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Searle (1969: 33) classifies these rules into two types: (1) regulative rules that regulate independently existing forms of behaviour such as traffic rules, and (2) constitutive rules that create or define new forms of behaviour such as chess game rules. The forms of the two types of rules reflect their different status: regulative are expressive as imperative "Do X", but constitutive rules are more definitial, e.g., "X counts as Y in context C" for further details about these rules, see Searle, 1969: 33 - 42; Leech, 1983: 21- 22; and Levinson, 1983: 251- 261).

The ground has now been prepared for deriving our set of semantic rules from our established felicity conditions. They are as follows:

1. The Propositional Content Rule ;

Advising is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) X, the utterance of which predicates some future action of the hearer.

2. The Preparatory Rules:

- a. Only use the illocutionary force indicating device of advising when speaker has some reason to believe that hearer's act will benefit hearer.
- b. Only use the illocutionary force indicating device of advising when it is not obvious to hearer that the act specified will benefit him in the normal course of events.

3. The Sincerity Rule:

Advising is to be uttered only if speaker believes that the action will benefit hearer.

4. The Essential Rule:

The utterance of advising counts as an undertaking to the offect that action is in hearer's best interest.

The first three rules together make up the "regulations" for advising. But advising is achieved by the fourth rule (a consitutional rule).

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that H will do A in the normal course of events.

- 3. Sincerity: S believes A will benefit H.
- 4. Essential: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that A is in H's best interest.

Bach and Harnish (1979: 48) suggests the following conditions:

In uttering e, S advises H to A if S expresses.

- 1. the belief that there is (sufficient) reason for H to A, and .
- 2. the intention that H take S's belief as (sufficient) reason for him to A Allan (1986: 200) suggests the following condition:
- 1. S advises H to do A.
- 2. S can authoritatively recommend that it is in H's interest to do A.
- 3. S believes it is in H's interst to do A.
- 4. S reflexively intends U to be taken as sufficient reason for H to do A.

In what follows, we will suggest some felicity conditions taking into consideration the general framework of Al-Sulaimaan (1997), and some suggestions made by Searle (1969), Bach and Harnish (1979), and Allan (1986):

1. The Contact Code Conditions:

Both speaker and hearer know (how to deal with) the language, can understand each other, are aware of what they are doing; and are normal human beings (see Searle, 1969: 57 and Al-Sulaimaan, 1997: 69).

- 2. The Propositional Content Conditions:
- a. The speaker expresses the proposition of his advies in his utterance, and
- b. predicates a future act of the hearer.
- 3. The Preparatory Conditions:
- a. Speaker has some reason to believe that the future action of the hearer will benefit him.
- b. Speaker believes that it is not obvious to hearer that this futhre action on the part of hearer will benefit him.
- 4. The Sincerity Condition:

Speaker believes that this future action on the part of the hearer will benefit him.

- 5. The Essential Conditions:
- a. Speaker believes that the effect of the action specified is in hearer's best interest.
- b. Speaker intends to make hearer recognize speaker's intention that the suggested action will be advantagous to hearer who recognizes the speaker's intention.
- 6. The Wrap- up- Condition:

The structure of the utterance in question allows making a speech act of advising if and only if conditions (1-5) obtain.

Our next task is to derive from our set of conditions a set of rules for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device for advising. But before tackling the subject, let us explain the nature of these rules.

Felicity Conditions:

Crystal (1985: 120) says that felicity conditions "refer to the criteria which must be satisfied if the speech act is to achieve its purpose". Hatim and Mason (1990: 241) state that felicity conditions refer to the "conditions which have to be fulfilled in order for an utterance to be successful in achieving its intended function".

Austin (1962: 14-15) suggests a typology of conditions which performatives must meet if they are to succeed or be happy. They are as follows with few modifications and new framing.

1. Preparatory Condition: There must be an accepted conventional procedure with a certain conventional effect.

2. Executive Condition: The procedure must be carried out correctly and completely by all participants.

3. Sincerity Condition: The participants must have the intention to conduct themselves.

4. Fulfilment Condition: The participants must actually carry out what they have intended.

Searle (1969) retained Austin's concept of felicity conditions and reclassified them into the following types:

1. Preparatory Conditions: They specify prerequists states of affairs.

2. Propositional Content Conditions: They specify restrictions on what can be expressed in the proposition.

3. Sincerity Conditions: They specify the required beliefs, desires and intentions of the speaker.

4. Essential Conditions: The essential condition for any act is the constitutive rule, that determines the illocutionary act type.

Al- Sulaimaan (1997) sets a general framework for the speech acts of promising, theratening and warning in terms of the content conditions, the preparatory conditions, the sincerity conditions, the essential conditions and the wrap-up-condition. We will set our felicity conditions using the same general framework so as to give a rather systematic and clear set of felicity conditions.

The Structure of the Illocutionary Act of Advising:

According to Searle (1969 and 1991), the force of an utterance derives from a set of necessary and sufficient conditions relating to the particular act. These conditions relate, on the one hand, to the beliefs, attitudes and intentions of a speaker and hearer, and, on the other, to their mutual understanding of the use of linguistic devices for communication: The conditions which underlie a sincere advice are specified as follows (Searle, 1969: 66):

1. Propositional Content : Future act \boldsymbol{A} of \boldsymbol{H} .

2. Preparatory : a.S has some reason to believe A will benefit H . Types of Rules \P

b. It is not obvious to both S and H

and commands) and "peripherial directives" (like advice and warning, challenges and threats, etc.). To him, the speech acts of advising and warning are those categories which fall between directives and assertives in which the force of both advising and warning is in the fact that the speaker attempts to direct the hearer to a more favourable course of action to him.

Thosborg (1995: 15) says that a pices of advice is an intention to do something for the interest of the hearer. She believes that it can be so co,plicated that it is difficult to express in a single sentence. She claims that a suggestion which is beneficial to both speaker and hearer is an instance of giving advice if it is performed exclusively for the benefit of the hearer (see Trosborg, 1995: 188). She points out that a request may be presented as a suggestion or even as a piece of advice, a warning or a threat. Thus, a desire on the part of the speaker to have the grass cut may take the following forms:

- 25. Would you mind cleaning the car? (request)
- 26. Wouldn't be an idea to clean the car? (suggestion)
- 27. I think you'd better clean the car. (advice)
- 28. If you don't clean the car it'll get too dirty . (warning)
- 29. If you don't clean the car you won't get your pocket money . (threat)
- As for the linguistic structure of the speech act of advising, Trosborg (1995:
- 190) says that imperative structure as well as the use of the auxiliaries (e. g. should and ought to) can be used. Examples are:
- 30. Steer not after every mariner's direction.
- 31. Give a thief enough rope and he'll hang himself.
- 32. You ought to be more polite to your mother.
- 33. You should leave immediately.

The speech act of advising has a world - to- word direction of fit. Its illocutionary point is an attempt by the speaker to get the hearer to do something for his benefit. The expressed psychological state is that a man who advises hearer to do action expresses a desire (want, wish) that hearer do (for these features, see Searle, 1979: 22, 1983: 11, and 1990: 99).

It has a less degree of strength than that of the speech act of insisting. For instance, "I advise you to go to the movies" and "I insist that you go to the movies" have the same illocutionary point, but they are presented with different degrees of strength (Searle, 1979: 5). In the speech act of advising, the speaker's knowledge of the good consequences of future actrion is more than the hearer. The action is in the interest of the hearer (Searle, 1979: 6). Certain adverbs like "politely", "frankly" and "sincerely" serve to strength the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions (Vanderveken, 1990: 119). Concerning the condition of satisfaction, an advice is satisfied if and only if it is accepted (Vanderveken, 1994: 12). The primitive directive force is realized syntactically in the imperative sentential type (Vanderveken, 1990: 17; Schiffrin, 1994: 53; Sbisa, 1995: 500; and Guthrie, 1997: 400).

Haverkate (1979: 31- 32 and 1984: 18- 19) says that direct speech acts are of two types: (1) impositive which affect the intentional behaviour of the learer to the benfit of the speaker whether the action is directly specified or indirectly suggested by the proposition as in the speech acts of orders and requests, and (2) non-impositive directive speech acts are supposed to primarily benefit the hearer himself as in the case of such speech acts as advice. recommending . and inviting.

Vanderveken (1990: 174) states that the speech act of advising rescueles the speech act of warning, except that the additional presupposition is to use effect that what is advised is good for the hearer. He believes that "to advise a course of action is to suggest that someone perform that action while presupposing that it would be good for him to do it. This opposition in the preparatory conditions explains why one and the same speech act can be both a warning in the assertive sense and advice in the directive sense". For instance, in warning someone that this part of town is dangerous at night, one can also advise him indirectly to stay away from it.

Vanderveken (1990: 197) says that cautioning means to warn or advise the hearer to take care of something (propositional centent condition). As for the degree of strength, Vanderveken (1990: 119) says that some advers like "politely", "frankly" and "sincerely" can serve to strengthen the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions on sentences such as:

17. I politely advise you to leave this room.

18. I sincerely advise you to do it . (for the same view, see also Verschueren (1998: 30) .

Vanderveken (1994: 197) points out that "to recommend, in the directive sense, is to advise while presupposing that the future action recommended is good in general, and not only for the hearer." As for the categorization of the speech act of advising, Vanderveken (1994) classifies it under both assertives and directives.

Wierzbica (1991: 31) in her contrastive study of the speech act of advising in English and Polish, claims that advice is formulated in English more tentatively as in the following cases:

- 19. If I were you I would tell him the truth.
- 20. Tell him the truth- I would.
- 21. Why don't you tell him the truth? I think it would be best.
- 22. Why not tell him the truth? I think that might be best.
- 23. May be you ought to tell him the truth?
- 24. Do you think it might be a good idea to tell him the truth?

Wierzbica (1991: 32) claims that the English verb "advise" is seldom used performatively in ordinary speech. She believes that the phrase "I advise you" sounds very stiff and formal (for the same view, see also Kalisz, 1993: 110).

Van de Walle (1993) adopts Verschueren's (1985) classification whose taxonomy distinguishes between "coredirectives" (like requests, orders, begging

5. Passengers are hereby advised that the train will be late (assertive).

It seems, that the speech act of advising may be either telling you that something is the case (with relevance to what is or is not in your interest) or telling you to do something about it (because it is or is not in your interest). Searle (1969: 29) believes that it can be, but need not be both at once. He defines the speech act of advising as attempts by the speaker "to get the hearer to take evasive action" (Searle, 1969: 67). As for the linguistic structure of the speech act of advising, Searle (1979: 22) believes that a sentence like "I advise you to leave" has the following deep structure:

l verb you + you Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv).

"I advise you to leave" is, thus, the surface structure realization of "I advise you + you will leave" with equi NP deletion of the repeated "you" (for further details, see Searle, 1979: 22).

Searle (1969: 67) rejects the view that the speech act of advising is a species of requesting. He believes that one may compare it with the speech acts of "urging", "advocating" and "recommending". Advising someone is not trying to get him to do something in the sense that ewquesting is. Advising is some like telling someone what is best for him (Searle, 1969: 67). Hence, we believe that advising has some sense of requesting simply, because when I tell someone that something is good for him, I indirectly request him to follow my advice in order to achieve what is best for him.

Palmer and Kingdon (1969: 196) point out that this well-established idiom "had better" suggests that a certain course of action is (or is not) advisable, or in the best interests of the subject. For suggesting the advisability of doing something and not doing something, they suggest the following realizations for advising:

- 6. You had better tell him about it.
- 7. You had better not tell him about it.
- 8. They had better be starting soon.
- 9. Hadn't it better be cooked at once?
- 10. Hadn't I better go. It resembles "It's advisable for me to go, isn't it?"
- 11. Had it better not go? It resembles "Is it advisable for me not to go?"
- 12. He'd better eat breakfast before 9 o'clock.
- 13. Breakfast had better be eaten before 9 o'clok.
- 14. You would rather wait, wouldn't you?
- 15. You would rather not wait, would you?

(for further examples about the different realizations of the speech act of advising, see Quirk et al., 1972: 102 and 1985: 212).

Edmondson and House (1981: 124- 125) say that a speaker may present his / her advice, as a request, e.g.

16. You must take a holiday / go and see a doctor, etc.

Thus, presenting as his / her own concern what is really for the benefit of the hearer (for further details, see Edmondson and House, 1981: 125).

Setting Felicity Conditions and Deriving Semantic Rules for the Speech Act of Advising By

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1. Abstract:

This paper is a theoretical study of the speech act of advising. Its aim is twofold. First, it attempts to formulate a set of felicity conditions for the speech act in question taking into consideration the general framework suggested by Searle (1969), Allwood (1987), Mey (1994), and Al-Sulaimaan (1997) for the speech act of promising. Second, it will modify Searle's semantic rules of (1969) for the speech act of advising for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device.

2. The Concept of Advising:

The speech act of advising has received relatively little attention compared with many other speech acts. Austin (1962) classifies it under the category of exercitives. For him, the consequences of the exercitive class may be that others are "compelled" or "allowed" or " not allowed" to do certain acts (Austin, 1962: 151). He gives only few examples in this book How to Do Things with Words to show different structures and different types of the speech act of advising. His examples are:

- 1. You must shut it ..
- 2. You ought to shut it.
- 3. I advise you to shut it.

Austin points out that both (1) and (2) resemble (3). In this respect, we believe that both (1) and (2) are implicit (to use Austin's terminology), whereas (3) is explicit. Austin (1962: 141) states that the main structure of the speech act of advising is: "I advise you to do X".

Austin (1962: 42) points out that the speech act of advising may be done correctly or incorrectly, well or badly. For instance, I may advise you to do something which is not in fact at all in your interest, though I think it is. However, I may advise you to do something which is really in your interest. Austin believe that the former is bad and incorrect, whereas the latter is well and correct.

Searle (1979: 13-14) classifies the speech act verb "advise" under the class of directives. For him, directives are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something (e.g. urging, advising, insisting, suggesting, etc.). He, however, points out that the speech act verb "advise: can take either the directive syntax or the assertive syntax, e.g.

4. I advise you to leave (directive).