

Towards a Model of Local Pragmatic Coherence

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١. Introduction

PRAGMATIC COHERENCE can be either local or global. Global PRAGMATIC COHERENCE, which is not the concern of this study, holds the relations of speech acts in a whole conversation, whereas local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE holds the relations between sequential speech acts in that conversation. In this work, the relations and interrelatedness between the utterances of discourse will be investigated in terms of local pragmatic coherence only. This means that the type of relations investigated here will be pragmatic ones. Theoretically, these relations will be differentiated from other types of relations such as semantic or rhetorical relations. Nevertheless, some kind of similarity or overlap will be revealed among such classes of relations. Precisely, the essential aim of this paper is to develop a model which can be used for the analysis of data in relation to local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE. The workability of the model will be tested against data taken from D. H. Lawrence's novel *Sons and Lovers*. The data will be represented by conversations randomly selected from this novel.

٢.١ Pragmatic Relations vs. Semantic Relations

At the level of meaningful coherence, two types of relations have been the focus of discourse analysis: semantic and pragmatic. However, labels vary from one linguist to another: semantic vs. pragmatic (Van Dijk, ١٩٧٩), contents vs. pragmatic (epistemic/speech act) (Sweetser, ١٩٩٠), external vs. internal (Martin, ١٩٩٢), identical vs. interpersonal (Degand, ١٩٩٨), and the like. What unifies such labels is their division of level according to semanticness and pragmaticness.

Redeker (١٩٩١: ١١٦٧-٨) proposes that semantic relations hold in discourse when uttering discourse units in the given context entails the speaker's commitment to the existence of that relation in the world the discourse describes. Some of these relations are found in temporal, causal, elaborational and contrastive links in

discourse. On the other hand, she (ibid) stresses that pragmatic relations (which she calls 'rhetorical structure') are found in discourse when the strongest relation does not hold between the propositions expressed by sentences but holds between the illocutionary intentions they convey. This means that the pragmatic relation is connected with the participants' concept of discourse purpose. Examples of these relations are evidence, justification, conclusion and so forth.

According to Sanders (١٩٩٧), the two levels of coherence relations – 'semantic / locutionary / propositional' and 'pragmatic / illocutionary / speech-act' – are not always separable; pragmatic relations are in fact not always overtly linked to the real world, although that is what characterizes them. Moreover, he proceeds,

... a pragmatic relation can, but not be [always] based on a connection in the real world. The distinction implies that in the case of a pragmatic relation the level of connection ... is the illocutionary level. This connection possibly exists in addition to a locutionary connection, but the relevant level of connection is the illocutionary one. (ibid: ١٢٣)(Addition is by researchers)

This propounds the possibility but not the necessity of the relation between the pragmatic relation and the real world.

Similarly, Van Dijk (١٩٧٧c: ٢٢٠) emphasizes that certain relation labels between semantic and pragmatic relations may overlap. Moreover, the same connectives that relate sentences, or clauses in the semantic level can relate the speech acts issued by uttering such sentences. However, such insights will be revealed in more detail in the succeeding sections.

٢,٢ Models of Local Pragmatic Coherence

Knott (٢٠٠١: ١٢٩-٣٠) points out that Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a, ١٩٧٧c, ١٩٧٩) and Sweetser (١٩٩٠) are the most influential models of coherence relations at the local level. Generally speaking, Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢١٣) introduces his model of coherence as a bipartite distinction, that is, semantic vs. pragmatic. He does not subdivide any of these relations. On the other hand, Sweetser (١٩٩٠) elaborates on the distinction to be tripartite, that is, semantic vs. pragmatic (speech act vs. epistemic). This means that she subdivides pragmatic relations into speech act and epistemic relations.

٢,٢,١ Van Dijk's Model of Local Pragmatic Coherence

Van Dijk's model can be identified in various publications and articles of his in this field. Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٤٧) mentions that speech acts usually do not come alone. They are not a mere series of isolated utterances, but they may occur in ordered sequences of speech acts achieved by one speaker (henceforth S) or by subsequent speakers, as it is the case in conversation. Much in the same way as sentences satisfy some constraints such as semantic coherence when they come in sequences, it should be proposed that speech act sequences do not occur at random. They must also satisfy a number of constraints.

One of the most important notions in speech act sequences is that one speech act gives additional felicity conditions to the previous or successive speech act. Hickey (١٩٩٨: ٧٥) emphasizes this fact stating that "a speech act sequence will fasten on and develop original appropriateness conditions. This means that some acts will be treated as main, others as subordinate". These felicity conditions are additional and contextual; i.e., they are not inherent in the issuing of a given speech act. For instance, a request can be preceded by a justifying assertion or not, according to the degree of intimacy and power between speaker and hearer (See Ferrara, ١٩٨٠). Van Dijk (١٩٧٧c: ٢٢٧) indicates that the comprehension of speech act sequences is based on the interpretation of the connectedness between the subsequent speech acts. The most general connection condition is that previous acts establish the context with respect to which a subsequent speech act is evaluated. In other words, there is some kind of conditional relation that holds for successive acts. The weakest form is that of 'enablement', viz: a speech act makes next speech acts more possible. Stronger forms are those of probability and necessity. Such modalities are in their social and interactional sense. They are based on norms or rules determining what may be done in which conditions (See Van Dijk, ١٩٧٩: ٤٤٨). Al-Hindawi (١٩٩٩: ٣١) argues that when engaged in rule-governed activities such as debating, teaching in classroom, making a conversation, ... etc., speakers resort to accomplish a sequence of speech acts in order to achieve their communicative goals. In spite of the fact that these acts are not of the same status in the flow of the speaker's action, they are related to each other. "The first act provides a good justification for producing the second one

which stands as a sub-goal" (ibid).

An illustration for this conditional relatedness between subsequent speech acts is the following:

(١) It is cold in here. Could you please shut the window?(Van Dijk, ١٩٧٩: ٤٤٨)

Here, an assertion is followed by a request. The first speech act can be taken as a 'preparation' for the second; viz: requests are usually made as a consequence of certain wishes and purposes of the speakers. "Especially when addressed to strangers and when the motivation for the request is not obvious, requests may need an 'explication'" (ibid).

Before studying the various pragmatic relations between subsequent speech acts, it is thought that an explanation of the nature of such sequences and their correlations to sentence sequences is necessary. Such a discussion is significant in that it paves the way to a clear-cut framework for determining the nature of the pragmatic relations. This will be the focus of the following section.

٢,٢,١,١ Sentence Sequences and Speech Act Sequences

Van Dijk (١٩٧٧b: ١٠١-٢) argues that when one utters a sequence such as:

(٢) I am hungry. Do you have a sandwich for me?

S/he thereby seems to accomplish an assertion followed by a request. A syntactic characteristic of this sequence is that it cannot be simply reduced to one compound sentence, e.g. with the connective 'and'. Here, one can defend a strong hypothesis which assumes that in principle the accomplishment of a speech act requires the utterance of (at least) one sentence, and that there should be another sentence for the accomplishment of a next speech act. Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢١٣) refers to this hypothesis by mentioning that "sentence boundaries are particularly appropriate to express boundaries between speech acts". Accordingly, one cannot accomplish more than one speech act by uttering one independent sentence. To elaborate, another example is introduced by Van Dijk (١٩٧٧b: ١٠١):

(٣) I am hungry and I am going to take a sandwich.

In this compound sentence, it can be said that one speech act has been performed, that is, the assertion of a compound proposition (i.e. a conjunction).

However, some problems remain with this hypothesis. Firstly, this assumption,

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as Van Dijk (1994a: 213-4) states, is to be inconsistent with examples in which two speech acts are apparently accomplished by uttering one sentence:

(4) I'll give you the money, but you don't deserve it.

(5) I wouldn't go to Italy at the moment, because the weather is very bad there.

In (4), there is a promise and then an assertive evaluation, whereas in (5), there is a piece of advice followed by an assertion (ibid).

Secondly, Van Dijk (1994b: 101) argues that the case of compounded explicit performative sentences is more problematic (e.g. I promise you ..., but I warn you ...).

Thirdly, Van Dijk (1994a: 214) presents the problem in many examples where speech acts cannot be successfully accomplished by the utterance of only one sentence:

(6) It is cold in here and please shut the window.

(7) Because I am busy, shut up!

Examples (6, 7) are not acceptable because the connectives used, i.e., 'and' and 'because', have a semantic function which relates denoted facts between propositions. Thus, no such a relation (semantic coherence) is found in these sentences: its being cold and your shutting the window, and my being busy and your shutting up are not directly related. Rather, it should be said that; for instance, its being cold is a 'condition' for making a request. "What is needed, then, are pragmatic sentence initial connectives or simply new sentences" (ibid). The conclusion to be made here is that a change of illocutionary force requires the utterance of a new sentence.

The argument above is intended to suggest that there is no strong parallelism or correlation between sentence boundaries and speech act boundaries.

2.2.1.1 Sentence Types and Speech Act Sequences

In grammar, the sentence has been classified into two main types: simple and composite; the composite into complex and compound. The simple sentence consists of a single independent clause, e.g. 'I like that'. The composite (multiple) sentence, on the other hand, consists of more than one clause. A complex sentence is like a simple sentence since it has only one main clause, but unlike a simple

sentence it has one or more 'subordinate' clause functioning as an element of the sentence, e.g. (I reject her conclusions, although I admire her reasoning). A compound sentence has two or more coordinated main clauses, and these clauses are in a paratactic relationship, viz: they have equivalent function and similar status, e.g. (I admire her reasoning but I reject her conclusions) (See Quirk et al., ١٩٨٥: ٩٨٧). Similarly, speech acts are classified into two types: simple, and composite; the composite into complex and compound.

This grammatical classification has been adopted to some extent by the theory of action. Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢١٤-١٥), for example, argues that there are single (simple) acts and composite acts, the latter may be either compound, i.e. when they consist of component acts at the same level, or complex, when some act is subordinated or embedded in one of the component main acts, e.g. as an auxiliary act. Moreover, a sequence of actions is interpreted as one action if they are related to the same intention or goal, and on a more general level this action can be a condition or a consequence of other actions. Consequently, the same holds for speech acts. There may be sequences of unrelated speech acts, but some sequences would be understood as one speech act consisting of several component acts or auxiliary acts. Dik and Hengeveld (١٩٩٧: ٤٢٩) emphasize that "speech acts may be combined in higher-level speech act sequences, sequences of two or more speech acts which in some way or another depend on each other". Hence, they focus on the study of complex speech acts in which there is a main speech act and another supporting auxiliary speech act. Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢١٥-١٦) introduces the following example for composite speech acts:

(^) You have done your best. I'll give you a new bike.

The utterance is primarily a promise, not an assertion. Firstly, the hearer already knows that s/ he did her/his best, so s/he needs not be told. Accordingly and secondly, the assertion functions as a praise and as gratitude for the merits of the hearer, thus establishing a certain obligation with respect to her/ him. When this condition is realized, the promise is ready to succeed. As a result, some speech acts "function as a condition, part or basis for another speech act" (ibid).

Although the distinction between component speech acts and auxiliary speech

acts is not totally clear-cut, it can be said that when the speech act is an essential part of another speech act in a given context, this former speech act is a component speech act. Thus, in a given context there should be a preparation or a motivation for issuing a certain speech act (See *ibid*). To summarize, whether complex or compound, speech acts are pragmatically related. The difference is, then, that complex speech acts contain one or more auxiliary or subsidiary speech acts, and compound speech acts consist of main or component speech acts (sometimes called nucleus acts (See Dik & Hengeveld, 1997: 429)). When speech acts are unrelated or independent from each other, there will be a mere sequence of speech acts, i.e. simple (single) speech acts. This is shown in Figure (1) below.




Fig. 1: The Structure of Speech Acts

2.2.1.2 A Taxonomy of Speech Act Relations

In this section, the various speech act relations between will be investigated according to Van Dijk's point of view. The nature of relation depends on the function achieved by a certain speech act in relation to another speech act. Mostly, this function accompanies the auxiliary speech act and one of the main component acts in compound speech acts.

2.2.1.2.1 Justification

Van Dijk (1997b: 101) indicates that some speakers use speech acts as a motivation or a reason for making another speech act more felicitous. In other words, the first speech act so to say functions as a condition for appropriately or effectively carrying out a next speech act. This can be exemplified by the following example:

(1) I am tired. Could you postpone the game?

Similarly, Dik and Hengeveld (1997: 229) stresses the fact that some assertions

give a motivation for asking questions:

(١٠) You look so pale. Are you ill?

In (١٠) the second speech act is a question, and the first is a motivation for that question. Moreover, the relationship between the separate speech acts of a speech act sequence is in many cases similar to what could be expressed by a complex speech act. Thus, (١٠) can be compared with (١١):

(١١) Are you ill, because you look so pale?

in which the subordinate clause functions as an illocutionary auxiliary to the main clause. Ferrara (١٩٨٠: ٢٤٠) argues that justifications have an essential extra-conditional role where the subordinate speech act must relate to a state of affairs which counts as an adequate, plausible reason for the performance of the main (component) speech act. Further, the resort to motivations or justifications for issuing speech acts is usually regarded as a sign of politeness (See Brown and Levinson, ١٩٧٩: ١٩٤, Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧a: ٢١٥).

Another example to illustrate justifications is the following:

(١٢) Peter is in hospital. Harry told me. (ibid)

Here, it can be said that there is a speech act of assertion consisting of two assertions. That 'Harry told me' is probably of secondary importance. However, assertions, too, need 'justification'. That is, the source of knowledge must be reliable and, if necessary, be specified. Thus, the second assertion provides this source. "The more reliable a given source, the higher the credibility of the assertion based on it" (ibid). It should be, however, pointed out that providing the source of knowledge for H depends on the relation and sincerity between the interlocutors. To sum up, justification postulates that comprehending the speech act in the subordinate component will increase H's readiness to accept S's right to perform the main act.

٢,٢,١,٢,٢ Explanation

A converse case of justification is 'explanation' where a statement (or assertion) follows another main speech act as shown in the following examples:

(١٣) Can you please tell me the time? I forgot my watch.

(١٤) Keep out of sight. He would kill you!

(١٥) Please forgive me. I won't do it anymore. (Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧b: ١٠٢-٣)

In (١٣), the speaker wants to say that s/he stated that s/he forgot the watch, in order to make asking about the time a reasonable act. Similarly, s/he may state the grounds for a warning (١٤) or advice, or the sincerity of an excuse. In this case, Van Dijk (١٩٨٠: ٦١) points out that 'explanations' are not only adding an utterance mentioning a reason or cause, but at the same time may be interpreted as a particular 'act of explaining'. That is, it is one of the postponed speech acts which are intended to represent conditions of previous speech acts. Such speech acts specify why the previous speech acts have been performed.

However, Al-Hindawi (١٩٩٩: ٣٣) argues that Ferrara (١٩٨٠) does not mention this type of speech act relations. Moreover, Al-Hindawi (ibid.) considers explanation as a variant of 'justification', believing that the only difference between them is that in justification, "the subordinate act justifies the issuance of the following act", whereas in explanation "it justifies the initiation of the preceding act". Nevertheless, this type of difference is of value in the study of speech act sequences, and thus, the change of label from 'justification' to 'explanation' is important here as it will be shown in the part of analysis of the present study. Eventually, Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢٢٢-٣) postulates that there are cases of complex or compound sentences which convey 'composite speech act', that is, in the cases where not the facts are interrelated, but a speech act or two.

(١٦) I'll send you a postcard this summer, because I know that I'm going to Italy.

(١٧) I'll send you a postcard this summer, because I know that you like postcards.(ibid)

In these cases the second subordinate clauses give an explanatory assertion for the promising act which is accomplished by the utterance of the first clause. In other words, 'they express necessary conditions for appropriate promising' (ibid). Besides, it is worth to mention that the previous classes of speech act types in (٣,٢,١,٢) depend on separate sentences and not complex or compound sentences. In (١٦) and (١٧), it has been illustrated that this classification can be extended to

include even multiple sentences.

٢,٢,١,٢,٣ Addition

Certain speech acts indicate that the speaker wants to add something to the preceding speech act (See Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧a: ٢١١). Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٠) propounds that some speech acts are conjoined to signal what can be termed as 'addition' or 'continuation', as illustrated in the following examples:

(١٨) Peter was not at the party. And Henry said that he was in hospital because he had had an accident.

(١٩) Laura ran off to Paris. And she did not even let me know.

Here in (١٨) and (١٩), there is an addition of assertions to previous assertions. Furthermore, there are certain devices which indicate a pragmatic relation between subsequent speech acts. Such devices are kinds of what is called 'discourse markers' (See Schiffrin, ١٩٩٤). These markers are defined as linguistic expressions that are used to signal the relation of an utterance to the immediate context (Cf. Redeker, ١٩٩٠: ٣٧٢). One of these markers is clear in 'pragmatic connectives'. A connective is, according to Bussmann et al. (١٩٩٦, s.v. connective), a linguistic expression with the function of joining sentences/utterances. Conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs belong to the class of connectives. They join either propositions or state of affairs (semantic connective), or illocutions (pragmatic connectives). Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٤٩) reveals that 'pragmatic connectives express relations between speech acts, whereas semantic connectives express relations between denoted facts'. Thus, the same expression can be used or can have a semantic and pragmatic function in the same time. Moreover, Van Dijk (ibid) emphasizes that 'pragmatic connectives will often be sentence-initial, followed by a pause and uttered with a specific intonation contour'. As for 'addition' connectives, the most commonly used pragmatic ones are 'and' and 'moreover'. Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٠) introduces the following exemplifications to show the pragmatic and semantic uses of 'and':

(٢٠) Yesterday we went to the movies and afterwards we went to the pub for a beer.

(٢١) Why didn't Peter show up? And, where were you that night?

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(٢٢) Harry has counted me out. And, I even hadn't had a chance!

In (٢٠) 'and' is used in its semantic function, that is, it expresses a relation between two denoted facts which are ordered in time, whereas in (٢١) it is apparently used to signal the fact that the speaker has another question. Similarly, in (٢٢) the speaker has another assertion. This function can be defined in terms of relations between speech acts at the mono-logical and dialogical levels ,i.e., in moves or turns. Schifffrin (١٩٩٤: ٧٨) mentions that at the dialogic level there may be another interlocutor's speech act which gives an addition to a preceding one. She terms this function as 'expansion', and exemplifies it in:

- (٢٣) a. You want a piece of candy?
b. No.
c. She's on a diet.

where (c) is an addition or expansion of (b) (ibid).

٢,٢,١,٢,٤ Conclusion

Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢٠٨) argues that there are certain speech acts which function as a conclusion of other speech acts which function as a premise as exemplified in:

(٢٤) Peter had an accident. So, he is in hospital.

where it does not invoke a factual consequence but also as a conclusion drawn explicitly by the speaker.

Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٣) indicates that the pragmatic connective which is used in conclusion is 'so'. The pragmatic nature of this connective is based on the fact that 'drawing a conclusion' or 'concluding' is grasped as a type of act.

This pragmatic use of 'so' is different from its semantic interpretation. Semantically, it expresses a logical consequence (See Swan, ١٩٩٥: ١٥٥). Moreover, the semantic 'so' is considered as a resultant subordinator (See Quirk *et al.*, ١٩٨٥: ١١٠٨). This means that the semantic meaning of 'so' is used to indicate a logical relation between two facts, whereas the pragmatic use shows a relation between an argumentative premise and a conclusion, between two assertions, for instance. Furtherly, Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a: ٢١٠) points out that the connective 'therefore' may be used in the same way as 'so'. Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٣) raises the

argument that 'so' which functions pragmatically may also function semantically by introducing the following example:

(٢٥) John is sick. So, let's start.

He (ibid) shows that, indirectly, John's sickness and starting (e.g. playing) are also related as facts (or propositions). Assertions are similarly related, e.g. made by the chairman of the team, and the actual properties of the communicative context, viz the proposal to start playing. That is, if certain information (in an assertion) has been supplied, the communicative context allows the speaker to accomplish a next speech act. This is some kind of overlap between the two functions. It is not a problematic one because the level of analysis is differentiated. At the dialogic level (as in conversation), interlocutors may draw conclusions from the other's speech acts (See Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧a: ٢٠٩), as in the following instance:

(٢٦) a. I am busy.

b. So, you are not coming tonight?

a. I'm sorry.

Here, Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٤) comments, the conclusion is closely related to the underlying 'semantic' consequence between the fact of being busy and not coming. Conversationally, conclusions need not always maintain denoted facts, but may also be drawn with respect to the previous speech act itself, and its conditions:

(٢٧) a. Give me that hammer!

b. So, you are in charge here?

This example shows that b's ironic conclusion reflects the usual condition that orders are performed by those who are authoritative to issue orders.

٢,٢,١,٢,٥ Contradiction

Contradictions are functions that may be accompanied by the utterance of a speech act to protest or deny some expectations that may accompany another speech act (Cf. Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧a: ٢١٣). Thus, the same speaker, as Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٢) reveals, can concatenate his speech act in order to mark the (non-) satisfaction of illocutionary conditions, or to stress that a previous speech act only becomes felicitous under specific circumstances:

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(٢٨) Yes, I'll buy you a mink coat. But, I must first ask my boss for a promotion.

It can be said here that the speech act of promise performed by the first utterance may be qualified by the condition asserted in the second utterance. Accordingly, the second speech act has 'restricted' the first one (ibid).

As noticed above, the pragmatic connective 'but' is used in 'contradiction'. However, Van Dijk (ibid: ٤٥٠) highlights that the speaker may use 'and' in order to signal a contradiction or protest, e.g. to prevent the hearer from drawing false conclusions from another speech act as in:

(٢٩) Harry has counted me out. And, I even hadn't a chance.

Lakoff (١٩٧١) (Cited in Ondera, ٢٠٠٤: ٣٢) points out that 'but' has a pragmatic meaning requiring the hearer to make a presupposition. Thus, 'but' is either a semantic opposition or a denial of expectation. Examples are:

(٣٠) John is tall but Bill is short.

(٣١) John is tall but he's no good at basketball.

In (٣٠) the contrast in meaning is apparently explicated in the antonyms. In the case of (٣١), 'but' is used with inconsistency implied between the two conjuncts. Thus, to interpret the contrast, there must be a presupposition: 'if someone is tall, then one would expect him to be good at basketball' (ibid). This presupposition is not as Lakoff (ibid.) thinks it to be. It is still semantic because it relates two denoted facts. Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥١) explicates that such uses of 'but' are semantic, not pragmatic, as in:

(٣٢) Harry was ill, but he came to the meeting anyway.

٢,٢,١,٢,٦ Explication

Explicative speech acts are those acts which are performed by the speaker to show that s/he more explicitly indicates the particular speech act s/he is making. Such explications are at the same time a form of repetition. Thus, in (٣٣) the speaker more explicitly expresses his/her promise:

(٣٣) I'll be there tomorrow. I promise that I'll come. (Van Dijk, ١٩٨٠: ٦١-٦٢)

Another form or way of explication can be found in the case of 'reinforcement'.

In (٣٤) there is a positive evaluation in the first speech act, which is reinforced by the more specific compliment accomplished after that evaluation:

(٣٤) That is not bad at all. My compliments. (ibid.)

In sum, it can be concluded that it is possible for speakers to redefine the pragmatic context by becoming more specific and more general with a next speech act.

A particular type of redefinition is apparent in the case of 'correction' which is the concern of the following section.

٢,٢,١,٢,٧ Correction

Sometimes, speakers perform speech acts that check whether one of the conditions (presuppositions) of a preceding act is satisfied or not. (Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧b: ١٠٣). This type of correction is a momentary suspension of the earlier speech act, as in:

(٣٥) Congratulations. Or, aren't you happy about it? (Van Dijk, ١٩٨٠: ٦٢)

The basic pragmatic connective which is used in correction is 'or'. It disjuncts not only denoted facts, as in semantic 'or', but also subsequent speech acts (Van Dijk, ١٩٧٧a: ٢١١). Moreover, Van Dijk (١٩٧٩: ٤٥٢) ascertains that the use of pragmatic 'or' is apparently distinct from that of semantic 'or'. The latter demands that two facts are alternatives in two possible worlds (unknown to the speaker). Typical examples of pragmatic 'or' are the following:

(٣٦) Do you want a sandwich? Or, aren't you hungry?

(٣٧) Give me a hand, will you. Or, don't you want it fixed?

(٣٨) Shut up! Or, don't you See I'm busy? (ibid)

In the three examples above, the function of the questions introduced by 'or' is to check, make sure or 'correct' conditions of a previous speech act performed by the same speaker. The fact that most of the corrective speech acts are questions is due to the requirement for information to check the necessary presuppositions.

Van Dijk (١٩٨٠: ٦٢) emphasizes that corrections may be suitable means to redefine a situation in cases where the speaker believes that a speech act is too strong after which he takes back some implication, as in:

(٣٩) He is really stupid. Or well, I don't know. He is also quite clever.

Other pragmatic connectives that are used in correction are 'that is, well, though, in fact, on the contrary', and the like. Besides, 'if' (normally preceded by 'at least') can be used to introduce corrections (Van Dijk, 1980: 62), as in the following example:

(٤٠) I'll send you a postcard this summer. At least, if I go to Italy.

In addition, the resort to corrections may be a sign of politeness, as in:

(٤١) Could you lend me a hundred guilders? Or, are you short of cash yourself right now? In this case, Van Dijk (1979: ٤٥٣) explicates, questioning a condition for a request, at the same time, provides the hearer with a possible excuse for not complying with the performed request.

٢,٢,١,٢,٨ Condition

Some speech acts are performed to specify certain conditions of a context unknown to the speaker under which a speech act should count (See *ibid*: ٤٥٥). These conditions are not inherent in the previous speech act, rather they are momentary or contextual. The pragmatic connective which is used in conditions is 'if'. The difference between semantic 'if' and pragmatic 'if' is that the former indicates a conditional relation between two facts where the situation in the main (or matrix) clause is contingent with that in the subordinate clause (See Quirk et al., 1985: ١٠٨٨). Some examples of conditions in their pragmatic sense are the following:

(٤٢) Take that one. If you want my advice.

(٤٣) You look fine. If I may say so. (Van Dijk, 1979: ٤٥٤)

The respective advice and compliment, accomplished by the utterance of the first sentences of (٤٢) and (٤٣), respectively, have a number of conditions which are checked after the act by the speaker. Van Dijk (*ibid*) concentrates on the fact that just for pragmatic 'or' the speaker reassures him/herself of the appropriateness of the speech act. This time, the speaker does not ask for a (negated) condition, but uses a polite, or rhetorical, conditional question. That is, the speech act performed at first is not neglected as it may be the case in 'correction'. Rather, it is still valid, but under the condition of the following speech act. In sum, the pragmatic relations suggested by Van Dijk can be grouped in Table (١).

Table (١) An Overview of Pragmatic Relations According to Van Dijk's (١٩٧٧a) Model.

Type of Relation	Basic Meaning	The Basic Pragmatic Connective	Example
Justification	SA _a motivates SA _b (SA _a precedes SA _b)	-----	(٩)
Explanation	SA _a motivates SA _b (SA _a follows SA _b)	-----	(١٣)
Addition	SA _a continues SA _b	and, moreover	(١٨)
Conclusion	SA _a concludes SA _b	so	(٢٥)
Contradiction	SA _a denies, protests SA _b	but, and	(٢٨)
Explication	SA _a repeats, reinforces SA _b	-----	(٣٣)
Correction	SA _a checks SA _b	or, well, in fact	(٣٥)
Condition	SA _a checks condition for SA _b	if	(٤٢)

٢,٢,٢ Sweetser's (١٩٩٠) Model of Local Pragmatic Coherence

Here, Sweetser's (١٩٩٠) model will be explained according to its theoretical bases and classifications. It represent a shift of elaborating the division of PRAGMATIC COHERENCE relations that are basically suggested by Van Dijk (١٩٧٧a) and other sources. The basic notion in Sweetser's (١٩٩٠) model is that she divides pragmatic relations into two categories: speech act relations and epistemic relations. In the following sub-sections, The definition of each category will be clarified. Moreover, the relation between Sweetser's model and Van Dijk's model will be highlighted. In addition, some light will be shed on the subsequent developments of Sweetser's model.

٢,٢,٢,١ Speech Act vs. Epistemic Relations

At first, Sweetser (١٩٩٠) differentiates between 'semantic' relations and 'pragmatic' relations; and then, she re-crystallizes the nature and the types of 'pragmatic' relations. Sweetser (١٩٩٠) (Cited in Knott, ٢٠٠١: ١٢٩) introduces two examples to show the distinction between 'semantic' relations (٤٤) and 'pragmatic' relations (٤٥):

($\xi\xi$) Bill was starving, so he had a sandwich.

($\xi\circ$) Bill had five sandwiches, so he was/must have been starving.

In ($\xi\circ$), the type of relation is said to have an implicit performative. This performative could be made explicit as follows:

($\xi\vee$) Bill had five sandwiches, so I 'conclude' he was starving.

Sweetser (ibid) notes an important underspecification in a gloss such as the one given in instance ($\xi\vee$) above. She raises the question whether the implicit act of 'concluding' should be interpreted as a speech act. Sweetser(ibid.) maintains that this should be inappropriate since there are classes of use where causality is between 'premise' and 'conclusion' in the 'speaker's mind', although there is another class of causality where the relation involves the speech act itself. Thus, Sweetser draws a sharp differentiation between the act of drawing a conclusion and the act of stating it. Essentially, what the speaker decides to say and what s/he determines to 'believe' are two quite different things. Consequently, it is impossible to express one in terms of the other. Another observation to be added is that though the epistemic act can be expressed by performatives, this act is a theorem-proving or argumentative act. As for epistemic relations, Dirven *et al.* ($\forall\circ\circ\xi$: $\vee^9\xi$) assert that they show up if one of the two clauses relates to the speaker's judgement, e.g. a first clause describes a 'worldly' event and in a second clause the speaker states what his reasoning is based upon, as in:

($\xi\vee$) Maggie must be eager for promotion. She's worked for three days in a row.

(ibid)

In interpersonal or speech act relations as in ($\xi\wedge$) the first clause gives a reason for uttering the second one (See ibid):

($\xi\wedge$) Since we are on the subject, when was George Washington born?

It seems that Sweetser's definition of pragmatic relations has some degree of dependence on mood as she argues that "if an utterance is imperative or interrogative in form, then it cannot reasonably be causally conjoined to another utterance except at the speech-act level" ($\vee^9^9\circ$: $\vee\wedge$).

In fact, many scholars are aware of the variation which Sweetser refers to within the class of pragmatic relations. For some of them, (See for example

Halliday and Hasan, ١٩٧٦: ٢٤٠), the relation in question is

not so much a relationship between speech acts (though it may take this form) ... as a relationship between different stages in the unfolding of a speaker's communication role ... his choice of speech role and rhetorical channel, his attitudes, his judgements and the like.

For others, such as Redeker (١٩٩٠: ٣٦٩), "they hold between the 'beliefs and intentions' which underlie the two spans". However, they can be identified as "applying between the content of on span [clause or sentence] (added by researcher) and the speaker's (claim/advice/conclusion) about the content of the other" (See Sanders, ١٩٩٧: ١٢٦). Definitions of such relations, as Knott (٢٠٠٤: ١٣٢) points out, frequently contain disjunctive elements or appeals to somewhat ill-defined higher-level constructs. Generally speaking, epistemic and speech act relations are of various types, the most important of which are: disjunctions, conditionals, temporals, and causals. These relations will be tackled in the following subsections.

٢,٢,٢,١,١ Disjunctions

Knott (ibid: ١٣٣) presents Sweetser's (١٩٩٠) illustration of the disjunctive relation as follows:

(٤٩) John is home, or somebody is picking up his newspapers.

(٥٠) Would you like to come round tonight? Or, is your car still in the shop?

Sweetser analyzes example (٤٩) as conveying that the alternative propositions presented are the only two possible conclusions that one can reach. On the other hand, she analyzes (٥٠) as consisting of a pair of alternative speech acts, viz: the speaker is asking to be understood by the hearer as performing either one or the other (ibid). Thus, it is inappropriate to interpret (٤٩) in terms of speech act relation, and (٥٠) in terms of epistemic relation. As illustrated in (٣,٢,١,٢,٧), the kind of speech act relation in (٥٠) is considered as 'correction'.

٢,٢,٢,١,٢ Conditionals

Renkema (٢٠٠٤: ١٠٩) defines condition as 'a necessary or possible cause or reason for a possible consequence'. Sweetser (١٩٩٠) (Cited in Knott, ٢٠٠٤: ١٣٣) gives the following examples to exemplify epistemic and speech act conditionals:

(^{๑๑}) If John went to that party, he was trying to infuriate Miriam.

(^{๑๒}) How old are you, if it is not a cheeky question?

Example (^{๑๑}) can be analyzed as expressing an implication relation between the speaker's beliefs. Thus, the speaker is apparently informing the hearer that if I (the speaker) believe that John went to the party, I believe that he was trying to infuriate Miriam. On the other hand, example (^{๑๒}) is to be interpreted as the conditional performance of a speech act: the speaker only wants to ask about the hearer's age if it is not a cheeky question. Speech act conditionals in such a kind of treatment can be seen as similar to Van Dijk's pragmatic relation 'condition' (See ๓,๒,๑,๒,๘).

๒,๒,๒,๑,๓ Temporal Sequences

Sweetser (๑๙๙๐) (Cited in ibid: ๑๓๕) presents other examples concerning epistemic and speech act temporals:

(^{๑๓}) A: Why don't you want me to take basket weaving this summer?

B: Well, Mary took basket weaving, and she joined a religious cult.

(^{๑๔}) Go to bed now! And no more backtalk!

In each of these instances, Sweetser stresses, 'and' is to be recognized sequentially. However, while the temporal sequence in example (^{๑๔}) is related to the order in which the speech acts are accomplished, the sequence in (^{๑๓}) concerns the order of events in the epistemic or mental world. Knott (ibid) adds that the idea in the last example is that the two propositions are both to be understood as premises in an argument that 'A should not take the basket weaving, but that their ordering is important'. Moreover, the assumption that sequential conjunctions such as 'to begin with' and 'next' can be used to link or relate multiple premises (postulations) in an argument has often be observed and highlighted, and provides on evidence or rationale for temporal epistemic relations. An example is provided by Halliday and Hasan (๑๙๗๖):

(^{๑๕}) John's unsuitable for the job. To begin with, he is too young. Next, he's too hotheaded. Finally, ...

๒,๒,๒,๑,๔ Causals

Sweetser (๑๙๙๐) (Cited in Spooren et al., n.d: ๗) introduces the notion of

epistemic and speech act causals and provides the following example of epistemic causals for illustration:

(٥٦) I am sure that Jan is not at home, because his car is gone.

Degand (١٩٩٨: ٣١-٢) uses what he calls 'paraphrasing' as a method to explain the nature of epistemic relation: 'one may conclude this on the basis of the following situation'. Thus, in (٥٦), one may deduce that 'Jan is not at home on the basis that his car is gone'. On the other hand, Sweetser (١٩٩٠) (Cited in Kyratzis & Ervin-Tripp, ١٩٩٩: ١٣٢٢) emphasizes that this relation can be found at the speech act level, as in:

(٥٧) Can I have that daddo? Because I like him.

Here, the speaker is giving support to his request. Moreover, speech act causals function at the action level of discourse, serving as justifications for various speech acts. Thus, one can argue that Sweetser's notion of speech act causals is similar to Van Dijk's notion of the pragmatic relation 'justification' (See ٣,٢,١,٢,١).

A further observation which should be taken into account is the difference between pragmatic (epistemic and speech act) relations and semantic (volitional and non-volitional) relations.

٢,٢,٢,١,٤,١ Epistemicity vs. Volitionality

To discard the ambiguity of mixing the notions of epistemicity and volitionality, the following theoretical argument is needed. What epistemicity and volitionality have in common is that both crucially involve an animate subject, a person whose intentionality (or mentality) is conceptualized as the basic source of the causal event, be it an act of reasoning (rationalization) or some 'real-world' activity. This appears to be a fundamental distinction: the one between events that originate from some 'mind', versus events originating from non-intentional causes; or between causes that are crucially located in a subject of consciousness, and those that are located in the inanimate, outer world (Maat & Sanders, ٢٠٠١: ٢٥١).

The notion of subjectivity is useful in accounting for this idea. Spooren et al. (n.d: ٢) define subjectivity as "the degree to which the conceptualizer – the person responsible for the causal relation – is present in the utterance". Thus, subjectivity is used here in its philosophical sense as an opposite to objectivity. That is,

subjectivity concerns the causal connectivity in the subjective (personal) world, whereas objectivity concerns such relations in the objective (real) world.

Maat and Sanders (۲۰۰۰) put forward a subjectivity scale, one of speaker involvement. This scale is a continuum on which non-volitional content relations are maximally objective, whereas epistemic relations are very subjective, and volitional content relations hold an intermediate position. A difference between epistemic and volitional relations is that the typical volitional subject of consciousness is explicitly realized, whereas epistemic subjects of consciousness often remain implicit, i.e., the subject of consciousness is by default assumed to be the speaker (See Maat & Sanders, ۲۰۰۱: ۲۵۳). In sum, the causal relations can be ordered from least subjective to most subjective, as follows (See Spooren et al., n.d: ۵).

Non-volitional content. Volitional content < Epistemic. Speech act

Examples are:

(۵۸) The house burnt down because it was struck by lightning. (Non-volitional content)

(۵۹) He was home because he was ill. (Volitional content)

(۶۰) He must be on holiday because his car is gone. (Epistemic)

(۶۱) Can you hand me my coffee? I'm busy. (Speech act).

۲,۲,۲,۱,۴,۲ The Nature of the Underlying Relation

In causal relations, Degand (۱۹۹۸: ۳۲) demonstrates that the underlying meaning reflects the causal inference to be made. This causal reasoning can proceed in three ways: deductively, inductively, or abductively. He also emphasizes that a causal reasoning process consists of three elements: rule (general law), circumstance (specific case), and result (or consequence), as in the following example:

Rule: Every time when it rains (a lot), the river is high.

Circumstance: It has rained a lot.

Result: The river is high.

Deduction is a process of reasoning which moves from the more general to the more specific or particular, e.g. from the general proposition that all trees have

leaves and the further proposition that oaks are trees one may draw the 'deductive inference' that oaks have leaves (Matthews, ٢٠٠٧: ٩٤). In Degand's (١٩٩٨: ٣٣) terms, deduction is reasoning from circumstance and rule to the result. This can be exemplified in:

(٦٢) The river is high because it rained all night.

On the other hand, induction is a method of inference for discovering general rules and principles from particular facts or examples (See Hornby, ٢٠٠٧: s.v. deduction). In other words, induction is reasoning from (several) results and circumstances to a rule: The river is high (and it has rained a lot, and last week when the river was high, it also had rained a lot, ...), so when it rains a lot, the river is high (See Degand, ١٩٩٨: ٣٣).

Finally, abduction is a process of reasoning by which, e.g. from 'All dogs bark' and 'This animal barks', one can draw the conclusion 'This animal is a dog' (Matthews, ٢٠٠٧: ١). Degand (١٩٩٨: ٣٣) states that abduction is reasoning from result and rule to circumstance: The river is high (and every time when it rains (a lot), the river is high.), so it has been raining a lot. Thus, in a backward abductive causal relation a cause/reason (circumstance) in the first span can be inferred on the basis of a consequence (result) in the second span. This type of inference can only happen if there is a real causal link between the two spans. He adds that there should be some kind of reversibility, that is, the two spans can substitute for one another. This will prove the distinction between abduction from deduction.

Sweetser (١٩٩٠) (Cited in *ibid*) illustrates that epistemic relations are with constructed examples of abductive reasoning type because she believes that epistemic relations reflect a reasoning process of cause in the mental space of the speaker, while Degand (*ibid*) indicates that a deductive reasoning pattern is semantic in nature because it is close to the real cause-consequence process. This useful in the analysis of data because it shows the nature of the epistemic relations.

Degand (*ibid*) claims that epistemic relations include epistemic-deductive and epistemic-abductive, whereas speech act relations are still one category. Pander Maat and Degand (٢٠٠١: ٢٢١-٥) present different labels for this distinction. In their terminology 'non-abductive' relations are 'causality-based epistemic relations';

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'abductive' relations are termed 'non-causal epistemic relations'. Nevertheless, the favourite term is abductive, which refers to this class and remains 'causal' in the general sense. Sanders (1997: 130) notes that "relations which appear to be ambiguous with respect to the semantic-pragmatic distinction turn out not to be ambiguous in context". Accordingly, the utterance in (13b) clearly receives a semantic interpretation as an answer to the question in (14); the reason that Miriam returned home was that she realized her lights were still on. A pragmatic interpretation is preferred if the same utterance serves as an answer to the question in (15). In that case, (13b) can be interpreted as 'I am sure; I saw her lights were still on when I passed her home'.

(13a) Miriam is not at home, because I saw her lights were out.

(13b) Miriam is home again, because her lights were still on.

(14) Why did Miriam return home?

(15) Are you sure Miriam came back home?

Moreover, within the speech act domain, the same subdivision can be made: in the non-abductive example in (16) the argument given in support of asking the question may also be the real-world cause for Miriam's coming home. By contrast, in the abductive utterance in (17), seeing that the lights were out cannot be taken as the reason for Miriam's being home.

(16) Did Miriam come home? Because her lights were still on.

(17) Is Miriam at home? Because I saw her lights were out.

To summarize this section, Table (2) gives an overview of the different categories of pragmatic relations.

Table (2): An Overview of Pragmatic Relations According to Sweetser's (1999) Model.

Type of Relation	Domain	Further Subdivision	Example
Pragmatic	epistemic	non-abductive	(13b)
		abductive	(13a)
	speech act	non-abductive	(16)
		abductive	(17)

2.2.2 Dialogic Speech Act Sequences

In the previous sections, the PRAGMATIC COHERENCE relations are used at

both the mono-logic and dialogic levels. However, some other scholars have focused on the relations that are only at the dialogic level.

Speech act sequences are not only related (i.e. coherent) at the monologic level, but also at the dialogic level. Thus, taken as moves in the respective turns of a conversation, speech acts may also be categorized functionally. Van Dijk (١٩٨٠: ٦٣-٦٤) emphasizes that

functional properties of speech acts must be defined in terms of the role a speech act has with respect to another, often a previous, speech act. In this case, these roles are defined in terms of interaction categories, such as, the contribution to the realization of a goal of the other speaker (helping, facilitating, approving), or a negative reaction or interference with respect to the intentions or purposes of the speaker (protesting, disapproving, objecting).

What has been discussed in ٢.٢.١ and ٢.٢.٢ concerns monologic speech act sequences. No attention has been given to dialogic sequences there as they need a separate treatment. Besides, the treatment of more than one turn has been kept to be the basic concern of this section.

A turn, defined a stretch of talk of the same speaker, may not only consist of a single speech act but also of a series (or sequences) of speech acts. When two turns depend on each other for the proper fulfillment of their function, there should be a certain reference to 'adjacency pairs (henceforth APs). (Dik & Hengeveld, ١٩٩٧: ٤٢٩-٣٠). Accordingly, APs model can be adopted to be an approach to the study of local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE, namely speech act relations at the dialogic level.

٢.٢.٣.١ Adjacency Pairs

APs refer to the phenomenon that, in conversation, one utterance has a role in determining the subsequent utterance or at least in providing expectations concerning its co-texts. They are pairs of utterances whose parts are regularly produced one after the other although by different speakers (See Taylor & Cameron, ١٩٨٧: ١٠٧-٨). A fundamental rule of APs process is: given the production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should

stop and a next speaker should start and produce a second pair from the pair type the first is recognizably a member of (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 239).

APs are, then, two utterances which are mutually dependent. They are dependent in the sense that the first speech act predicates the second (subsequent) act, and the second one presupposes the first (Cf. McCarthy, 1991: 119).

Edmondson (1981: 46) describes APs as having the following features:

- a. Two utterances length
- b. Adjacent positioning of component utterances
- c. Different speaker producing each utterance
- d. Relative ordering of parts (i.e., first pair part precedes second pair part), and
- e. Discrimination relations (i.e., the pair type of which a first pair part is a member is relevant to the selection among second pair parts.

(See Levinson, 1983: 303)

APs are probably better understood by an example. Given a compliment, for example, one expects a reply, and if s/he does not receive one, it may be thought that the compliment has been wasted. Similarly, when we greet a friend or an acquaintance, we expect a greeting in turn (See Woods, 2006: 105). Another example would be question and answer turns. The asking of question will generally signal a shift of turn and require that the turn should take the form of a reply. The kind of reply will, surely, depend on the kind of question, or it may be a matter of conventional routine (Widdowson, 2007: 37). The second pair part is usually matched at several levels, or it may be heard as incoherent. If there is a mismatch, the hearer still looks for a match by inferring a link (filling in gaps), or by soliciting the second turn or some account for its non-presence (Ervin-Tripp, 1993: 249).

2.2.3.2 The Conditional Relevance Criterion

Some scholars such as Levinson (1983) and Renkema (1993: 113) argue against the strict notion or criterion of adjacency. They introduce the criterion of conditional relevance. This criterion replaces, as Levinson (ibid: 306) points out, the criterion of 'adjacency' which presumes that given a first part of a pair, a second part is immediately expectable and relevant. The criterion of adjacency,

thus, is illuminated by the fact that some second parts do not occur, but some new first parts occur to reestablish the conditions for performing the original second part of the former first part. Accordingly, one should not focus on the absence of the expected second part, but on the fact that some expectations should be fulfilled before the performance of the expected second part. Schegloff (١٩٦٨) (Cited in Burton, ١٩٨٠: ٣٣) stresses that when we postulate that an answer is conditionally relevant upon a summons,

it is to be understood that the behaviours referred to are not 'casual options' for the persons involved. A member of the society may not naively choose not to answer a summons. The culture provides that a number of strong inferences can be drawn from the fact of the official absence of an answer, and any member who does not answer does so at the peril of those inferences being made.

Sacks (١٩٦٧) (Cited in Coulthard, ١٩٨٥: ٦٩) demonstrates that, whereas the absence of a particular item in conversation has initially no significance because there are numbers of things that are similarly absent, in the case of APs the first part provides specifically for the second and therefore the absence of the second is noticeable and noticed. He, thus, observes that participants regularly complain 'you didn't answer me' or 'I said hello, and she just walked past'.

In such cases, it can be said that some participants think that their utterances (e.g.: questions, greetings ... etc.) are appropriate and felicitous in the given context of the talk. Hence, when not replied, they will be surprised and upset.

Edmondson (١٩٨١: ٤٢-٤٣) introduces the notion of 'conditional relevance' under the label 'sequential relevance'. He thinks that the notion of sequential relevance is interactional – i.e., the constraints on what I can say or do given what you have said and done are social constraints. Accordingly, in 'answering' a 'question', one is responding to a person, and not an utterance. In addition, he introduces the term 'uptake' to represent the hearer's 'acceptance' or 'understanding' of the previous speech activity of the speaker. Acceptance is used non-evaluatively. That is, if I assert a proposition, you may 'accept' that I have asserted that proposition, without accepting that proposition is the case.

It is worth mentioning here that the criterion of 'adjacency' can coincide with

the criterion of 'conditional relevance' if the former is taken to be adjacency in appropriateness. That is, the second part is adjacent to the first part because it is the most acceptable response to it. Thus, adjacency should not be taken or grasped in the structural sense which is deviated by the interruption caused by certain sequences called 'inserted sequences' (See ٣,٢,٣,٤.).

٢,٢,٣,٣ Types of Adjacency Pairs

Levinson (١٩٨٣: ٣٠٣) indicates that there are various types of APs such as question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance, apology-minimization (See also; Mey, ١٩٩٣: ٢٤٣).

One common form of APs is question-answer pairs. Participants can direct questions to others which derive their interactional power from the obligation they place upon a hearer to come back with an answer, or as Sacks (١٩٦٨) puts it 'appropriate question gets proper answer'. The questioner gets another chance to talk by virtue of his placing the question in the first place, i.e., he obtains a 'reserved right' to speak again. In such a manner, methods of putting the question and receiving an answer can develop into 'chain-structure of turns' (Sperber & Wilson, ١٩٨٨: ٤٢١). Levinson (١٩٨٣: ٢٩٣) reveals that questions can be followed by partial answers, rejections of the presuppositions set by the question, statements of ignorance, denials of the relevance of the question, and so on, as illustrated in the following example:

(٦٨) A: What does John do for a living?

B: a. Oh this and that.

b. He doesn't.

c. I've no idea.

d. What's that got to do with it?

In such a case, Mey (١٩٩٣: ٢٤٨) considers these various answers as 'to the point'; that is, they make sense as answers (depending on the context, naturally), even though they do not provide any 'real' answer to the question, except in some vague, evasive way. A similar form is the summon-answer sequence. The summon is often termed 'an attention getting device' which includes the terms of address. One of the specific features of this form is that it is a preliminary preamble or

preface to some further conversational activity. The difference between the question-answer and summons-answer is that the latter is more constraining since it more forcefully constrains both interlocutors, i.e., speaker and hearer, whereas in the former the questioner has to talk again. Besides, summons-answer sequence is non-repeated in the sense that once a summon has been answered, the summoner may not begin another summons-answer sequence. A contrast is suggested with question-answer sequence where a questioner can develop QAQAQA sequence (Schegloff, ١٩٩٩: ٣٨٣). There is a class of first pair parts which includes Questions, Greetings, Challenges, Offers, Requests, Complaints, Invitations and Announcements which accept either more than one expected second pair part such as (Complaint-Apology/ Justification), or one appropriate second such as (Question-Answer). When the second part is the same as the first, it is called 'reciprocal', but when they are different; they are named 'non-reciprocal' (See Bahrami, ١٩٩٩: ٤).

٢,٢,٣,٤ Insertion Sequences

It has been indicated in (٣,٢,٣,٢) that APs may be separated by other sequences termed 'insertion sequences'. Schegloff (١٩٧٢) (Cited in Coulthard, ١٩٨٥: ٧٣) illustrates that the speaker or the participant resorts to such sequences either because s/he doesn't understand or because s/he doesn't want to commit her/himself until s/he knows more, or because s/he is simply stalling, a next speaker produces not a second pair part but another first pair part.

Bloor & Bloor (٢٠٠٧: ١٠٧) consider such sequences as intervening APs between the first and second part, as in the following example:

(٦٩) A١: D' you want a beer?

A٢: What've you got?

B٢: Grolsch 'n mm Bud.

A٢: Grolsch please.

Before completing the offer-acceptance pair, A٢ initiates a new pair by asking a relevant question. B٢ completes this inserted pair, and B٢ then completes the first pair with an acceptance (ibid).

Coulthard (١٩٨٥: ٧٣) emphasizes that APs are normative structures, the second

part should occur, and thus the other sequences are inserted between the first pair part that has occurred and the second pair part that is anticipated.

An important view in this regard is the one issued by Mey (1993: 223-4), and by which he argues that inserted sequences do not break or suspend coherence in talk. Thus, "in an insertion sequence, the normal flow of conversation is not stopped; conversationalists behave as if they have been aware that the 'turns' in their talk are operating at different levels" (ibid). However, it can be maintained that inserted sequences may be regarded as means for reinforcing coherence in talk. This means that they check appropriateness conditions for issuing the second pair part.

Jefferson (1992) (Cited in ibid) proposes an embedded sequence different from 'inserted sequences' issued by Schegloff and labels it as 'side sequence'. She notes that the general flow of conversation may be suspended at an unpredictable point by, for example, a request for clarification, and then the talk goes on again where it left off. The function of 'side sequence' is to remedy a problem in what has just been said, fundamentally by using a 'questioning repeat' which is an interrogative item indicating that problem. Questioning repeats occur after the questioned utterance has been completed. This is because of the fact that the other speaker may correct himself. Jefferson (ibid) suggests that the misapprehension sequence has a triple structure: a statement of sorts, a misapprehension of sorts, and a clarification of sorts. In such a case, the side sequence looks rather like Schegloff's insertion sequence. There are, however, two basic distinctions: First of all, the 'statement', is not a first pair part, the other items are in no sense inserted, and there is no exception of who should speak at the end of the sequence or what kind of utterance should follow; secondly, while the sequence 'misapprehension-clarification' looks like a pair, there is a third compulsory element in the sequence. This element is an indication by the misapprehender that he knows or understands, such as 'that is better' or 'Yeah'.

(9) Statement: If Percy goes with – Nixon I'd sure like that.

Misapprehension: Who?

Clarification: Percy. That young fella that uh – his daughter was murdered.

Terminator: Oh Yeah. Yea.(ibid)

It can be said that the strict notion of 'side sequence', that the first part is misapprehension and the second part is clarification, is not the 'unmarked' but the 'marked' sequence. That is, not all such suspending sequences follow this pattern. Moreover, 'Who' may be considered as 'surprise' in (٧٠). In addition, Coulthard (ibid: ٧٦-٧٧) highlights that there is no reason why Schegloff's insertion sequence couldn't also have a termination, as in the following example:

(٧١) A: I don't know where the – wh – this address is. (Q)

B: Which part of town you live? (Qi)

A: I live four ten East Lowden. (Ai)

B: Ah yeah. Termination

Well you don't live very far from me. (A) (ibid)

٢,٢,٣,٥ Preference Structure

APs are not contentless noises in sequence. Rather, they stand for social actions, and not all social actions are of equal ranks when they are reflected in second parts of some pairs. Thus, the basic assumption is that a first part that contains a request or an offer is typically made to expect an 'acceptance' second part. It is intended that acceptance is structurally more likely than a refusal. This likelihood is termed 'preference'. Preference is not intended as a psychological concept, but rather as a technical means of referring to the sequence and the organization of conversation (Cf. Yule, ١٩٩٦b: ٧٨-٩; Taylor & Cameron, ١٩٨٧: ١١٣).

Cook (١٩٨٩: ٥٣-٤) stresses the fact that the utterance of one speaker makes a particular kind of response very likely. A greeting, for instance, is likely to be answered by another greeting, a summons by an answer. If they are ignored, it is supposed to interpret this somehow: as rudeness, of deafness, or lack of attention. He adds that there is often a choice of two likely responses. One of the responses is termed the 'preferred response' (because it occurs most frequently) and the other the 'dispreferred response' (because it is less common or unexpected).

Levinson (١٩٨٣: ٣٠٧) points out that preferred responses are the unmarked seconds, whereas dispreferred responses are the marked seconds (See Ervin-Tripp, ١٩٩٣: ٢٥٣).Mey (١٩٩٣: ٢٣١) mentions that there is a recurrent and reliable pattern

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of correlation between the two domains, that of preference and that of the kind of action performed. Thus, for instance, 'in the case of offers or invitations, an acceptance is in preferred format, whereas refusals normally are in dispreferred format' (ibid.). Following Levinson (1983: 336), an illustration of such correlation can be made as in Table (3) below.

Table (3): Preferred and Dispreferred Structures

First Part	Second Part	
	Preferred	Dispreferred
Request	acceptance	refusal
offer/invitation	acceptance	refusal
assessment	agreement	disagreement
blame/accusation	denial	admission
question	expected answer	unexpected (or non-) answer

After Levinson (1983: 336)

Yule (1996b: 49) gives the following example where the responses in each second part all represent preferred answers. Thus, acceptance or agreement is the preferred second part response to a request (4 a.), an offer (4 b.), an assessment (4 c.), or a proposal (4 d.):

(4) First part	Second part
a. Can you help me?	Sure.
b. Want some coffee.	Yes, please.
c. Isn't that really great?	Yes, it is.
d. Maybe we could go for a walk.	That'd be great.

Checking dispreferred seconds, Levinson (1983: 336) observes that they are distinguished by incorporating a 'substantial number of the following features':

- 'delays': (I) pause before delivery; (II) by the use of a preface (See b); (III) by displacement over a number of turns via the use of 'repair initiators or insertion sequences.
- 'prefaces': (I) the use of markers or announcers of dispreferred parts like 'Oh' and 'Well'; (II) the production of taken agreements before disagreements; (III) the use of appreciations if relevant (for offers, invitations, suggestions, advice); (IV) the use of apologies of relevance

(for requests, invitations, etc.); (V) the use of qualifiers (e.g. 'I don't know for sure, but ...'); (VI) hesitation in various forms, including self-editing.

- c. 'accounts': carefully formulated explanations for why the dispreferred act is being done'
- d. 'declination' component: of a form suited to the nature of the first part of the pair, but characteristically indirect or mitigated.

It can be observed that most of dispreferred features are politeness markers. Thus, they include 'downgraders' such as "Well", and qualifiers such as (bv). Also, the use of hedges is in (b IV) and (b II) (See Trosborg, ١٩٩٥: Ch. ١٠).

Yule (١٩٩٦b: ٨١) presents good examples to illustrate dispreferred features as follows:

(٧٣)

a. delay/hesitate	pause; er; em; ah
b. preface	well; oh
c. express doubt	I'm not sure; I don't know
d. token Yes	that's great; I'd love to
e. apology	I'm sorry; what a pity
f. mention obligation	I must do X; I'm expected to X
g. appeal for understanding	You See you know
h. make it non-personal	everybody else; out there
i. give an account	too much work; no time left
j. Use mitigators	really; mostly
k. hedge the negative	I guess not; not possible

٢,٢,٣,٦ The Underlying Relation in Adjacency Pairs

One of the important issues in the study of APs is the nature of relation between the two pair parts and the type of action achieved by such parts. Hopper (١٩٩٢: ١٣) considers the sequences of acts in APs as speech act sequences. Similarly, Dressler & Barbaresi (١٩٩٤: ٢٤) use the terminology that has been used to describe APs to

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label speech act sequences such as offer-acceptance/refusal, greeting-greeting ... etc., within their theory of morphopragmatics. However, Mey (1993) disagrees with such opinions, and considers the acts performed in APs as 'pragmatic acts'. Thus, he (ibid: 261) asserts that pragmatic acts can be looked at from two points of view: societal and linguistic. From the societal view, the focus will be on the constraints imposed on the individual in the form of necessary limitations on personal resources such as life history, education, class and the like. Such constraints concern what is termed 'background knowledge'. By contrast, the linguistic point of view concerns the question: what language is used to perform a pragmatic act, and to create the conditions to perform a pragmatic act? In this case, the notion of 'adaptability of language' plays a noticeable role: this means that the individual members of society rely on language as their chief tool to adapt to the ever-changing conditions surrounding them (See Verschueren, 1999: 12). The classical notion of speech act, Mey (1993: 261) adds, belongs to the linguistic viewpoint. This is because of the fact that speech acts are among the means that speakers have in their disposal to control their environment, and in turn to adopt it. Van Dijk (1980) maintains that what is found in APs are speech acts, but the labels are not so. He focuses on the second pair part indicating that the labels of such seconds do not refer to the speech acts performed, but to the functions achieved by such acts in a given context to be coherent to the previous speech act which is the first pair part in APs. This has led Sbisà (2002: 70) to remark that the hearer will accept or agree to the speech act performed by the speaker when the former thinks that it is felicitous. Contrarily, when the hearer finds the speech act performed infelicitous, s/he will express her/his refusal. For instance, when someone has no authority to give an order, the hearer will refuse that order, although the former uses the imperative mood and authoritative intonation. Consequently, one can say that the second pair parts are pragmatic functions achieved by certain speech acts to be relevant to the previous speech act. The local pragmatic coherence relations so far discussed can be presented in an eclectic model illustrated in Figure 2 below:




Fig.(٢): A Taxonomy of Local Pragmatic Coherence Relations.

In this eclectic taxonomy, the chronological development of the theories of local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE is taken into consideration. The first step in theorizing the taxonomy is that of Van Dijk (١٩٧٧) in which speech act relations are considered as the only PRAGMATIC COHERENCE relations in language, and they are both mono-logic and dialogic, i.e. they can be issued by the same speaker or by two. The second step is achieved by Levinson (١٩٨٣) in which the focus has been on the speech act relations that are found only at the dialogic level. The third step is presented by Sweetser (١٩٩٠) in which the pragmatic relations are divided

into speech act relations and epistemic relations. Generally speaking, these types of relations can operate with the assistance of using certain mechanisms as illustrated below.

۳. Degand's (۱۹۹۸) Techniques

The mechanisms that can be used to help in operating this model make use of Degand's (۱۹۹۸) techniques which can be summed as follows:

۱. Paraphrase: In this technique, the relation is paraphrased according to the definition of that relation. For instance, 'justification' is defined as that relation in which the function of a preceding speech act is to motivate and activate the performance of the following main speech act (See ۳, ۲, ۱, ۲, ۱).

۲. The use of the pragmatic connective: Certain relations are concerned with specific type of connectives which, in turn, can be considered as 'indicators' for these relations. For example, the pragmatic connective 'and' is used to convey the pragmatic relation of 'addition' between speech acts. To ensure the meaning of the pragmatic connective, analysts resort to substitution where a connective can be replaced by another one retaining the same meaning. Hence, this technique is an investigating one. For example, if the pragmatic connective 'and' is replaced by 'but' and the meaning is still 'contradiction', one can conclude that 'and' is used here in the meaning of connecting a 'contradiction' relation between speech acts. Generally speaking, the use of the pragmatic connectives is a sign of explicitness in local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE.

۴. Analyzed Examples for Illustration

۴, ۱ Speech Act and Epistemic Relations

To show the validity of the model in this study, the types of pragmatic relations will be investigated here: they are speech act relations and epistemic relations.

The illustrative sample of the situations analyzed here are randomly taken from the novel *Sons and Lovers* by D. H. Lawrence. The number of these situations amounts to fifteen in order to give a clear idea about the workability of the model developed by this study and to provide a vivid picture about the kind of pragmatic relations used in the novel under study. Generally speaking, the analysis of all the situations of the novel reveals that the speech act relations are used more than the

epistemic ones. Using the percentage equation to calculate the results shows that the frequencies of using the former relations amount to ٩٨,٤ %, whereas the latter are only ١,٦ %. This result indicates that the characters of the novel rarely relies on their own personal conclusions to relate their utterances. This leads one to conclude that the mental epistemicity of the figures is not linguistically reflected in the novel. The following examples of the situations analyzed will be illustrative of the statement that the speech act relations are appealed to more than epistemic ones.

٤,١,١ Speech Act Relations

(١) Mrs. Morel: You won't die if they do. Beside it's only half-past twelve.

(Mrs. Morel is talking to her son William about his being fast to arrive a festival)

The relation here is between two speech acts: the speech act of assertion ' Beside it's only half – past twelve ' is an 'addition ' to the previous speech act of assertion. Thus, it is a relation between two assertions.

(٢) Annie: I want to go. I want to go.

(Annie is talking to her mother that she insists on going with William to the celebration) The relation here is between two speech acts in which the second speech act of assertion 'I want to go' is an 'explication' to the previous speech act of assertion. Consequently, it is a relation between two speech acts.

(٣) a. Mr. Morel :Now do come and have this one wi' me. It's easy, you know. I'm pining to see you dance.

b. Mrs. Morel: No, I won't dance.

(Mr. Morel tries to convince Mrs. Morel to dance with him in a party)

In (٣) above, the relation is between two speech acts: the speech act of assertion in (٣b) is a 'refusal' of the speech act of offer in (٣a). this means that the relation is a speech act relation.

(٤) Mr. Morel: Eh, the mucky little 'ussy, who's drunk, I sh'd like ter know
I sh'd like ter know.

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(After his coming drunken from the bar at night, Mr. Morel quarrels with his wife Mrs. Morel)

In this example, the relation is between two speech acts where the speech act of assertion ' I sh'd like ter know ' is an ' explanation ' to the speech act of enquiry ' who's drunk'. This proves that the relation is a speech act relation .

(°) a. Mrs. Morel : You don't look as if you'd come much un-curled.

b. Mrs. Morel: I'm like a pig's tail, I curl because I cannot help it .

(In a party before their marriage, Mrs. Morel talks with Mr. Morel about his character)The relation in (°) above is between two speech act: an assertion in (°b) which is an 'agreement' with another assertion in (°a) which is an ' assessment ' .

(ʼ) a. Paul: Do you know where Arthur is ?

b. Mrs. Morel : I do not .

(The family is informed that Arthur joined the army)In (ʼ) above, again, the relation is between two speech acts: the speech act of assertion in (ʼb) which is a form of an 'answer' to the speech act of enquiry in (ʼa), which is a 'question'.

(ʷ) a. Paul: well, what am I but a common clerk.

b. Mrs. Morel : A good deal, my boy!

(Paul speaks to his mother about his status and job)

The relation is between two speech acts : the speech act of assertion in (ʷb) is a ' disagreement ' with the speech act of enquiry in (ʷa) which is an ' assessment' . This shows a kind of a speech act relation .

(^) Miriam : I wish you could come too. What time are you free?

(Miriam talks to Paul to come to her house)The relation is between two speech act: the speech act of assertion 'I wish you could come too' functions as a 'justification' for the speech act of enquiry 'What time are you free'.

(⁹) a Paul: Well, get the French and we'll do some--some

Verlaine .

b. Miriam: Yes.

(Paul is teaching Miriam French in her house) The current relation is between two speech act: the speech act of assertion in (⁹b) is an 'acceptance' of the speech act of request in (⁹a).

(١٠) Paul: Don't carry on again . I can't work .

(Paul said this to his mother when she interrupts his work talking about a financial problem with his father) The relation presented in (١٠) above is between two speech act : the speech act of assertion 'I can't work ' is an 'explanation ' for the previous speech act of request .

(١١) a. Mrs. Morel: Is there nobody else to talk to ?

b. Paul: Not about the things we talk of.

(Mrs. Morel is talking with Paul about his involvement with Miriam all the time)

The relation is between two speech act : the speech act of assertion in (١١b) is seen as a ' denial ' of the speech act of enquiry in (١١a) which is a blame . This indicates a speech act relation .

٤,١,٢ Epistemic Relations

(١٢) Mrs. Morel: Take your pudding in your hand –and it's

only five-past one, so you were wrong –you

haven't got your two pence .

(Mrs. Morel speaks to William about his being impatient) The relation that can be seen here is an epistemic pragmatic one . This relation is 'causal' between the premise 'it's only five –past one ' and the conclusion 'so you were wrong ' . It is an epistemic relation because it depends on the induction which is made the speaker herself (Mrs. Morel).

(١٣) Mrs. Morel: An' he'll be satisfied if he gets his 'lowance, whether they give him more or not.

(Mrs. Morel talks with William about his father's being late and improvident)

This is also an example of epistemic pragmatic relations . It is a 'conditional ' relation between the premise 'if he gets his ' lowance' and the conclusion 'An' he'll be satisfied' which is drawn according to the speaker's induction, and not on factual postulates.

(١٤) Mrs. Morel: I made that, so I can make thee one .

(Mr. Morel talks to Mrs. Morel about his ability to make coal-cutter to her like the one he made to his mother) This, again, is an epistemic pragmatic relation. the utterance 'I made that', which is a premise, functions as a 'causal' for the conclusion

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in 'so I can make thee one'. The relation is epistemic because the speaker concludes a result from a cause (premise) according to his own induction, not based on facts.

(١٥) Mrs. Morel: But you're never too tired to go if she will come for you .

(Mrs. Morel talks with her son Paul about his carelessness to her when he comes late)The relation in (١٥) above exemplifies an epistemic pragmatic relation . The premise ' if she will come for you ' is a 'conditional ' for the conclusion in 'you're never too tired'. The relation is epistemic because the speaker draws conclusion from a condition (premise) depending on her own induction and experience, not on factual matters.

٥.Conclusions

On the bases of theoretical treatment conducted throughout this work

and the analysis carried out in the previous section, the following conclusions can be introduced:

١. There are two levels of local PRAGMATIC COHERENCE relations: monologic and dialogic relations.

٢. Some of the types of local pragmatic coherence relations are found at both levels.

٣. The relations under study can be organized in the form of a comprehensive model which can be used for their analysis in a precise way.

٤. Some techniques are needed to operate the model in question.

٥. The workability of the model has been verified through the analysis of a sample of data randomly selected from D.H. Lawrence's ' Sons and Lovers '.

٦. The application of the model developed by this study to the data of this work reveals that **Local Pragmatic Coherence** manifests itself mostly through speech act relations than epistemic ones.

٧. The analysis of the data also shows that 'justification' is the most commonly used local pragmatic coherence relation . This proves that the speakers aim to give more explanations for their speech acts to be more felicitous.

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الخلاصة

تتناول هذه الدراسة موضوعاً اتساق المعنى التداولي وتطوير أنموذج أو نمط لتحليله على المستوى المحلي في المحادثات. يوجد الاتساق التداولي على مستويين أحدهما محلي و الآخر عام، و يخصص المحلي لدراسة العلاقات الموجودة بين الأفعال الكلامية، مثل "التسوية" و "الإضافة" و "الاستنتاج"، أما العام فيفترض أن النص أو المحادثة تكون ذات اتساق تداولي عام إذا ما عبرت عن فعل كلامي عام سواء كان بسيطاً أو مركباً، وذلك عن طريق تطبيق القواعد التقليصية العامة الثلاث على النص، وهي "التركيب" و "الاعمام" و "الحذف". واستفاد البحث من الدراسات والنظريات السابقة كنظرية الأزواج المترافقة ونظرية العلاقات الكلامية الذهنية للأفعال الكلامية.