



Occupating Iraq and the Role of United Nation to deal with it

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Introduction

When George W. Bush came to power as President of the United States he adopted a policy entirely different from that of his predecessor President Clinton. He adopted a policy of force and determination. He was proud of this policy, which he considered befitting the United States as the greatest power in this age, a style of panoramic thinking, a styling of acting based on pride, determination and decision worthy of an affluent empire.⁽¹⁾

After the events of September 11, the United States turned to fighting the regimes that it believed were supporting and financing terrorism. It started with the Taliban government in Afghanistan where the American forces controlled Kabul. After the end of the war against the Taliban government and Al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan, Iraq was the obvious target. This intention was felt by the well-known writer Bob Woodward in a special interview with Bush in August 2002. During the interview, the writer concluded, "All indications suggest that George Bush is embarking on a war on Iraq and he wants to topple Saddam Hussein".⁽²⁾

The US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair continued to assert that the war against Iraq would be justified if the United Nation refused to give its approval of such action. On March 6, 2003, Tony Blair declared that he would be prepared to ignore the veto voices in the Security Council and go to war.

In this paper



The War, which was illegal

Bush and Blair were clearly embarking on war that was illegal and lacking in a Security Council resolution or had no back-up in Article 51 of the UN Charter that "allows individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs". The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan confirmed, on March 10, 2003, the popular view that the war proposed to be waged would be illegal because it did not carry a UN mandate:

"If the United States and others went outside the Council and embarked on a military action, it will not be consistent with the International Charter. If they (Security Council members) failed to reach a mutual stand and a decision is taken without permission from the Security Council, legitimacy and back-up of such action would be a serious violation".⁽³⁾

However, American intransigence and the law of power and domination, in addition to the British and Spanish alliance, all prompted American policy to impose its will, particularly as tens of thousands of Anglo-American troops are in the Gulf awaiting a sign to invade Iraq.

Despite these appeals and the realization by the United States, that the Security Council refused to give international legality to the war, President Bush decided to withdraw the US-British resolution and give 48-hour ultimatum to the Iraqi President to leave Iraq to spare the Iraqi people and the country war and destruction. The Iraqi leadership rejected promptly this warning. Thereupon, it became certain to the whole world that the war was inevitably coming, particularly after American forces completed the concentration of their troops in the Arab Gulf, which reached to 250,000 American troops in addition to tens of thousands of British troops.⁽⁴⁾



The signs of actual war on Iraq had already appeared when the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued his orders to the Peace Keeping Force in Kuwait and Iraq to leave their positions, in clear indication that the UN had failed to prevent the American military war machine. Immediately afterwards, on March 18, 2003, the international inspectors left Baghdad on board of an aircraft that took them with their information and maps of the vital and military installations all over Iraq after destroying several sites and missiles and exhausted the Iraqi combating capabilities in preparation for the American strike. ⁽⁵⁾

At dawn of March 20, 2003, on termination of the 48-hour ultimatum, the war began with massive aircraft and missile offensive on the Iraqi capital Baghdad. The strikes targeted Saddam's palaces and civil and military installations. The US President declared the starting of war to topple Saddam Hussein, stressing on the use of decisive force to shorten the war. In return, Saddam Hussein called on the Iraqi people and the armed forces to fight the Americans and Britons who had come to occupy Iraq. Saddam promised to inflict the heaviest losses to the invading forces. ⁽⁶⁾ Saddam addressed the states and peoples that opposed the war by saying:

"Friends and opponents of evil in the world, peace be on you. You have seen how reckless Bush has derided your stands and views against the war and your genuine appeals for peace and is committing his vicious crime today. We pledge to you, in the name of our leadership and the militant Iraqi people and their heroic army in the Iraq of civilization and history and faith that we shall resist the invaders and, by the will of God, drive them to lose patience and lose any hope of achieving what they have planned to do". ⁽⁷⁾



The Great Powers promptly criticized the military solution policy adopted by the United States towards Iraq. The Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov declared that America and Britain had violated the Security Council resolutions and stressed that:

"Not one of the resolutions issued by the United Nations gives the right to use force against Iraq outside the UN Charter and no resolution allows the overthrowing of the leadership of a sovereign state by force." ⁽⁸⁾

With regard to the role, which the United Nations should have played at the beginning of the American invasion of Iraq an international law expert said: ⁽⁹⁾

"As a matter of fact, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security Council should have automatically met at the beginning of the aggression, as an act of violation of peace and security had been committed. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council is the proper authority, particularly in the case of acts of aggression. The Security Council should have convened to discuss the situation, follow up developments and keep in contact with the events, as the United Nations would be going through its most serious times when an aggression on a UN member state is committed, and the Security Council would meet or be called on to meet. The aggression started and two or three days passed, yet the Security Council had been plunged in deep sleep as if, surprisingly enough, the aggression was being committed in another planet. However, this is expected when the aggressor is the strongest state in the Security Council and controls the affairs of this international body". ⁽¹⁰⁾

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan characterized the war on Iraq as a violation of the UN Charter, pointing out that the Security Council



resolutions did not authorize waging that war and asserting that the American presence in Iraq was a foreign occupation that the UN had been obliged to deal. ⁽¹¹⁾

Invasion Iraq 2003 and the International Reaction

From the first day of the war, the invading forces started their ground offensive from Kuwaiti territory towards the south of Iraq. It was odd that this attack should start so soon, to the contrary of the case in the Gulf War of 1991. In that war air strikes had continued for three weeks before the ground offensive started. The American command was apparently aiming at reducing the war to the shortest possible period, because a prolonged war would draw the command into numerous troubles besides increasing human and material losses. This was what the US President indicated when he said in his war declaration speech: "Use decisive force to shorten the duration of war."

The first days of the war were notably characterized by focus on targeting the Iraqi capital Baghdad by missiles and aircraft in order to destroy Iraqi command headquarters, including Saddam's palaces and Republican Guard, Intelligence and Security commands and communication centers. These strikes aimed at cutting off communication between the Iraqi command and the war fronts. For this reason, the missile and aircraft bombings in those first days synchronized with the launching of the coalition ground forces' penetration inside Iraq and besieging the city of UM Qasr, adjacent to Kuwait, in an attempt to take control of it and then control the cities of Basra, Nassiriya, Najaf and Samawa. ⁽¹²⁾

Millions of angry protestors took to the streets in Western capitals calling for immediate halting of the American-British invasion of Iraq and



the massacres and crimes being committed by the United States and their allies against the Iraqi people in order to control the oil sources. The angry millions demanded the restoration of troops to their countries before the number of casualties rose. On March 22, 2003, demonstrations were staged in Spain, Canada, Australia and many American towns. Many demonstrations ended in riots and arrests, as was the case in San Francisco where demonstrations continued for three consecutive days.⁽¹³⁾

There is no doubt that the war brought the anticipated human disaster to the Iraqi people in addition to numerous casualties and wounded among civilians as a result of the air bombing. With the beginning of the war, the "Oil-for-food-and-medicine" Program, approved by the Security Council Resolution 986/1995, came a halt, distribution of foodstuffs was suspended and drinking water was cut. Inevitably, malnutrition aggravated and water-communicative diseases spread. On March 20, 2003, Kofi Annan pointed out that the Iraqi people were facing a new tragedy and expressed hope that all parties would observe the requirements of international law very closely.⁽¹⁴⁾

The battles continued, reaching their peak at city approaches. At the end of the second week and the beginning of the third week of the start of war large cities began to fall in the grip of American forces. These forces took control of Nassiriya, then Najaf. Air bombing was fiercest against National Guard forces. On April 2, the American forces announced the destruction of Baghdad Division of the National Guard at Kut city, near Baghdad. This was an announcement of the imminence of the decisive battle of Baghdad. Several airdrops were carried out in areas around Baghdad, which had been meant to confuse the Iraqi Republican Guard.



These airdrops did actually create a state of confusion and disorder among the ranks of the Iraqi army on the third day of the war. A National Guard officer eyewitness related that up to the middle of the third week of the war the morale of the army, the National Guard and the people had been very high, and the Americans had not won any victory they could boast of and their losses had been high and unusual. They had been driven out of the Iraqi cities and in the desert. Divisions 11 and 51 had been able to check attacks by the coalition forces at Um Qasr. They had been similarly checked in Basrah, Nassiriya, Najaf and other Iraqi towns. However, the situation reversed in the middle of the third week. Most Iraqi troops withdrew to Baghdad to reorganize their units and defend the capital.⁽¹⁵⁾

As a result of concentrated strikes on all communication centers and command headquarters of Republican Guard forces, there occurred a state of loss of control on the units and their movements and disconnection of communication between the central command and these forces. The result of this the unit commanders began to act individually without resort to orders issued by the general command.

The battle for control of Baghdad International Airport was the fiercest that had been fought between the American forces and the Iraqi National Guard. The battle started on April 3, 2003, when the American forces announced that they had taken control of the International Airport. This came as a shock to the Iraqis, considering the ease with which the Airport had fallen. The Iraqi forces should have prepared well for the battle of Baghdad and have taken account of the strategic importance of Baghdad International Airport, not forgetting the great psychological impact the news of the fall of the Airport in the hands of the American forces would make on the Iraqis. The Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Sa'id Al-Sahhaf



confirmed the truth of the news of the American capture of the airport, but he then came back to assert that the American forces would be surprised that same night by a new style of combat. The Iraqi forces did in fact launch a counter attack on the American forces present at the Airport. After a grinding battle, the invaders were driven out of the Airport, having suffered heavy losses in lives and equipment. ⁽¹⁶⁾

One day after the recovery of Baghdad International Airport by the Iraqi forces, the American forces recaptured it in a manner still raising many question marks. The accusation finger was pointed at the American forces, which, as transpired, had used unconventional weapons against the Iraqi forces that had been in possession of the Airport. ⁽¹⁷⁾

There are reports indicating that General Tommy Franks, commander of the coalition forces, decided to enter Baghdad when he had discovered that its defenses were nominal following an armored penetration test that lasted 3 hours. When the American forces faced attacks in the south of Iraq, some officers raised the question whether to stop and crush the militias in the south or continue progress towards Baghdad.

The debate did not last long, for the campaign relied on speed, since any recoil or stoppage would reduce the required momentum to disturb the balance of the Iraqi forces and the central government. The orders of the Defense Secretary Ramsfeld and General Franks to field commanders were: Baghdad is the prize, push and push harder! ⁽¹⁸⁾

An Iraqi reporter who was present in Baghdad during its fall described those moments by saying:

"The fall of Baghdad on April 9th was not mysterious or unexpected for us all. Having taken control of Baghdad International Airport, the



republican palace and Al-Rasheed Military Camp (at 10 kilometers to the south east of Baghdad) – the three strategic sites and significant symbols of the State of Iraq -, the American forces tightened their grip on the capital Baghdad from all directions. The giant Iraqi Army disappeared, and disappeared the myth of the Republican guard that had been a source of worry to the invaders. Members of the Baath Party and Fidayeen Saddam militias withdrew in a puzzling manner for which no explanation has been found to this day. In those hours Baghdad became a ghost city, where there was no sound or movement after its inhabitants had fled to escape the hell of war that had burnt the green and the dry and scorched with its fire whoever stood in its way." ⁽¹⁹⁾

How American Troops Could Occupy Baghdad?

It was clear that the American forces succeeded in breaking up the ranks of the Iraqi army. Occupier had paralyzed the ability of the Iraqi military commanders to take decisions and move their troops to address various situations, penetrated at tremendous speed the battalions of the Iraqi army charged with defending Baghdad following a wave of raids by Special Forces and landing in various areas of the capital. They carried out seven consecutive landings on the Baghdad-Hilla road executed by airborne forces of 3000 fighters in each landing. These operations paved the way for another landing near the Saydiyya area on the Karkh side of Baghdad, near the Bayya' highway bridge. Fierce battles took place on Wednesday and Thursday, April 2-3. Some officers who participated in these battles assert that Saddam Huseein commanded these battles. The other landing was carried out on the Rustamiya (east of Baghdad) side. A column comprising 30 armored vehicles landed on April 4 and took its way in the direction of Zaffarniya, 10 kilometers to the east of Baghdad. An Iraqi officer mentioned



that "we demanded an additional force to resist the said landing and were promised a quick supply, but nothing of this happened until another landing came on the next day at the same place. The Americans were able by this landing to form a fortified knot and started to increase their forces that had been marching towards Rasheed Camp". It should be mentioned here that the absolute air supremacy had allowed supplying the advancing forces with their provisions by air without any obstacles despite the long communication and supply lines for the forces marching towards Baghdad. These forces were supposed to be exposed to attacks from the Iraqis to paralyze their movements, but nothing of this happened, which confirms the fact that the Iraqi forces had been highly confused and incorrectly directed.⁽²⁰⁾

Thus, the American forces pushed towards Baghdad without significant resistance, while the city's streets were empty of Iraqi troops, the Party militias or Saddam's *Fedayeen* who had apparently withdrawn from the city and abandoned the principle of resistance. The occupier forces continued their progress until, on April 9, they arrived at Firdos Square at the heart of Baghdad where a big statue of Saddam Hussein stood. The American forces pulled down that statue as a symbol of the fall of Baghdad and occupying Iraq.

An Iraqi pressman gave an account of that moment by saying:

"Eventually it was Iraq's destiny to start a new era with the occupation. Here they are, the American forces penetrating the streets of Baghdad to close the page of Saddam Hussein after thirty-five years of rule of Iraq. It is indeed an unexpected and sad end for Saddam, his people and even those who did not support him or exchange sentiments of love with him, for if they rejoiced for Saddam's fall they were unhappy with the occupation".⁽²¹⁾



While his statue was falling at the center of Baghdad, Saddam himself was there in a quarter in Adhamiya and alive. Saddam preferred before the fall to stay at Adhamiya because of the Sunni majority who were support to him. Adhamiya was the last district in Baghdad to fall in the grip of the American forces after a brutal battle that started on the morning of April 10 when the Americans tried to penetrate it from different directions. After fierce resistance, the American forces arrived at Ras-al-Hawash, in central Adhamiya, to embark on a huge battle between those forces and resistance elements that included Arab and Iraqi fighters during which many American military vehicles were destroyed. The battle, which eyewitnesses said had been led by Saddam himself continued until the evening of April 11, 2003. The American forces bombarded Abu Hanifa mosque and the surrounding buildings in the belief that Saddam was taking shelter there. Saddam toured the streets of Adhamiya openly until April 9, the day of the fall of Baghdad. This was the last appearance of the Iraqi President when he realized that the years of his rule have ended. ⁽²²⁾

In an interview, the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the invasion of Iraq was one of the "worst disasters" in the history of American foreign policy. She also said to the *New York Times* that "the deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was terrible, but I don't think he posed an imminent threat to the United States". She added: "We can't wage war against anyone we don't love". ⁽²³⁾

The UN Role under American Occupation of Iraq

It turned out, even before the end of the war that serious differences between the United States and Europe had emerged on the extent of participation desired for the United Nations in post-war Iraq.



The US Foreign Secretary Colin Powell declared early in April, 2003, that he would discuss with the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan the appointment of a special representative for the UN to supervise humanitarian aid. However, he stressed that a political role for the UN was uncertain, "but we understand that the UN should play some role but we must still determine its nature." He added that "the United States and its allies will play the leading role in pushing progress ahead."

The United Nations had contemplated possible scenarios for post-operations period. It presumed the reactivation of the oil-for-food program that had been suspended because of the war. It would possibly be asked to take charge of the largest portion of the task of rebuilding the essential civil institutions after the war.⁽²⁴⁾

On March 28, 2003, the Security Council unanimously voted for reactivating the oil-for-food program that had been dispensed with since the beginning of the war on March 19, 2003. Resolution 1472 again contained the odd phrase that all member states are committed to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, at a time when Iraq was bleeding under heavy American air and missile blows.

After occupying Iraq by the American forces, the United States presented a draft resolution said to aim at lifting the economic sanctions on Iraq. After weeks of deliberations, a resolution to this effect was unanimously voted on May 22, 2003, carrying No.1483.

In its preamble, the resolution provided for recognition of the American occupation of Iraq in a paragraph stating "recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities and obligations under applicable



international law of these states (the United States and Britain) as occupying powers under unified command (the "Authority")".

The Resolution contained 27 operative paragraphs, the most important of which was paragraph 10, which decides, "all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661/1990 and subsequent relevant resolutions...shall no longer apply".

The resolution referred to the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Iraqi Central Bank. The funds of this Fund were to be used in a manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and for economic reconstruction. The funds were to be disbursed at the direction of the occupying Authority. The resolution also terminated the operation of the Oil-for-Food Program after six months from the date of the resolution. The resolution requested the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities included participation in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq and working with occupying authority and the Iraqi people and the appropriate organs to restore and rebuild national and local institutions for representative governance. The resolution also indicated the importance of establishing an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq. It also supported a speedy restructuring of Iraq's debts. ⁽²⁵⁾

In a discussion of the contents of the resolution, an international law expert⁽²⁶⁾ asserted in respect of the American occupation of Iraq that:

"The Security Council Resolution 1483 did not legitimize the occupation, because occupation violates the UN Charter and is deemed outside the purview of international legitimacy as it violates international law. The



Security Council, in recognizing this occupation, did not legitimize it. The occupation is still void and will remain so until it is eliminated".

He adds:

"The resolution that states it aims at lifting the sanctions from Iraq has achieved the principal aim for which it had been originally designed, which is to impose a policy of *fait accompli* that involves recognition by the Security Council of the occupying power as an authority and dealing with it in the future on the basis of this recognition. We cannot interpret the Security Council resolution as recognition of military aggression or an aggressive war. Aggression and war are prohibited in international law and the UN Charter and this prohibition is an imperative rule that agreement on the violation of which is not permissible.

"The resolution named the occupying authorities as the "Authority" and did not give the full name customarily given by international or human law. This brief name was not given haphazardly, but it involved circumvention to and violation of international law because it carried different meanings from those involved if described as "Occupying authority".

From the practical point of view Resolution 1483 gave a role to the United Nations whether in the reconstruction process or in the participation in the political process. The expert referred to by saying:

"Resolution 1483 referred coyly to the United Nations which has become largely broken and crippled, as it was only given very secondary roles in what should be its constants. The Authority, instead of acting as representative under the supervision of the United Nations, which is the logical and legal role in cases of foreign occupation, acted in the exact opposite way. The resolution places the work of the United Nations in



Iraq under the supervision of the Occupying Authority, thus reversing the balance in contradiction to what the position should be in accordance with international law principles in practice. Accordingly, supremacy of international law was alienated and replaced by the law of power in the management of international affairs. ⁽²⁷⁾

All the states voted for the resolution except Syria, which abstained from voting. Commenting on France's voting in favor of the resolution, Colin Powell said: "France's voting for the resolution is a step in the right direction. Work should be done now to deal with the tension points and difficulties remaining from past differences." ⁽²⁸⁾

In implementation of resolution 1483, the UN Secretary-General appointed the Brazilian diplomat Sergio de Mello as his representative in Iraq. De Mello paid several visits to Baghdad to familiarize himself with the situation there. Due to the deterioration of the security situation at that time the United Nations Representation Headquarters in Baghdad was hit by a car bomb on August 19, 2003, resulting in the killing of 23 people and wounding of over 80 people. In that attack the UN representative Sergio de Mello was also killed together with a number of the international mission. The Secretary-General terminated the work of the UN Mission in Iraq and withdrew all the international staff due to the deterioration of the security situation. ⁽²⁹⁾

No UN representative was sent to Iraq until mid-August, 2004, when the Secretary-General appointed Pakistan's ambassador to the UN Mr. Ashraf Jahangir Qadhi to take up the post of Secretary-General's Representative in Iraq. Qadhi visited Iraq on August 13, 2004, and met the interim Iraqi President, Ghazi Al-Yawar, and the interim government Prime



Minister Ayad Allawi. Qadhi also participated in the Iraqi national conference which was held on August 15, 2004.

The Security Council also issued resolution 1500 on August 14, 2003, welcoming the establishment of the Iraq Governing Council.⁽³⁰⁾ The resolution considered this Council as representing the largest sector of the people and an important step towards the formation of internationally recognized representative government that will exercise sovereignty in Iraq in the future.

Conclusions

1. After the issuance of resolution 678, The United States of America prepared for the actual occupation of Iraq. This resolution was used as a basis for aggression on Iraq in 1991. Its provisions remained active through resolution 687, which means that Iraq remained threatened by virtue of the provisions of resolution 687 and its active paragraphs with the use of force to implement the provisions of the said resolution on the basis that resolution 687 lays down conditions for ceasefire in the Gulf War with Iraq. This means that any violation of ceasefire committed, or individually interpreted by the US as having been committed, by Iraq renders the use of force again justified according to the American stand. Accordingly, when the US failed to have a new resolution issued in 2003 for the use of military force against Iraq due to opposition by Russia, France and China, it reverted to resolution 678 and its subsequent conditions for ceasefire in the Gulf War and through resolution 687. This was an untenable position from the legal point of view and condemned from the angle of international legitimacy, because resolution 678 authorized the US specifically to oust the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the effect of the said resolution ceased with the pull out of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991.



2. Iraq occupied on April 23, 2003, by military action, which, according to international law and international relations and in all aspects, is considered an act of aggression and an invasion by two countries of another without a legitimate basis or a legal justification. They were thus obliged to immediately acknowledge that they are occupying countries and set up an authority known as the occupying authority.

18. Facts on the ground and American and British official documents proved that there was no basis for the claims on which the aggression was committed and that it was a military action aimed basically at achieving political, strategic and economic interests in the region.

3. In accordance with all the facts we have established, the United States, Britain and the states that took part with them under the umbrella of the international coalition bear full responsibility for the acts of aggression, the destruction, devastation and undermining of institutions, understructure and environment in Iraq. The leaders of these states must first be held accountable, particularly as the International Criminal Tribunal has acted in this direction with respect to other countries. They should pay equitable compensation to Iraq in respect of all the damage that it had sustained since 1991 up to the present time when the occupation forces declared their abandonment of responsibility and departure from Iraq. Compensations can be paid through legal means as similar cases were treated with regard to the two world wars and others.

4. The occupation authority (the United States and Britain) promoted the spread of chaos, killing and absence of law by dissolving the Iraqi army, security and judicial institutions and abolition of laws and legislation. All This drove the Iraqis into a state of disorder, terror and killing as the American war machine did not know other than this language which still exists.



Resources

- (1) Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Madbooli Alsagee, Cairo (2002), p.41.
- (2) Ibid, p.100.
- (3) Jeaff Simons, *Iraq al-Mustaqbal*, al-Saqi House, Amman (2004), pp. ٣٥٩-٣٥٨.
- (4) Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, al-Ahliea for Publishing and Distributing, Amman (2004), pp. 17-19.
- (5) Fareed Al Faloji, *Qissat al-khiyana wal-Soqoot*, al-Kitab al-Arabi House, Cairo (2003), p.11.
- (6) Ibid, pp. 19-20.
- (7) Ala al-Deen al-Mudaris , *Sada al-Harb al-Aasifa* , al-Raqeem for publishing , Baghdad (2004), p. 78-80.
- (8) Jeaff Simons, *Iraq al-Mustaqbal*, al-Saqi House, OP. Cit., p.360.
- (9) Dr. Muhamed al-Duri, Proffesor of International Law, Baghdad University.
- (10) Muhammed Al Duri, *Intahat al-liba min al-Omam al-Mutahidah ila al-Iraq*, Arabic Cultural Center, Morocco (2004), pp. 85-86.
- (11) *Al-Baiyan*, 7 March 2003.
- (12) Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, OP. Cit., pp. 21-22
- (13) ALJAZEERA CHALNA 23 March 2003.
- (14) Jeaff Simons, *Iraq al-Mustaqbal*, al-Saqi House, OP. Cit., p.360.
- (15) Ala al-Deen al-Mudaris , *Tahta Ramad al-Harb al-Aasifa* , al-Raqeem for publishing , Baghdad (2003), pp.27-28.
- (16) Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, OP. Cit., pp. 70-72.
- (17) See for example, Interview with Muhamed Saied al-Sahaf by Abu Dahbi TV, 1st of October 2003, and Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, OP. Cit., p.72.
- (18) Al Amir House, *al-Sahaf wa Asrar Soqoot Baghdad*, al-Amir House, Baghdad (2003), p.170.
- (19) Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, OP. Cit., p.85.
- (20) Ali Al Jabri, *Asrar al-saat al-Akhira li Soqoot Baghdad*, OP. Cit., p.75.
- (21) Ibid, 91-92.



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- ⁽²²⁾ Ala al-Deen al-Mударis , *Sada al-Harb al-Aasifa*, OP. Cit., pp. 171-177.
- ⁽²³⁾ *al-Jazeera* , 25/4/2006
- ⁽²⁴⁾ Jeaff Simons, *Iraq al-Mustaqbal*, al-Saqi House, OP. Cit., pp. 82-83.
- ⁽²⁵⁾ See the text of Resolution 1483 in *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 23 May 2003 and Muhammed Al Duri, *Intahat al-liba min al-Omam al-Mutahidah ila al-Iraq*, OP. Cit., pp. 276-283.
- ⁽²⁶⁾ Dr. Muhammed al-Duri, Proffesor of International Law in Baghdad University.
- ⁽²⁷⁾ Muhammed al-Duri, *Qarar Majlis al-Amin 1483 Ruia Qanonia wa Siyasia*, *al-Baiyan*, Dubai, 2 July, 2003.
- ⁽²⁸⁾ *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 23 May 2003.
- ⁽²⁹⁾ *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 20 August 2003
- ⁽³⁰⁾ Governing Council of Iraq, established in 13 August 2003, by the decision of Americna Civil Governer in Iraq Paul Bremer.