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A Critical Analysis of African Development in the New Millennium: Going Beyond the "Good Governance" Debate

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Abstract:

Africa is a continent undergoing rapid change. However, a lot of people continue to be ignorant of it due to myths and misinformation. In many ways, Africa is a marginalized continent. Still, there is no denying that things are shifting and will probably change much more quickly. This paper examines the claims made for and against "good governance" in terms of its actual contributions to development. In three areas-the consequences for Africa's economic development, the evidence-based approach to the "good governance" objective, and its impact on the continent- it offers a concise synopsis of the research and evidence. The following sections cover the following subjects: The second section looks at the history of the debate over African governance from the 1970s to the 1990s; the third section looks at the arguments and rebuttals that have dominated academic discourse since 2000; the fourth section applies the findings to the issue of moving Africa from economic growth to economic transformation; and the fifth section concludes that comprehensive governance reform is not always necessary for developing Africa to advance economically.

Keywords: Africa, Governance, Development, Economic Growth, Economic Transformation, Neopatrimonialism

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Introduction:

Kayima is a small, remote community in the far northeast of Sierra Leone, West Africa, home to 2,000 people. From the nearest metalled road, it takes around three hours to reach there by rough road. One of the writers moved to Kayima in 1974 and stayed there for a year before returning forty years later in January 2014. The people, the houses, and the streets were all mostly unchanged. Everything seemed to be stuck in a time warp, save for a new community bank, a mobile phone mast, and a few burned-out houses on Main Street that date back to the Civil War. The dwellings were still made of mud brick, had no electricity, and got their water from a few standpipes outside, just like they had in 1974. At least in the case of Kayima, it seemed that not much had changed in forty years (Binns and Maconachie, 2005; Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Bateman et al., 2017). Still, we have to ask ourselves: Is all of Africa like Kayima? Across the continent, there are undoubtedly many Kayimas, but there are also a lot of skyscrapers, expanding cities, and obviously upgraded villages. There is no doubt that speaking about Africa in the twenty-first century or the past—or even today—makes generalizations unsafe. The cultures, economics, and levels of development of the 54 nations exhibit remarkable diversity.

Readers of *The Economist* might not agree with the generalizations made about Africa during the previous 20 years. An article titled "Hopeless Africa" in the *Economist* at the beginning of 2000 began with a somber description of Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, in the midst of the country's ten-year civil war. The author went on to say that "Sierra Leone manifests all the worst characteristics" of the continent (The Economist, 2000: 6). An even more optimistic piece regarding the continent appeared in *The Economist* in 2011. Under the heading "Africa Rising," the piece discussed China's efforts to modernize infrastructure and boost the industrial sector, as well as thriving local markets, a boom in commodities, advancements in healthcare, and peaceful, democratic governance (The Economist, 2011: 3). For the foreseeable future, Africa—as a continent and as all of its sovereign governments combined—is well-positioned to spearhead the new growth patterns. In a May 2013 lecture at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, stated that Africa has changed from being the country of doom and gloom to the land of opportunity (Lamy, 2022: 1).

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Does effective governance promote development? A series of thought-provoking research projects called "This Provocative Question" was funded by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs a few years ago (Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). That was a very smart move. Its pun on the word "good" caused academics and activists committed to traditional public sector reform and capacity-building projects in developing countries to rethink their assumptions. By posing the issue rather of providing an answer, it correctly recognized the reality that many aspects of the function of government, and more broadly, patterns of governance, in the economic and social growth of impoverished nations are still ambiguous or contentious.

Naturally, the subject of governance for development is not limited to Africa; in fact, discussion around it has gained more traction there than it has anywhere else in the developing world, particularly in the sub-Saharan area, which is our primary focus here. This makes Sundaram and Chowdhury's (2012) challenge extremely relevant to the issues raised in this guide. Their query and the variety of responses it has generated offer a useful foundation for examining the literature on African governance published, studied, and discussed throughout the last 50 years.

Over half of those fifty years have seen the use of the term "good governance." It is still a popular abbreviation among African thought leaders, pundits, and members of civil society, as well as in the hallways of international development organizations. It has a common core, even if many individuals interpret it differently. Some elements of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 16 of the UN (which states: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels") could be considered to encapsulate the essence. The international community is obligated by UN (2015) to significantly reduce bribery and corruption in all of its forms as well as to establish "responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making" at all levels and "effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels."

The attraction of such publicly articulated objectives is undeniable. They complement around eight other sub-goals, all of which are certainly significant and deal with a range of violent abuses, crimes, and injustices that happen all over the world and need swift national and international response. Sub-goals 16.5-26.7, on the other hand, do not work as well as they should as action guides.

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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which present a list of somewhat abstract governance attributes as self-evidently and universally desirable, at best obscure a great deal of unresolved issues and controversies regarding the relationship between forms of government and development outcomes in the real world. Controversially, they claim that a government system may be deemed good based on a single, simple set of characteristics. In the worst case scenario, they encourage the thoughtless application of concepts related to "best practice" governance without taking practicality and context into account.

When viewed in this light, the good governance agenda has consistently influenced perspectives on African development, primarily in situations that are action- and policy-oriented. On the other hand, scholarly study and research have made it their mission to scrutinize the presumptions that underlie these apparently straightforward statements of purpose. Scholars have consistently emphasized the necessity to differentiate between goals and methods, between value judgments and verifiable claims on causal relationships, and between the interests of the privileged and those of the underprivileged. The collective output of this body of work has been a more comprehensive understanding of what counts in the governance of development, one that is based on shared ideals, historical experience, and empirical data.

The fact that we now have this strong scientific foundation is crucial. It implies that we can respond to more detailed and focused inquiries on the sort of governance that distinct nations require. A key point has lately been reached in the economic and social development of several sub-Saharan African nations. Regular yearly growth in the gross domestic product and steady progress in important social metrics have become the norm. Civil wars and other forms of warfare are significantly less common than they formerly were. These shifts and realignments in the global economy, particularly in China, present significant chances to convert these gains into processes of economic transformation, whereby widespread advances in productivity and competitiveness serve as the foundation for economic development. But a lot will rely on what governments are willing and able to do before these opportunities are taken advantage of.

The literature and statistics on three topics are quickly summarized in this paper: the "good governance" agenda and its impact on Africa, the research-based reaction to it, and the implications for Africa's economic development. As a result, the second section explores the history of the debate over the quality of

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African governance from the 1970s to the 1990s; the third section surveys the refutations and reformulations that have dominated academic discourse since the year 2000; the fourth section applies the findings to the problem of advancing Africa from economic growth to economic transformation; and the fifth section concludes.

(Not) Understanding African Governance

Drawing generalizations about Africa is dangerous since it is not a nation. But it is better to comprehend the distinctive features of a nation within the context of certain broad trends or cycles of change that have profoundly influenced nearly all of them. At the most fundamental and general level, most of the countries were either a part of the British or French colonial empires until the 1960s or were ruled by the Portuguese until the 1970s. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the bulk of the currently sovereign states abandoned their initial multiparty constitutions and either adopted single-party systems or came under military rule. In the 1990s, pro-democratization movements gained traction once more. Formally liberal-democratic constitutions are the norm in the area today, with political practices ranging from flawed democracy to covert authoritarianism (Crawford and Lynch, 2012; Cheeseman, 2015).

The average economic performance of sub-Saharan African countries also exhibited considerable ups and downs throughout the same time period. In certain countries, national and per capita income growth was notable in the first 10 years following independence, as per Jerven's (2013) and (2015) estimates. But by the end of the 1970s, this progress had sharply slowed down, and by the 1980s, it had completely collapsed. The economy began to improve in the 1990s. This happened gradually at first, but since the middle of that decade, steady, relatively fast, but unevenly distributed rates of economic development have been the norm.

Does Governance Matter?

At this broad level of study, there are no obvious or straightforward connections between observed advances in formal political government and economic performance. The general research evidence (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Kelsall, 2014; Masaki and van de Walle, 2014) is inconclusive regarding the relationship between variables such as the quality of democracy and economic development, but it does suggest a long-term benefit once democracy is consolidated. Therefore, this is not surprising. When the idea of excellent governance is focused on the immediate causes of development outcomes, including objectivity and low levels of corruption in public administration, the evidence becomes more clear

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(Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein and Tannenberg, 2015). This discovery, however, raises questions about what the most likely political forces are that influence this kind of quality.

Even with the justification for holding off on making a decision about the main issues, since the early 1990s, the dominant perspective on African governance has been anything but cautious. One of the main arguments made for independent Africa has been that its poor overall governance is the reason for its uneven and sporadic economic and social progress. This has been interpreted broadly to suggest that the countries in the area should more fully adopt the political structures and policies used by the nations that have had the most success in elevating their citizens' standard of living and degree of national power. They just require better governance, and we already know exactly what it entails since it is demonstrated in cities like Stockholm, London, and Ottawa.

This viewpoint emerged during a specific historical juncture for both Africa and the global community, when a straightforward interpretation of the situation appeared consistent with the salient details. A lot of significant things happened around 1989, and those things combined to make a lot of sensible individuals come to the same conclusions at that time. African economies had hit rock bottom and were, at most, only now starting to bounce back, or more accurately, their formal sectors, which are the components whose status is evaluated. Those at the forefront of this movement realized that stronger institutions would be necessary for economic recovery in addition to sound policies, as the World Bank and IMF-funded structural adjustment and economic stabilization programs were becoming more and more influential in shaping national policy (World Bank, 1989). The world was starting to take notice of the new institutional economics, which maintained that markets could only operate effectively when they were underpinned by strong institutions (North, 1990). As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, previous barriers to Western governments' support of democratic politics as the cornerstone of reasoned institution-building were soon eliminated. At the same time, an increasing number of African urban residents under the control of repressive authoritarian regimes interpreted these global events as a sign that a second liberation was possible. Multipartyism became the norm, even in countries like Tanzania where a sort of single-party governance was still quite popular in rural areas.

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Consolidation of an Orthodoxy

In this fashion, a large coalition of African reformers and Democrats and Western bankers and funders joined together to create an initially impregnable accord. The idea of good governance was developed to give the agreement's numerous components coherence. It expanded to encompass everything from extensive social involvement and civic rights to effective macroeconomic management and efficient operations of the public service, including the development and supervision of economic adjustment programs. All of these fields shared the basic principle that responses to common problems were based on experience and clarity.

Finally, virtually all came to the same conclusion: (a) the lack of strong institutions of governance in Africa was preventing it from growing; and (b) this would not change until it did. It was tacitly assumed that good institutions were those that had been embraced more recently in the developed West and Japan, notably liberal-democratic constitutions accompanied by anti-corruption measures, transparent decision-making procedures, and systems fostering public responsibility. The collection of solutions swiftly adopted the most recent ideas in Western culture, including privatization, the "unbundling" of public sector responsibilities, and the creation of relatively autonomous executive bodies to boost civil service productivity (Bangura and Larbi, 2006).

The World Bank's initiatives, which provided concessional loans in exchange for "second generation" reforms that prioritized institutions over policies, were among the first examples of the new consensus in action (World Bank, 1994). Apart from the growing number of competitive elections, other changes included different formal structures that embody modern concepts of public administration best practices. These included civil service performance development initiatives, medium-term expenditure frameworks, public defenders, electoral commissions, citizen monitoring committees, and participatory planning systems.

For a considerable amount of time, these innovations had wildly contradictory results (Carothers, 1999, 2006; Andrews, 2013), but this didn't stop the zeal with which they were pursued. Governments and donors were frequently chastised for wanting more of the same things or for trying harder to make the solution work better. The average passenger on Nairobi's or Lagos's urban transportation system needs appropriate application of good governance principles, period. On the other hand, experts who temper their assessments of values with

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historical data and methodical investigation adopt an alternative stance.

Releasing the Historical Spirit

On one level, the consensus on efficient government in Africa makes perfect sense. When compared to the rest of human history, African economies and social interactions are relatively in the early stages of capitalist growth. It would be surprising from a historical perspective if their political systems did not have components associated with pre-capitalism in other parts of the world. But which specific kind? This topic was of concern to the first generation of political scientists studying independent Africa, many of whom had read works by Max Weber (1978 [1922]).

Weber made a distinction between modern democratic/bureaucratic, patrimonial, and feudal forms of political power. Many Africanists choose to support the notion that modern and patrimonial aspects coexist in contemporary Africa (Eisenstadt, 1972; Médard, 1982). Especially in contrast to the feudalism of premodern Europe and Japan, the concentration of power and the blurring of boundaries between the ruler's private residence and the wealth of the state are the hallmarks of patrimonial power. Neopatrimonialism is the term used to characterize a hybrid form of government that incorporates important patrimonial elements with elements of contemporary democratic/bureaucratic rule.

The Concept of Neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism has been historically shown to be harmful to capitalism and economic progress, just as pure patrimonialism. What is now called grand corruption—centralization and the use of public funds for the private enrichment of rulers and their families—opposes the conditions that promote private investment, especially the kinds of private investment that, for example, fund infrastructure and create large numbers of jobs. A plethora of instances were provided by this group of political scientists (Hyden, 1983; Callaghy, 1984; Joseph, 1987; Chabal, 1992) to demonstrate how the neopatrimonial regimes' control orientation and plundering of public resources harmed African economic progress. Van de Walle (2001) then showed how neopatrimonial influences influencing policy hindered and distorted attempts at economic recovery in the 1980s and 1990s. A substantial corpus of more recent research and theory supports the notion that it is difficult to sustain economic growth, and in particular meaningful economic transformation, under neopatrimonial regimes and "limited access orders" (North et al., 2009, 2013).

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The scholarly community did provide some academic credence to the broad good governance approach in 1989 with the political science agreement supporting the theory of neopatrimonialism. This is partly the reason that those who question the latter have so often directed their criticism at the former. Some detractors incorrectly claimed that the theory implies that the peculiar and disagreeable characteristics of African culture are connected to the obstacles to African development (Therkildsen, 2005; Pitcher et al., 2009). Others accused the political scientists of misinterpreting Weber. They were in agreement with a third group that thought the idea was helpful in pointing out some general similarities but incorrect in hiding the fairly significant variations in the shapes that neopatrimonial leadership adopted in various nations and eras, with varying consequences for potential economic advancement (Kelsall, 2013; Mkandawire, 2015).

Africa Viewed Through a Comparative Lens

When compared to the stances adopted by scholars and students of comparative development during the previous 25 years, the differences between regimes that share certain fundamental aspects of neopatrimonial administration become intriguing. There are five arguments that are important:

- Even if Africa's subpar development performance is linked to inadequate governance originating from neopatrimonial institutions, there is no solid reason to search for solutions in the institutional best practice ideologies that have surfaced in the world's wealthiest nations in recent decades. Should the experience of the developed world hold any significance, it would be prudent to examine their past, extending back to the days of absolute monarchy, when European administration was distinctly patrimonial. If not, we could be culpable for what Chang (2002) dubbed "kicking away the ladder," which is to say, depriving today's emerging nations the institutional frameworks and policy tools that allowed them to break free from their feudal or patrimonial pasts.
- Considering the relationship between economic success and governance, one may argue that the relatively recent development achievements of China, East Asian countries, and parts of South East Asia are a considerably more relevant source of inspiration. Taken as a whole, these experiences don't suggest any one universal formula or type of political structure that works well for development outcomes. These administrations have exhibited a tremendous lot of variability. The governance arrangements of the South East Asian countries that most closely mirrored sub-Saharan African countries about 1960 were strikingly similar to those of

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Africa at the time. Nevertheless, they have performed remarkably well economically. The causes must not be related to the type of regime (Henley, 2015).

- There is barely any dispute these days that, generally speaking, a country's acquired institutions play a vital role in determining what may be expected in terms of development performance. Nonetheless, this research-based agreement has two significant and related caveats.
- The first is that without certain fundamental institutional functions are carried out in some way, capitalism growth will not materialize; yet, the manner in which these tasks are carried out is neither universal or predetermined (Chang, 2007; Rodrik, 2007). To use just one prominent positive example, China has been able to provide private actors the confidence to spend over the last three decades, although with astonishingly favorable results, even in the absence of a precise type of well-defined property rights and contract law. Uganda, which is thought to have the most extensive system of transparency and anti-corruption institutions worldwide, is arguably the most egregious example of a country that has failed to meet the conditions for dynamic capitalist growth (Andrews and Bategeka, 2013).
- The second, related insight about institutions is that seemingly similar institutional structures work quite differently in different situations when the underlying configurations of political and economic power (what some refer to as the "political settlement") varies. Political scientist Robert Bates has also repeatedly advanced this claim, which is presently mostly credited to economist Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2010).

Bates gained notoriety with a book that was influenced by the public choice movement (Bates, 1981). This clarified why it may make political sense for African governments to use pricing, tax, and exchange rate policies to collect "rents" from their agricultural sectors, then reinvest at least part of these funds in the form of subsidies into the rural areas. In contrast to the straightforward solution of offering favorable general circumstances for rural development, the book argued that the discretionary allocation for subsidies was a more successful means of establishing and preserving a political base in the countryside.

In many locations, state-run marketing boards remain one of the main tools used in this politically motivated suppression of African agricultural potential. However, during his research for his second book, Bates traveled to Kenya and discovered that, while Jomo

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Kenyatta was president, Kenyan marketing boards supported smallholder farmers very well; however, under Daniel arap Moi, they stopped doing so (Bates, 1989). The power brokers overseeing the boards' operations and their links with Kenya's principal ethnic and political constituencies were the key causes of the reasons (Bates, 2014).

Multiple Paths

Therefore, if we understand comparative history correctly, it becomes evident that there are ways to escape neopatrimonial underdevelopment other than adopting the kinds of government that are currently ideologically preferred in the wealthier regions of the world from an early age. First off, as Henley (2015) points out, having a strong institutional structure may not be as crucial as having the correct policies. Second, the notion of a robust institutional framework is situational and highly contingent upon the allocation of political and economic power. In light of all of this, we must ultimately take into account a variety of approaches for achieving growth; in some cases, relevant developments in governmental patterns are relatively continuous, while in other cases, they are not (Levy, 2014). In order to succeed in either scenario, a significant amount of trial and error learning is probably required (Rodrik, 2007).

Contemporary Governance and Economic Transition

In recent decades, rapid economic expansion in Africa has become the norm, and focus has switched to the growth's structure and quality. Concerns include how the GDP has increased overall and in relation to different sectors and socioeconomic groups, how growth has seldom had a significant effect on poverty, and how poorly the most dynamic industries have been able to generate jobs. These problems stem from the fact that, within an economic framework that hasn't altered much since colonial times, a large portion of recent expansion has been driven by high commodity prices. Apart from minerals, the primary forces behind recent growth have been urbanization and services for the rising middle and upper classes. There haven't been any noticeable gains in the productivity of manufacturing or agriculture, which generates employment, with very few exceptions.

From Growing to Transforming Economies

One approach to phrase this would be to say that countries are experiencing "growth with depth" or "economic growth but not economic transformation" (ACET, 2014). In this context, "economic transformation" refers to the process of moving labor and other production inputs from lower- to higher-productivity activities, either

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within or between sectors (McMillan et al., 2016). The fastest rate of labor productivity convergence between richer and poorer countries has been observed in manufacturing investment, despite the fact that there are still valid reasons to concentrate on productivity gains in agriculture, especially in the early stages of development (Breisinger and Diao, 2008). (Cimoli et al., 2009; Rodrik, 2013; Whitfield et al., 2015). Thus, a particularly concerning aspect of the political economy of sub-Saharan Africa today is the lack of focus on both manufacturing jobs and agricultural production.

Until recently, many would have considered this an impossible task, arguing that it was unreasonable to expect African countries to assume the duties of a "developmental state" since they had not done enough to fortify their administrative frameworks. There are two groups of reasons to be more upbeat, though. The first is related to shifts in the global economy, particularly in China. The potential for African expansion along conventional lines has been undermined by the slowdown of Chinese economic growth, which has already resulted in a decrease in demand for Africa's main commodities, particularly minerals. Positively, African manufacturing is currently experiencing a window of opportunity as Chinese wage hikes compel Chinese firms to move the more labor-intensive components of global value chains to other parts of the world (Lin, 2013; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013).

Learning from Asia

The third section's list of several critiques of the traditional viewpoint on African governance issues provides additional justification for our cautious optimism. Referring back to the experience of prosperous Asian nations, two points stand out as very pertinent. First, the nations that had the quickest changes in the industrial sector and/or in agriculture were not at all originally democracies. In their first stages of operation, they were deficient in several attributes linked to "sound governance." However, they did gain from a political leadership that viewed economic reform as a project for the betterment of the country and advocated for inclusive growth. Their regimes, with a few notable exceptions, established highly complex mechanisms to guarantee responsibility and foster agreement. The classic binary between democracy and authoritarianism fails to capture some of the most significant features of Asian development models (MacIntyre, 1994; Campos and Root, 1996; Woo-Cumings, 1999).

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Second, the Asian experience shows that state bureaucracy does not have to develop into a potent policy coordinator or a driver of productivity development and investment from the private sector. Most great success stories start with one politically influential government agency in one sector of the economy. This was the main subject of Johnson's (1982) inquiry of Japan's Ministry of Trade and Investment. According to Henley (2015), it is connected to the story of Indonesia's agricultural revolution, which aims to end poverty.

Building on this, Ansu *et al*. (2016) distinguish four requirements that appear universally relevant to effective policy for economic transformation:

- Bringing important players together to forge an agreement that positions economic transformation as a national development initiative with shared responsibilities that go long beyond a single term in office.
- Granting enough political authority, financial authority, and autonomy to at least one public agency so that it may overcome issues with interdepartmental coordination and work constructively with reputable private sector organizations.
- Putting in place institutional frameworks that can effectively coordinate a sizable number of influential public and private actors in order to guarantee that: (1) a sufficient level of technically justifiable governmental assistance is provided to promising sectors or enterprises; and (2) this support is contingent upon mutually enforced performance requirements.
- Facilitating the identification of transformational strategies that are effective in the specific national context by clear testing, constructive criticism, and prompt correction.

Getting Practical

These sorts of agreements have been adopted by numerous Asian and a few Latin American nations, but examples of their adoption in sub-Saharan Africa are extremely rare. The main recorded exceptions are a small number of highly favored agricultural subsectors (dairy in Uganda, cocoa in Ghana, etc.) (Whitfield et al., 2015). Thus, in addition to assessing the technical appropriateness and efficacy of economic transformation strategies, it is crucial to consider their institutional design and political viability. There are two general concepts that appear to be true.

Plans for reform and change must, first and foremost, be strategically clever in their pursuit of modest goals while taking into account the interests and motives of diverse economic actors. Experiences from countries like Nigeria, Nepal, and the Philippines

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show that politically astute advocates can successfully implement regulatory reforms that improve the long-term conditions for economic transformation even in politically unfavorable environments if they are skilled at navigating the political-economic roadblocks and learning along the way (Booth, 2014, 2016).

Second, policy objectives and early investment selections should include the ability to influence the political economy and opinion through demonstrative effects, in addition to the case's economic benefits. As in other places, entrenched interests and antiquated economic theories frequently act as roadblocks to effective institutions and strategies for economic development in Africa (Rodrik, 2014; te Velde et al., 2016). Initiatives created expressly to outline the parameters of an economic transformation agenda might be helpful in these situations. This means focusing on one or two promising industries where it will be possible to demonstrate the financial advantages and potential profitability of new, high-productivity endeavors in a way that will make arguments raised only on the basis of intellectual curiosity seem less compelling. It thus becomes simpler to address the entrenched interests.

Conclusion

These arguments together have a clear and significant significance. The priorities for African governance have been shaped for far too long by perspectives that begin with a comparison between the current state of African countries and that of capitalist liberal democracies, rather than where they used to be, when their economic and social structures were more akin to those of Africa today. Far too little focus has been placed on the lessons that Asia's repeated economic progress cycles have taught us. Considering this, the messages that surfaced and were popular on the need of "good governance" in the 1980s and 1990s are, at most, misleading. It is unfortunate that the SDGs are still referenced in the UN statement, although in a fairly cryptic way. In developing Africa, economic advancement does not always need comprehensive improvements in governance. Based on lessons learned elsewhere, the key criteria include politically astute initiatives that are directed towards particular transformational hurdles and are complemented by quick feedback and correction. These ought to be the cornerstones of any future discourse on African governance for development.

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