

## Particularized Conversational Implicature in English Religious Texts

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### ١- INTRODUCTION

The notion of conversational implicature is a core concept of pragmatics and seems to offer some significant functional explanations of linguistic fact. A conversational implicature is not a semantic inference, but rather an inference based on both the content of what is said and some specific assumptions about the cooperative nature of ordinary verbal interaction; Conversational implicature is divided into particularized and generalized conversational implicature; only the former is to be tackled in the present study. As a component of a speaker's meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in an utterance, particularized conversational implicature is not part of what is said (Levinson, ١٩٨٣: ٩٧, ١٠٤; Horn and Ward, ٢٠٠٦: ٣). For example, in (١):

١- A- *Can you cook?*

B- *I know how to put a kettle on.*

(Aronoff and Rees-Millar, ٢٠٠٣: ٣٩٤)

speaker B's response implies that she cannot cook. Here, the manifestly irrelevant answer by B acts as a trigger for A to construct additional premises so that she (speaker A) will be led to see by indirect implication that B is trying to communicate something (Ibid: ٤٠٢).

This research aims at:

- ١- Tracing the notion of particularized conversational implicature.
- ٢- Finding a common criterion for the pragmatic analysis of particularized conversational implicature in English religious texts.
- ٣- Investigating the use of particularized conversational implicature in selected religious texts in English.

It is hypothesized that:

- ١- More than one stratum of particularized conversational implicature can be inferred from religious texts.
- ٢- Religious texts carrying particularized conversational implicatures are exposed to be more economic and more effective.
- ٣- Particularized conversational implicatures can lead to purposes of either favourable or unfavourable implications.

The following are the steps to be followed in the study:

- ١- Surveying the notion of particularized conversational implicature in English.
- ٢- Describing English data of particularized conversational implicature, taking Grice's model into consideration.
- ٣- Applying the notion of particularized conversational implicature to English religious texts selected from The New Testament.

### PARTICULARIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

#### ٢-١ Grice's Theory of particularized Conversational Implicature

Grundy (٢٠٠٠: ٧٨), following Grice's logical rules of conversation, sums up that knowing the Cooperative Principle and its maxims *enables* an addressee to draw inferences as to the implied meanings (or implicatures) of utterances. However, Verschueren and Ostman (٢٠٠٩: ١٠٤) indicate that "the maxims comprise the Cooperative Principle in toto, with implicature external to it". Particularized conversational implicatures are subsumed under the Cooperative Principle since it is

intended to be a means of making conversational contributions 'cooperative'. A particularized conversational implicature is a follow-up in which a hearer first attempt to make sense of an utterance by recourse to the maxims alone; if this fails, he resorts to implicatures to determine its meaning and its speaker's intention.

### ٢-١,١ The Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims

Devitt and Hanley (٢٠٠٦: ١٥٥) state that Grice presents his Cooperative Principle and the conversational maxims as guidelines for how to communicate successfully. Grice (١٩٨٩:٢٦-٧) explicates his governing dictum, the Cooperative Principle: "*Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged*". This general principle is instantiated by general maxims of conversation governing rational interchange. Echoing Kant, Grice presents four main categories (or maxims) that yield results in accordance with the "Cooperative Principle". Thus, these conversational maxims are:

١) **The Maxim of Quantity:** The category of Quantity relates to the *quantity of information* to be provided and under which fall the following maxims:

١. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
٢. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

(Grice, ١٩٨٩:٢٦)

The maxim of Quantity is also called as the maxim of Informativeness (Kearns, ٢٠٠٠: ٢٥٨). Maxim ١ requires a speaker to give enough information that enables a hearer to recognize his intention. Maxim ٢ requires a speaker not to give redundant information passing through extra words.

٢) **The Maxim of Quality:** Try to make your contribution one that is true.

١. Do not say what you believe to be false.
٢. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(Grice, ١٩٨٩:٢٧)

The maxim of Quality is also called as the maxim of "sincerity" in which truth is the ultimate goal, i.e. the semantic content of an utterance coincides a speaker's intention (Horn and Ward, ٢٠٠٦: ٢٠٨; Verschueren and Ostman, ٢٠٠٩: ١٥٠). This maxim of "Truthfulness" is taken by Grice to be of a higher priority than the other maxims, since it provides the background against which they come into play, and generally it takes precedence over the others if there is a clash. It contains the heart of the social principle of cooperation intrinsic to Grice's theory of conversation (Kearns, ٢٠٠٠:٢٥٧; Aronoff and Rees-Miller, ٢٠٠٣: ٤١٤). It directs the provision of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious). The maxim of Quality "seems rather to spell out the difference between something's being, and failing to be, any kind of contribution at all"(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٧١).

٣) **The Maxim of Relation:** Be relevant (ibid: ٢٧).

The maxim of Relation requires using appropriate utterances relevant to a preceding discourse, i.e. to be pertinent (Mey, ٢٠٠٩:١٠٥٢; Bara, ٢٠١٠:٤٦). A speaker is required to associate his current utterance to a former participation (i.e. linguistic co-text), so as to give talk exchange cohesive clues. Brown and Yule (١٩٨٣: ٨٤) translate this maxim of Relation into a more particularly useful form: "Make your contribution relevant in terms of the existing topic framework", in which case the speaker makes his contribution fit closely to the most recent information incorporated in the topic framework.

٤) **The Maxim of Manner:** Be perspicuous. It is related to how what is said is to be said.

١. Avoid obscurity of expression.
٢. Avoid ambiguity.
٣. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity.)
٤. Be orderly.

(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٢٧)

٥. Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply

(ibid: ٢٧٣)

The final point, i.e. "○", is what Grice proposes as an addition to the maxim of Manner in his 'Presupposition and Conversational Implicature': "Frame whatever you say in the form most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate"; or, "Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply." (ibid; Korta and Perry, ٢٠١١: ١٣٦). The maxim of Manner is also called the Maxim of Clarity (Kearns, ٢٠٠٠: ٢٥٥). It requires a speaker to use the fittest among several paradigms. This maxim is rather different from the others because it relates not to what is said, but rather, to how what is said is to be said" (Blutner and Zeevat, ٢٠٠٤: ١٩٥).

## •) A Social Maxim: Be Polite.

Grice's maxims are not limited to those mentioned in ١, ٢, ٣ and ٤; "one might need others". There are other "aesthetic, social, or moral" maxims that participants observe in talk exchanges, and that may generate conversational implicatures. Nonetheless, Grice gives "Be Polite" as an example, leaving it open to generalize his scheme (Grice, [١٩٧٥] ١٩٨٩: ٢٨; Brown and Yule, ١٩٨٣: ٣٢; Verschueren and Ostman, ٢٠٠٩: ١٥٥).

## ٢-٢ Generating Particularized Conversational Implicature: Observation and Exploitation

Observation and exploitation are in line with the general pattern for generating a particularized conversational implicature. It is a speaker- hearer correlation to work out particularized conversational implicature. A speaker's implication relies on the following:

- a- A speaker observes the conversational maxims or at least the Cooperative Principle, promoting conversational rationality.
- b- He is aware that his implication is required in order to make his saying or utterance consistent with this presumption.
- c- The speaker thinks that it is within the competence of the hearer to deduce, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition in (b) is required.

(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٠-١)

However, to work out that a particularized conversational implicature is present, a hearer's inference may rely on the following data:

- a- The conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved.
- b- The Cooperative Principle and the maxims.
- c- The context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance.
- d- Other items of the background knowledge.
- e- The fact that all the relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants; and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

(Ibid: ٣١)

A particularized conversational implicature is connected to a speaker's deliberate violation of a maxim, with the supposition that this speaker is rational in his communication. Grice (ibid: ٣٧٠) states that an implicature arises in the following way: an implicature is the content of that psychological state or attitude which needs to be attributed to a speaker in order to secure one or another of the following results:

- a- A violation on speaker's part of a conversational maxim is in the circumstances justifiable, at least in that speaker's point of view.
- b- What appears to be a violation of a conversational maxim (by a speaker) is only by *seeming*, *not real*, violation; the spirit, though not the letter, of the maxim is respected. Mey (٢٠٠٩: ٣٦٦) upholds that Gricean reasoning leads the hearer to the insight that violation is only apparent.

Grice (١٩٨٩: ٣٠) expounds flouting the maxims to be the connection between the Cooperative Principle and the maxims on the one hand and the particularized conversational implicature on the other. A speaker can fail to observe the maxims, yet remain within the Cooperative Principle through the use of implicature (Verschueren and Ostman, ٢٠٠٩: ١٠٥). So, a participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways:

- ١- He *may* quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim, in which case he dispromotes a


conversational rationality; if so, in some cases a speaker is prevented for some reason from observing a maxim and would be liable to mislead.

- ٢- He *may* opt out from the operation both of the maxim and the Cooperative Principle, often with the intention to mislead, such as when he says ' *I cannot say more; my lips are sealed*'.
- ٣- He may be faced by a clash which arises when one cannot be fully cooperative, being unable, for example, to fulfill the maxim of Quantity without violating the maxim of Quality.
- ٤- He may flout a maxim or blatantly fail to fulfill it. The assumption is not that communication breaks down, but that a speaker chooses an indirect way of achieving it, though considerations of politeness may inhibit the speaker. A maxim is said to be exploited, still the Cooperative Principle is observed. This is one of the most crucial aspects of Grice's theory for the interpretation of various types of texts.

(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٠, ٣٧٠; Black, ٢٠٠٦: ٢٤-٥)

The following figure presents the way particularized conversational implicatures are derived according to Grice's theory:

**Figure (١): The Researcher's Formulation of Deriving a Conversational Implicature (Based on Grice's (١٩٨٩))**



### ٢-٣ Groups of Particularized Conversational Implicature

According to Grice (ibid: ٣٧), particularized conversational implicatures are cases in which an implicature is carried by saying a particular proposition on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context. They result from situations in which an utterance would be inappropriate on the basis of its conventional meaning *alone*. Grice (ibid: ٣١- ٧) construes three groups of examples of how to generate a particularized conversational implicature:

**Group A:** It includes examples in which *no maxim is violated*, or at least in which it is not clear that any maxim is violated. An example glossed by Grice is a talk exchange between A, who stands by an immobilized car and B, a passerby:

- ١- A - *I am out of petrol.*
- B - *There is a garage round the corner.*

(ibid: ٣١)

To assume that A immediately proceeds to the garage, secures the petrol, and refills his car, B's contribution may be described as having been successful (Mey, ٢٠٠٩: ١٥٢). In this example, as he gives **hint** of what he intends to mean, B generates a particularized conversational implicature by observing the maxim of Relation. Premises, derived from B's utterance through a process of reasoning, make clear that what he intends to convey is relevant to A's proposition. An implicature is inferred via rational interpretation of these premises and a hearer can reach a particular conclusion. In example (٣), B's response can carry the following assumptions:

- i- *There is a garage round the corner.*
- ii- *If so, the garage is supposed to be open.*
- iii- *If so, it has petrol to sell.*
- iv- *If so, A can have petrol from that garage.*
- v- *A can have his car fueled. (Conclusion)*

The hearer deductively infers premises, i.e. ii, iii and iv, which gesticulate v. The manifestly irrelevant response by B acts as a trigger for A to construct additional premises, in order that *he can* be led to make out that speaker B tries to communicate something which is in accordance with the maxim of Relation. All such additional pieces of information, whether premises or conclusions, are said to be particularized conversational implicatures (see Aronoff and Rees-Miller, ٢٠٠٣: ٤٠٢).

**Group B:** It includes examples in which a maxim is violated, but its violation is to be explained by the supposition of a *clash* with another maxim, e.g.:

۲- A- *Where does C live?*

B- *Somewhere in the South of France.*

Speaker B refers to C's location in an unspecific way. B (*seemingly*) opts out the first maxim of Quantity since he is less informative than is required to meet A's needs. This infringement can be explained only by the supposition that B observes the second maxim of Quality; so, speaker B implicates that he does not know in which town "C" lives (Grice, ۱۹۸۹: ۳۲-۳; Atlas, ۲۰۰۵: ۷۷). Another example of a clash between the maxim of Quantity and the maxim of Manner is manifested by Verschueren and Ostman (۲۰۰۹: ۱۵۲); a doctor who says of his patient:

۳- *One of the valves of his heart has narrowed, and consequently the blood no longer flows well.*

instead of simply saying that he has a "mitral stenosis" (whence, it is the implicature conveyed) certainly violates the maxim of Quantity as he speaks with verbosity, while it is possible to use a shorter expression; the speaker does that in order to fulfill the maxim of Manner, "not to be obscure". The circumlocution used in this utterance elucidates a morbidity state that can directly be derived from the semantic content of the utterance with no need for premises.

**Group C-** It includes examples in which a maxim is exploited; it is a procedure by which a maxim is flouted for the purpose of getting in a particularized conversational implicature by means of something of the nature of a figure of speech. The hearer is entitled to assume that the Cooperative Principle and the maxims are observed at the level of what is implicated, rather than at the level of what is said (Grice: ۱۹۸۹: ۳۳). As for Group C, flouting the maxims can have the following examples:

(۱a) A flouting of the first maxim of Quantity: Examples of flouting the first maxim of Quantity can be provided by utterances of patent **tautology**, such as:

۴- *War is war.* (ibid)

in which there is a blatant infringement of the injunction to be as informative as required to meet a hearer's needs for information (Atlas, ۲۰۰۵: ۷۶). Davis (۱۹۹۸: ۴۲) explains tautology in the case of (۴) that it is the nature of war that terrible things always happen in it and it is no good lamenting that particular disaster. The details of what is implicated depend upon the particular context of the utterance.

(۱b) A flouting of the second maxim of Quantity: An infringement of the second maxim of Quantity ("don't give more information than is required") is due to the assumption that the existence of such a maxim should be admitted (Grice, ۱۹۸۹: ۳۳). As such, a speaker may use several words belonging to the same semantic field. It is always a word technique, and if mishandled, it results in verbosity. The utterance in (۵) can be presented (as in ۶) with less information, and still gives the same content:

۵- *I blocked the alleys, lanes, streets, highways and thoroughfares that led to the hideout.*

۶- *I blocked the roads that led to the hideout.*

For some hearers, it is possibly that (۵) sounds more poetic, whereas it would sound tedious and repetitive for others, as compared to (۶). The utterance in (۵), via exploitation of the second maxim of quantity, giving more information than is required, conveys the struggle a speaker underwent to block access (Wright and Hope, ۱۹۹۶: ۱۷۲). An example of figures of speech that embody flouting the second maxim of Quality is **periphrasis**, a roundabout way of referring to something by means of several words instead of naming it directly in a single word or phrase such as when referring to "fish" as "the finny tribe" (Baldick, ۲۰۰۱: ۱۸۹).

(۲a) A Flouting of the first maxim of Quality: Examples in which the first maxim of Quality (don't say what you believe to be false) is flouted are stated mainly in four figures of speech: irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it is just not information. Hence, a flouting of the first maxim of Quality, resulting in a particularized conversational implicature via a figure of speech, is an infringement at the level of what is said, and

truth is supposed to be reserved at the level of what is implicated (Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٤, ٣٧١).

#### i. Irony:

Irony is intimately connected with the expression of a feeling, attitude or evaluation. An utterance is ironic if it is intended to reflect a hostile or derogatory judgment or a feeling such as indignation or contempt (ibid: ٥٣-٤). Irony is always against a character and occurs when there is a gap between words and the meaning which those words have in work (Gill, ٢٠٠٦: ٥٠٦). For example, when you say of someone you trusted completely but who has betrayed your trust that:

<sup>٧</sup>- *He is a fine friend.*

the utterance cannot be intended to be taken as a true expression of belief; rather, the speaker must intend some other related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he asserts to put forward, i.e. *He is a bad friend* (Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٤; Chapman, ٢٠٠٥: ١٩٦).

#### ii- Metaphor

Metaphor is a semantic equivalence and a comparison in which there is an implicit identity as one thing is described in terms of another (Gill, ٢٠٠٦: ٥٠٧; Cuddon, ١٩٩٨: ٥٠٧). Three stages are envisaged to recognize a statement as metaphorical rather than literal: forming a literal interpretation of the utterance, relating that interpretation to the immediate context and to world knowledge; then seeking a non-literal interpretation. The second stage is related to the maxim of Quality: 'Do not say anything which you know to be false'. If the utterance is false in literal terms, then a metaphorical meaning must be intended (Field, ٢٠٠٤: ١٧٨), such as:

<sup>٨</sup>- *You are the cream in my coffee.*

Though the assertion of what is said in (<sup>٨</sup>) is no doubt false, the truism of what is conveyed lies in the interpretation in which a speaker intends a hearer to reach the interpretant "*You are my pride and joy*". The first maxim of Quality is flouted at the level of what is said, but not at the level of what is implicated because the speaker is supposed to attribute to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles the mentioned substance (Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٤). In other words, a metaphor involves transparent violation of the maxim of Quality with the false proposition expressed by the literal meaning of the sentence, having to be replaced by some quite different proposition (Aronoff and Rees-Miller, ٢٠٠٣: ٤١٤).

#### iii- Meiosis

Meiosis is a rhetorical figure by which something is referred to in terms less important than it really deserves; it is an understatement or 'belittling' used for emphasis (Baldick, ٢٠٠١: ١٤٩). For example, of a man known to have broken all the furniture, one says:

<sup>٩</sup>- *He was a little intoxicated.*

(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٤)

The belittling of the state of indignation expressed in (<sup>٩</sup>) indicates speaker's deploring towards such behaviour and implicates that the agent "was" a madman.

#### iv- Hyperbole

It is an overstatement which is simply an exaggeration in the service of truth; here, one may add emphasis to what he really means (Perrine, ١٩٧٤: ٦٥٠), such as:

<sup>١٠</sup>- *Every nice girl loves a sailor.*

(Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٣٤)

Speaker's exaggeration of sailors to be generally loved to every nice girl implicates that sailors are so attractive to girls.

(<sup>٢</sup>b) A Flouting of the second maxim of Quality: Examples in which the second maxim of Quality "don't say that which you lack adequate evidence" is flouted, are such as to say of X's wife that:

<sup>١١</sup>- *She is probably deceiving him this evening.*

The **probability** of such a proposition in a suitable context, or with a suitable gesture or tone of voice, might well be that she is given to deceiving her husband. For X's wife to be under suspect for such a conduct, a probability of a future action, though with no evidence, is given to implicate that she is the sort of person who would not stop short of such conduct (ibid: ٣٤-٥).

(२) A Flouting of the maxim of Relation: Examples in which an implicature is achieved by real, as distinct from apparent, violation of the maxims of Relation are cases in which a speaker does not associate what he says to the most recent information. Violations of the maxim of Relation may be achieved by changing the subject of speech, though the addressee may not realize this violation. At a genteel tea party, for example, the following talk exchange occurs:

1२- A- *Mrs. X is an old bag.*

(After an appellant pause)

B- *The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?*

(ibid: ३०)

Speaker B blatantly refuses to make what he says relevant to A's remark. A **variate** "conveying a topic shift can be understood as a signal of disagreement" (Fischer, २००६: ११). Speaker B thereby indicates that A's remark should not be discussed, seeing that A commits a social gaffe (Grice, १९८९: ३०). Davis (१९९८: १८०-६) notifies that two propositions may be less closely related. As Grice's maxim of Relation is concerned with the relationship between speaker's contributions and the purpose of the conversation, the principle of antecedent relation is concerned with the relationship between the literal sense of the implicating utterance and the implicated proposition.

(ॢ) A Flouting of the maxim of Manner: Examples in which various maxims falling under the super-maxim, "Be perspicuous", are flouted are as the following:

(ॢa) **Ambiguity**: This sort of implicature is concerned only with ambiguity which is deliberate and expected (by a speaker) to be recognized by a hearer (Grice, १९८९: ३०); it is a "property of having more than one linguistically encoded meaning" (Chapman and Routledge, २००९: ३). There are two types of such case:

i- The first includes examples in which there is no difference between two interpretations of an utterance with respect to straightforwardness; neither interpretation is overriding the other. An example taken from Blake's verse is:

1ॢ- *"Never seek to tell thy love,  
Love that never told can be."*

There may be a double ambiguity in this line of verse: first, '*thy love*' may refer to either a state of emotion, i.e. to feel affectionate for someone, or an object of emotion, i.e. beloved; second, '*love that never told can be*' may mean either '*love that cannot be told*' or '*love that if told cannot continue to exist*' (Grice, १९८९: ३०).

ii- The second includes examples in which one interpretation is notably less straight-forward than the other. An example of that is when a British general, who captured the province of Sind, sent back a message: '*Peccavi*' which literally means '*I have sinned*'. His message can have a straightforward interpretation '*I have Sind*' and a non-straightforward interpretation '*I have sinned*'; though the former is conveyed, it seems that there are stylistic reasons for conveying by an utterance merely its non-straightforward interpretation. The choice of either interpretation depends on whether such a supposition would conflict with other conversational requirements, for example, would it be relevant, would it be something the speaker could be supposed to accept, and so on. However, ambiguity arises mainly for the foreigner who makes standard translation into native English (ibid: ३६).

(ॢb) **Obscurity**: For a speaker to make his utterance obscure may carry implicit intentions. Trying to keep a secret from a child, a speaker might deliberately make his utterance obscure for that child (Mey, २००९: १०३), but perceptible for his addressee, for example:

1।- A- *Let's go to the supermarket.*

B- *But an I-C-E C-R-E-A-M should not be on the list.*

Speaker B in his response exploits, for the purpose of communication, a deliberate and overt violation of the requirement that one should avoid obscurity. Hence, if the Cooperative Principle is to operate, the speaker must intend his partner to understand what he says despite the obscurity he imports into his utterance (Grice, १९८९: ३६).

(ॢc) Failure to be brief or succinct can be clarified in comparing the following remarks:

١٥- A- Miss X sang "Home Sweet Home."

B- Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of "Home Sweet Home."

To suppose that a reviewer has chosen to utter that in *B* rather than *A* is to select that **rigmarole** in place of the concise and nearly synonymous "*sang*". It is presumably to indicate some striking difference between Miss X's performance and those to which the word "*sing*" is usually applied. The most obvious supposition, for the implication of speaker *B* which the reviewer is likely to spring to mind, is that Miss X's performance suffers from some hideous defect (ibid).

(٤d) Failure to be orderly, though not explained by Grice, can be observed in communications with overlaps between speakers that result from conversations with interventions from other speakers (see Jørgensen and Phillips, ٢٠٠٢: ٨١).

Grice's examples indicate figures of speech that can result in generating particularized conversational implicature. Notwithstanding, a figure of speech is an expression that cannot be taken literary, or a way of saying one thing and meaning another (Perrine, ١٩٧٤: ٦١٠; Baldick, ٢٠٠١: ٩٧). These examples are means to an implicature rather than meanings inferred through mental discern. So, here is a distinction between an implicature and a means to an implicature.

## ٢-٤ Particularized Conversational Implicature, Interpretation and the Purpose of Speech


Grice's theory is in part a theory of interpretation or under-standing (Davis, ١٩٩٨: ١٤). As Grice's inferential approach to conversation explains how a hearer selects the interpretation which the speaker intends, there is a general assumption that the interpretation of an utterance is a collaborative enterprise guided by the Cooperative Principle. A particularized conversational implicature can be derived by a retrieving interpretation through a process of reasoning in the face of an apparent violation of the maxims which lie at the heart of the Gricean account of conversation (Aronoff and Rees-Miller, ٢٠٠٣: ٤٠١-٢).

Grice's notion of particularized conversational implicature is based on the idea that the logical form of an utterance may be to a certain extent different from context-bound interpretation, with general principles of language use mediating between the two (Chapman, ٢٠٠٥: ١١٨, ١٦٧). Two levels of interpretation are to be tackled to reach a speaker's intention. The first is that of "usual interpretation", indicating a speaker's intended meaning down to adherence to the Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims; the second is that level in which the "usual interpretation" is not "sacrosanct" and possibly abandoned, but replaced by a "closely allied interpretation" that embodies a particularized conversational implicature. The Cooperative Principle is intuitively attractive and it seems likely that participants (unconsciously) use it in their interpretation of discourse, though different societies may interpret the maxims differently (Black, ٢٠٠٦: ٢٤).

In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim or an accepted purpose representing transitory conversational interests of the participants who are expected to identify them. Participants recognize a common purpose or a set of purposes that are connected to the conversational maxims and which a particularized conversational implicature is supposed to serve (Grice, ١٩٨٩: ٢٨-٩). Speaking with a mode of speech resulting in particularized conversational implicature appears to be connected to the expression of a certain feeling, attitude or evaluation such as hostile or derogatory judgment, indignation or contempt (Ibid: ٥٣-٤). So, a particularized conversational implicature carried in an utterance aims at serving the purpose of talk exchange. The purpose of speech is the end point in the interpretation of an utterance as it reflects the aim why participants exchange information. Interpretation is an intellectual manipulation that transfer's speaker's utterance into an intended meaning and purpose in a hearer's thought. The following figure delineates the levels mediating between an utterance and the purpose of communication.

Figure (٢): The Researcher's Formulation of Utterance Interpretation

Utterance



## ٣- DATA ANALYSIS

### ٣-١ The Model of Analysis

To analyze religious texts in English, Grice's dichotomy of particularized conversational implicature (PCI) is to be tackled. PCI has been classified into three main groups on account of the extent to which a conversational maxim is infringed. It can be extended to the following possible examples:

١. To group A, in which no clear violation of a maxim is made, it is possible to add the following examples:
  - a. Insinuation: it is a circumstantial metonymy that aims at a feature unmentioned in the utterance, depending on the situational context.
  - b. Exemplum: it is a short tale used as an example to illustrate a moral point, usually in a sermon or other didactic work.
  - c. Symbolic meaning: a speaker may conceal a concept in his utterance while he intends to make it intelligible for a hearer
  - d. 'Shifts': the shift in the direction of speech indicates a violation of the cooperative principle.
٢. To group C, in which a maxim is flouted, it is possible to add 'personification', i.e. the attribution of human qualities to inanimate objects.

In the present study, it is possible to recognize favourable or unfavourable purposes derived from the religious texts. A purpose is volition or something in mind that language is supposed to achieve. A possible dichotomy of such purposes is: admiration and contempt, consent and regret (or indignation), exaltation and derogatory judgment, supplication and repudiation, preachment and enticement, commendation and reprimand, etc.

As far as PCI is concerned, the present study is going to analyze data from certain religious verses selected from different Gospels of The New Testament. PCIs are assorted according to:

- a- whether there is an infringement or not; a case which includes three groups: Group A, Group B and Group C.
- b- flouting the maxims respectively in Group C: ١A- a flouting of the first maxim of Quantity, ١B- a flouting of the second maxim of Quantity, ٢A- a flouting of the first maxim of Quality, ٢B- a flouting of the second maxim of Quality, ٣- a flouting of the maxim of Relation, ٤- a flouting of the maxim of Manner.

### ٣-٢ Analysis of English Texts

#### ٣-٢,١ Text ١

You are vipers' brood! Who warned you to escape from the coming retribution? Then prove your repentance by the fruit it bears; and do not presume to say to yourselves, "We have Abraham for our father" I tell you that God can make children for Abraham out of these stones here. Already the axe is laid to the roots of the trees; and every tree that fails to produce

good fruit is cut down and thrown on the fire.

(Matt, ٢: ٧-١٠)

In this text, John the Baptist (عليه السلام) addresses the Pharisees and Sadducees who come to him for baptism. The following analysis can be presented:

a- You are vipers' brood!

In this utterance, the first maxim of Quality is flouted since vipers do not give birth to human (Pharisees and Sadducees). A metaphor is indicated in this utterance that these Pharisees and Sadducees are the sons of Satan (c.f. "Your Father is the devil" (John, ٨: ٤٤)) and they are sneaking adversary (فكري: [http://st-takla.org/pub\\_Bible-interpretations](http://st-takla.org/pub_Bible-interpretations)).

b- Then prove your repentance by the fruit it bears; and do not presume to say to yourselves, "We have Abraham for our father" I tell you that God can make children for Abraham out of these stones here.

John the Baptist (عليه السلام) disputes that the Pharisees and Sadducees should show themselves righteous with their deeds or "by the fruit" that their repentance bears, rather than by merely claiming that they are the seeds of Abraham. A flouting of the first maxim of Quality is made as the word "fruit" is borrowed for the sequel of their deeds. That God can make children for Abraham out of stone gives hint to the implication that the Pharisees and Sadducees have no priority over people.

c- Already the axe is laid to the roots of the trees; and every tree that fails to produce good fruit is cut down and thrown on the fire.

This parable is about the false prophets who lead people to wrong-doings (Matt, ٧: ١٥-١٧). The image with which a portrait of a bad tree is thrown on the fire implicates that those who have no faith are like a tree that fails to produce good fruit; they are thrust down to hell.

The following implicatures can be derived from this analysis.

a- PCI. Group C. Metaphor: *Pharisees and Sadducees are sneaking adversary.*

b-

:

i.

PCI.

Group C. Metaphor: *The Pharisees and Sadducees cannot be favoured to God by merely being the seeds of Abraham; they have to show good deeds.*

ii.

PCI.

Group A. Hint:

١.

God can

*make children for Abraham out of stones.*

٢.

If so, the

*Pharisees and Sadducees have no favour or priority over people.*

٣.

If so, they

*should not presume their descending from Abraham.*

٤.

If so, their

*kinship from Abraham does not save them from the coming retribution.*

٥.

So, it is

*only by true faith and good deeds, and not by kinship, that man can be safe from the coming retribution.*

c-

PCI.

Group A. Exemplum: *Those who have no faith shall be thrust down to hell.*

A general purpose derived from the text as a whole is:

•

PS: *It is a*

*derogatory judgment.*

٣-٢, ٢

Text ٢

As they sat at supper Jesus said 'I tell you this: one of you will betray me — one who is eating with me.' At this they were dismayed; and one by one they said to him, 'not I, surly?' 'It is one of the twelve', he said 'who is dipping into same bowl with me. The Son of Man is going the way appointed for him in the scriptures; but alas for that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would be better for that man if he had never been born.'

(Mark, ١٤:١٨- ٢١)

Sitting with his disciples in his last supper, Jesus (ﷺ) exposes that one of the disciples, referring to Judas, betrays him (فكري: [http://st-takla.org/pub\\_Bible-Interpretations](http://st-takla.org/pub_Bible-Interpretations)). A prophecy in the scriptures is to be materialized that one of Jesus' disciples, i.e. Judas, betrays him. The following analysis is to be applied:

- a- 'I tell you this: one of you will betray me \_\_ one who is eating with me.' At this they were dismayed; and one by one they said to him, 'not I, surly?' 'It is one of the twelve', he said 'who is dipping into same bowl with me.'

Jesus (ﷺ) is well aware of the one who betrays him, but he does not call him by name. Jesus (ﷺ) does not scandalize Judas though he knows his inner self which is not apparent for the others. Jesus (ﷺ) presents an insinuation expressed by the clause "who is dipping into same bowl with me", implicating that Judas' betrayal is ignoble as he shares food with Jesus (ﷺ).

- b- The Son of Man is going the way appointed for him in the scriptures;

The epithet used in the utterance is a symbolic reference to Jesus (ﷺ). A metonymy is used in this utterance that a prophecy is mentioned in the scriptures: "*I will strike the shepherd down and the sheep will be scattered*" (Mark, ١٤: ٢٧). The second maxim of Quantity is flouted since it is possible to say '*I am going the way appointed for me in the scripture*', but Jesus (ﷺ) intends to make his words relevant to what is mentioned in the scriptures, a case which explains the metonymy in the utterance as a whole. So, here is a clash between the second maxim of Quantity and the maxim of Relation, generating an implicature that a prophecy in the scriptures that the Christ (ﷺ) is to be given up into the power of men, and they will kill him, is to be materialized (see Mark, ٩:٣١).

- c- but alas for that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would be better for that man if he had never been born.'

Jesus (ﷺ) imparts his regret for what Judas' destiny would devolve to because of his betrayal. As Judas betrays Jesus, he betrays a prophet who is sent by God. Judas' work is against God and his punishment will be so hard that "it would be better for him if he had never been born". Observing the maxim of Relation, a hint is made that Judas will suffer severely in the Afterlife.

Hence, it possible to derive the following implicatures:

- a- PCI. Group A. Insinuation:

١. Judas is dipping into same bowl with Jesus.
٢. If so, he is supposed to be so close to Jesus.
٣. If so, Judas is supposed to be loyal to Jesus.
٤. But Judas on the contrary betrays Jesus.
٥. So, Judas' betrayal offends the ethical, moral or any high-minded dogma.

- b- :

- i. PCI. Group A: Symbolic: *Jesus is the one referred to in the scriptures.*
- ii. PCI. Group B. Allusion: *A prophecy, in the scriptures that the Christ is to be given up by men into the power of men, and they will kill him, is to be materialized.*

- c- PCI. Group A. Hint:

١. Judas betrays Jesus the Christ.
٢. If so, Judas betrays a prophet.
٣. The prophet is the messenger of God.
٤. If so, Judas' betrayal is against God.
٥. If so, his punishment will be bifold that he regrets being once alive.
٦. Thus, Judas will suffer severely in the Afterlife.

A general purpose derived from the text as a whole is:

- PS: *It is indignation.*

٣-٢,٣

## Text ٣

The thief comes only to steal, to kill to destroy; I have come that men may have life, and may have it in all its fullness. I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.

(John, ١٠: ١٠-١١)

In this text, Jesus (ﷺ) gives two opposite sights: one of a thief, the other of a

shepherd. As Jesus gives a statement of what a thief may do, he portrays the role of a shepherd. The following analysis can be drawn.

- a- The thief comes only to steal, to kill to destroy. I have come that men may have life, and may have it in all its fullness.

As Jesus starts talking about "the thief", he shifts the direction of speech by talking about himself. This gives an impact to what follows. A flouting of the first maxim of Quality is made since "men" already do have life. The meiosis of how it could be that "men may have life" while they do have life is explained in the supposition that Jesus enlivens people's faith so that they "may have it in all its fullness" in the Afterlife.

- b- I am the good shepherd;

This utterance indicates a flouting of the first maxim of Quality. It expresses a metaphor implicating that Jesus is the real custodian over Christianity.

- c- the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.

An exemplum of how the shepherd sacrifices his life so that his sheep would survive implicates that Jesus, like the good shepherd, lays down his life for the Christians.

The following implicatures can be derived from the text:

- a- :
    - i. PCI. Group A. Shift: *People should resort to Jesus.*
    - ii. PCI. Group C. Meiosis: *Jesus enlivens people's faith so that they may have it in all its fullness in the Afterlife.*
  - b- PCI. Group C. Metaphor: *Jesus is the real custodian over Christianity.*
  - c- PCI. Group A. Exemplum: *Jesus lays down his life for the Christians.*
- The text as a whole has the following purpose:
- PS: *It is Preachment.*

#### ٣-٢,٤ Text ٤

O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that murders the prophets and stones the messengers sent to her! How often have I longed to gather your children, as a hen gathers her brood under her wings; but you would not let me. Look, look! There is your temple, forsaken by God. And I tell you, you shall never see me until the time comes when you say, "Blessings on him who comes in the name of the Lord!"

(Luke, ١٣: ٣٤-٣٥)

Jesus (ﷺ) in this text converses the Pharisees, but his words addresses Jerusalem in a reproof. He imparts that Jerusalem is a doomed city that murders the prophets, stones the messengers and prevents Jesus to gather its people under his authority. The following analysis is to be derived.

- a- How often have I longed to gather your children, as a hen gathers her brood under her wings; but you would not let me. This utterance indicates a flouting of the first maxim of Quality; though a city can have citizens, still they are not its children. So, this rhetorical question embodies a metaphor, implicating that Jesus so far intends to convert the people of Jerusalem to worship God under his authority, but neither the people of Jerusalem nor its rulers tolerate that.

- b- Look, look! There is your temple, forsaken by God.

God is not satisfied with the citizens of Jerusalem because they forsake his prophets and messengers and follow their desires. The utterance gives hint to the implication that the citizens of Jerusalem are no longer the servants of God.

- c- And I tell you, you shall never see me until the time comes when you say, "Blessings on him who comes in the name of the Lord!"

Here is an allusion to Jesus' resurrection that he, and his followers with him, shall reign for a thousand years (Revelation, ٢٠:٤-٦). The first maxim of Quantity is opted out because the time of Jesus' being back is not specified except by an indirect reference in the scripture. This infringement is made so that Jesus' speech would be relevant to what is mentioned about his resurrection in the scriptures.

The following implicatures can be inferred:

- a- PCI. Group C. Metaphor. *Jesus so far intends to convert the people of Jerusalem to worship God under his authority, but neither the people of Jerusalem nor its rulers tolerate that.*
- b- PCI. Group A. Hint:
  - ١. *The temple is forsaken by God,*
  - ٢. *If so, God is not satisfied with what happens in the temple,*
  - ٣. *If so, the citizens of Jerusalem disobey God,*
  - ٤. *If so, they forsake God,*
  - ٥. *So, the citizens of Jerusalem no longer worship God.*
- c- PCI. Group B. Allusion: *Jesus leaves Jerusalem, but he will be back in his resurrection.*  
The purpose of the text is:
  - PS: *It is a reprimand.*

## ٣-٢,٥ Text •

You Pharisees! You clean the outside of cup and plate; but inside you there is nothing but greed and wickedness. You fools! Did not he who made the outside make the inside too? But let what is in the cup be given in charity, and all is clean. (Luke, ١١:٣٩-٤١)

The situational context of this text is that a Pharisee invited Jesus for a meal. When Jesus came and sat down, the Pharisee noticed with surprise that Jesus had not begun by washing before the meal (Luke, ١١: ٣٧-٨). Jesus makes his foresight of what needs to be cleaned and he denounces the state of hypocrisy that the Pharisees apply. Jesus (ﷺ) makes his indignation of the Pharisees that they are hypocrite, taking care of their appearances, pretending to be the faithful and ignoring their love to God. The following analysis can be derived:

- a- You clean the outside of cup and plate; but inside you there is nothing but greed and wickedness.

The Pharisees take care of their appearances; but, as for their interior side, they ignore justice and love of God (Luke, ١١:٤٢). This is indicated in the shift from a speech about cleanness of "cup and plate" to that about the Pharisees' interiors which are in turn full of greed and wickedness. This shift in the direction of speech indicates a violation of the Cooperative Principle implicating that the Pharisees are hypocrite.

- b- You fools! Did not he who made the outside make the inside too?

In the utterance, "You fools!" indicates an irony and implicates that the Pharisees blunder, since they take care of their appearances and ignore justice and love of God.

- c- But let what is in the cup be given in charity, and all is clean.

This utterance embodies a metaphor that "what is in the cup" stands for man's interior which, if reformed, will result in reforming all his status.

It is possible to derive the following implicatures:

- a- PCI: Group A. Shift: *The Pharisees are hypocrite as they take care of their appearances and ignore the love of God.*
- b- PCI. Group C. Irony: *The Pharisees blunder.*
- c- PCI. Group A. Metaphor: *If man reforms his belief in God, then all his life will be reformed.*

The text as a whole can have the following purpose:

- PS: *It is a derogatory judgment.*

## ٤- Conclusions

The following conclusions are derived:

- ١- Particularized conversational implicature is exposed to be the final step of the process of interpreting an utterance that leads to a purpose. It is an inference due to mental discern of what is intended to be conveyed and it relies on speaker's self-commitment to facilitate the transferring of his message, hearer's deduction of the message conveyed and the conventionality of the message.
- ٢- Particularized Conversational implicatures is justified by a speaker's mode to create an effect on his hearer.
- ٣- Grice's approach of PCI manifests a ground of applicability to English religious texts.

- ٤- There would be more than one stratum of implicature of an utterance with the supposition that an utterance as parts can have implicatures and as a whole can have a more all-around implicature. This validates the second hypothesis of the study.
- ٥- An utterance comes to reconcile speaker's intention and satisfy those purposes of talk exchange in which a speaker and a hearer are engaged. Utterances carrying particularized conversational implicatures are exposed to be more effective since language draws attention to itself, and more economic, showing a set of words with plentitude of signification.
- ٦- The purpose of speech is the end result in the interpretation of an utterance as it reflects the aim why participants exchange information. A possible dichotomy of purposes that an implicature can hand round is: admiration and contempt, consent and regret (or indignation), exaltation and derogatory judgment, supplication and repudiation, etc.
- ٧- The interpretation of an utterance is that process with which a hearer infers a particularized conversational implicature and the purpose of that implicature. It is a speaker-hearer correlation with the supposition that a hearer extracts semantic features from a speaker's utterance so as to compose an associate representing his purpose, his intention and any implicit meaning included in that intention. It is the selection of the appropriate among a paradigm of associations (or obtainable significations). So, interpretation is the cornerstone with which an utterance can be discriminated to have a conversational implicature.

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