: 95). He (ibid) states that the addresser wishes to inform his addressee that someone has returned from Nigeria. This depends on what he estimates about his addressee's knowledge. So, if he thinks that his addressee knows John, but not his brother, he can assert his sentence in the following ordering assertions:

Assertion 1: John has a brother X.

Assertion 2: X has come back from Nigeria .

If the addresser judges that the addressee knows (Ass.l), but not (Ass.2), which is new information, he needs to foreground it. So, the addresser introduces (Ass.l) as old information to help his addressee   to realize the new information (ass.2). Moreover, even if the addressee does not know that John has a brother, the addresser can use (Ass.2). Both assertions are new, but the addresser decides to rank them in a particular order.

Saeed (1997: 101) points out that a pragmatic presupposition is not an independent phenomenon, but one of a series of effects produced when the addresser resorts to syntactic structures, word order, and intonation to show the addressee how the current sentence fits into the previous background. He (ibid: 99-100) proposes the following examples:

(18) It was Harry who Alice loved.

*(19) **It was Alice who loved Harry.***

These sentences seem to describe the same essential situation of Alice loving Harry; or in other words they embody the same proposition. The difference between them is that they belong to different conversational contexts. Then, depending on

what an addresser wants to assume and what he wants to focus on, the first sentence presupposes that Alice loved someone and focuses on the fact that the one who Alice-loved was Harry, whereas the second sentence presupposes that someone loved Harry and focuses on the fact that Alice is the one who loved Harry.

Saeed (ibid) adds that the same phenomenon is found with intonation in English, where stressing different parts of the sentence can produce different presuppositions as shown below;

(20) a**. Alice loved HARRY.**

b. **Alice loved someone.**

a.   **ALICE loved Harry.**

b.   **Someone loved Harry.**

Jackendoff (1972: 230) and Comrie (1981: 58) draw a distinction between presupposition and focus, stating that the former is used to denote the information in the sentence that the addresser assumes to share with the addressee, whereas the latter is used to denote the information in the sentence that is assumed by the addresser not to be shared by him and the addressee.

3.1 Pragmatic Presupposition and Accommodation

In terms of common ground, presuppositions are defined as the set of assumptions shared by interlocutors, however, this set is not considered if new sentences are uttered. In this view an addresser's next sentence builds on this common ground and it is pragmatically odd to assert something which does not fit it. However, Simons (2002: 7) states that addressers may have false beliefs about the common ground, i.e., assume that the addressee has been given adequate clues to provide the correct interpretation, and so presupposes propositions which should not be presupposed. To illustrate, Simons (ibid) suggests to suppose that

'Anne' believes, as a matter of fact incorrectly, that it is common ground between herself and her interlocutor 'Bud' that she has a Rottweiler, i.e., a kind of dog. Then, according to the common ground account, she presupposes that she has a Rottweiler. The same mistaken belief would also no doubt dispose her to act in her linguistic behaviour as if she took this proposition for granted, i.e., Anne makes-believe that she has a Rottweiler and intends to make her addressee, Bud, believe so. Thus, she might say:

(21) **I have to take my Rottweiler to the vet.**

The presuppositional requirement of this utterance is that Anne has a Rottweiler which is taken as the addresser's shared presuppositional requirement. However, if this requirement is not shared, then this mistaken presupposition requires some redressive action on the part of the addressee. In such examples what has gone wrong is very slight. The redressive action required is easy to take and even the conversation in which such an adjustment is made may be unaffected by it.

Stalnaker (1979) (cited in Cole, 1979: 322) introduces the distinction between 'defective' and 'non-defective' contexts, emphasizing that each participant in a conversation has his own set of presuppositions, i.e., his own beliefs about which propositions are on the common ground. He adds "it is part of the concept of presupposition that a speaker assumes that the members of his audience presuppose everything that he presupposes". In ideal situations, this assumption would be correct, and thus, the presuppositions of all participants would match. Stalnaker labels such situations as 'non-defective context'. He elaborates that when participants discover that the context is defective they try to eliminate observed discrepancies among their presupposition sets. He (ibid) states:

Because hearers will interpret the purposes and content of what is said in terms of their own presuppositions, any ... discrepancies between the presuppositions of speaker and addressees is likely to lead to a failure of communication. Since communication is the point of the enterprise, every one will have a motive to try to keep the presuppositions the same.

So, if reconsidering example (21), the situation is this: when 'Anne' utters the sentence, she presupposes that she has a Rottweiler which is the presuppositional requirement of the sentence. However, her utterance provides 'Bud' with evidence that 'Anne' has this presupposition, revealing to him a discrepancy between Anne's presupposition and his own, that is, revealing that the context is defective.

Simons (2002: 9) points out that Bud might do one of several things considering Anne's revealed presupposition. He might not be prepared to accept that Anne has a Rottweiler, and might want to let Anne know this (perhaps he has seen Anne's dog, and knows that it is a poodle). This kind of case is naturally classified as presupposition failure, whereas the addressee is most likely to respond with an explicit rejection of the presupposition. On the other hand, if Bud considers Anne reliable on this point, he might well add the proposition that Anne has a Rottweiler to this set of beliefs and to the set of propositions that he believes to be common ground. In other words, he will presuppose that Anne has a Rottweiler or may become disposed to act as if he takes the truth of this proposition for granted. If Bud considers Anne unreliable with respect to this proposition, and does not have any interest in challenging its truth, he might merely decide to go along with her presupposition.

Accordingly, Simons (ibid) argues that if Bud does not share that presupposition, then a general interest in eliminating defectiveness in the context leads him to do one of two things: to try to get the addresser to change her presupposition; or to change his own which is the main concern of accommodation. Therefore, Crystal (1998: 4) defines this principle by relating it "to the extent to which a hearer shares the same premises as the speaker in order to interpret a sentence". So, presuppositional accommodation is rather a matter of participants cooperatively trying to match their presuppositions to the presuppositions of others.

3.1.1 Common Ground Change

Simons (2002: 10) points out that the clearest exposition of the process of accommodation is presented in Stalnaker's common ground, where the idea that

accommodation is the result of simple belief change is emphasized. He (ibid) illustrates the process with respect to Stalnaker's example **I have to pick my sister up at the airport,** assuming that the addresser, Alice, genuinely presupposes that she has a sister (i.e. believes this proposition to be commonly accepted) at the time of utterance. What Simons concentrates on is what will happen if the addressee, Bob, does not initially share this presupposition.

He illustrates the process as follows: Alice, by her utterance, reveals that she believes that it is common ground that she has a sister. The addressee infers that Alice believes that she has a sister, and thus having discovered that she has this belief, is willing to believe it too as a common belief between them. So, Alice's use of a presupposing sentence has the result that the presupposition becomes part of the common ground, and is believed by each interlocutor to be so this is how the process of accommodation proceeds.

Accordingly, the addressee comes to believe (accepts) this presupposition through the recognition that the addresser believes (accepts) it as a common belief between them. Therefore, it seems that the following sequence of events happen for the purpose of ordinary communication which leads the addressee to change his common ground belief as a process of accommodating the addresser's presuppositions as proposed by Simons (ibid).

- Alice believes that she has a sister.
- Alice believes that Bob believes that she has a sister.
- Bob believes that Alice has a sister.
- Bob believes that Alice believes that she has a sister.

Stubbs (1983:124) points out that this common ground change condition is necessary for the success of communication. For example, a sentence, such as, **My children are sick** has one of its presuppositions **I have children.** So, if this presupposition is not shared by an addressee as part of his real world knowledge, the communication does not break down simply because the felicity condition for such a sentence has been broken. The addressee infers the presupposition and is more likely to say **Oh dear!** rather than **what children?**

3.1.2 Informative Presupposition

In any conversation, addressers may express mistaken beliefs about the common ground, and, thus, can inadvertently utter a sentence, the presupposition of which is not shared by its addressees. However, the most difficult case is the one in which an addresser utters a presupposing sentence although knowing that the presuppositions of the sentence are not in the common ground, that is, the addresser needs not really be assuming that his addressee recognizes in advance that he is taking something for granted. Such utterances may be entirely appropriate, and may lead to a perfectly natural process of accommodation. Such uses of presupposing sentences are called informative presuppositions.

Fromkin (1986:228) defines informative presuppositions as assumptions potentially informative that can be used to communicate information indirectly through conversation. Allan (1988:287) observes that addressers can use presuppositions not only as something given or taken for granted by their addressees, but also to inform them of something. For instance, when conversing with a stranger on a train, one might say, e.g.:

(22) **It's been so hot, hasn't it? I can't stand it, but my husband just loves it.**

In using the noun phrase "my husband", the addresser informs her addressee that she is married and her husband is presupposed to be alive.

Informative presuppositions can also be defined in terms of dispositional account of presupposition. Simons (2002:13) states that in uttering the sentence (see example 21) **I have to take my Rottweiler to the vet,** Anne, the addresser, knows that Bud, the addressee, does not know that she has a Rottweiler, and is going willingly to accept without argument that she does. Consequently, she is disposed to act in her linguistic behaviour as if she took the truth of his proposition for granted. Bud having noted that Anne is acting as if she took the truth of the Rottweiler proposition for granted, he can conclude one of the following: either she really does take its truth for granted, or she is trying to get it accepted as something which she is allowed to treat in this manner, where in both cases she uses this presupposition informatively. Thus, regarding this informative presupposition, Bud has two options either to explicitly reject this informative proposition, or to aquire the disposition to act as if he takes it for granted although

he may be still not believing that it is true, or acquire both the disposition and believing.

This interlocutors' ability of informativeness is introduced by Lewis (1979) (cited in Eglj, et al, 1979:127) as a principle of accommodation where "if at time t something is said that requires presupposition p to be acceptable, and if p is not presupposed just before it, then presupposition p comes into existence". Lewis (Ibid) argues that an addresser presupposes p in uttering an utterance only if he/she believes that p forms common ground following his/her utterance. Therefore, presuppositions can be introduced as new information if they are not shared by the addressee who is going to reject or accommodate this informative presupposition as appropriate background information.

3.2 Pragmatic Presupposition and Relative Well-formedness

Traditionally, it is often assumed that one can speak of the well or ill-formedness of a sentence in isolation, removed from all presuppositions about the nature of the world. It has become clear over the past several years that such a position can not be maintained. Of course, languages exhibit certain constraints on the form of sentences. English, for example, requires that, for the most part, verbs must follow their subjects and propositions must, in general, precede the noun phrases they are associated with. Therefore, violation of such constraints does indeed make such sentences ungrammatical. However, there are many cases where it makes no sense to speak of the well-formedness (i.e. grammaticality, validity) of a sentence in isolation. Instead, one must speak of relative well-formedness; that is, in such cases a sentence is well-formed only with respect to certain presuppositions about the nature of the world.

Jacobsen (1977:166-67) states that pragmatic presuppositions play a crucial role in the concept of relative well formedness as discussed by Lakoff (1971). Lakoff argues that grammar generates pairs: PR, S (where PRr=a set of presuppositions and S= sentence); and well-formedness should be on PR, S, e.g.,

(23) a. **John told Mary she was ugly and then she insulted him.**

b. That John told Mary she was ugly entails that John insulted Mary.

(24) **a. John told Mary she was beautiful and then she insulted him.**

b. That John told Mary she was beautiful entails that John insulted Mary.

Sentences (23 a) and (24 a) are well-formed relative to (23 b) and (24 b) respectively. However, it is obvious that (24 a) is in conflict with interlocutors' value of social world. Consequently, if one is asked to give his opinion of (23 a) and (24 a), one might well say that (24 a) is semantically anomalous, whereas (23 a) is well-formed. The reason for this judgment, as proposed by Jacobson, would be that in the former case, there is a clash between the PR of S and the interlocutor's pragmatic assumptions, whereas, in the latter case, there is no such clash. Lakoff states that the ability to spot this clash is a matter of competence, whereas the clash itself is a matter of performance. The competence underlying such judgments involves the notion of relative-grammaticality. A grammar can be viewed as generating pairs, (PR, S) consisting of a sentence S, which is grammatical only relative to the presuppositions of PR. This pairing is relatively constant from addresser to addresser and does not vary directly with one's factual knowledge, cultural background, etc. However, if an addresser is called upon to make a judgment as to whether or not the sentence is well-formed, then his extralinguistic knowledge enters the picture.

As a further example of this, consider the predicate "feel sorry" which requires the selectional feature of human in the following sentence:

(25) a. **The dog feels sorry for having bitten you in the leg.**

b. Dogs have a mental structure which makes them capable of ruing their bad deeds in the same way as we humans.

The sentence (25 a) is well-formed due to its PR of S as in (25b). Now, it is probably the case that many interlocutors, owing to their general assumptions about dogs, would characterize (25a) as ill-formed or at least slightly odd. On the other hand, if an addresser is a passionate dog-lover, his set of beliefs

concerning the nature of dogs might well include (25b). Hence, it is well-formed relative to his pragmatic presuppositions, (Jacobsen, 1977:167).

Accordingly, it is inferred that different sets of beliefs about the nature of the world may lead to different judgments about sentences which are defined as being well-formed relative to their presupposition.

Lakoff (cited in Steinberg and Jakobovits, 1971:330) confirms that an interlocutor can make certain judgments about the well-formedness or ill-formedness of sentences which vary according to ones extralinguistic knowledge. If the presuppositions of the sentence do not accord with ones factual knowledge, cultural background, or beliefs about the world, then one may judge that sentence to be odd, strange, deviant, ungrammatical or simply ill-formed relative to one's own pragmatic presuppositions about the nature of the world. This reflects the fact that checking the validity or well-formedness of presupposition is an important application of pragmatic inference; that is, presuppositions have to be recognized by addressees, so their well-formedness or validity has continually to be confirmed or rejected by addressees.

4.0 Pragmatic Presupposition as Culture - based

Culture is a dynamic process, a combination of different codes concerning the way of life and all its acts that are pragmatised only by a particular community using a particular language as means of expression, (Byram,1989: 80) (see also Rivers, 1983 : 122 ; Lado, 1957: 110). Culture includes all the beliefs, values, knowledge, arts, morals, customs, law and all the habits, abilities, etc., gained by members of a cultural community.

Pragmatic presuppositions, therefore, refer to all those shared beliefs and understandings found in a culture, (McGregor, 1998: 6). They refer to any underlying assumptions, beliefs and ideas that are culturally rooted and widespread, (Nida and Reyburn, 1981: 41). Accordingly, much of inter-cultural misunderstanding among interlocutors of a particular or different culture are due to the fact that they may have different, or not shared, and, hence,

unfamiliar pragmatic presuppositions. Consider the following sentence cited in Ghazal (2001 : 86)

(27) <u>If you please madam, cooks say have you got the flags for the sandwiches?</u>

The context in which this sentence occurs describes the on-going preparations for a garden party. However, the addressee (the reader) in another culture may wonder about the relation between the word "flags" and the word "sandwiches" especially if he takes into consideration the general idea involved in the notion of "flag", i.e., a symbol of a particular country. So, the addressee can not understand accurately what the sentence means unless he comprehends the pragmatic presupposition behind it, relying on the background knowledge of the source language culture where it is a western tradition to place small coloured flags on the sandwiches for decoration.

Accordingly, much of pragmatic presuppositions are culturally-derived and deserve a special attention from interlocutors. Another good example (28) is quoted by El-Samir (1999: 185 - 86) from Shakespeare's King Lear: (Act I, Scene IV, PP. 13-16).

<u>(28) to serve him truly that will put me in trust; to love him that is honest; to convers with him that is wise; and says little; to fear judgment; to fight when I cannot choose; and eat no fish.</u>

In this quotation as Kent is addressing King Lear, the addressee may find the last part of it **"and eat no fish"** problematic if he/she does not understand the presupposition about the source language culture. El-Samir (ibid) states that to understand this part one must be aware of its cultural connotation. That is, in Shakespeare's times, only Roman Catholics who were against the reign ate fish. Thus, the pragmatic presupposition which must be shared by the addressee to understand this part appropriately is that Kent was protestant and a supporter of King Lear and his reign.

[Another example about this cultural misunderstanding among interlocutors due to the absence of acknowledged pragmatic presupposition is found in Mey (1993: 299). He (ibid) provides the following dialogue between a western tourist and a Japanese temple attendants as shown in example(29):

(29) Tourist: <u>Is there a toilet around here?</u> Attendant: <u>You want to use?</u> Tourist: <u>(somewhat astonished): Sure I do.</u> Attendant: <u>Go down the steps.</u>

Clearly, the tourist did not ask this question because he was conducting a comparative study of toilets west and east, or some such thing. Therefore, the attendant's respond **"You want to use"** is highly unexpected by the tourist for in his own culture, it probably never would have occurred **in** this form. However, the pragmatic presupposition in Japanese culture is closely different, which is why it made sense for the attendant to ask the question. Obviously, it seems that the attendant wanted to find out whether the tourist's question could have anything to do with the different kinds of toilets that are available in his country: Japanese or western style.]

To sum up, pragmatic presupposition affects interlocutor's interpretation of facts and events. Such different pragmatic presuppositions between interlocutors may constitute the source of many disagreements and much misunderstanding among them. Hence, pragmatic presuppositions vary from one culture to another, as well as from one individual to another within a particular culture.

4.1 Pragmatic presupposition vs Implicature

On the relation between presupposition and implicature Blackemore (1987: 73) points out that although pragmatic presupposition has been used to cover a heterogeneous class of phenomena, "it is unlikely that everything that is called a pragmatic presupposition is in fact a case of conventional implicature". It is likely more related to conversational implicature. Soams (cited in Keyser, 1979: 627), and Allen and Widdowson (in Allen and Pitcorder, 1975: 132) agree that this general area of pragmatic presupposition and conversational implicature has received a great deal of attention recently. They contend that some examples that linguists have treated as presuppositions

are, in fact, either generalized or particularized conversational implicature, the former not being restricted to a particular context, the latter requiring a specific context. In other words, an addresser assertively utters a sentence which conversationally implicates a proposition if and only if he is presupposed to be observing the conversational maxims.

Finch (2000: 157) observes that implicatures result from the process of implication which addressers and addressees rely on in the production and interpretation of utterances. That is, "any communicator uses implied knowledge or presupposition in order to arrive at the additional implied meaning".

Palmer (1981: 175) suggests that the notion of impliture can handle all cases dealt with under presupposition. For example **The king of France is bald** implicates that there is a king of France according to the maxims of relevance, and perhaps quantity, for one would not talk about the king of France if there was not one. However, Palmer (ibid) emphasizes that it would be unfortunate if this suggested that one can draw no line between what is presupposed and what is implicated, for the latter alone assumes that the addresser actually intends to provide information that is not part of his sentence meaning.

Lyons (1977: 606)argues that what is presupposed is what the addresser takes for granted and assumes that the addressee will take for granted as part of the contextual background, whereas what is implicated is what the addressee can reasonably infer in the context in which the utterance occurs from what is said or not said. Accordingly, there is nothing in this pretheoretical account of the difference between them. Hence, various attempts have been made recently to subsume presuppositions under the notion of implicature and to account for their presence in terms of Grice's maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner.

However, this does not mean that there are no differences between presuppositions and implicature. Instead, although they are interdependent they are still distinct pragmatic concepts.

First, presuppositions are more closely linked to what is actually said, implicatures are more closely linked to what is actually meant, (Lyons, 1977:605).

Secondly, presuppositions are oriented towards a background of beliefs, given as shared. Implicatures, on the other hand, are oriented towards knowledge yet to be built. In other words, presupposition is seen as information which the addresser assumes that his addressee knows it, too. Implicature is reserved to the further information implied by the addresser which is not part of the sentence meaning and not known by the addressee, (Chaff as cited in Lamarque, et al, 1999: 939). Consider Ghazal's (2001: 41) example:

(26) **I am going to John's.**

The addresser who utters this sentence presupposes that his addressee knows that 'John's refers to a big department store where high quality and expensive clothes are sold. The same devices may be used by the addresser to imply extra-information to his addressee, i.e., he is implying a request to his addressee to give him a large amount of money so that he could afford buying high quality and expensive clothes from John's department store. Thus, one, as proposed by Mey (1993: 206), may put presuppositions to work to create an implicature but one can not use an implicature to create a presupposition.

Thirdly, presuppositions concern beliefs constituting the background of communication, thus, losing the status of presupposition only if something goes wrong; that is, the addressee does not accept them or question them, forcing the addresser to explain his presuppositions. Implicatures, on the contrary, concern a knowledge which is not yet shared and which would be shared only if the addressee goes through the correct inferences, while interpreting the addressee's communicative intention. In other words, presuppositions can remain in the background of communication and even if remained unconscious by the addressee without communicating. Although they often remain outside conscious awareness, they are brought into consciousness when the addresser is exposed to a context in which his presuppositions are not shared by his addressee. Implicatures must be calculated for communications to proceed in the direction desired by the addresser, (Chaff cited in Lamarque, et al, 1997: 939)

Fourthly, Chaff (ibid) adds that presuppositions require the addressee to abandon his laziness; that is, to cooperate creatively with the discourse. With implictures, higher degree of cooperation and involvement is asked of the addressee.

Fifthly, as proposed by Chaff (ibid), their degree of cancellability also seems to be different: presuppositions are less cancellable than implicatures.

Finally, presuppositions are definite, whereas implicatures are indefinite. For instance, from the sentence **My car broke down,** one can draw a limited number of presuppositions: **There's a car; The car is the addresser's; Nothing was wrong with the car before.** One can also draw an indefinite number of implicatures: **Where's the nearest garage?; I can't drive you to the gym; bad luck haunts me; Can you lend me some money to have it repaired?** etc., (Chaff: ibid).

To sum up, Presuppositions are contextual, depending on the interlocutors knowledge of the world, shared background knowledge and interlocutors readiness to cooperate.

Conclusions

1- Presupposition is background presumption Prior to an utterance that must be mutually known or assumed by the interlocutors for the utterance to be considered appropriate in a context.

2- Presupposition is contextual, thus it is a pragmatic rather than a semantic phenomenon.

3- Pragmatic Presupposition are not invariable since they involve aspects of individual usage and context – dependent meaning .

4- Pragmatic Presupposition varies from one person to another, one culture to another, and from one time to another.

5- Presupposition is of importance in interlocutors' understanding of the background knowledge and the context to determine the interpretation of an utterance, thus, involves common knowledge between the addresser and addressee.

6- Pragmatic Presupposition provides the interlocutors the freedom of implicitness, which spares unnecessary details in interlocution.

7- In semantics analysis, Presuppositions' failure occur as a result of lack of truth values, while in pragmatic analysis such failure is attributed to inappropriateness, unintelligibility, and failure to perform a speech act.

8- Although Presuppositions appear to be constant in most syntactic forms of Presupposing utterances, e.g., declarative sentences, yes/no and wh questions, etc., they may fail in others, e.g., exclamation, direct and indirect commands, etc. As pragmatic conjunctures, they can also be defeasible in particular defective contexts.

9- Common knowledge and context of discourse, together with the role of lexical items categorized by semantics help to formulate the pragmatic content of Presuppositions

10- Since Presuppositions are important in interlocutors' understanding of how background knowledge and context determine the interpretation of an utterance, thus, pragmatic analysis involves reference to the conditions under which they are appropriate to be used. The conditions include the state of mind, belief,

cooperation, estimation, expectation, preparedness, attitude, and common knowledge of the addresser and the addressee.

11- Different sets of beliefs about the world may lead to different judgements about sentences, which are defined as being well- formed relative to their presupposition.

12- Presuppositions are recognized by addressees, so their validity has continually to be confirmed or rejected by addressees.

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الافتراض المسبق التداولي: مفهوم ما بعد اللغوي

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و

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الملخص

يدل الافتراض المسبق على افتراض ضمني لغرض تفسير المعنى، وهو من المفاهيم الهامة في علم الدلالة وعلم اللغة التداولي. وعلى الرغم من الاتفاق العام بان الافتراض المسبق يشكل خاصية عامة في اللغة، هناك طروحات متنوعة حول طبيعته. الا ان هذا البحث يطرح الافتراض المسبق مصطلحا سياقيا مما يجعله اقرب الى علم اللغة التداولية في طبيعته مما هو الى علم الدلالة.

وعلى الرغم من ان علم الدلاله وعلم اللغة التداولية نظامان مختلفان الا انهما متداخلان ومكملان لبعضهما البعض، اذ ان المعنى الكامل يشمل الاثنان، نظرا لعدم وجود حدود واضحة وصريحة بينهما. ونظرا لضرورة تحديد البحث، يكتفي الباحث بالاشارة الى الجوانب الدلالية والتركيز على الجوانب التداولية باعتبار ان الافتراض المسبق مفهوم سياقي اي تداولي.

اضافة الى ذلك، بما ان البحث يطرح ان الافتراض المسبق هو مفهوم تداولي، فهو يعتبر التحليل الدلالي لهذا المفهوم غير كاف ولايفي بالغرض اذ ان نطق الجملة يجب ان يكون ضمن سياق محدد يتضمن متحدثين وخلفية من المعلومات المشتركة والمعرفة بالعالم المحيط والعلاقة بين الجمل الملفوظة والمفاهيم الثقافية، والتي تقع جميعها ضمن مجال علم اللغة التداولية.

يتكون البحث من اربعة اجزاء. يتناول الجزء الاول المفهوم التداولي للافتراض المسبق. ويناقش الجزء الثاني الافتراض المسبق التداولي من حيث العلاقة بين الجمل الملفوظة. وخصص الجزء الثالث لسبل تفسير الافتراض المسبق. ويتناول الجزء الرابع علاقة الافتراض المسبق بالثقافة.

ويختم البحث بالاستنتاجات التي تم التوصل اليها، تتبعها قائمة بالمراجع التي تم الاعتماد عليها.