A Comparative study of the Insincere Speech Act of Inviting in American English and Iraqi Arabic

By:

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Abstract

People sometimes extend invitations they don't intend to be taken seriously. Such invitations have gained different terminologies. Levinson (1983) calls them ambiguous invitations; however Clark and Isaacs (1990) prefer to use the term ostensible invitations. Regardless of the term used, such invitations require a number of defining features: a pretense of sincerity by the speaker; mutual recognition of the pretense by speaker and addressee; collusion on the pretense by the addressee; ambivalence by the speaker about its acceptance; and an off-record purpose by the speaker. Linguists understand ostensible invitations as a kind of non-serious speech act in which the words and syntax of an invitation are used when a request for going somewhere or doing something is not intended. In ostensible invitations, a speaker supposedly will invite a hearer without the intention of an invitation, but for some other background purpose. This paper explores the similarities and differences (if there are any) across the insincere speech act of inviting (ostensible invitations) in American English and Iraqi Arabic. The present study found out that there is a sort of sameness in terms of the defining features of ostensible invitations in American English and Iraqi Arabic.

1. Literature Review

Wolfson's (1983) is one of the first linguistic studies that note the insincere speech act of inviting, framing them explicitly within Speech Act Theory. This study leads to the conclusion that many illocutionary acts, a combination of the propositional content of an utterance and the pragmatic conditions, purpose, and force that accompany it, which appear to be invitations are not real ones. The

study focuses on the propositional content of these non-real invitations and their linguistic features such as indefinite time, lack of response, and modal auxiliaries such as "must", "should", or "have to." While the goal of the study is not to describe these invitations explicitly, the work is important for drawing scholarly attention to their existence and framing it theoretically as a speech act.

In a follow up work, Clark and Isaacs' study (1990) argues that the aim of such invitations is to accomplish some other unstated purpose. They are the first to call these acts "ostensible invitations." In contrast with Wolfson et al, they point out that the content of the act has five defining features including pretense of the reality of invitation, mutual recognition of the ostensibility of the invitation, collusion of each participant in the speech act, ambivalence towards the response of the hearer, and an off-record purpose. They explicitly define the phenomena and begin a research tradition that continues until the present.

Beyond developing our understanding of the phenomenon as a speech act, Clark and Isaacs also theorize the individual and social purposes of the ostensible invitation. Clark and Isaacs argue that if the inviters want their invitation not to be taken seriously they may use a number of strategies including motivating the invitation as a "social courtesy." This is important as social courtesy or politeness which is at the heart of social interaction, relationships, and society. They link ostensible invitations with the comfort that people feel with each other, how they respect one another, and ultimately, how they co-operate in accordance with expectations and conventional norms within a society, social class, or group.

This universal feature of politeness in human society is the subject of much sociocultural elaboration, shared and learned in societies and historical time periods in different ways. Therefore, the work by Clark and Isaacs has generated comparative studies in English and Persian. Salmani-Nodoushan (1995) concludes that Persian speakers' ostensible invitations are similar to those of English in terms of their defining features and the strategies that the inviters use to establish their invitations as ostensible. In Persian, Eslami (2005) has found that the ostensible invitations are more frequent and complex due to a ritual culture of politeness. For example, inviters in Persian will extend the invitation numerous times in sequence, what Dastpak and Mollaei (2011) call persistence, complicating the structure of the exchange. In Persian, the invitations go beyond simple courtesy and involve a ritualistic, repetitive aspect which involves an active face-making process. Further, the inviters in Persian emphasize their desire for the other's presence and the honor that would be bestowed upon them, while Clark and Isaacs have argued that English ostensible invitations emphasize the hearer's desires and wants.

2. The Speech Act of Invitation

An invitation is generally considered a speech act "attempted by the speaker to get the hearer to do something" (Searle, 1975: 13), which is extended when the inviter sincerely wants the invitee to be present at an event and is willing to

accept the invitee's presence. But this definition is not flawless in that it does not distinguish between "imperatives" and "invitations." Imperatives, after all, invite somebody to perform some task. From the cost and benefit aspect. Leech (1983: 217) characterizes the act of inviting as a directive involving a benefit to the addressee and at the same time a cost to the speaker. These definitions just focus on the directive feature of invitation.

Some linguists further interpret the speech act of invitations. Hancher (1979:13) claims that inviting is referred to as a "commissive directive" speech act. Furthermore, Wolfson (1989:119) views invitations as "arrangements for a social commitment". According to their views, invitations are illocutionary types which are intended to move the addressee into the performance of some kind of future action and count as attempts to make the addressee carry out a physical action which is assumed to be beneficial to him. Invitations bind the speaker to a future action, which involves allowing or facilitating the state of affairs in which the addressee will perform the action expressed in the invitation (if one invites someone else to dinner, one will then have to allow that person to take part in it). This means that, in uttering an invitation, the speaker is creating in the addressee expectations. These expectations are traditionally called Perlocutionary effects, or perlocutions (Austin, 1962). Invitations have two expectable perlocutions:

Perlocution 1. B comes to believe that A wants B to attend event E.

Perlocution 2. B comes to feel that A likes or approves of B to an extent consistent with P1.

If the speaker fails to carry out his share of specified action, he will be shattering those expectations and, as a result, will bring about a negative state of affairs for the addressee. In short, the fact that the act of inviting 1) presents the addressee as the agent of a future action, 2) involves a future benefit for the addressee, and 3) involves the speaker's cooperation in carrying out the future action, explains its mixed commissive-directive nature.

3. Politeness and invitation

The term "invitation" finds occasion in the contexts of "politeness" and "face" which is defined as a "social value" and an "image of self" which people claim for themselves (Goffman, 1974:224). In the framework of Brown and Levinson's Face Threatening Acts (FTA) theory (1987), an invitation itself may constitute a face-threatening act. Hence, issuing and accepting an invitation place both the inviter's and the invitee's face at risk. An invitation is generally considered as being for the invitee's benefits, for it can make the invitee feel good whether he/she accepts or rejects it. The issuing of an invitation shows the inviters' desire to establish, maintain or strengthen the relationship with the invitee(s), or to show their respect and/or considerations for the invitee(s), and thus it is regarded as a consideration of the invitees' positive face; but at the same time, invitations threaten invitee's negative face because they put pressure on him/her, and to let an inviter pursue a course of action that may place an

invitee under the inviter's debt. On the other hand, the inviter puts his /her own positive face at risk, because invitation responding can also be employed to express disapproval.

From the invitee's side, it is good to receive the inviter's consideration and solidarity. A rejection of an invitation may cause a negative state of affairs for the inviter (i.e. it goes against his desires), and it may threaten the inviter's positive face. Nevertheless, accepting the invitation shows consideration for the speaker's positive face, but the invitee may be seen as being greedy or something else, besides, if the inviter is not sincere, it will risk the invitee's positive face. On the other hand, it will threaten the invitee's negative face in that there exists an acknowledgement of his/her acceptance of a debt, for an invitation is considered as being totally for the invitee's benefits. In this way, the invitee's freedom to accept or reject an invitation is found to be constrained by the workings of the convention of politeness.

The place of invitation issuing and responding within the pool of positive or negative face contributes to the dilemma posed in the mind of the inviter and the invitee in issuing and responding to an invitation. Because of the complex nature of invitations, the Generosity and Tact Maxims and the principles of Sincerity and Balance will play the role of helping the inviter and the invitee to achieve their satisfactory goals, without overtly hurting each other's face. Therefore, an invitation which often involves a process of negotiation, is characterized as incorporating "multiple speech acts"(Mao, 1992:79) linked by both temporal and relevance conditions. An invitation is not only negotiation of a satisfactory outcome, but face-saving maneuvers to accommodate the noncompliant nature of the act. The present study will find some hints on how the Iraqis maneuver their politeness values to realize the speech act of invitation.

4. Functions of invitations

Invitations, as communicative events and politeness phenomena in social interaction, provide the means for making conversations appropriately and for establishing, maintaining and negotiating social relationships. They are also linguistic routines that form part of the repertoire of politeness. Although invitations appear to be unexceptional in their structure and function, they are in fact highly complex interactional phenomena. They can be understood as extremely important strategies for the negotiation and control of social relationships between participants in conversation. Invitations serve a number of functions that might not be the same in Iraqi and American societies.The following are some of the occasions with which invitation giving is often associated in the Iraqi cultural context:

1) Exchanging for friendships or for better communication or sharing feeling with friends;
2) Thanking an individual for hospitality, kindness, or special service;
3) Seeking favor from an individual;

4) Social activities deserving celebrations such as birthday or getting awards or wedding etc.;

  5) Receiving friends and relatives during festivals or upon visiting or returning from a long journey.

We can see from this list that there are, broadly, two functions of invitation-extending in the Iraqi cultural context: 1) the Phatic function: as an expression of friendship and good feelings or respect; 2) Instrument function: as an instrument in building and expanding social networks.

By Phatic function, it is meant that invitations are primarily issued to establish an atmosphere or relationship of intimacy. When invitations are extended as an expression of friendship and good feelings, they help to reinforce the affective sentiments and emotional commitment that accompany such long-standing and intimate social bonds as those found between family and certain favorite relatives.

5. **Ostensible Invitations**

Clark and Isaacs (1990) carried out a research project on the so-called ostensible invitations. According to these scholars, native speakers of American English often extend invitations they do not intend to be taken seriously. They argue that the aim of such invitations is not to establish invitations but to accomplish some other unstated purpose. The term "ostensible acceptance" has been used by these scholars to define the positive response of the invitee to such invitations. Take the following example:

Mary: *Let's do lunch sometime.*

Justin: *Yes, let's.*

Mary's utterance is an example of ostensible invitations. Justin's response is an example of ostensible acceptances. Clark and Isaacs (1990) believe that ostensible invitations belong to a category of speech acts which they called ostensible speech acts.

Traditional theories of speech acts are not perfect in that they define invitations as a speaker's (S) inviting a hearer (H) to an event (E) only if S requests H's presence and promises acceptance of his or her presence (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979: 51). By this analysis, Mary's invitation is insincere because she does not really want Justin to come to lunch. According to Clark and Isaacs (1990), it is not right to describe this invitation as insincere. It is not like a lie. A lie is an insincere assertion primarily meant to deceive the hearer. Mary's invitation, however, is not insincere because both Mary and Justin mutually believe they both "recognize it for what it is (only ostensibly an invitation and actually something else)." In other words, there is a kind of mutually recognized pretense in this type of invitation.

In order to pinpoint the defining properties and the characteristic features of ostensible invitations, Clark and Isaacs collected a repertoire of 156 invitation exchanges. Fifty-two undergraduates taking a course in psycholinguistics were required to record an instance of one sincere and one insincere invitation or offer

they witnessed. Forty other examples were gathered from face-to-face interviews with ten undergraduates who would remember two sincere and two insincere invitations of their own experience. Ten examples were also gathered in face-to-face interviews with ten pairs of friends at Stanford University. The two final examples were recorded from spontaneous telephone calls between Ellen A. Isaacs and two different friends.

The authors, then, analyzed their data to understand what possible properties make ostensible invitations distinguishable from genuine/sincere invitations. A careful analysis of the data revealed five important points about ostensible invitations:

(1) Pretense: The inviter, in ostensible invitations, is only pretending to extend a sincere invitation. Mary, in the above example, is only pretending to invite Justin to lunch;

(2) Mutual Recognition: Inviters intend their pretense to be vividly recognized by them and their addressee. This is called mutual recognition. Mary intended Justin and herself to mutually believe they both recognize that she was only pretending to make a sincere invitation. Mutual recognition is highly significant in that it distinguishes ostensible invitations from genuine/sincere ones;

(3) Collusion: Invitees are intended to collude with the inviters on the pretense by responding in kind. In other words, they are intended to respond in a way which is appropriate to the pretense. In the above example, the response is appropriate to the pretense. The invitee may sometimes offer ostensible excuses, or reasons why s/he supposedly could not make it;

(4) Ambivalence: If inviters were asked, "Do you really mean it?" they could not honestly answer either yes or no. This is a paradoxical point in relation to ostensible invitations. Ambivalence usually differentiates between ostensible speech acts and other forms of non-serious speech uses like joking, irony, etc;

 (5) Off-record Purpose: Ostensible invitations are extended as a way of expressing certain intentions off-record. Any given utterance has a set of vivid implications which the speaker can be held accountable for. These implications are said to be on record. There are, on the other hand, certain other plausible but not necessary implications for which the speaker cannot be held accountable. These are referred to as off-record (Brown and Levinson, 1978). An ostensible invitation in this case may be a means of testing the waters to see how the invitee might react.

As such, ostensible invitations have two layers: a top-layer at which the inviter issues an invitation and the invitee responds in kind; and a bottom-layer at which they both take the collusive actions towards each other with the mutual recognition that the top-layer is only a pretense. The feature general to ostensible invitations is that the inviter shows his/her ambivalence about the invitee's acceptance, and that the invitee shows her/his recognition of that ambivalence. Unlike Wolfson (1989), Clark and Isaacs refrain from referring to

these invitations as ambiguous. They believe that because they are designed so that addressees will recognize the pretense; ostensible invitations are not intended to be ambiguous. They may appear ambiguous to the analyst, but by no means to the addressee. The pretense, no doubt, is meant to be recognized.

6. **Establishing Invitations as Ostensible**

In order to make the pretense of the invitation vivid, there are a number of strategies that may be used in extending invitations. Based on their data, Clark and Isaacs could find seven different ways of making the pretense obvious:

(1) A makes B's presence at event E implausible. To do so, the inviter usually sets out to violate the felicity conditions needed for establishing genuine invitations. The felicity conditions for invitations are:

 (a) A must believe B would like to be present at E; and
 (b) A must be able to provide what s/he offers.

By violating these conditions, B will have enough grounds to believe the invitation is insincere. However, if the violation is obvious for both of them, the invitation is ostensible. According to Atkinson and Drew (1984), and Levinson (1983), inviters often use questions or utterances whose primary purpose is to establish the felicity conditions for invitations to follow. They call these utterances "pre invitations" (Wolfson ,1989). With genuine invitations, these pre invitations are used in an ordinary way to establish a favorable condition for the invitation. With ostensible invitations, however, they will establish unfavorable conditions. This will highlight the pretense of these invitations.

(2) A invites B only after B has solicited the invitation. B can solicit invitations in two ways: through the context or directly. In the former case, B can take advantage of the cultural connotations of politeness formulas. For instance, in American culture, it is always impolite to exclude some members of a group from an event. B, if excluded, can ask a question which will highlight B's exclusion. In the latter case, B explicitly requests an invitation if s/he believes that A cannot or will not anticipate B's desire to be present at event E.

(3) A does not motivate the invitation beyond social courtesy. If the invitation is genuine, A usually uses utterances to make the invitation more attractive. In other words, A tries to induce B's acceptance of the invitation. With ostensible invitations, however, A does not motivate the invitation, whereby making the pretense vivid.

(4) A does not persist or insist on the invitation. In genuine invitations, A usually repeats the invitation several times. With ostensible invitations, A usually fails to pursue the invitation upon B's very first refusal to accept.

(5) A is vague about the arrangements. Unless they are established by the situation and the shared knowledge of the interactants, A must specify the time and place of the E for B. A common feature of ostensible invitations is the vagueness of such logistics. In the above example between Mary and Justin, "sometime" is not sufficient to ensure that Justin and Mary will be at the same place at the same time.

(6) A hedges the invitation to B. A can show that his/her heart is not really in it by hedging the invitation with such expressions as "well," "I guess," "I mean," etc.

(7) A delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues. Usually genuine invitations are very vivid and crystal clear. Ostensible invitations, however, are fraught with inappropriate cues such as hesitations, pauses, down-casting of the eyes, rapid speech, and other non-verbal signs that manifest the pretense of the invitation.

It should, however, be noted that these seven features are not independent of each other. There are, in fact, examples of invitations in which two or more of these are used by the inviter simultaneously.

7. Collecting Data

Collecting the data of the study is done by means of exploratory research method, survey method and face to face interview. Part of the data is collected in the city of Basrah, Iraq, where the researcher with the assistance of some colleagues at the University of Basrah, compiled a collection of 50 examples of ostensible invitations from their own lives. Fifty undergraduate students at the Dept. of English, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basrah participate in the survey method and provided a set of 50 examples of ostensible invitations. They are asked to provide a vivid description of the context to make the exchange comprehensible and to quote, as best as they could, exactly what was said. The other part of the data is collected in the United States during the period when the researcher participated in the Fulbright Visiting Scholars Program at Eastern Washington University. With the assistance of the staff members of the College of Arts, Letters and Education the researcher compiled a collection of 30 examples of ostensible or as Americans prefer to call them insincere invitations. Ten American undergraduate students attending the College of Arts, Letters and Education at Eastern Washington University were interviewed face to face. Each student was asked to recall two insincere invitations extended towards him/her. These students were then asked to describe the context, to reenact the dialogue as best as they could, and then to explain why they believed the act had been insincere.

8. Results and Interpretations

The comparison of Iraqi Arabic and American English ostensible invitations reveals that the apparent difference between the two languages is a matter of degree rather than nature. In other words, the nature of the strategies employed by the inviters in the process of extending ostensible invitations in Iraqi Arabic does not differ from that of American English. However, the extent to which one feature is present in Iraqi Arabic ostensible invitations slightly differs from that of the American English. Add to this, in certain situations especially when the invitee knows about the intentions beyond extending the invitation, Americans would interpret ostensible invitations negatively whereas

Iraqis would interpret them all the way positively. Americans feel that such invitations are just like a game which is less for the honor and dignity of the hearers, but rather for the right not to have them at certain event or insult them for a lack of invitation. So, they are much more intended to free the inviter from accusation of something. The case is a little bit different with Iraqis whose goal when extending such invitations is double facet; to save their own faces as inviters and to save the faces of the invitees. So, ostensible invitations seem patently designed as face-saving devices. For Iraqis such invitations are interpreted as necessity of social courtesy. The similarity between American English and Iraqi Arabic ostensible invitations is greater in terms of such features as *solicitation, motivating,* and *hesitating.*

8.1 Do the collected data meet the defining properties of ostensible invitations?

It was Thursday afternoon, X's wife called saying that the school bus wasn't coming that day and they had to pick their son up from school. X told his wife he would pick him up. As X was leaving, Y, a colleague of his stopped him . Y asked X where he was going and he told him the story. X asked him "what about you?"; Y said that he was going home:

X: come with me; let me give you a lift. You are on my way.

Y: That's very kind of you.

When X stopped the car in front of Y's house,

Y said: Come let's have lunch together

(tʕʔl - xliːnæ - ntɣdæ - suːæ)

X: Thank you, I can't. You know I have to pick my son up from school. I don't want to be late for him. Bye.

(ʃuːkræn - mæ- ʔqdær. ʔntæ- tʕru ʃ- læːzim- ʔdʒiːb- ʔbniː-min-ilmædræsæ- mæ- ʔriːd- ʔtʔxær-ʕliːh)

Y: Bye.

As Y knew that X had to pick his son up from the school there is no place for anyone to think that his invitation was a serious one.

(1) *Pretense:* The inviter, in ostensible invitations, is only pretending to extend a sincere invitation. The colleague (Y), in the above example, is only pretending to invite X to have lunch;

(2) *Mutual Recognition:* Inviters intend their pretense to be vividly recognized by them and their addressee. This is called mutual recognition. Y intended X and himself to mutually believe they both recognize that he was only pretending to make a sincere invitation. Mutual recognition is highly significant in that it distinguishes ostensible invitations from genuine but insincere ones;

(3) *Collusion*: Invitees are intended to collude with the inviters on the pretense by responding in kind. In other words, they are intended

to respond in a way which is appropriate to the pretense. In the above example, the response is appropriate to the pretense. The invitee may sometimes offer ostensible excuses, or reasons why s/he supposedly could not make it. The reply uttered by X in the above example is an attempt at colluding with Y on the pretense of his invitation;

(4) *Ambivalence*: If inviters were asked, "Do you really mean it?" they could not honestly answer either yes or no. This is a paradoxical point in relation to ostensible invitations. Ambivalence usually differentiates between ostensible speech acts and other forms of non-serious speech uses like joking, irony, etc;

(5) *Off-record Purpose*: Ostensible invitations are extended as a way of expressing certain intentions off-record. Any given utterance has a set of vivid implications which the speaker can be held accountable for. These implications are said to be on record. There are, on the other hand, certain other plausible but not necessary implications for which the speaker cannot be held accountable. These are referred to as off-record (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978). An ostensible invitation in this case may be a means of testing the waters to see how the invitee might react.

In the analysis of the data for the present study. Both the 100 exchanges collected in the city of Basrah, Iraq and the 50 exchanges collected in Washington State, United States were compared against these five features of ostensible invitations. Twenty Iraqi undergraduate students who participated in the survey failed to provide enough contexts in the examples they provided which made it difficult for the researcher to consider their invitations as examples of real or ostensible invitations. For this reason, these 20 exchanges were neglected. The rest 80 exchanges of the Iraqis met the five defining features of ostensible invitations proposed by Clark and Isaacs (1990). The 50 American exchanges were all in line with the aforementioned five features of ostensible invitations.

8.2 Do Iraqis and Americans use the same strategies for establishing invitations as ostensible?

All of the exchanges gathered as the data for this study were checked against the seven different strategies proposed by Clark and Isaacs (1990) that interactants could use to make the pretense obvious:

(1) *The inviter makes the invitee's presence at event implausible* :

If A invites B to an event when they mutually believe that B has other unbreakable plans or can't be there for certain reason, B would have some reason to believe that the invitation was ostensible. This very thing appeared in almost 70 per cent of the Iraqi ostensible exchanges as well as the 50 per cent of the American exchanges. The following examples illustrate this:

Example (1) Iraqi Data: *One afternoon. Mr. X was going to Al-Hartha District. He wanted to get off the bus in Qarmat Ali centre of Al-Hartha District. The driver, Mr. Y, however, had to continue his journey for another Seven kilometers to reach Al-Intisar Quarter. When he wanted to get off,*
Mr. X said: Come over to our house for dinner!
(tʕl – ilæ- biːtnæ - lilʕʃæ)
Mr. Y, the driver, said: Thank you. I don't want to bother you.
Besides, I have to drop the other employees to their houses.
(ʃuːkræn- mæ- ʔriːd- ʔtʕbæk- ʔæiːdˤan- læːzim- ʔnæzil-ilmuːæðˤfiːn- libjuːt hum)
Mr. X: Okay, then. Bye

The example above clearly shows that Mr. X's invitation is not a serious one for he knows that Mr. Y won't accept it because he has to drop the other employees to their houses. The other party, Mr. Y, knew that the invitation isn't sincere but he reacted as if it was a sincere one.

Example (2) American Data: *X was going to a birthday party at Y's place. X invited his roommate, Z, to join him. Regardless of the fact that they mutually knew that Z isn't on good terms with W, Y's roommate, When Z asked if W would be there, X hedged and said, "I don't know," which, he later said, indicated that W probably would be there.*

Since it was mutually believed that Z wouldn't want to be present in a party with W, but X had extended the invitation anyway, Z decided the invitation must be an ostensible one.

(2)A invites B only after B has solicited the invitation: The examples below illustrate this:

Example (1) Iraqi Data: *A group of university professors were setting their bags and getting ready to leave for a football match. Dr. X, a colleague of theirs, standing by, heard their speech but was excluded of the group.*
Speaker: Hurry up! We will be late.
(bsirʕæː- ræːħ- nitʔxær)
Dr. X: Where are you going?
(wjn- ræːiːħiːn)
Speaker: We're going to play a football match.
(ræːiːħiːn- nilʕb- tˤwbæː)
Dr. X: Is everyone going to play?
(hil-ilkwl- ræːħ-jilʕbuːn)
Speaker: Not exactly. Seven of us are……..
(muː- ilkwl-bis- sbʕæ- minæ)

Dr. X: It has been long since last time I played football. I'd love to....
> *(sær-wæqit- tæwiːl- mæ- lʔʕib- tˤwbæː-ʔħib….)*

Speaker: Well, uh, ……if you want to, come with us.
> *(ziːn- ʔʕ……iðæ- triːd- tʕʔl- wjænæ)*

Dr. X: Thank you. May be next time.
> *(ʃuːkræn- mræ- θænjæ)*

Speaker: All right, next time.

Example (2) American Data: *In the office of a business, a worker was standing among a group of her co-workers and invited them for the weekend party she is having in her apartment. A co-worker woman in another cubicle, was standing very close to them, realized that she was not considered part of the group.*
Woman 1: Never forget. Friday night at 9 p.m. Come in time.
Woman 2: Are you guys having an event or something?
Woman 1: Actually, we're having a party at my place.
Woman 2: Is everyone invited?
Woman 1: Not really. Many are.
Woman 2: Am I among the invitees?
Woman 1: Well, you can come also.
Woman 1: Thanks anyway. Dan and I are headed out of town this weekend.
Woman 2: No problem. Enjoy your weekend.

The similarity in terms of soliciting invitations is very apparent between American and Iraqi ostensible invitations. The analysis of the Iraqi data shows that 20 per cent of the ostensible invitations were extended after they were solicited. Surprisingly, the same percentage of ostensible invitations was found to be extended after being solicited in the American data.

(3) A doesn't motivate the invitation beyond social courtesy:
All of the ostensible invitations in the Iraqi and American data were not motivated beyond social courtesy. As it is clear in the examples provided in number one and number two above the inviters didn't use any word or expression that might induce the invitee(s) to take the invitation as a genuine one. The inviters did not motivate the invitation which makes the pretense vivid and obvious.

(4) The inviter doesn't persist or insist on the invitation:
An inviter can show an invitee that the invitation is merely ostensible by accepting the invitee's first polite declination and not giving the invitee another chance to accept. Data analysis shows that 100 % of both American and Iraqi invitations the inviter(s) fail to issue a second invitation.

(5) The inviter is vague about arrangement:

If the inviter offers no other arrangements, the invitee has some reason to believe the invitation was insincere, and if the arrangements are clearly required, the invitee should believe the invitation is ostensible. In the data of this study, arrangements were not specified by the context for 5 per cent of the ostensible invitations in the Iraqi data and only 10 per cent in the American data. The following two examples help highlighting the vagueness of arrangements in the American and Iraqi data respectively.

Example (1) American data: *A man and his wife traveled a good distance to visit his older siblings. At the end of the visit, as they were climbing into their car, the siblings extended an invitation to them.*
Sibling: Have a good trip home! Next time, you should come down and see our beach property.
Man: Okay. Thanks. See you later.

Example (2) Iraqi Data: *One day while Mr. X was heading to room 14 where it is scheduled for him to deliver his lecture. He met an old friend who was visiting the college on business. As the friend realized that Mr. X was in a hurry he saw him off.*
Mr. X: Come over to visit me in my office one day.
   (tʕl- ʐuːrniː- bmæktæbiː- fæd- jwam)
Friend: May be I will one day.
   (jmkin-ʔʐuːræk- fæd- jwam)

(6) The inviter hedges the invitation to the invitee:
The hedges in the ostensible invitations of the collected data appear quite often. They appeared in 5 per cent of the Iraqi data and 2 per cent in the American data. Note the hedges in the insincere invitations cited earlier," Well h, do you want to, if you want you can come".

(7) The inviter delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues:

Ostensible invitations are full of inappropriate cues such as hesitations, pauses, down-casting of the eyes, rapid speech, and other non-verbal signs that manifest the pretense of the invitation. These cues weren't clearly shown in both Iraqi and American data for the descriptions of the situations weren't enough to show these features. That's why the researcher wasn't able to recognize this seventh feature in the data he collected. However, this does not mean that this feature does not exist at all.

These features are not reciprocally exclusive: the presence of one of them in an invitation does not exclude the others for they are not independent of each other. In this way, making an event implausible and leaving the arrangements vague both work because the preparatory conditions for the invitation do not hold. Deliberate unwillingness to motivate beyond social courtesy, failure to persist, and hedging all show the inviter's lack of commitment to the invitation.

And so does an inappropriate delivery. Once any of these features is defective, the invitee has reason to suspect the invitation is insincere. If the defective feature seems obvious enough that the inviter would have to expect that they mutually recognize it, the invitee has reason to believe the invitation is ostensible.

9. Conclusions

The results of the data analysis and interpretation reveal that the defining properties of Iraqi Arabic ostensible invitations are similar to those of the American English ones. It is also revealed that Iraqi inviters take advantage of the same strategies in making the pretense of their invitations vivid as their American counterparts do. The difference is only a matter of degree.

Both Americans and Iraqis notice that the major aim beyond extending ostensible invitations is social courtesy. However, such invitations are just like a game which consists of a set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and a specification of payoffs for each combination of strategies. So, such invitations are, in fact, to some Americans, in certain situations, less for the honor and dignity of the hearer(s), but rather for the right not to have them at certain event or insult them for a lack of invitation.

All in all both Iraqis and Americans realize ostensible invitations as face-saving devices. The purpose of ostensible invitations, for the most part, is politeness. Indeed, many of the invitations in the data of this study were found to be extended when they were socially expected, when their absence would have offended the other party.

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المستخلص

يقوم الناس في بعض الأحيان بأطلاق دعواتٍ لا يريدونها أن تؤخذ على محمل الجد. لقد أسميت مثل هذه الدعوات بتسميات مختلفة. ليفنسن (١٩٨٣) يسميها الدعوات الغامضة بينما يفضل كلارك وآيزاكس (١٩٩٠) أستخدام مصطلح الدعوات الظاهرية. بغض النظر عن المصطلح المستخدم لوصف هذه الدعوات فإنها تتطلب عدد من السمات المميزة مثل : تظاهر المتكلم بالصدق و الادراك المتبادل للمتكلم والمخاطب بتظاهر المتكلم بالصدق وتواطؤ المخاطب بقبول التظاهر. يفهم اللغويون الدعوات الظاهرية على أنها نوع من أنواع أفعال الكلام غير الصادقة والتي تستخدم نفس كلمات الدعوة وتركيب جملتها عندما يكون الطلب بالذهاب الى مكان ما او فعل شيء ما غير مقصود. في الدعوات الظاهرية يفترض بأن المتكلم يدعو السامع من دون قصد الدعوة بل لاجل غرض آخر. تستكشف هذه الدراسة أوجه الشبه والأختلاف (أن كانت هناك) في أستخدام فعل الكلام غير الصادق (الدعوات الظاهرية) بين الأنجليزية الأمريكية والعربية العراقية. ووجدت الدراسة إلى أن هناك نوعا من التشابه من حيث السمات المميزة للدعوات الظاهرية في اللغة الإنجليزية الأمريكية والعربية باللهجة العراقية.