

Consequences of the exclusion of Effective forces on political stability in Yemen after 2011 Reality Analysis 2019

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Introduction:

Yemen appears to be joining countries in crisis, Because the chances of a successful political settlement in this country are diminishing significantly, The reasons for this are due to complex and complex factors, In which many internal and external subjective and objective elements overlap, The nature of the conflict, manifested by the dispersal of conflicting forces, Multiple agendas and external engagements, The fragility of alliances among competing forces, and the lack of clarity of the objectives of the countries involved in Yemeni affairs, All these factors have created a weak political situation that does not provide a basis for a solid political settlement, a military situation tends to stagnate Where great military victories cannot be created to create a victor capable of imposing his will, and defeated accept the reality of the situation.

And as Yemen's civil war continues, it is imperative engagement become more widely understood that the international community, local decision-makers, security and military leaders and both local actors in Yemen and the dynamism of their engaged to harness efforts and bring all these parties to the table to negotiate a sustainable peace agreement, In the absence of this, Yemen is in danger of continuing a humanitarian catastrophe of dire proportions.

This study deals with the range of challenges faced by the people of Yemen because of the difference in political views between the group of parties that have power on the ground 'after this long

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period of war led by Saudi Arabia against Yemen and in cooperation with a group of Arab and non-Arab countries, the Arab coalition forces were unable to change the political equation in Yemen, where the coalition was unable to strengthen one political party at the expense of another political party, therefore, we will go to study the group of political forces that have the ability to participate in the conflict in Yemen, which is part of the political problem today, where the study will address the political parties and their relationship with foreign countries and their supporters, In return for the Houthis' control of power in Yemen, with foreign assistance from Iran as well, and the exclusion of the power of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi by force, then we will go to discuss the repercussions of this war on the future of political stability in Yemen, and its impact on security stability after 2011, the year President Ali Abdullah Saleh was overthrown, when the war left a deadly impact on the people of Yemen after coalition forces exaggerated the bombing of safe areas and civilians without regard for human rights.

I .Who are the warring powers Inside Yemen?

Yemen officially adopts (22) registered parties which obtained legal status until the end of ٢٠٠٣, however, the parties that announced their presence in the political arena had reached 46 parties, the media have shown an unreal picture of the conflict in Yemen when it refers to it as a conflict between the legitimate forces and the coup forces, while we see that the picture is more complicated than that 'as the conflict is between multiple forces with diverse agendas, especially in the front where the Houthis are fighting 'The conflicting forces are: Houthis on the one hand, Al-Haq Party and the Union of Popular Forces, supporters of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, on the other, the General People's Congress Party, represented by President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Yemeni Rally for Reform (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen), and the Salafi forces (the Rashad Party, And the Union of Popular Forces, the party National solidarity, The Renaissance Movement, and the Peace and Development Party), and the Islamic Action Party and civil components (including the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization, the Justice and Construction Party, the Republican

Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the Baath Party), separatist movements in the south, extremist groups and others, on the other hand, by analyzing the nature all these forces have their own agendas, some of which may share some commonalities, such as the Houthis and supporters of the late President Saleh, or the forces on the other side 'which does not exceed the temporary alliance against a common enemy or enemies.

II. Political Parties in Yemen:

The political structure in Yemen consists of a group of political parties and blocs that can be summarized as follows:

1.Houthis:

The Houthis adhere to the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam. The vast majority of Shia Muslims are known as Twelvers 'recognizing a class of twelve imams as the legitimate successors of the Prophet Muhammad. However, the Zaydis are known as Fivers, or followers of the Fifth Imam.²

The Houthi movement, led by the cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, started in the name of Ansar Allah, a Zaidi political party formed in 1990, affiliated with the Al-Haq Party / the wing of the Young Believers to contest the legislative elections in Yemen in 1993 'where Hussein al-Houthi won the membership of the Yemeni parliament. His movement focused on reviving the Zaidi faith he believed in. In 1997, al-Houthi left parliament and traveled to Iran and other countries to expand his religious education and Islamic perceptions, He studied his doctorate and returned to Yemen from Sudan after the events of September 11, 2001, Convinced that the region will soon become embroiled in a series of wars with foreign powers, then take tough positions on the interventions of the West in the affairs of his country, causing divisions with moderate leaders and liberal young believers after it became known slogan (God is great, death to America 'death to Israel, curse On the Jews, victory for Islam) is based on the slogan of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Death to America), where there

² -Thomas Juneau, Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons, USA, 2016, P:651 also see: Michael Knights, The Houthi war machine: From guerrilla war to state capture, USA, September 2018, P: 15

is an ideological rapprochement between Iran and the Houthis regarding the confrontation of Zionism and US imperialism, but the Houthis have the goal of establishing their authority in Yemen, Saleh tried to pressure him to soften his tone toward the West before issuing a warrant for his arrest with a small group of his followers, but moved to the Marran area in the center of the northern province of Saadah 'which borders Saudi Arabia. In September 2004, Saleh ordered his arrest, After a brief fight he was captured but one of the soldiers was shot in retaliation for his fellow soldiers who were killed by Ansar Allah during the violence in Saadah and was not killed by Saleh's desire, The movement then became a well-organized and trained militia that gained popularity in northern Yemen, especially after Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the founder's brother, reformulated the movement's rhetoric and seemed more moderate, But the main leadership appeared to be committed to the radical revolutionary principles of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, The movement's leaders also maintained the Zaydi approach of Hussein al-Houthi's doctrine, but a number of prominent Houthi supporters converted to Shiite doctrine over the two decades beginning in the third millennium and initiated religious education in Iran.³

The Houthis are the central party in the conflict in Yemen as they are directly responsible for the war in the country, having seized power and abolished the consensual power resulting from the political settlement in 2011, and the source of the power of the Houthis comes from their militarism, totalitarian organization, and central leadership, their strict ideology, their relations with Iran and the forces in its orbit, like the Lebanese Hezbollah⁴.

³ - Peter Salisbury, Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War', Middle East and North Africa Programmed, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs 'February 2015, P ° :Also see: Mohammed Hassan Al-Qadi, The Iranian Role in Yemen and its Implications for Regional Security 'Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Cairo, Egypt, 2017, PP: 45-46 also see: Ahmad Mohammed al-Daghashi, the Houthis and their military and political and educational future, the Forum on Arab and International Relations, Doha, first edition, Qatar, 2013, P:20 and beyond.

⁴-Ahmad Mohammad Al-Daghashi 'Al-Houthi Phenomenon: A Comprehensive Systematic Study- The Nature of Genesis and Formation- Factors of Appearance and Dialectical Relationship Abroad-Future Scenes, Yemeni Books House, Sana'a, Yemen, 2009, P:39

On the other hand, the Houthi movement suffers from major weaknesses, the most important of which is the ambiguity of its political project, which makes it unable to market it to a large segment of the population 'And the difficulty of legitimizing it, even at minimum levels, they also suffer from a lack of self-resources, which makes them unable to withstand for a long time ' especially because they work in a hostile geographical environment, there is no geographical connection with its major allies (Iran and its forces in its orbit.)

The movement benefited from the political vacuum resulting from the split and the wrestling of the Yemeni political class after the revolution against President Saleh in '٢٠١١' where they employed that division and invested in their favor effectively through their alliances and understandings with most political parties, such as the late President Saleh, the current president Hadi, and some factions Southern Movement and leftist parties, where some separatist movements and leftist parties, especially the Socialist Party, met with the Houthis in their ideological and political hostility to the Islah Party, This has led these forces in one way or another to support the Houthis during their expansion and arrival in Sana'a, all of which contributed to the ease of the Houthis' control of Sana'a and key areas of Yemen⁵.

During the movement's expansion and control of the state, the movement accumulated a huge amount of enemies as a result of its violent style and holistic approach, Its reliance on military action, and its project contradicts the projects and ideologies of most other political forces, accordingly, the movement's cannot retreat from its current locations 'and hand over the weapons in its possession to those you consider its enemies 'and its holistic structure makes it incapable of being part of a pluralistic system, and turn into a civilian political party.

At present, the movement controls most of the state's resources and institutions, It controls in one way or another most of Yemen's population (more than 70% of the population), It is the strongest

⁵-Special Report, Embassy of the republic of Yemen, The Houthis Legacy in Yemen, Lasting Damage Internally and Looming Danger Internationally, Washington, USA, May 2018, P: 5 and beyond

party in the equation of power and influence, especially since most of the areas it controls are one of the most difficult and powerful areas of Yemen, Besides most of them fall within what can be considered the social and sectarian shelter of the movement, the areas controlled by the Houthis include the most rugged areas of Yemen, It also includes the most intense and dire population «the warring northern tribal areas, the same population that made up the Zaidi region, which is the social incubator for the Houthis, therefore, they remain in a strong military and political situation, which is illustrated by their ability to fight, mobilize and military initiative in some areas, and toughness to repel attacks by their opponents.⁶

In the past period, the movement was able to add to its strength a new factor, represented in achieving an important political understanding, albeit limited with Saudi Arabia, which resulted in a truce on the border and the exchange of prisoners, If the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis actually improves, this will add significant benefits to the Houthis, but this will not happen without the Houthis undertaking a fundamental review of their organizational and ideological structure and their relationship with Iran.

It is therefore not expected that the movement will make any real concessions in the negotiations, especially in the aspect of the delivery of arms and state institutions, because doing so would mean its defeat and surrender, and exposing itself to retaliation against its opponents.

2. Al-Haq party:

Al-Haq party was founded in 1990 and is a Shiite Islamic party (Zaidi).

The party was founded by a number of religious scholars and members of the judiciary chief among them is Judge Ahmed Mohammed al-Shami, Al-Haq is considered one of the elite parties because it includes the elite of intellectuals, scholars and jurists

⁶ -Thomas Juneau, Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment, op.cit, P:651 also see: Michael Knights, The Houthi war machine: From guerrilla war to state capture, op.cit, P: 17

who follow the approach of Imam Hadi Bin Al-Hussein, the structure of the party is divided into two parts:⁷

- A. Department of reference: They are scientists who are the highest leadership in the party and decision makers without reference to members, this section was represented during the founding period Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayadi and Badr al-Din al-Huthi, who were based in Sa'ada, north of the capital Sana'a.
- B. The second section is represented by the administrative and executive leadership of the party and the rest of its members from the leaderships and bases coming from the central areas such as Judge Ahmed Mohammed al-Shami and Mohammed al-Maqaleh the party is characterized by a clear political and religious discourse.

3.The General People's Congress Party: Ali Abdullah Saleh:

The General People's Congress (GPC) was established in the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) on August 24-1982, during that time the country was going through a period of national unrest and rebellion, following the uprising in 1977 and 1979, presidents Hamdi and Gheshmi were already assassinated, after them, President Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power in July 1979, the same insurgency and violence continued during the first two years of President Saleh's regime, the National Front, a rebel force, has increased its pressure in Ibb and Taiz (central regions), many other underground groups and organizations such as the Nasserites, the Baath, and the Muslim Brotherhood are gaining strength, against this political background, the GPC was established in 1982. After the unification of Yemen in 1990, Article 5 of the ROY Constitution endorsed multi-party politics in 1991, Many groups that previously existed under the GPC umbrella were divided Of it,

⁷ - Falah Abdullah Al-Mudairis, *Islamic Movements and Groups in Yemen (1929-2004* (Strategic and Future Studies Series, Center for Strategic and Future Studies , Kuwait University, Kuwait, May 2005, P:22

forming their parties or joining other political parties and movements coming from the south⁸.

The dominant Popular Congress Party developed a policy of blending tribal elders with political authorities, these traditional forces now control the parliament through the ruling party, which in turn continues to strengthen tribal ties because of the many gaps in the prevailing electoral law, after a while, the transition to a one-party system became a competition between members of the same party⁹.

In the presidential elections held in (20-9-2006), President Saleh declared that his relationship with the opposition depends on its position as blocs and parties and that the dispute does not spoil the friendliness issue, although his victory has angered the Yemeni opposition parties, especially the parties of the Joint Meeting¹⁰.

It is unclear how much power the conference has, this is due to the great overlap between it and the Houthi movement during the current stage, the strength of the conference is that it was the ruling party in Yemen until the end of 2011, this enabled its members to dominate most state institutions during and after that period, the most important of these institutions: the former Republican Guard forces, the Republican Guard was disbanded and its brigades distributed to a number of forces as part of President Hadi's plan to restructure the Yemeni army 'security and intelligence forces, which most of its leaders owe allegiance to former President Saleh (president of the Popular Congress) even after he left office, however, under the Gulf Initiative, the Congress Party won half the seats of the government formed after the signing of the initiative, Besides 'President Hadi belongs to the conference, having held the position of Vice-President and Secretary-General of the Party until he was dismissed by the Party Chairman and his allies at an

⁸- Ahmed Abdel Azeez Hezam Al-Yemeni, *The Dynamic of Democratization – Political Parties in Yemen*, Copyright by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ISBN 3-89892-159-X, Germany 'February 2003 'PP:24-26

⁹-Houria Mashhour and Abdul Aziz Mohammed Al-Kameem, *International Foundation for Democracy and Elections 'Democratic Development in Yemen: Report on Promoting Women's Participation in Politics, Political Party Development and Electoral Process Development* 'Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany, 2005, PP: 15-16

¹⁰-Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper, Issue 5397, Wednesday, 4-10-2006, p: 17

extraordinary meeting of the Standing Committee of the Party on 8 November(2014)¹¹.

Since the Houthis took control of Sana'a, there has been a state of cooperation and harmony between these forces and the Houthis, except for rare cases of clash, the most important confrontation took place between the two sides when the Houthis took control of the Special Forces Camp in Asr area west of the capital Sanaa on February 25, 2015, which was reported by Reuters according to the BBC Arabic site on the same date, this cooperation has increased dramatically after the outbreak of " **Decisive** storm "which targeted both sides and treated them on the basis that they are one party.

During the rounds of negotiations, the conference appeared as a junior partner compared to the Houthis, there seemed to be an implicit agreement between the internal parties, including the Houthis, And externally Saudi Arabia to marginalize the role of the Congress Party, this may lead to the party's hardening on the negotiating table and its dealings with other internal and external parties, as the Houthi movement begins to take moderate positions on Saudi Arabia, the Popular Congress shows more aggressive attitudes toward Saudi Arabia than the Houthis do, and they seem to want to convey a message to Saudi Arabia and others that they are a key party to deal with and accept it.

Overall, the Congress party still has a lot of potential to remain a key player in Yemen, the most important: the great experience in governance compared to other forces, and important presence within state institutions, and the large number of supporters in most northern regions of Yemen, the party is betting on these possibilities to use them in time, which may come during the break of the Houthis, or the collapse of his alliance with them and the alliance with other forces.

4. President Hadi:

Although most of the forces fighting the Houthis are operating under the legitimate authority of President Hadi 'however, President Hadi remains the weakest link in the map of power and influence, almost all of these forces are not loyal to him, It is

¹¹-Statement of the Extraordinary Session of the Standing Committee of the Popular Congress Party, on 8 November. ٢٠١٤

practically subordinate to political and regional forces, It has its own agendas away from President Hadi's agenda, and all that Hadi has is a seal of legitimacy and external support.

Hadi's weakness is due to subjective and objective factors, his leadership capabilities are limited, and his rise to power was due to factors he had no hand in, In 2011, the conflicting forces agreed to choose him as a consensus president for many reasons, the most important political weakness and proximity to former President Saleh and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, this choice came as they believed that they could manage it for their benefit, and that he had no political ambition as he seemed to be a vice president, however, Hadi showed a strong desire to hold on to power and strengthened his position by initially aligning himself with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the Islah Party against the late President Saleh, and later an alliance with the Houthis against Ali Mohsen and Islah, In addition, he has no political, military, tribal or regional power to support him, most of the political forces do not trust him as a result of his policies suffered during the previous period.

Because of his fragile political situation 'he is vulnerable to neglect and perhaps exclusion, should there be a political settlement, or even a military victory, as a result, it is in his interest to keep the situation unchanged, which has made him unenthusiastic about a settlement in the Kuwait negotiations.

5. The Yemeni Rally Party for Reform and Muslim Brotherhood:

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest fundamentalist organizations that began its organizational activity in Yemen since (1949), and its activity in Yemen was linked to the same organization in Egypt, when the group's guide in Egypt 'Hassan al-Banna, expressed his interest towards the Yemeni scholarship between (١٩٣٩-١٩٤٠). Where they enrolled to study at Al-Azhar University and Science House.¹²

The Yemeni Rally for Reform Party was founded on (13/9/1990) under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar 'four months after the announcement of the Yemeni unity which

¹²-Falah Abdullah Al-Mudairis, *Islamic Movements and Groups in Yemen (1929-2004)*, (op.cit, P:8

was held on (22/5/1990) (the party was born, believing in democratic choice and political pluralism, recognizing it as an approach, rationalizing partisan practice and consolidating the principle of peaceful transfer of power and democracy regulated by the provisions of Islam as a way of exercising power¹³.

Islah party appears to be in the state of its opponents and has competed with most of the political forces in Yemen, During the past years, the party has been subjected to campaigns of abolition and weakening by the Popular Congress, the Houthis, president Hadi and the Southern Movement, as well as his partners in the JMP, especially the Socialist Party. In addition, the party is subjected to campaigns of exclusion from many countries, the most important of which are: Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the previous period, which had to accept it in the coalition after the **"Decisive storm."**

As a result, Islah party is practically Fighting in political and military battles with more than one party, and in more than one front, the most important of these fronts are those he wages with the Houthis, who consider them their first ideological and political opponent, this has led them to practice organized campaigns of repression and dismantling of its organizational, economic, intellectual and military structures, the Houthis are aiding the Popular Congress Party in this (which considered Islah Party the main reason in its removal from power, the Islah Party has economic institutions and educational facilities, since 2011 (some military units have been affiliated with the party, It was part of the first armored division led by Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. The Islah Party emerged as a coalition of three distinct groups: 1.the tribal forces headed by the Red, 2.The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, which provided the organizational and political backbone of the party, 3.and a number of conservative businessmen (initially represented by Muhammad Abdul Wahab al-Ja'bari, who became a member of the Supreme Council for Reform, came from the Sunni community, which represents just over (60%)

¹³- Mohammed Abdul Rahman Al-Maqrami (The Yemeni gathering for reform : A Vision and Path Study in Establishment and Development from 1990-1998, Dar Al Kutub: Sana'a, Yemen, 1998, pp. 185-187

of the the Yemeni population (the next largest of which is the Zaidi Shia community, with an estimated (30 to 35% of the population) emerged in northern Yemen in the early 1960s. Like other Islamist parties and movements in the Arab world, it has been influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The movement's founders, such as the prominent Sheikh Yassin Abdulaziz, Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, and Abdulmalik Mansoor were students at Egyptian universities in the early 1960s. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood markedly shaped the party's ideology and reform platform¹⁴.

However, the party remains one of the most important forces in Yemen for several reasons, including: 1.Its organizational structure covering almost all regions of Yemen, 2.The cohesion of its members.٣ ٤His political experience, 4.His early presence in the organs of the Yemeni State, 5.His alliances with some military commanders such as General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and with some Hashid tribal elders, In addition, Saudi Arabia needs the party in its war against the Houthis and supporters of the late President Saleh, because the party is the objective equivalent politically and intellectually, and perhaps military for them.

Since the outbreak) Decisive storm) the Islah Party strengthened its political and military Sites ٥where he has a presence within the institutions of the legitimate authority ٥through the presence of some of its members and affiliates within the political staff in Riyadh, besides dominating a number of military forces in what is known as the Saudi-backed National Army, specifically on the fronts of Marib ٥Al Jawf and Haradh, which are considered the most important forces follow of this army, most of the military commanders of these forces are members of the party or affiliated with their ally General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, in addition ٥many forces associated with the resistance in many areas of Yemen are affiliated with the Islah Party.

In general, Islah party remains an important political force on the map of major powers, however, it is vulnerable to setbacks due to

¹⁴- Amr Hamzawy, *Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform*, Carnegie Middle East Center, Publications department, Number 18, Washington, USA, November ٢٠٠٩ P:3 Also see :Ahmed Abdel Azeez Hezam Al-Yemeni, *The Dynamic of Democratization –Political Parties in Yemen*, op.cit :P:43 and Beyond.

the large number of internal enemies and the absence of a true external ally, his current relationship with Saudi Arabia is not strong and still characterized by mistrust, there is also a strong competitor who started to compete with him in his geographical and ideological regions represented by Salafi groups fighting the Houthis, in addition, the fragility of his alliance with President Hadi, the most serious political challenge facing the party is its transformation into a militia if the war drags on and continues at its current pace.

As for the circumstances of the party and its hostile climate, any political settlement in accordance with the current balance of power will be at the expense of the party, as all internal and external parties will reduce the party's share to a minimum, especially as any possible compromise may keep the party's main enemies (Houthis, and Congress) (which will be at its expense, and for all this we find that the party more enthusiastic to continue the war until the defeat of its opponents or at least weaken them.

6. Salafists:

Sheikh Muqbel ibn Hadi al-Wada'i is considered the actual founder of the Salafi movement in Yemen, he received his religious education in Saudi Arabia and was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1979 after being suspected of involvement in the Jahiman Al-Otaibi incident at the Grand Mosque in Mecca.¹⁵

The Salafis have emerged as a major force in areas that have seen battles with the Houthis specifically in some southern regions, Taiz and al-Bayda, including the recently established Salafi Rashad Party, What drives them in their conflict with the Houthis is severe sectarian rivalries, In addition, there is a desire of Salafis to avenge the Houthis for displacement from the most important Salafi center in Yemen in the Dammaj city in early 2014. The Salafis established a center in the Dammaj area of Sa'ada governorate, which is the historical center of the Zaydi sect. this center was established by Sheikh Muqbel Al Wadei in the late seventies and early eighties, this center has attracted many students from many nationalities, At the end of ٢٠١٣, the Houthis imposed a siege on the center that led

¹⁵ - Falah Abdullah Al-Mudairis, *Islamic Movements and Groups in Yemen (1929-2004)* (op.cit, P:25)

to violent clashes between the two parties that ended with the displacement of Salafis from the area on 14-1-2014, through mediation led by committees formed by President Hadi, the Salafis' influence has expanded relatively as they are the most enthusiastic party in the fight against the Houthis, to weaken or remove Islah from some positions on the other, the continuation of the war in its current form will strengthen the Salafis.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is trying to build itself as an alternative to the political system and trying to impose itself in Yemen as a model for the jihadist political system within popular societies, because al-Qaeda in southern Yemen assumes that hearts and minds are sympathetic to it, and that this can easily be turned into viable political institutions, and jihadists are also trying to impose themselves on tribes.¹⁶

The Salafis, however, have a major problem of scattering a large number of entities, weak institutional structure of these entities, and their association with a large number of leaders, there is no central leadership of Salafi forces, besides, most Salafist forces reject political action within the democratic system, which makes them refuse to work within clear party frameworks, the only Salafi party that has been deviated from this rule is the Rashad Party, which represents only a fraction of Salafi forces, as a result of the status and extremism of Salafi forces, they are not expected to be part of a possible political settlement, especially since its hostility to the Houthis takes on a religious nature, which does not accept bargaining and half-solutions, on the other hand, some Salafi groups have understandings with the Houthis that have ensured relative freedom of movement in areas controlled by the Houthis.

Tribal leaders and activists in tribal areas complain that al-Qaeda in Yemen could have been exterminated a long time ago had the country's leadership especially President Saleh been serious about combating the group, for a decade the United States depended on President Saleh and provided almost unconditional backing to his, despite the fact that he did not actually work to rid his country of

¹⁶ -Sarah Phillips, What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building, Carnegie Middle East Center, Publications department, Number 107, Washington, March 2010, P:

the terrorist group, this dependence ended in (2011) only because Saleh Became out of power, some U.S. officials now acknowledge that Saleh used al-Qaeda's presence to secure a steady flow of U.S. counterterrorism aid and other support, using it to strengthen his grip on power while deploying al-Qaeda militants to eliminate his political opponents, a former senior U.S. official closely involved in Yemen policy in (2017) described Saleh as "an unreliable partner, someone who used terrorists as a useful tool to draw aid from the West to distribute to his family."¹⁷

With the collapse of the political settlement and the ensuing war and chaos in Yemen, extremist forces such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have benefited from this situation and became prominent in the war with the Houthis, Specifically in some areas of the south and the governorates of Taiz and al-Bayda, these groups were able to control large areas in the south 'the most important of which was the control of the coastal area of Hadramout, which lasted for about a year 'during this period, these groups received a lot of money and huge military equipment, It was able to recruit additional personnel.

Although the public presence of these groups has diminished considerably in the southern regions 'after being taken out of some areas of Hadramout, Aden and Lahj, however, their actual presence is still effective. Their departure was not due to a real military defeat, but rather to understandings between them and some local forces 'apparently under the auspices of some external parties, that being the case 'what happened was merely a redeployment and repositioning of these groups and a change in the way they work, and after being in public, she went into hiding and working in secrecy in small groups, which increases her risk.

These groups are known to be dangerous because of their clandestine work rather than their public work, their specific operations against vital people and centers have far greater effects than their formal governance practices in some areas.

¹⁷ -Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Yemeni Tribes and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Project on middle east democracy-POMED 'Washington, USA, February 2018, P٢٩:

In the negotiations in Kuwait, these extremist groups appear to be absent and present at the same time, as the most important concerns of the major countries in the situation in Yemen is the proliferation of these groups and the direct dangers that this poses to them, therefore, these countries are pressing all parties to the Yemeni crisis and influential countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to end the war and reach a political settlement at any cost.

7. Islamic Action Party:

Established after the declaration of the state of unity between north and south Yemen and the declaration of political pluralism, the most prominent of its founders Ibrahim bin Mohammed Minister, his choice of the name (Islamic Labor Party) was a result of his interest in the rights of workers, peasants, the poor and everyone who works is a worker, the party takes the term of vulnerability on the grounds that the movement advocacy for workers is a movement orbit of the industrious sons of Yemen, the party considers itself a progressive party and one of the conditions for advancing the teachings of Islam about a modern and civilized understanding, the Party fights against the concept of capitalism and calls for undermining this concept because it is in the interest of capitalism and not in the interest of the people, he describes capitalism as an unjust usury and calls for the exploitation of man and monopoly, the party believes in Islamic pluralism and emphasizes that the Islamic arena is Includes to all Islamic trends so that there is no disagreement over the assets but the dispute in the branches.¹⁸

8. The separatist movement in the south:

Loosely organized regional opposition in southern provinces initially started by retired southern army general Nasir Ali an-Nuba, but currently serves as a political umbrella for multiple southern opposition groups, some who claim former YSP leader and vice president Ali Salem al-Beidh as the champion of their cause. The movement was joined in 2009 by Sheikh Tareq al-

¹⁸-Falah Abdullah Al-Mudairis, *Islamic Movements and Groups in Yemen (1929-2004* (op.cit, PP:24-25

Fadhli, a former southern ally of President Saleh in the GPC Al-Qaeda in the Arab peninsula (AQAP)¹⁹.

Southern movement means the large number of forces and entities, some of which have only a name 'almost all of these forces demand a special status for the southern provinces ranging from full independence to federalism, during the war, some of the movement's forces benefited from the war after receiving military, political and financial support, some factions of the movement were able to take effective control over some areas of the south, as in the governorates of Aden 'Lahj and Zali, this was done in understanding and coordination with the United Arab Emirates, which leads the management of the situation in the southern regions, and with the legitimate authority that has given them their legitimate control by integrating some of its members into the official army of the state 'and the appointment of a number of leaders of the movement administrative and security officials in a number of provinces, this resulted in a de facto and symbolic separation of some areas of the South from the Republic of Yemen 'although the southern issue does not exist directly on the negotiating agenda but its impact is obvious, It remains one of the issues hindering any political settlement, separation cannot take place as smoothly as its proponents promote 'and other solutions, such as federalism in its many forms, are not feasible 'and raise a lot of problems.²⁰

The separatist movement is one of the biggest problems that complicate the Yemeni political scene, due to its complex nature 'which makes its problem unsolvable, the separation does not have the actual elements of verification and most important:

1. Lack of legal basis.
2. Most of the world's nations refused to secede.
3. The absence of a coherent southern identity.
4. The dispersion of separatist forces.

¹⁹-Stephen W. Day, *The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement* ' Carnegie Middle East Center, Publications department, Number 108, Washington ' USA, March 2010, P: V and beyond.

²⁰ - Sama'a Al-Hamdani and Adam Baron and Majed Al-Madhaji, *The role of local actors in Yemen's current war*, Yemen in Crisis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, Policy Paper No ' ٢, July 2015, P: 4

5. The emergence of separatist movements within the south, specifically in Hadramout.
6. The survival of the South within the state among other projects such as federalism faces major problems and difficulties.

7. - Not to mention the rejection by some forces in the north. Because the political settlement will focus on stopping the war, restoring power and returning to the political process, the separatist forces are not enthusiastic about this compromise because, in their view, it means keeping the south within the Yemeni state, and denying the separatists much of the gains they gained from the war. The civil war has significantly strengthened the south's bargaining power and position within Yemeni politics during the early days of the conflict, loosely organized southern militias were able to push the alliance of the Houthi rebels and Saleh-aligned forces out of their territories with the support of special and conventional forces, including air power from the UAE later, UAE-backed forces in Hadramawt ousted AQAP from the southeastern port city of Mukalla²¹.

9. Yemeni Liberal Party:

The party was founded in 1944 in the Tawahi area in southern Yemen after World War II, when a large number of opposition emigrated from northern Yemen, and the most prominent founders of the party, Ahmed Mohammed al-Nu'man, who became the party's leader and Mohammed Mahmoud al-Zubairi, who became secretary-general during the founding period. The party is active under the name of the "Great Yemeni Society," and the newspaper "Voice of Yemen" is the official newspaper of the party, where they set the objectives of the party and criticized the regime of the imamate and demanded the existence of a parliament, the party participated in the coup movement in (1948).²²

²¹-Peter Salisbury, *Yemen's Southern Powder Keg*, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, ISBN ٠١ ٢٦٥ ٧٨٤١٣ ١ ٩٧٨ London, March 2018, P: 12

²² - Falah Abdullah Al-Mudairis, *Islamic Movements and Groups in Yemen (1929-2004)*, (op.cit, P:6

10. Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP):

YSP was established on (11-10-1978) in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) as a federation of a number of national parties, organizations and fronts, these included the Baath movement (an Arab nationalist movement) and the Marxist Party, each operating in the north and south, and six other parties that were only active in the south, after independence from Britain in (1967) (the PDRY became a socialist state and served as an important Soviet satellite in the Middle East, democratic People's Democracy was governed until (1979) by a national front that included leftist parties such as the Yemeni Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Popular Leader Party, and the Labor Party, In the mid-(1970s), these southern Marxist parties began negotiations with their counterparts in northern Yemen and formed the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the YSP became the only political party in southern Yemen, and its counterpart (the Popular Unity Party), of course, was not equivalent to the (YSP) in form and performance, and was established in the north. The two sides formally merged after the unification of Yemen in (1990), most residents of the south controlled it because they had been in the party for a long time. However (Abdelfattah Ismail is the founding father of (YSP), he served as Secretary General from (1978 to 1981), Ali Nasser Mohammed, a founding member of the YSP (took control of the (YSP) from (1981) until he was overthrown in the civil uprising of (1986), Ali Salem al-Baid, a Hadrami from Yemen's Hadramout region (came to power after an uprising in (1986), he was one of the few survivors of the uprising. He became the leader of South Yemen and secretary general of the) YSP) until the time of unification in (1990), from (1990) until (1994), he remained the secretary general of the (YSP), but was exiled in Oman for his role in the (1994) separatist movement. Whites are respected for his political and military role against the British in the National Front, serving as the first defense minister in the first government in southern Yemen, another prominent figure in (YSP) is Jarallah Omar, he achieved his authority as one of the leaders of the Northern National Front, a rebellion that broke out in the ١٩٧٠)s) and continued to fight Saleh's government until the mid-(1980s (Jarallah Omar is currently head of the Northern Group of

(YSP), It is widely respected within the party as well as through the opposition, the godfather has been the Yemeni opposition since the (1994) civil war, the (YSP) has been the ruling party of (PDRY) South Yemen since the party was founded in (1978) until unification in (1990), from (1990) until the (1993) parliamentary elections 'the (YSP) ruled in alliance with the (GPC), after the (1993) elections, the (YSP) participated in a tripartite alliance with the (GPC) and Islah, which ended with the civil uprising in (1994), in the (1993) elections, the (YSP) was the main party in almost all electoral districts in the former South Yemen²³.

11. Yemeni Popular Forces Union:

It is one of the opposite sides of Houthi and Saleh, which consists of a variety of forces, in light of the total collapse of state institutions and the absence of the central government in Sana'a, the large military and financial support by the Saudi-led coalition forces led to the temporary consolidation of these resistance forces, despite their varying objectives and motives to confront the Houthis, but the existence of a common adversary has reduced the emergence of deep divisions in ideology and goals among these groups openly, but despite their opposition to the Houthis, however, there is a common denominator that combines all the components of the popular resistance, which is not to accept President Hadi's return to power, the Popular Resistance is trying to counter the ambitions of the military coalition of the Houthis and their followers of the followers of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh but at the same time 'this represents an increasing rise of decentralized militias in much of Yemen 'this poses a significant risk to any potential political settlement through which the legitimacy and powers of the Hadi government are sought which they are supposed to fight for.²⁴

12. Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)

A political bloc that brought together the opposition parties of former President Saleh, was established in (6-2-2003), he had a

²³-Ahmed Abdel Azeez Hezam Al-Yemeni, *The Dynamic of Democratization – Political Parties in Yemen*, op.cit 'PP:59 also see: Peter Salisbury, *Yemen's Southern Powder Keg*, Chatham House 'op.cit, P: 8 and beyond

²⁴-Sama'a Al-Hamdani and Adam Baron and Majed Al-Madhaji, *The role of local actors in Yemen's current war*, *Yemen in Crisis*, op.cit, P: 3-4

prominent role in the revolution that led to the overthrow of Saleh in (٢٠١١) the bloc included the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Party, a branch of the Baath Party, the Haq Party, and the Union of Popular Forces close to the Houthis.²⁵

In some authoritarian regimes, the opposition continues, but it cannot offer anything and cannot change. Albrecht explained that the opposition can go along with tyranny, and that the opposition has no role in change²⁶. This is confirmed by Gandhi and Lust-Lokar when they suggest that when Authoritarian conditions dominate the country and in times of elections, the political system will be stable towards authoritarianism and can not change, and here will be the question of why the opposition participation in the elections with an authoritarian regime? Although the result is known as the ruling party's victory, the reason is that when the opposition does not have the tools to challenge the existing political system, the authoritarian regime will resort to ways of rigging elections in political participation, although such participation would involve the risk of strengthening the authoritarian regime²⁷. One of the successful means is to enter into alliances with the rest of the opposition, and Kraetzschmar points out three factors that can affect party leaders who will enter into an electoral alliance: first: having partners to collaborate with; second: from the chance to win and participate in the government, third: how to enter the coalition that will affect their electoral base²⁸.

The JMP identified their demands as follows :

1. Building a decentralized state for all Yemeni people, which is dominated by justice and equality.
2. Recognize and resolve the southern issue fairly.

²⁵-Vincent Durac, *The Joint Meeting Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Yemen*, School of Politics & International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland, December 2011 ·P:32 and beyond.

²⁶ - H. Albrecht, 'Authoritarian Opposition and the Politics of Challenge in Egypt,' in O. Schlumberger (ed) *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press (٢٠٠٧ : p. 59.

²⁷ - J. Gandhi and E. Lust-Okar, 'Elections under Authoritarianism,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12 (2009), p.p. 407- 411

²⁸ - H. Kraetzschmar, 'Electoral Rules, voter mobilization and the Islamist landslide in the Saudi municipal elections of 2005,' *Contemporary arab affairs* 3/4, (2010), p. 519.

3. Stop the wars in northern Yemen (Saadah.)
4. The fair distribution of wealth and resolve the economic issue to achieve justice and equality in the distribution, including public jobs and solve the problem of unemployment and the elimination of corruption and the balance of wages and prices.
5. Building national institutions away from favoritism and on a national basis away from loyalties and according to competencies.
6. The need to make the confrontation of terrorism a national issue away from employment and investment because this scourge threatens the stability of the country, and must be recruited all national potential to face them.

But the most extreme demands were announced in (30-3-2011):

1. President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down from power and transferred his powers and powers to his deputy, and imposed a ban on the participation of his family in military and civil affairs.
2. Suspension of the current constitution.
3. Forming a five-member provisional national council unrelated to Saleh's regime, including a youth representative, and declaring a six-month transitional period in which parliament and the Shura Council are dissolved.
4. Appointment of a technocratic person by the National Assembly to form an interim government.
5. Restoration of looted public and private property and the release of political prisoners.
6. Abolish the Ministry of Information and enable journalists to practice the profession freely.
7. The dismantling of the State Security and Intelligence Services and the Defense Council and the establishment of a national security organization in its place under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, provided that its mission is limited to the investigation and prevention of external threats to internal security.

8. Dissolve the municipal councils and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, dismiss the Attorney General, and establish a Supreme Constitutional Court²⁹.

Yemen is one of the countries where a group of intersecting ideologies and different parties live in its political ideology. this difference comes according to national 'religious and sectarian roots, so we will go to identify the national identity in Yemen, then we will discuss the topic of Neural Tribe.

III. National identity and ideological and national disagreement:

It can be said that the identity in Yemen has been subjected to a number of acts of distortion and distracting. It was not mentioned that Yemen was ruled by a single state until ١٩٩١ by declaring a project of unity between two independent national states) the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), which represented the government of southern Yemen and the (North Yemen Arab Republic), which represented the government of northern Yemen. An attempt that failed since its inception and was completed after the 1994 war. The unit is the subject of disagreement with the Southern Movement, which is struggling to return to its independent state with its national identity, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen³⁰.

It is a unit carried out by the ruling elites of the two countries under the motives of interests and the influence of National unitary thought and Marxist ideology in both countries .because the content of the process of unification in national thought is based on ignoring the reality of pluralism and difference in society, and did not look at the components of society, which is divided into tribes,

²⁹ -Hisham Al-Qarawi, Yemen revolution replacing Ali Abdullah Saleh or replacing neglected Institutions, Arab Center for Research and Policies Study, Case Assessment Series, Doha Institute, Qatar ٢٠١١ .pp. 13-14

³⁰ - Group of Researchers, Reconstruction of Yemen (Political, Economic and Social Challenges), edited by Noel Brehouni and Saud Al-Sarhan, King Faisal Center for Research and Studies, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 1437 Hijri, p: 1

clans, groups, trends and identities that represent a real reality did not help the process of unification³¹.

This thought was reflected in all Arab countries 'Yemeni unity has not been built on solid foundations because of the multiple divisions in identity and cultural and social differentiation between the two countries in Yemen, whose courses have been defined for centuries. Identities between citizens in countries divided along regional lines, whose citizens adopt stronger regional identities, undermine the sense of any common national unity, and this is evident in Yemen, which witnessed a number of nervous wars such as the war (1994) that ended the unity project between the two countries.³²

Ibn Khaldun explains in his talk about the nervousness and the state the impact of the geographical factor of nervousness so that the tribe penetrates to seize power and rule by war and take advantage of the wealth of the land and wealth of others, either because of the small number or lack of integration with them³³.

This is what happened to the south after the war (1994), when Sanaa took power and the wealth of the south, so that the south turned into a war boot that affected everything, as is the case in the tribal wars that Ibn Khaldun talked about. Nervousness was the catalyst for many North-South wars, such as the ongoing war (2015-2019), or the long-standing wars between the Zaydi and Shafi'i communities in Yemen, as well as the wars between the two countries prior to 1991, and the Houthi wars with the Salafis. The last few years, all wars are centered on the subject of existence.

After we finished reviewing the political parties in Yemen and how some of them were excluded from power sharing, because of the military weight of others, and the reasons for the internal division of Yemen ideological and national disagreement, we will go to the

³¹ - Mohammed Omar Ahmed Abu Anza 'the problematic reality Arab Identity: Between National and Islamic Theses' 'A Study from an Intellectual Perspective,' Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Middle East University 'Jordan, Amman, 2011, p: 32

³² - Group of Researchers, Reconstruction of Yemen (Political 'Economic and Social Challenges), edited by Noel Brehouni and Saud Al-Sarhan 'op.cit, p: 49

³³ - Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, Ibn Khaldun's Thought: Neuralism and the State, "Milestones of Khaldouni Theory in Islamic History," 6th edition, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Lebanon, Beirut ١٩٩٤, pp. 25 and 212.

study of external interference in Yemen by the Arab coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand in support of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi's party in return for Iran's support for the Houthis.

IV. The consequences of external military intervention in the political conflict in Yemen:

The main reason for the outbreak of war on Yemen by Saudi Arabia and the coalition led by it emerged after the Yemeni revolution in February 2011, when Ali Abdullah Saleh tried to strengthen his family's control over the state apparatus. This was a threat to the ruling political, tribal and military classes, and over time the aging elite entered the line of demonstrations and the main leaders of the demonstrations were removed and the old conflict between the rulers began. Where everyone claimed they were offering revolutionary ideas, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ruled out of his post as president of the republic in a political deal according to the Gulf initiative and under the supervision of Saudi Arabia. And go into transition, Parliamentary elections were held in early 2012 and deposed Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi became president of the republic, which was part of the system.³⁴

1.The reasons for the Saudi campaign?

Houthis who oppose the status quo. At the same time, one of the reasons behind the Saudi campaign was to protect the post-(2011) status quo and the elites it controlled. Saudi interests were threatened by the rise of the Houthis, who defeated Saudi allies, particularly Islah and Ali Mohsen, therefore, Saudi intervention can be seen from the perspective of Riyadh's efforts to restore the balance of power in Yemen in favor of the existing forces in line with it, it is also useful to see the Houthi-Saleh alliance through dissatisfaction with the status quo. Since (2012), the two sides have found common ground, despite past enmity. Both now oppose the

³⁴-Hadil Mohammed and others 'Yemen between the impact of the climate change and the ongoing Saudia Yemen war: A real tragedy, an analytical Report Published by the Centre For Governance and Peace building Yemen (GPBC), in collaboration with Centre for international development issues Nijmegen (CIDIN), Radboud university, Netherlands, November ٢٠١٧ P٢:

Also see :Mohammed Hassan al-Qadi, the Iranian role in Yemen and its implications for regional security, op.cit, P:30 and beyond.

post-2012 internal system, which was initially dominated by the Saudi-backed Islah party and Ali Mohsen, Saleh Before killing him has been marginalized, he wants to regain his former position at the top of the country's political structure and put his son Ahmed as the next president, he also carries a deep grudge against Islah and Ali Mohsen, saying they are responsible for losing the presidency, the common opposition to Ali Mohsen and Islah - which the Houthis have a hostile relationship with - has brought the Houthis and Saleh together since (2014), at the same time, reform over the decades has been one of the main instruments of Saudi influence in Yemen. In short, there is a convergence of interests between the Houthis and Saleh and Iran in opposing the axis of reform - Ali Mohsen - Saudi Arabia, directly or indirectly.³⁵

2. The reality of Iranian support for the Houthis:

Western and Yemeni officials have accused Iran of backing the Houthis. In January (2013), The New York Times reported on US officials providing data to Yemeni authorities that the arms shipment seized by Yemeni security forces off the country's southern coast was from Iran, and that the contraband was destined for Iran, in an article published in the Financial Times in February (2014), a Yemeni official was quoted as saying that Iran and its Lebanese proxies provided financial support, weapons, and direct military advice to the Houthis, the United States was more concerned that President Saleh would use the weapons it finances for the Yemeni government to fight al-Qaeda extremists in southern Yemen for use against the Houthis in the north" 'The ship, which Sanaa claimed was carrying an Iranian arms shipment to the Houthis, did not carry any weapons at all "one sensitive US official report said, the US government provided satellite images of Houthi positions during the last Sixth War in Saadah to the Sanaa government, Iran expressed its sympathy for the Houthis when they entered Sana'a on (21-9-2014) (where (Ali Akbar Velayati), adviser to the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei) for international affairs and head of the Strategic Research Center of the Diagnostic Complex the system, said that Tehran supports the Houthis in their legitimate

³⁵ -Thomas Juneau, Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment, op.cit, P:660

struggle, while conservative MP Ali Reza Zakani told the media that "Houthi's seizure of Sanaa was a victory for the regime in Tehran "adding that Iran now controls the four capitals of Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa, noting that Iran could not interfere in Arab affairs. Without the divisions among the Arab countries and their weakness, which opens the door for intervention, however It remains difficult to imagine that an isolated human group in the northern mountainous interior was able to develop an organized and tactical combat force without outside support, it is more difficult to imagine that it is capable of arming itself, even though Yemen is famous for being a major center of the arms trade, It has become clear that the main sponsor of the Houthis since the capture of Sana'a is Saleh and not an outside party that encouraged his tribal and military allies to either stand aside or support the Houthi campaign, whose loyalists make up a large proportion of the popular committees that have patrolled the streets of the capital since (September 2014 (and captured On the Scud / B missiles that the central government imported from Russia and North Korea and called them the volcano.³⁶

Unlike Saudi Arabia, there is no history of Iranian involvement in Yemen in the modern era. Although President Saleh routinely alleged during the six Saadah wars that Iran was actively supporting the Houthis, there was little evidence to support his claims. (Indeed, Saudi frustration over Saleh's exaggeration of the Iranian role in the Saadah wars was likely one of the factors that influenced their decision to support the political transition in 2011) Nor did Iran participate in the international community's effort to facilitate the political negotiations leading to Saleh's departure in (2011), but, belying claims that Iran's support to the Houthis was a reaction to Saudi intervention, Iranian training and assistance began

³⁶- Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, USA, April 12, 2018 ,P: 4-5 Also see: Peter Salisbury, Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War', op.cit, P ٩-٧ :Also see: Thomas Juneau, Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment, op.cit, P:655

to expand in (2012), when the majority of Yemenis were fully committed to the implementation of the GCC Initiative³⁷.

3. Attempts to peaceful solutions:

Since January 2018, it has become difficult to find a peaceful solution to the power struggle in Yemen, after previous GCC mediation efforts to resolve the internal conflict have yielded limited results, which abbreviated the agreement signed by the parties for the cautious transfer of power from Ali Abdullah Saleh to Abed Rabbo Mansour in (2012) and the integration of the Houthis into the security establishment. In 2016, UN envoy Ismail wald Cheikh Ahmed presented a plan to settle the dispute as a result of the Kuwait talks, but to no avail, he resigned in January 2017, three years after he took office. Riyadh and Muscat began defensive projects that included strengthening The army's capabilities and fortification of border fences and ports with Yemen in response to the Houthis' use of anti-tank weapons and ballistic missiles, which were not in the stores of the Yemeni army, which entered secretly from the Omani border to Yemen, but tightening border controls has political and humanitarian consequences, because a general agreement (2000) (which organizes a Saudi-Yemeni borders allows the passage of the free grazing of livestock in the bar (20 / km) on both sides of the border, because Saudi Arabia has developed a technical barrier to prevent traffic and opposed by the Yemeni government because it led to the restriction of freedom of grazing and feeding of livestock with the scarcity of resources in the Yemeni side.³⁸

4. Houthi control of power:

Since the Houthis seized power, western countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states - particularly Washington and Riyadh - have presented a series of complex political challenge, after the Houthis took control of the capital, they began to focus on the province of al-Bayda In the central Yemen, which is considered a stronghold of support for AQAP, which Washington considered

³⁷-Gerald M. Feierstein, Yemen: The 60-year war, Policy paper 2019-2, Middle East Institute, USA, February 2019, P:21

³⁸ - Giulio Coppi 'The humanitarian crisis in Yemen: Beyond the man-made disaster, The international peace institute (IPI), offices of United Nations in New York 'January '٢٠١٨ P٤-٣ :

the most deadly region before the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS), the Houthis have also repeatedly supported plans to abolish the current state of Yemen and push for a new constitution and democratic elections. Since early 2015, the country has faced a severe financial crisis that could only be averted through Saudi funding, Riyadh cannot guarantee a state that it considers to be in the hands of a Shiite armed group, but recognizes that the worsening economic crisis could lead to a wave of unwanted new migration northward. Houthi supporters acknowledge that Yemen needs external financial support if it is to avoid economic collapse, the United States has made in (November 2014) - At the request of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Riyadh, the Security Council petitioned the Security Council to impose sanctions on Saleh and two key Houthi field commanders, including Abdul Malik al-Houthi, but Abdul Malik al-Houthi was removed from the list because Riyadh and Washington are aware of the reality, that They may need to cooperate with the Houthis in the future, and while the Houthis recognize the need to interact with foreign powers, Yemen's foreign policy is likely to be aligned with Iran, because it needs to eradicate radical Sunni movements such as Al-Qaida organization and (ISIS), this is ostensibly in tune with Saudi, US and Iranian interests, yet the prospect of Yemen becoming more compatible with Iranian foreign policy would create serious concerns for Riyadh, which fears that the Houthis could become a direct threat to their own interests, when the Houthis took control of the presidential palace as well as the private residence of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi in Sana'a and the headquarters of the two main intelligence organizations in Yemen before demanding more political power, they showed that the sanctions did little to stop the Houthi uprising and that the international community could not influence the movement.³⁹

5.The collapse of the authority of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi:

The researcher believes that the revolution in Yemen against the government (Abd Rabbo Mansour) became official in (17-1-2015) because of the rejection of the Houthis draft constitution submitted

³⁹ - Peter Salisbury, Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War', op.cit, P١٢-١١ :

by the government, which included the division of Yemen into (6) federal areas, and in (22-1-2015) The head of state formally submitted his resignation before his prime minister, who submitted it in early February. His parliament was dissolved and an interim authority (the Supreme Revolutionary Committee) was established. The Houthis occupied the presidential palace with Saleh's forces, Hadi was then placed under house arrest and then fled a month later from Sanaa to Aden and declared that he is still president and that all his political decisions since (September 2014) ineffective, On March 19, 2015, the Gulf states announced the relocation of their embassies to Aden, violence escalated and fighting erupted between pro-Saleh military units and forces loyal to Hadi in Aden, the next day, Sanaa bombed and witnessed suicide bombings in two Zaidi mosques, which Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for, Then (Abdul-Malik al-Houthi) on (21-3-2015) announced the mobilization of the armed forces to launch a campaign against the south of Yemen to fight al-Qaeda, and the same day Hadi announced that Aden is the provisional capital of Yemen, on 24 March 2015, he asked the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to intervene militarily against the Houthi incursion and Saleh's forces in the south, but after the arrival of the troops, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia, Following this, Riyadh formed the Arab Alliance and announced the beginning of the "Decisive storm."⁴⁰

6. Battle Decisive storm:

Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states consider that the war they are leading against Yemen (Decisive storm) and the support of the Arab coalition countries is the appropriate response to prevent Iranian expansion in the Gulf and prevent a disaster threatening its security in the backyard of the Kingdom, knowing that it is a proxy war, necessity and unavoidable because it involves the highest national interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council after the failure of peaceful attempts to persuade the Houthis to abandon their position opposed to the assumption of the presidency of Abed Rabbo Mansour in Yemen. Oman has refused to participate in the

⁴⁰ - Sari Araf, Report about the armed conflict in Yemen: A complicated mosaic, The Geneva academy A joint center, October 2017, P ٦-٤ :also see: Stephen W. Day, The future structure of the Yemeni state, Middle east institute, August 2019, P:5 and beyond.

alliance and preferred to remain neutral because it has a wide common border with Yemen and its fear of exploiting it in the ground operations of the war and opening a front with it is indispensable on the one hand, and because it has common interests with Iran - especially in the Strait of Hormuz - do not want to lose. Because of the convulsive attitudes of the Gulf States towards Iran, Oman has played the role of mediator between Iran and the Gulf States to influence the behavior of players, and Saudi Arabia believes that Iran since its Islamic revolution in (1979) defy the Arab countries, especially Riyadh. Consequently, Riyadh can no longer tolerate the ongoing power struggle in Yemen because it threatens their national security and stability, especially after the controversial statements of the conservative deputy (Ali Reza Zakani) that Iran is now controlling the four capitals of Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sana'a and their influence on the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf is sending messages to Iran and the international community through this war that it will not allow further interference in Arab affairs or the expansion of Iranian influence in the region that any attempt by Iran and its proxies in many countries of the middle east will face a firm force, Iran should change its aggressive behavior and reconsider its current approach in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and this alliance will deter it, Iranian investments in Yemen have paved the way for changing the balance of power in Yemen and the region in recent years, the Gulf states considered that Iran is using the Houthis and providing them with an air defense system to carry out its objectives and achieve its ambitions to control Yemen and threaten the authority of President Abd Rabbo Mansour, the Gulf states believe that the Iranian position came in support of its nuclear negotiations (5+1), while Iran does not see that there is a relationship between its nuclear negotiations and the war in Yemen.⁴¹

⁴¹ - Al Jazeera Center for Studies 'Implications of Operation Decisive Storm, Position Papers, 26 March 2015, P ٢٣ - Also see Giulio Coppi, The humanitarian crisis in Yemen: Beyond the man-made disaster, op.cit, P:1 Also see: Alexander Mitzarski, The Civil War in Yemen: A Complex Conflict and Diverging Perspectives, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, September 2015, P:3

7. Parties to the internal conflict:

The conflict in Yemen cannot be summed up as between Abed Rabbo Mansour and Ansar Allah al-Houthis 'but between large formations in the north and south after all efforts failed to bring the disputing parties to the table of dialogue, the Houthis' alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Republican Guard led by his son Ahmed and his assistance in entering and delivering weapons to Sana'a in (2014) was also with the blessing of UN envoy Jamal bin Omar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by reading the statement of former Yemeni defense minister Mohammed Nasser to the media after his return from the UAE before the fall of Sana'a and Amran governorate that the Yemeni army is neutral, and the fact that the UAE arranged for the fall of Amran governorate under the pretext of overthrowing the Yemeni Rally for Reform and the Muslim Brotherhood, and that the Congress Party considers itself deceived by this alliance with the Houthis, He swallowed the taste offered by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and even Abd Rabbo Mansour, because Saleh's relationship with the Houthis was not positive because he had fought six wars against them with the knowledge of the United States and its ambassador in Sanaa, so what happened in Yemen is an external plan led by America, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, How did these countries be supportive of legitimacy and at the same time establish the militias of the movement in Aden 'so Saleh realized the futility of continuing alliance with the Houthis and began the process of disengagement with them with the help of the Arab Alliance through communication with the leaders of the Conference in Riyadh (Sheikh Sultan al-Barakani and Abdul Karim al-Iryani), He sent many messages to the coalition to prepare for national reconciliation according to the Gulf initiative and lift the sanctions imposed on Yemen, and received a positive response from Riyadh, but the Houthis felt that Saleh is trying to keep them out of the political scene and leaked the message to them by Saudi Arabia 'killing him after the rule of Yemen (33) years lasted for a period (1978-2012.⁴²(

⁴² - ياسر اليماني، القيادي في حزب المؤتمر الشعبي العام والمتحدث باسم الرئيس الراحل على عبد الله صالح، بتاريخ (٢٠١٨-٩-١٠). <https://arabic.sputniknews.com> موقع سبوتنك الاخباري

8. The killing of Ali Abdullah Saleh:

The Houthis (Ansar Allah Group) killed former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Chairman of the General People's Congress) on the morning of (4-12-2017), after having called upon the citizens and the military, security and social leaders to rise up against the Houthis, he announced the dissolution of his party's partnership with it, then the Houthis found their chance to avenge him for killing their leader Hussein al-Houthi in the Saadah war of 2004 because of Ali Abdullah Saleh, with the liquidation of Saleh, the coalition of contradictions, governed by the desire for exploitation and revenge are ended, after both Saleh and the Houthis failed to share the authority of President Hadi, Saleh's death has left many repercussions on various political, military and social fields, where his death contributed to changing these tracks during (30) years and left a large vacuum and a policy loaded with contradictory positions and alliances, some of which represent time bombs, his son Ahmed is a former Republican Guard commander and Yemen's former ambassador to the UAE, where he still lives as the most fortunate in the leadership of the Congress Party, but the fact that his name remains within the sanctions approved by the UN Security Council against some leaders of the coup coalition against President Hadi and some opposition to him may prevent this⁴³.

9. Human rights violations:

The Saudi-led international coalition launched air attacks targeting armed Houthi factions under the title fighting against Shiites in Yemen, sparking a large-scale armed conflict, the conflict widened in the following two years and caught fire across the country, they were accompanied by horrific human rights violations and war crimes in various parts of Yemen, causing great suffering to civilians, in addition to the ongoing aerial bombardment by coalition forces, rival factions are engaged in fierce fighting on the ground between the Houthis allied to supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the forces of current President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, More than (42,000) people were killed and wounded, including (10,000) civilians who were victims of

⁴³ - Strategic Fiker Center for Studies, Yemen after Saleh's Liquidation : Implications and Options, Yemen, 2018, p:3

aerial bombardment and war, according to United Nations statistics, by the end of (May 2017), the International Coalition had launched about (90,000) air strikes, Air strikes and ground forces cost (\$ 250) billion ‘but these figures are inaccurate because the number of air strikes confirms that the death toll has far exceeded that number. The Saudi-led conflict and blockade have hampered the import of basic goods, the main port of Hodeidah in Yemen is partially operational, with (60%) of the food-insecure population funded. Medical supplies have also been reduced, many doctors and nurses work for free or on modest wages, Humanitarian workers estimate that a child under the age of five dies from preventable causes every 10 minutes, that more than (٦٣,٠٠٠) children under the age of five have died as a result of the humanitarian catastrophe, More than 8 million people suffer from a lack of safe water and sanitation, putting them at risk of outbreaks of diseases such as cholera and scabies, UNFPA estimates that violence against women has increased by more than (63%) since (2015), this means that about (2.600.000) million women and girls are at risk and for early marriage, and the world health organization (WHO) announced that one million pregnant women are at risk of contracting cholera a month after the outbreak of the epidemic (27 April 2017 ‘(and the number of people who They died of cholera (1.073), and there are approximately (155.000) suspected cases and approximately (55,000) confirmed cases in (19) of Yemen's (21) governorates.⁴⁴

10.Targeting infrastructure and education:

The war on Yemen has had a devastating impact on its people and state infrastructure, many civilians have been killed and the rest are threatened by starvation, the destruction of (٢.٦٠٠) schools as a result of the bombing of Saudi and Emirati airplanes and the closure of (12.000) schools out of (14.600) schools and teachers did not get paid, and the bombing of health institutions and potable water stations and sewage stations until it collapsed, and deprived (15) million people drinking water and sanitation, millions (70%) of the population are at risk of starvation, in camps for displaced

⁴⁴ - Giulio Coppi, The humanitarian crisis in Yemen: Beyond the man-made disaster, op.cit, P٧-٥:

people and the accumulation of waste in the streets, where (65%) of the population live in poverty before the war, which exacerbated their situation, and the spread of cholera in (95,600) people ‘mostly among children, is expected 400,000 children die from illness and food insecurity.⁴⁵

11. The problem of the port of Hudaydah:

In (2014), a month after taking control of Sanaa, Houthi militants seized Yemen’s principal cargo port at Hudaydah, for the Houthis, controlling Hudaydah is vital for several reasons, Hudaydah provides the mostly land-locked northern Houthi-controlled areas with access to the Red Sea, control of Hudaydah is key to resupplying the Houthi-controlled national capital of Sanaa, the port (Yemen’s highest capacity port and second-most populous port city after Aden) is north of the Bab al Mandab strait, one of the world’s maritime chokepoints, Hudaydah also generates revenue for the Houthis, who “tax” imports and control the distribution of food and fuel leaving the port, Hudaydah also is (25) miles south of the Ras Isa floating terminal, which, until (2015), had been used to export oil produced in the Marib oil fields via the 270 mile Marib-Ras Isa pipeline Nearly four years after the Houthis’ capture of Hudaydah, in June (2018), the Saudi-led coalition, spear headed by the United Arab Emirates and its local Yemeni allies ‘launched Operation Golden Victory in order to change the balance of power on the ground and regain leverage in any future political settlement of the Yemen conflict, for the coalition, retaking Hudaydah was an attempt to turn the tide of the war in their favor and perhaps even facilitate their gradual disengagement from direct involvement in the conflict, by the end of (2018 ‘(coalition forces had advanced north along the western coast all the way to Hudaydah city, where fighting there threatened to cripple port operations and thereby exacerbate Yemen’s already dire humanitarian crisis. With international pressure mounting to maintain the flow of

⁴⁵-Hadil Mohammed and others ‘Yemen between the impact of the climate change and the ongoing Saudia Yemen war: A real tragedy, op.cit, P:1 also see :Peter Salisbury and others, Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen, The Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation, USA, January 2018, P: 40

humanitarian relief through Hudaydah ‘Martin Griffiths, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen, had repeatedly tried to broker a cease fire and stave off a final coalition assault against Hudaydah⁴⁶.

12. Violations of international humanitarian law associated with air strikes By the coalition forces:

In (2018), the international panel of experts on Yemen found that, the coalition continued to obstruct commercial flights from Sana’a airport that could have been used by Yemeni civilians to gain access to medical treatment outside the country, the option for people in Houthi-held areas to seek medical assistance outside Yemen requires travel to Say’un or Aden airports, which takes several hours by road⁴⁷.

The Panel investigated five air strikes that affected civilians and civilian objects in ٢٠١٨ in Houthi-controlled areas. The air strikes reportedly led to approximately (78) deaths, with (153) wounded, and caused significant damage to civilian objects, the Panel also investigated one case of shelling in a populated area, an incident attributed to either the coalition, which reportedly led to (55) deaths, with (170) wounded, the panel sent letters to the coalition asking for information on the five air strikes and met with the Joint Incident Assessment Team, the Panel shared that information with Saudi officials in June and (December 2018) during its visits to Riyadh. The Saudi Arabian authorities provided a written reply to the Panel with regard to case ‘the coalition has made public statements on cases’⁴⁸.

⁴⁶-Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, op.cit, P:9

⁴⁷ -Fernando Rosenfeld Carvajal and others, Letter The Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council United, The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 8 January 2019 and considered by the Committee on 18 January 2019, United Nations, Security Council, 25 January 2019, P: 56

⁴⁸ -Fernando Rosenfeld Carvajal and others, Letter The Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council United, op.cit, P: 47

Reported air strikes and use of explosive ordnance (2018:)

Date	Location	Impact point	Ordnance	Victims/damage
2 April	N14,49,01.0 E42,59,39.0	Civilian buildings in Hali district, Hudaydah	Aircraft bomb	14 killed including 7 children and 4 women
22 April	N15,41,24 E43,21,07	Wedding party in Raqah village of Bani Qays in Hajjah	Aircraft bomb	21 killed including 11 children and approximately 90 wounded including several children
27 May	N14,49,53.5 E42,56,02.2	Wharf at Hudaydah port	Aircraft bomb	Damage to the wharf
23 July	N17,2,25.09 E43,55,6.58	Water supply system, Nashur, in Saadah	Aircraft bomb	Damage to the borehole, pipe and solar panels
2 August	N14,46,46.08 E42,57,03.92 N14,46,53.01 E42,56,51.74	Hospital and fish market, Hudaydah althawra	120mm mortar bomb	55 person killed and 170 wounded
9 August	N17,03,51.2 E43,36,05.8	Bus in Dayhan Saadah	Aircraft bomb	Approximately 43 killed and 63 wounded, the majority of whom were children

Although neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis have yet split from the coalition, signs of tension have emerged periodically, the two combatants face very different perceived and actual threats that range from border security and territorial incursions for Saudi Arabia to the region-wide campaign to crush Islamist groups in the case of Abu Dhabi, this has produced distinct alignments with local forces on the ground, with the Saudis backing President Hadi and the Emiratis supporting various factions and militias in southern Yemen that reject Hadi's leadership. On occasion, these differences have come to the surface, as during a (March ٢٠١٧) firefight between a battalion of Sudanese soldiers belonging to the Saudi-led coalition and an Emirati backed militia over control of Aden international airport⁴⁹.

Conclusions:

It is clear from the above that conditions are not ready for a successful political settlement in Yemen, all local parties are not ready or ready to resolve, and still betting on its military power to impose a fait accompli as the Houthis try, Or to achieve a military victory by which it is forced to surrender to its opponents, as wished by many factions fighting the Houthis.

⁴⁹ -Peter Salisbury and others, *Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen*, op.cit, P: 32

However, the complexities of the Yemeni landscape make it difficult to predict the success of a political settlement even if imposed by Saudi Arabia and other countries. Yemen, with a population of close to 30 million people and complex and chronic problems, of extreme poverty, a fragile political identity, fragile institutions, divided elites, separatist calls, and other problems that are growing and growing, is too difficult to arrange from the outside. Therefore, the best that can be expected from the negotiations in Kuwait would be a fragile settlement, which would at best lead to moving the war from its present square to another, such as the cessation of air strikes, which would weaken the media interest in the war in Yemen, and would ease the embarrassment for Western governments, and coalition countries.

Unreality of the solutions presented:

There is a wide gap between the demands of Abed Rabbo Mansour's authority and the other party at the negotiating table. The authority demands the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2216 which provides for the handover of weapons and state institutions by the Houthis, and return to the political track from the point where he stopped according to the outcome of the dialogue and the Gulf initiative, and these demands seem unrealistic and do not reflect the balance of power on the ground. On the other hand, the Houthis demand the formation of a new transitional authority to replace the current authority of which they are part, and then discuss the issue of handing over power and weapons to this authority and the institutions that will emerge from it, these demands are rejected by the Hadi government because in practice they will lead to their abolition, as well as a complex process and take a long time to implement.

If approved, the settlement would probably include the following features:

- Forming a system of quotas with political, sectarian and regional backgrounds.
- Maintain effective control of some of the forces within this authority, on some areas that are the main areas of influence, such as allowing the Houthis effective control over parts of the Zaidi region, and the separatist movement over the areas of Aden, Lahj and al-Dali, with some Salafi forces, and control the Islah and its military and tribal allies

on parts From Marib and Al-Jawf governorate, and some pockets in the governorates of Taiz and Ab.

- The dominance of political forces over state institutions, particularly institutions of control and fiscal collection.
- Weakness and decline of the central authority in favor of regional powers.
- Continued intensive external intervention in all political, economic, social and cultural fields.
- Deporting durable solutions to the future, and entering into a stage or transitions in accordance with inconclusive partial settlements.
- Adding new references to previous references will be new sources of conflict.
- Permanent differences over the implementation of the terms of the settlement, and mutual accusations of breach.

Abstract

Yemen is one of the countries that give way to freedom of political action, whereas the Yemeni Constitution of 1990 and its amendments in 1994-2001 guarantee multi-party and political pluralism for the peaceful transfer of power, therefore, we find that the political parties in Yemen have a historical dimension in the establishment of the state, whereas most of its political parties were founded before the unification of North and South Yemen in (22-5-1990), the character of the parties ranges from nationalism to Islam. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the current crisis in Yemen is so difficult and complex that it is far from any solution that may be covered by a settlement, while the continuation of the current crisis creates more complexity and results in more violence, the chaos in a country that is in a state of near collapse 'the war which is one of the main features of the crisis, has turned into a war of attrition for the Yemeni state and the participating countries 'to become a real dilemma for its most important players, and all this led to the strong desire of the major countries to stop it, where the war represented in Yemen It is a problem for Western countries that supply weapons 'intelligence, and logistical support to the coalition countries, On the one hand, they see no clear prospects for war, and they have created ideal conditions for the growth of terrorist groups, On the other hand, the mistakes made by coalition

aircraft to kill civilians have caused a sensation in these countries, officials There is a lot of criticism, even accusations of violating the laws of these countries, which prevent them from exporting weapons to countries that do not comply with international humanitarian law, and on this basis Western countries are pressing the parties to the conflict and Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stop the war and go towards a political settlement.

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