

# Nature of a holy book in the poetry of Ibn Arabi Mohi

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## ABSTRACT

The paper discusses the lack of a uniform definition of politeness due to the constant tension between its universality and language specificity, and argues that some of the theoretical debate could be resolved if the distinction between politeness as a commonsense notion and politeness as a theoretical construct were clearly addressed and acknowledged in the research.

## 1 - Introduction

Politeness has become one of the fields of research to which more and more attention has been devoted in the last three decades. The connection of politeness studies with other domains , such as sociolinguistics and socio-pragmatics ,ethnography of communication , second language teaching , second language acquisition or conversation analysis have definitely contributed to this growing interest .

A quick look at the literature may clearly show that different researchers have favored different senses of politeness . Simply , one may argue that to Leech ( 1983:16 )being polite involves making the hearer to “ feel good” ( polite as friendly ) ; to Brown & Levinson ( 1987 : 77 ) it means making him not “ feel bad” ( polite as diplomatic ) ; to Lakhoff ( 1975 : 45 ) politeness is “ . . . a velvet glove to conceal the iron of fist .”

In this, ten theories of politeness are going to be investigated . Starting with Grice ( 1975 ) four maxims , and then Lakoff’s discussion of politeness in terms of Grice’s linguistic co-operation .The paper after that will deal with Brown & Levinson’s ( 1978 , 1987 ) theory , whose names have become almost synonymous with the word “ politeness” , and a survey of Leech’s theory of politeness would be necessary .

Within the context , exploring a number of Non-Anglo Saxon theories on politeness would be useful , among which comes Gu’s theory which is based on Chinese concept of politeness , and let alone Ide’s theory that deals with politeness in the Japanese society.

Furthermore , and in order to gain a coherent view about the field, the study will investigate some more recent theories on politeness , such as Shoshana Blum- Kulka ( 1989 ) theory and her “ **cultural norms**” , Bruce Fraser and William Nolen’s ( 1990 ) theory and their “**conversational –contract view**” , Arndt and Jannay’s ( 1993 ) and their focus on **people** as a determining factor of politeness and Watt’s (1992) distinction between “ **politic behavior**” and “ **polite behavior**”

## **2- Approaches to politeness theories**

### **2-1 H. Paul Grice ( 1975 )**

Grice ( 1975 : 45 ) argues that the overriding principle in conversation is one he calls **co-operative principle** ( henceforth CP ) , so he suggests :

“ make your conversational contribution such as is required ,  
at the stage at which it occurs , by the accepted purpose or  
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged .”

And in order to put this in more detailed context , Grice lists four maxims that the CP follows : **quantity , quality , relation** and **manner** .

On the other hand , Grice points out that these maxims do not apply to conversation alone . He says :

“ It may be worth noting that the specific expectation or pre-

sumptions connected with at least some of the forgoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transaction that are not talk exchange.” ( Grice ,1975 : 7 )

What we get from this is that “ the maxims are involved in all kinds of rational co-operation behavior” ( Wardhaugh 1986 : 282 ) . Nevertheless , Grice points out that the speakers do not always follow the maxims he describes , and they may implicate something fairly different from what they say actually . “ They may violate , exploit , or opt out of one of the maxims , or two of the maxims may clash in a particular instance .” ( Ibid : 282 )

This list , to Grice , is not an exhaustive list , because “ a maxim , such as **Be polite** , is also normally observed – nor the equal weight should be attached to each of the stated maxims” ( Brown & Yule 1983 : 32 ) . Moreover , it is obvious that perception such as “ **Quantity , Quality , Manner and Relevance** ‘ vary from one culture to another , and let alone the fact that different people value such maxims differently.

Hence , these maxims , according to Grice himself , might be exploited for many reasons to function as “ ironic , metaphoric or hyperbolic in nature and reasons”(Wardhaugh 1986 : 281 – 284 ) .

## **2-2 Robin T. Lakoff**

What makes Lakoff’s rules of politeness interesting is that they start from Grice’s suggestion that there are maxims not covered by CP , such as “ **Be polite** ” ( Grice 1975 : 47). And , importantly , Lakoff is seen by some researchers as “ the mother of modern politeness theory , for she was the first to examine it from a decidedly pragmatic perspective” ( Elen 2001 : 2 ) .

Robin Lakoff’s study started with the observation in a white middle–class environment to come out with the suggestion that “women’s insecurity due to sexism in society resulted in more purpose use of the rules of SAE [ Standard American English ] grammar than was found in the speech of men ,, ( Fromkin et al. , 2003 : 486 ) . By defining politeness as “ saying the socially

correct thing” Lakoff ( 1975 : 53 ) concludes that women are more polite than men in the sense of being “ more tentative and indirect” ( Ibid . ) .

When Lakoff put forward her politeness framework, she suggested that in any conversational situation there are “ rules of pragmatic competence ” ( Lakoff 1975 ) . And at play two simple rules are proposed : “ **Be clear** ” and “ **Be polite** ” .

To lakoff , each time we are engaged in a social discourse we use the “ three rules of politeness to make an addressee think well of us ; 1) don’t impose [ Principle of Distance or Formality ] ; 2) give options [ Principle of Deference ] ; 3 ) Make A feel good – be friendly [ Principle of Camaraderie ] ( Lakoff 1975 : 298 ) .

All these rule are present , to some extent , in any interaction , yet different cultures turn to emphasize one rather than another , thus definitions of politeness - of how to be polite – differ interculturaly "[ ... ] roughly speaking , European cultures tend to emphasize distancing strategies , Asian cultures tend to be deferential and modern American cultures tend towards camaraderie " ( Elen 2003 ) .

Furthermore , in a more recent book of hers , one can find her determination to examine politeness from a pragmatic perspective by adding an impersonal dimension to Grice’s predominantly informational framework , when she defines politeness as “ [ . . . ] a system of impersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange ” ( Lakoff 1990 : 54 ) .

However . Lakoff’s framework is thought to be effected by her work in generative linguistics , for “ . . . the rules of politeness she proposes are seen as part of a system of

pragmatic rules , which she links to that of syntactic rules [ . . . ] , so politeness rules are primarily seen as a linguistic tool to capture the systematic of the process ” ( Elen 2001 : 48).

### 2-3 Brown & Levinson

Brown & Levinson work on politeness is seen as the most influential in the area to the extent that one of the scholars believes that “the names **Brown & Levinson** have become almost synonymous with the word **Politeness** ” ( Elen , 2001 : 3 ) .

Following Lakoff’s work Brown and Levinson see Politeness “ In terms of conflict avoidance , but their explanatory tool differs substantially from Lakoff’s ” ( Ibid . 3 ) . However , they concede that the CP alone is not always enough ; they say : “ In our model . . . it is the mutual awareness of “face” sensitivity and the kinds of means-ends reasoning this induces that together with the CP allows for imprimaturs of politeness” ( **Brown & Levinson** , 1987 : 5) . Politeness , they argue , can account for much of the mismatch between what is “ said ” and what is “ implicated ” ( Ibid . : 2 ) . Almost like Grice , they build their model on the CP , for they assume that human interaction is a co-operative one in nature . Hence , they say “ In general people co-operate [ and assume each other’s co-operation ] in maintaining face in interaction . Such co-operation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face ” ( Ibid . : 61 ) . And from this , it seems that to Brown & Levinson , the reconstruction of people’s actions are related to their intention and face want.

The central constructs of Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness are : **face** “ the kernel element in folk notions of politeness ” (Ibid. : 57 ) , **face threatening acts ( FTA )** and **face saving strategies** . It is worth mentioning that the notion of **face** is adapted from Goffman and his view on the role of face social interaction :

“ . . . our view of **face** is derived from that of Goffman and  
from the English folk term , which ties up **face** notions of  
being embarrassed or humiliated , or **losing face** . Thus ,

**face** is something that is emotionally invested , and that can be lost , maintained or enhanced , and must be constantly attended to interaction . ” ( Ibid . : 61 )

The emphasis upon face is inevitable in the model of Brown and Levinson . that is , because **face** is a fundamental and universal notion . And so , face is considered as “ the public self-image that every member in the community wants to claim for himself ” ( Ibid . :61 ) .

Brown & Levinson argue that some speech acts , such as advising , promising , inventing , requesting , ordering , criticizing , complementing , and the like , are **risky** as they are **threatening** to the “ public self-image ” of the speaker ( henceforth **S** ) and / or the hearer ( henceforth **H** ) . It seems that they are risky if they do not satisfy the **face-want** of the S and / or H . For instance , asking someone for some money is an imposition on that person . i.e. , it may be considered as a threatening of a **negative face** sort towards H , whereas a negative evaluation of someone is considered as a threatening to his / her **positive face** . So , politeness appears here to be the redressing action taken to counter – balance the disruptive effect of FTA ( Ibid. : 65 – 66 ) , depending on the idea that people tend to maintain each other’s face .

Thus , the FTAs are categorized according to which and whose face is threatened . And , consequently , a **negative face** is threatened by acts that put pressure on H , and good examples of these are : orders , requests , suggestions , advices , reminding , threats , warnings , dares , offers , promises , complements , expressions of envy and expressions of strong emotion ( Ibid. ) , whereas **positive face** is threatened by negative or neutral evaluations , and good examples of these are : expressions of disapproval , criticism , contempt , ridicule , complaints , accusations , insults , disagreements , irreverence , raising in appropriate topics , the use of power-marked address terms and identifications ( Ibid. : 61- 66 ) . As for whose face is threatened , FTA may affect the S , and suitable examples of this are : excuses , unwilling promises , offers , self-humiliation and emotion leakage . Furthermore , some acts from the sort may damage the H face , and among them one would find apologies , accepting a compliment and divisive topics such as

politics , race , religion and woman liberation , and let alone raising such issues may create a dangerous atmosphere ( Ibid. : 67 – 68 ) .

However , the factors that affect the choice of a redressive action taken to prevent , or to mitigate face – threatening are ; **social distance** ( D ) , **relative power** ( P ) of S and H and **ranking of the imposition or threat** ( R ) . And according to Brown and Levinson , these factors “subsume all others ” ( ibid. : 80 ) , moreover they argue that P is “ an asymmetric social dimension of relative power ” ( Ibid. : 77 ) , which , in other words , shows the degree to which one party can impose their own plans and self-evaluation on others , whereas D involves the frequency of interaction between S and H , as well as the degree of similarity or difference between them . As for R , it is “ a culturally and situational defined ranking of impositions by the degree to which they are considered to interfere with an agent’s want of self-determination or of approval ( his negative - and positive – face wants ” ( ibid. : 77 ) . Therefore , in a certain speech act , the amount and the kind of politeness are decided by the “ **weightiness** ” of FTA , which is the total sum of **distance** between S and H , the **power** of H over S , and the **ranking imposition** of the act in a given culture . Consequently , it is possible to shape the relationship between these factors in a given speech act into the following formula :

$$WX = D ( S , H ) + P ( H , S ) + R X$$

where X denotes a speech act , S the speaker and h the hearer , and the outcome of the calculation is the basis on which speakers select specific strategy to formulate their communicative contribution .

Brown and Levinson propose four strategies which could be thought of as grading from the least polite , least formal and most friendly to most polite, most formal to least friendly. The less power, less distance and less impolite; the more power , and distance, to the more polite. The strategies are ;

- **Bold on-record strategy** : which provides no effort to minimize threats to its “face” .  
No redressive action is taken; rather S approaches H in a blunt, direct way (p.68)

- **On-record redressive action** : an action that ‘gives face to the addressee’ and ‘attempts to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA’ (p.69). Redress is of two kinds:
  - a – Positive politeness strategies
  - b – The negative politeness strategies
- **Off-record indirect strategies**: According to Brown and Levinson, the main purpose of this strategy is to take some of the pressure off the S, not to directly impose, so “all kinds of hints as to what a speaker wants or means to communicate, without doing so directly, so that the meaning is to some degree noticeable,’ ( p.69)

## 2-4 Geoffrey Leech

In his **Principles of Pragmatics** ( 1983 ), Geoffrey Leech provides a rhetorical model of pragmatics, when he defines it as ‘ the study of how utterances have meanings in situations’ (Leech 1983: x ). It is a ‘ complementarist’ model where communication seems as ‘problem solving’. The model deals with communication as goals and principles of ‘good communicative behavior’ .

Leech admits the influences of Austin, Searle and Grice on his model, as well as Firth’s for his ‘ situational study of meaning’ and Halliday’s ‘ Comprehensive Social Theory of Language’ ( Leech 1983 : 2 ) ,on his metafunctions , Leech builds his outline of pragmatics principle that makes distinction between two rhetorics : the interpersonal rhetoric that subsumes the CP, the Politeness **Principle ( PP)** and the **Irony Principle(IP)**, and the textual rhetoric which includes the principles of **processibility, clarity, economy** and **expressivity** ( ibid 1983:16). These later principles of textual rhetoric are subdivided into a set of maxims in accordance with Grace’s terminology which Leech calls ‘ sub-maxims’ (ibid: 15-16). The justification of the placing PP in interpersonal rhetoric is the inability of CP to explain many problems that interlocutors may encounter. Leech gives example to account for suggestion :

‘**P** : Someone’s eaten the icing of the cake .

C: It wasn't ME.'

Accompanied with the justification of the PP, Leech (1983) provides some important distinction between semantics and pragmatics. The most inclusive distinction is that which relates semantics to sense, and pragmatics to force (ibid: 30) which, one can say, correspond roughly to locution and illocution. Leech illustrates that CP works and makes significant remarks on its four maxims. He believes that the four maxims apply variably according to the context, but not in an 'all-or nothing' fusion (ibid: 80).

Leech formulates the **Tact Maxim** as a first step in outlining his PP, which is based on classification of speech acts in terms of illocutionary functions according to social goals. Hence, four types of illocutionary functions are proposed:

- **Competitive**; illocutionary goal 'competes' with social goal, e.g., asking, ordering
- **Convivial**; illocutionary goal 'coincides' with social goals, e.g., Thanking, greeting
- **Collaborative**; illocutionary goal 'indifferent' with social goals, e.g., reporting, answering
- **Conflictive**; illocutionary goal 'conflicts' with social goals, e.g., accusing, cursing, etc (Leech 1983: 104)

The Tact Maxim (henceforth, TM) tends to be inversely proportional to the degree of linguistic directness, i.e., the more an illocution is indirect the more polite it is. Indirect illocutions tend to be more polite as they (i) increase the degree of optionality for not doing something, and (ii) diminish force. For Leech the TM has two dimensions: one is (a) negative, which minimizes the cost to the H, and the second is (b) positive, which maximizes the benefit to the H. For this reason, he suggests a pragmatic scale of three degrees:

- (1) Cost-benefit-scale
- (2) Optionality scale
- (3) Indirectness Scale

Leech adds a further crucial factor in determining politeness behavior, i.e., '**social distance**', which involves considering the roles people are taking in relation to one another in a

particular situation, in addition to how well they know each other. A teacher, for instance, might say to a student ‘Get that essay to me by next week.’, but not ‘Make me a cup of coffee.’ (Leech 1983: 126). Politeness is a symmetric notion and sensitive to the context. For instance, one may find that not all direct speech acts are impolite: ‘you must have another sandwich’ is less polite as an offer than ‘Do have another sandwich.’ (Ibid : 109) . As for a symmetrical aspect: ‘What must be expressed strongly by one practice as a polite belief must be played down by the other participant as an impolite belief’ (Ibid: 110) . This point is already admitted by Leech when he speaks about the maxims of PP, because it is ‘perhaps the most important kind of politeness in English- speaking society’ (Ibid: 107 ).

Leech compares his version of the PP by subdividing the TM to go in pairs:

(I) **TM**( in impositive and commissive):

(a) minimize cost to other

[ (b) maximize benefit to other]

(II) **Generosity Maxim** ( in impositives and commissives ) :

( a) minimize benefit to self

[ (b) maximize cost to self ]

(III) **Approbation Maxims**( in expressives and assertives ) :

( a) minimize dispraise of others

[ (b) maximize praise of others ]

(IV) **Modesty Maxim** (in expressives and assertives)

( a) minimize praise of others

[ (b) maximize dispraise of others

(V) **Agreement Maxim** ( in assertives ) :

( a) minimize disagreement between self and others

[ (b) maximize agreement between self and others ]

(IV) **Sympathy** Maxim ( in assertives) :

( a) minimize antipathy between self and others

[ (b) maximize sympathy between self and others ]

( Leech 1983 : 132)

Nevertheless, leech admits that not all the maxims are of equal importance in every society, rather ‘there are cross cultural relations’ (Ibid).

Basically, Leech’s concept of politeness focuses on the “conflict avoidance, which is attested by the specification of the maxims ,as well as by his claim that politeness is regarded to establishing comity” ( Elen 2001: 9 ).

## **2-5 Yueguo Gu**

Gu’s theory is built on Leech’s PP and maxims. He contradicted Leech’s claim that politeness is not a regulative matter, which has nothing to do with morals or ethics, because the rules of politeness, in China, are ‘moral socially sanctionable precepts’ (Ibid : 10). Moreover, the notion of **face** in Brown & Levinson’s theory is not a matter of psychological want in the Chinese context, rather it is seen within social norms. So, face is threatened when the individual ‘s want fails to fulfill the society’s want. In China , politeness is considered instrumental as well as normative. That is clear in what Gu suggests in his article : **Politeness Phenomena in Modern Chinese** (1990) , saying that the PP for the Chinese is ‘. . . a sanctioned belief that an individual’s behavior ought to live up to the expectations of respect fullness, modesty, attitudinal warmth and refinement’ ( Gu 1990 : 245),Gu suggests four maxims :

( a) **Self-denigration** Maxim : which admonishes the speaker

to ‘denigrates **self** and evaluates **others**’

(b) **Address Maxim** : which addresses your interlocutor with an appropriate address term, and that indicates the hearer’s social status, role and his relationship to the speaker.

(c) **Tact Maxim**

(d) **Generosity Maxim** (Ibid : 257)

Balance Principle is a final principle discussed by Gu which suggests that the **cost/benefit** relation in politeness results from the tendency to pay back a debt brought up when a polite request, an offer, or an invitation is raised in the first place.( *ibid* ) .

## 2-6 Sachiko Ide

For Ide, who studies the concept of politeness in Japan, politeness is ‘a basically involved in maintaining smooth communication’ ( Elen 2001: 11 ). She criticizes other theories for being busy with the kind of politeness which she labels as ‘**Volition**’ ,i.e. , strategic interaction in which speakers use verbal strategy to attain some individual goals, which contrasts **Discernment**, as being a second and separate compound of politeness prominent in Japan. This kind of politeness is not dependant on the speakers free will, it is rather a part of the verbal choices which are socially obligated ( *Ibid* :11 )

In Japanese the speaker must choose between **honorific** or **non-honorific** forms, for there are no natural forms, i.e., the matter that conveys the speaker-hearer relationship. ‘This use of an honorific verb form is socially pragmatic equivalent of grammatical concord and may thus be termed socio-pragmatics concord’ (Ibid: 277 - cited in Elen 2901:11) .

## 2-7 Shoshan Blum-Kulka

Blum-Kulka builds her theory of politeness depending on many elements from previous theories, but the crucial element in her perspective is the cultural- relativistic.

For Blum-Kulka, **face-wants** are culturally determined and cannot be universal. She argues that though there are differences between strategic and obligatory linguistic choices, still their scope and depth differ from culture to culture. Obligatory choices are ‘**cultural conventions**’ , according to Blum-Kulka, and **the discernment** are highly conventionalized forms of politeness. Moreover, even the term ‘politeness’, she says, ‘differs cross-cultures’ ( Elen 2001: 12-13 )

Furthermore, Blum-Kulka’s concept of politeness is that the

‘ . . . system of politeness manifest a culturally filtered interpretation of the interaction between four essential parameters : **social motivations, expressive modes, social differentials** and **social meanings**. Cultural notions interfere in determining the distinctive feature of the four parameters and as a result, significantly effect the social understanding of ‘politeness, across societies in the world’ .

( Blum-Kulka 1992: 270- cited in Elen 2001 :13 )

By ‘**Social motivation**’ , she means why people are polite , or what is the function of politeness. While ‘**expressive modes**’ are the linguistic forms used to express politeness’ ; and ‘**social differentials** are meant to be the parameters of the situational assessment that are regarded as characteristics of politeness; and finally the ‘**social meaning**’ is to be the value of a certain situational contexts .

The value of all these parameters is decided by the conventional rules of a specific culture, on which people depend to use the appropriate polite expression in the appropriate context.

˘ To sum up, Blum-Kulka sees the politeness phenomena in a language from the angle of ‘appropriate social behavior as determined by cultural expectation or cultural norms’ ( Elen 2001: 12-13 ).

Blum-Kulka also called for the great importance of studying politeness, not only in speech acts such as request, offer , etc . . . . , but also in a large check of interactions such as speech events , like ‘family dinner discourse’ , ‘children discourse’ , ‘business negotiation’ , etc .

## **2-8 Bruce Fraser and William Nolen**

In their article : **The Association of Difference with Linguistic Form** , Nolen & Fraser introduced what they labeled to be ‘**conversational contract**[CC] view of politeness’ ( Fraser & Nolen 1981 : 96 ) . In their view each participant who is involved in a certain conversation brings to his/her encounter(s) all the expected rights and obligations, and these expectations are not ‘static’ but can be revised in the course of time, or because of the change of context .

The rights and obligations are multi-dimensional constructions, some of which are **conventional, institutional, situational** and **historical** . Conventional terms apply to all forms of interaction; institutional terms have relation to the rights and duties imposed by social institutions , e.g. : church, court, etc . ; situational terms are concerned with relative role, status and power of S and H ,e.g. : a student cannot authorize a teacher to do something ; while the historical terms relate to the social contract to previous interactions between specific Ss and H, i.e. , the starting position for each new interaction is determined by contractual terms negotiated during previous interaction.

For Fraser & Nolen, being polite is a matter of sticking the conditions of the conversational contract (CC) , and to violate the term could be impolite ( Elen 2001 : 14 ) . Politeness is the ‘norm’ whereas ‘impoliteness is marked. Politeness is ‘ . . . simply involves getting on with the task at hand in the light of the term and conditions of the CC’ (Fraser & Nolen 1990 : 233 – cited in Elen 2001: 14 ) .

Moreover, there is no language that could be more polite than another , ‘sentences are ipso facto polite, nor are languages more or less polite. It is only speakers who are polite . . . ’ ( Ibid : 233) . Therefore, forms like: ‘Sir’ or ‘Please’ are not intrinsically polite, rather they are forms of ‘situation-giving’ and their polite value depends on the CC at a specific moment, that is why they are captured under the notion of difference’ ( Ibid : 233 ) .

To conclude, Fraser and Nolen come out with the idea that ‘ politeness is totally in hands of the hearer’ ( Ellen 2001 13-14) .

Fraser’s ( 1990 ) four –fold classification of politeness ‘ the social-norm view, the conversational-maxim view, the face saving view and the conversational contract view ’ would be the most comprehensive approach to different conceptualization of politeness . ( Dimitrova , 2007:27 )

## **2-9 Horst Arndt & Richard Janney**

Arndt & Janney shift , in their vision of politeness, from the focus on linguistic forms, social convention or situational variables, which were the main concern of the previous theories towards putting emphasis on the speakers and hearers involved in communication, and it is for this reason their framework of politeness is seen as interpersonal ( Elen, 2001 : 15 ) .

They distinguish between **emotive communication** and **emotional communication** , for emotional expressions are of ‘uncontrolled nature, they come out spontaneously’ , whereas the emotive communications are ‘ . . . the conscious, strategic modification of effective signals to influence other’s behavior’ , which means that they are ‘ . . . regulated by social sanctions, norms of interaction and civilized expressions that enable people to control their natural impulses’ ( Arndt & Janney 1991: 529 ,quoted in Elen 2001: 15 )

Doubtless, it may be found that Arndt & Janney’s **interpersonal supportiveness** view replaces the entire notion of politeness , or ,in other words, politeness is a matter of avoiding interpersonal conflict (Ibid : 16 ) :

However, it seems that Arndt & Janney take Brown & Levinson’s definition of **face** ‘ wants for autonomy and social approval’ to come out with the idea that interpersonal supportiveness ‘consists of the protection of interpersonal **face**’ , which coincides with Brown & Levinson’s positive face .

In their conclusion, Arndt & Janney come out with four different strategies for **face-work** as illustrated in Table (1)

**Table (1)**

**Arndt & Janney ( 1985 a ) strategies of face-work**

Emotive strategy	Hearer's face	
	Personal  ( need for autonomy)	Interpersonal  (need for social acceptance)
Supportive positive	acknowledges	acknowledges
Non-supportive positive	acknowledges	threatens
Supportive negative	Threatens	acknowledges
Non-supportive negative	threats	threatens

**2-10 Richard Watts**

Watts comes out with the ‘**politic behavior**’ notion in his theory as a broader context in which politeness works. He defines politic behavior as ‘ . . . socio-cultural determined behavior directed towards the goal of establishing and/or maintaining in a state of **equilibrium** the personal relationships between the individuals of a social group’ ( Watts 1989 a : 135 ).

Watts makes a distinction between **restricted cods** , which are associated with closed communication systems and **elaborated cods** that belong to **open** communication systems. In the first type the interest of the group the (**We**) ‘suppressed those of the individual the (**I**)’ , whereas in the open communication system the (**I**) takes the place of the (**We**) . This, in a way or another, looks like Ide’s distinction between **Discernment** and **Volition** ( Ibid ). The only difference is that Watts ‘associates politeness with Volition only, while Discernment is

associated with political behavior' ( Elen 2001 : 18-19 ). However, for Watts, this is not an absolute identification , because both **open** and **closed** groups can occur in one culture ( Ibid ) .

What Watts means by political behavior is a wider concept and it is universal in which politeness is a subset political behavior that includes: ' . . . utterance s which would not fall into . . . . . general categories and thus neither marked nor unmarked with respect of a parameter of politeness' (Elen ,2001 :9 ) , where as politeness can be characterized as :

' . . . an explicitly marked , conventionally interpretable subject of political verbal behavior responsible for the smooth functioning of socio-communicative interaction and the consequent production of well-formed discourse within open social groups characterized by elaborated speech codes'

(Ibid:9-10)

So, both political behavior and politeness are involved in smoothing well-formed discourse and the only difference is that the first is marked whereas the latter is unmarked. Nevertheless, politeness is not the only direction, there is also the '**non-politic**', which is a **negative** form of the political behavior .

Thus, politeness is more than saying the appropriate, it is a 'conscious strategic behavior' with the aim of influencing the hearer positivist. Nevertheless politeness is not connected to specific linguistic forms, because the uttered words are not polite by their nature. For instance , if one uses a term of address appropriating this term is politic, and if he/she uses it more than appropriately the term is a polite one (Ibid:: 19-20) .

### **3--Conclusion**

A near glance at the literature on politeness shows a great confusion regarding its definition and conceptualization. It seems that the part of the problem emerges from the fact that it is not always easy to distinguish between the popular understanding of politeness and its theoretical concept. The other difficulty comes from the lack of a universal concept of the notion of politeness, which could be reliable cross-culturally.

One of the ways to approaching politeness is to handle it from the social appropriateness angle. For example , **Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary** defines ‘**polite**’ the adjective , as ‘having or showing good manners and respect for the feelings of others’ ( Oxford : 2005 : 976 ). Lakoff also looks at ‘politeness’ from a sociolinguistic view , when she says: ‘to be polite is saying the socially correct thing’( Lakoff 1975: 53). Similarly, Ide ( 1989) views politeness as a cover term for behavior ‘without friction’( p 7 ). Browns & Levinson see it as ‘saying and doing things in such a way as to take into account the others person’s feeling’ ( Brown & Levinson 1087 :114 ), while Fraser & Nolen deal with politeness with a general approach : ‘to be polite is to pay a bid by the rules of the relationship. The speaker becomes impolite just in cases he violates one or more of the contractual terms’ (Fraser & Nolen 1981 : 96 )

This social approach to politeness which views it as an appropriate behavior has the advantage of being applicable universally and cross-culturally. Yet, it seems vague for the linguistic research, the matter that makes Watts notes that to look at politeness from this one-dimensional point of view is to make it ‘nothing but a set of constrains on verbal behavior’ (virtually void of content’ ( Galaczi ,2001: 7:3 ) .

In their ‘Politeness in Language , Watts (1992),and Others ,distinguish between the more **traditional** notion of politeness ( the **first-order**) and the **linguistic** notion ( the **second-order**). This two-fold distinction was followed by many other researchers who are interested in the field of politeness , e.g. Kasper ( 1994) discusses politeness as the **common sense notion** i.e. , ‘**proper social** conduct and tactful consideration of others’ ( Kasper 1994: 3206 ) and politeness as the **pragmatic concept** of ‘ways in which relation function in linguistic action is expressed’ ( Kasper 1994: 3206 ) .

Janney & Arndt ( 1992 ) follow the same categorization , distinguishing between **social politeness** and **interpersonal politeness** Fraser ( 1990 ) also distinguishes between politeness as **etiquette** and **social appropriateness** ( the social –norm view and conversational contract view)

which is the first-order politeness , and politeness as seen through the linguistic perspective ( the conversational-maxims view and the face saving view ), i.e. , second –order politeness . As for Watts , he proposes **politic behavior** as second –order politeness to contrast it with polite behavior as first-order politeness.

This dichotomy is very useful, because it shows ‘layers in the conceptualization’ of politeness. Social appropriates is the border concept from which the narrow concept of is derived.

These two levels are interrelated in reality, yet without such a distinction the confusion will go on to cause a lack of agreement in the result of the researchers(Galaczi, 2001:7:3 ) .

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