Religion and Globalization

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Summary:

Since about 1980, globalization has rapidly become one of the most employed and debated concepts of our time. But it has also acquired buzzword status, invoked in a broad range of contexts and for a large number of purposes. Globalization has many dimensions in the twenty-first century. The challenges of global politics include the practice of governance and democracy in a world of diverse economic and social realities. As cultures meet, religions act and interact within core areas, along adjoining borders, and in far-flung diasporas. The encounter between religion and globalization is a crucial feature of our world. In this paper, the phases of globalization and their characteristics as well as religion as a source of opposition to globalization will be examined. There will be a definition of globalization, an examination of the models of the phases of globalization and then a proposal for a personal model. Having established the phases of globalization and their characteristics, effort is turned to describing religion in each phase. This paper will also provide a few brief comments on five dimensions of globalization, and then examine religious complaints against globalization from two diametrically opposed perspectives: Islamism, which has been successful in rallying opposition to globalization, and liberal Christianity, which has not. As different as these two complaints are in style and substance, they are structurally similar. Religious opposition to globalization is based on demands for justice and a defense of tradition.

Introduction

"Globalization" has quickly risen to the top of the list of terms used and discussed in our time since around 1980. However, it has also turned into a catchphrase that is used frequently and in a wide variety of circumstances. In the twenty-first century, globalization takes on numerous forms. The practice of administration and democracy in a world with various economic and social realities is one of the difficulties of international politics. Religions act and interact when cultures collide in key places, along adjacent borders, and in far diasporas. Globalization's interaction with religion is a key aspect of our world. There is a growing understanding of religion in political studies. Religion is crucial to

comprehending specific concerns in the ongoing global transition, including democracy and fundamentalism, conflict and reconciliation, tolerance and public religion, and standard and track-two diplomacy. The basis of the international system and other fundamental elements of international relations, such as sovereignty, have always been entwined with religion. Likewise, both locally and worldwide, political environments shape religions.

The actual world of human action, especially today's "globalization," is centered on the junction of religion and politics. Theories on the subject have a propensity to reduce religion to politics or the other way around. Practitioners and experts agree that, in light of current global politics, religions, politics, and globalization need to be reconsidered—and jointly. Global politics are not some kind of ideological contest for the hearts of religious believers, and neither is religion. Images in the media of international war and brutality, when paired with the religious assertions of those who do such acts, are just a conflation of human tragedies rather than a thoughtful understanding of how politics and religion interact.

In what has come to be known as the "cartoon crisis," the Danish daily *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve anti-Islamic cartoons on September 30, 2015, ridiculing the prophet Mohammed. The Danish government disregarded the complaints of diplomats from Islamic nations in October. In response to the cartoons being brought to a conference in Beirut by a Danish Muslim cleric, protests broke out in numerous Middle Eastern nations. Right-wing media in Europe and North America started republishing the cartoons in response to this, disguising their actions under the banner of "freedom of the press" and vehemently promoting the idea of a "clash of civilizations" (see, for example, Malkin, 2016). By February 2016, the situation had developed into what was perhaps one of the biggest Western-Islamic conflicts in recent memory. Riots and demonstrations ranged from Nigeria to Indonesia, several embassies were burned, economic boycotts cost Denmark up to €1,000,000 a day, and there were several fatalities. Of course, a situation like this is complicated and lends itself to several analyses. It will be examined in this essay as a manifestation of globalization and a protest against it. One way to look at the crisis is as a manifestation of globalization. A few racist cartoons that were initially targeted at a small immigrant community circulated swiftly via satellite TV and the Internet. Extremists on both sides then utilized the global reactions that were shown on television to plan more local responses (some analysts even referred to the cartoons as a gift to Al Qaeda). In some ways, the crisis was a nightmarish parody of the Global Village (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968).

The crisis as a form of protest against globalization is more intriguing and complicated. That such a seemingly little provocation to elicit such a strong reaction shows that much more is going on underneath the surface than what an insult to the

Prophet would suggest. The stages of globalization and their features, as well as religion's role as a source of resistance to it, will all be looked at in this paper. A definition of globalization, an analysis of models for its many phases, and a suggestion for a unique model will all be covered. Once the phases of globalization and their characteristics have been identified, attention will move to describing religion throughout each phase. This paper will also make a few brief observations on the five dimensions of globalization before contrasting Islamism, which has successfully united opposition to globalization, and liberal Christianity, which has not, in their analyses of religious complaints against globalization. The structural similarities between these two complaints outweigh their stylistic and substantive differences. Demands for justice and the defense of tradition are the cornerstones of religious opposition to globalization.

Defining Globalization

Globalization is thought of in many different ways. Globalization, according to skeptics, is a fiction (Held et al., 1999: 5-7; Akinjide, 2022). Others contend that while globalization is a real phenomenon, most of the discussion around it is "globaloney" (Veseth, 2015). Even the phrase "globalization is everything and its opposite" is used in a well-known introduction to the topic (Friedman, 2000: 406). Therefore, we need to start by defining the phrase. The term "globalization" is frequently used to refer to a single concept, such as the growth of western capitalism throughout the world or a form of western cultural imperialism (Robertson, 2013: 15–19). While there is some truth in such conceptions, globalization is far broader. Robertson defines it as a concept that "refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (Robertson, 1992: 8). He further states, "the world has become increasingly characterized by (1) *extensive connectivity*, or interrelatedness and (2) *extensive global consciousness*, a consciousness which continues to become more and more reflexive" (Robertson, 2013: 6). Drawing from Robertson, globalization is defined *as increasing extensity of world interdependence and increasing intensity of world consciousness*. The term "increasing" highlights that globalization is an ongoing process, not a static state of affairs, and that its tendency is to increase over time, although the process has been uneven and has involved reversals.

Key in the definition is the focus on consciousness. Changes in thinking that occur as a result of global interdependence are every bit as important as other factors affected by it, such as political or economic ones. Globalization profoundly influences norms, values, religion, and other ideas and beliefs. It is also assumed that globalization involves political, economic, social and cultural dimensions (Robertson, 2013: 3; Robertson and White, 2015), although it is neither adequately nor predominantly defined as any particular one of these.

Existing Models of the Phases of Globalization

The historical course of globalization is currently the focus of attention. What phases of growth has globalization gone through, and how long has it been happening? Following a review of three models of the phases of globalization, another is then suggested. It must be noted that "any periodization is artificially neat," as Jan Aart Scholte states. In practice socio-historical developments cannot be divided into wholly discrete phases. . . . Nevertheless, the historical shorthand of periods provides helpful general bearings" (2015: 86).

Types of Models

Conceptions of the chronology of globalization come in three basic types (Scholte, 2015, 19–20): cyclical models, linear models, which give globalization a long history, and linear models which give globalization a short history. Differing definitions of globalization naturally result in different criteria by which to measure its advance, and thus lead to these different understandings of its history. Defining globalization in economic terms (sometimes including also human migration) can lead to seeing it as cyclical. However, some who define it economically see 'globalization' as being a myth, believing that there is nothing distinctive about contemporary trade except for its volume. The definition of globalization provided precludes a cyclical view.

Another type of economic approach sees globalization as linear and recent. Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, etc.), for example, equates 'the modern world-system' with the rise of 'the capitalist world-economy', which he sees as beginning only in the 15th century. But those who define globalization more broadly are critical of Wallerstein's narrow focus, in spite of his substantial depth (Beyer, 1994: 15–21; Robertson, 1992: 61–84; Idowu, 2022: 30-32). The definition of globalization provided sees it as linear and as having a long history. It is models of this sort which will be analyzed here.

Robertson's Minimal Phase Model of Globalization

Robertson proposed a model of the phases of globalization over time in his pioneering work *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (1992). This model grows out of his definition of globalization as involving global interdependence and consciousness. Thus the criteria for the determining phases of globalization are increases in interdependence and global consciousness. While he holds that the globalization process has been proceeding for many centuries, his model traces "the major constraining tendencies which have been operating in relatively recent history" in regard to what he calls the "global field" (1992: 57). Robertson's global field is composed of four "reference points" around which globalization is constructed: individual selves, national societies, the world system of societies, and humankind (1992: 25–31). Robertson also properly emphasizes the self-limiting nature of globalization by introducing the concept of 'glocalization' (1992: 173–4), describing the reciprocal effects of the global and the local upon each other. He

proposes the following model (1992: 57–60): Phase I: The Germinal Phase (1400–1750 in Europe), Phase II: The Incipient Phase (1750–1870s mainly in Europe), Phase III: The Take-Off Phase (1870s–1925), Phase IV: The Struggle-for-Hegemony Phase (1925–late 1960s), and Phase V: The Uncertainty Phase (late 1960s–early 1990s).

The Global Transformations Phases of Globalization

Another model of the phases of globalization has been proposed by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton in *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (1999). They define globalization as "a process (or set of processes) which embodies transformations in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power" (Held et al., 1999: 16). By 'extensity' they refer to roughly what Robertson means by 'interdependence' (15). By 'intensity' they mean the (degree of) regularity of interdependence, which over time tends toward greater intensification. 'Velocity' refers to "the speeding up of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the potential velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people" (15). 'Impact' refers to the reciprocal effects of the global and the local upon each other (what Robertson terms 'glocalization'). Based on these considerations (and several other elaborate distinctions not detailed here) they propose this scheme (414–44; 432–35, 438–39): Premodern Globalization (c. 9,000–7,000 BCE to c. 1500 CE with the rise of the West), Early Modern Globalization (c. 1500–1850s, the rise of the West), Modern Globalization (c. 1850s–1950s, rise of the nation-state), and Contemporary Globalization (1950s to present).

Scholte's Phases of Globalization

Scholte proposes another model in his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (2015). He defines globalization as "the spread of transplanetary—and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial—connections between people" (2015: 59). He elaborates, "Globality in the conception adopted here has two qualities. The more general feature, transplanetary connectivity, has figured in human history for many centuries. The more specific characteristic, supraterritoriality, is relatively new to contemporary history" (2015: 60). "Supraterritorial relations are social connections that substantially transcend territorial geography", such as the instantaneous global links possible through telecommunications (Scholte, 2015: 61). His phases of globalization (87–117) are: Intimations of Globality: to the Nineteenth Century, Incipient Globalization: to the mid-Twentieth Century, and Contemporary Accelerated Globalization: mid-Twentieth Century to Present.

The three models compare this way:

Robertson	Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton	Scholte
	c. 9,000 BCE–CE 1500 Premodern Globalization	To 19th Century Intimations of Globality
CE 1400–1750 Germinal Phase	1500–1850s Early Modern Globalization	
1750–1870s Incipient Phase		To the mid-20th Century Incipient Globalization
	1850s– 1950s Modern Globalization	
1870s–1925 Take-Off Phase		
1925–late 1960s Struggle For Hegemony Phase	1950s–Present Contemporary Globalization	Mid-20th century forward Contemporary Accelerated Globalization
Late 1960s–early 1990s Uncertainty Phase		

A Proposed Model of Religion and the Phases of Globalization

The following model of the phases of globalization is based upon our definition of globalization as *increasing extensity of world interdependence and increasing intensity of world consciousness*. Thus 'objective' interdependence and 'subjective' consciousness of the world are the principal criteria used to determine the phases of globalization. Names that reflect the particular world consciousness which distinguishes each phase are used. Religion is defined here substantively rather than functionally, following Christian Smith: "*religions are sets of beliefs, symbols, and practices about the reality of superempirical orders that make claims to organize and guide human life*. Put more simply, if less precisely, what we mean by religion is an ordinarily unseen reality that tells us what truly is and how we therefore ought to live" (Smith, 2013: 98). Religion functions to establish *personal*

identity—a sense of meaning and belonging in social groups (Smith, 1998, 2013). It also contributes to *societal order*, that is, to the effort to define the contours of 'the good society'. This impulse has motivated attempts to improve society, and not infrequently involved it in power struggles and sometimes persecution when it seems a threat to established power.

Religion's functions are affected by pluralism. Since each new phase of globalization represents a new phase of interdependence with others and consciousness of others' ideas, the phases of globalization involve exposure to alternative ways of thinking and believing. Such exposure can *relativize* people's tradition, their way of seeing the world. Relativization is suddenly seeing one's own beliefs differently as a result of exposure to other beliefs, such as when a Christian, suddenly acquainted with Islam, begins to wonder if Christianity is 'true' or actually just a particular 'viewpoint'. The result is a sense of threat and insecurity because fundamental beliefs are called into question (Beyer, 1994; Robertson, 1992; Campbell, 2015). Predictable reactions to relativization are many (Campbell, 2015: 83–91), ranging from vigorously defending one's tradition, to skepticism out of despair of finding truth. The following model of phases of globalization will describe each phase's characteristics, and then examine aspects of religion which reflect the characteristics of the phase. Also noted will be such features as religion as a globalizing force and as a contributor to global culture, global violence by and against religion, and religious and anti-religious movements influenced by global forces or as reactions to globalization's relativizing of traditions.

The Inhabited World Phase: Beginning to 1400 CE

Defining the Phase

Widespread interdependence and consciousness of the world existed in ancient times. A term commonly used by the Hellenistic Greeks and also later by the Romans to signify this was *oikoumene*, which means 'the inhabited world'. Robertson and Inglis call this pervasive consciousness of an interdependent world the 'Global *Animus*' ('global spirit'), and they provide abundant primary source material documenting the global *animus* among "Greco-Roman social elites from the Hellenistic period onwards through to the height of Roman imperial power in the first two centuries after Christ" (2014: 39, 47; 2016). Diogenes, the fourth century BCE Greek, is famous for saying, "I am a citizen of the world" (*kosmopolites*). This 'cosmopolitan' outlook was a routine feature of the Hellenistic world created by Alexander the Great and among the Cynics and Stoics, and is painstakingly attested in the ancient historian Polybius (Robertson and Inglis, 2014: 40–41; Inglis and Robertson, 2015; 2016). Ancient empires often saw themselves as masters of the entire inhabited world, even though they also recognized that there were others outside of their empire. Mann (1986: 238–39) documents this consciousness in the Persian Empire, which began in 550 BCE. The Romans, from the 2nd century BCE to

the 3rd century CE, called this their *imperium sine ne*, "imperial power without [territorial] limit" and considered it to encompass the *orbis terrarum*, the "whole [orb-shaped] world", symbolizing it with a globe (Graham, 2016: 29–35). By the end of the 4th century CE this Roman rhetoric had been absorbed into Christian conceptions of a universal Christian empire (Graham, 2016: 159). Muslims of the eighth and subsequent centuries called their vision of a transworld Islamic community the *umma* (Scholte, 2015: 87–88), illustrated in the later portion of this phase in the travels of Ibn Battuta (Dunn, 1986). Robertson and Inglis correctly conclude that "by attending to ancient evidence as to 'global' attitudes and 'global consciousness', one may begin to overcome the presentism implicit in many contemporary accounts of globalization" (2014: 38). Though this phase falls short of the modern extent of globalization, the expansive territorial interdependence, and the widespread consciousness of a unified 'world' symbolized among the Romans by a globe, justifies considering this as the first phase of globalization, containing the elements which are prerequisite for the globally-extended 'globalization' of modern times.

Religion and the Phase

Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton comment, "the key agents of globalization in this epoch were threefold: political and military empires, world religions, and . . . migratory movements . . ." (1999: 415). They continue: the era witnessed the emergence, expansion and stabilization of what have come to be known as world religions. Their universal messages of salvation, the capacity to cross and unify cultural divisions, their infrastructure of theocracies and widely circulating holy texts constituted one of the great episodes of interregional and intercivilizational encounters. However, while their reach exceeded that of nearly all early empires, world religions remained initially confined to one or two regions or civilizations. Held et al., observe, "in terms of their impact, there is little doubt that the world religions are among humanity's most significant cultural innovations. World religions have furnished religious and political elites with immense power and resources, be it in their capacity to mobilize armies and peoples, in their development of transcultural senses of identity and allegiance or in their provision of the entrenched theological and legal infrastructure of societies" (1999: 333).

'World religions' founded in the era include Hinduism (c. 2000 BCE), Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Shinto in early in 2nd millennium BCE, Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism and Taoism in the 6th century BCE, Christianity in the 1st century CE, Islam in CE 622. Religion served as a globalizing force in this phase by stimulating travel. Lewis writes, "in all accounts of ancient travel religion is accorded the largest role as a motive for travel, even among the poor" and these pilgrimages also served as a major source of news and of global consciousness, particularly after the 4th century (Graham, 2016: 117). Religion served as a source of integration and

identity in numerous ways. After the collapse of Rome in 410, Christianity "provided an *ecumene*, a universal fellowship across Europe, within which social relations were stabilized even in the absence of political unity" (Mann, 1986: 463). Meanwhile, by 715 Muslim rule extended from Spain to India, and all across the Mediterranean shores of North Africa. The cultural peak of Islam was reached during the transcontinental Abbasid Empire in the years 750 to 1258. After the collapse of Rome in the 5th century, law was deeply influenced by Christianity, since the church was the most viable institution to maintain social order. Church law also served as a major source of civil law, though there were other influences as well, such as the Visigothic and Salic law codes. Between 1075 and 1122 secular law arose in the West, typically by removing religious specifics from Christian canon law (Berman, 1983).

This phase saw the birth of universities at the impetus of religious faiths. Pride of place goes to Al-Ahzar in Cairo, the world's oldest university, founded by Muslims in CE 972. In Europe, writes Stark, "The university was a Christian invention" (Stark, 2013: 62), arising in Paris and Bologna in the mid-12th century and in Oxford and Cambridge around 1200, and multiplying in the 13th and 14th centuries. Religious violence was a prominent feature of this phase, the Christian Crusades (1095–1270) perhaps being the leading example of this. Stark argues that they were partly the result of the inner logic of monotheism, and articulates a theory which offers an explanation for why the period of the Crusades is also the period in which Christian anti-Semitism and heresy-hunting became prominent, and that also accounts for why Muslim persecution of Jews coincided with Christian anti-Semitism (Stark, 2011: 115–72).

Violence against religion also marked the phase. Well-known are the persecutions of Christians by Nero (64–68 CE) and Diocletian (303–13) due to the perceived threat of Christians to the Empire. Less known in the West is the persecution of Christians in Persia 339–41 CE by Sha Pur II, which produced deaths estimated to be from tens of thousands to 190,000 (Moffett, 1998; Irvin and Sunquist, 2011: 196).

The World Exploration Phase: 1400–1815, Mainly in Europe

Defining the Phase

This phase is dated to coincide with the beginnings of the Renaissance, since together with the sixteenth century Reformation and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, it produced in this period new senses of global interdependence, of consciousness of global interdependence, of the individual and of 'humanity'. The Renaissance slogan *ad fontes* ('back to the sources') captures the spirit of a time when Greek, Roman and Patristic sources were revived as sources of inspiration, eloquence and education. The phase is named for the great global voyages of exploration which began in the mid-15th century, and which created an expanded

global consciousness. Of these voyages' effects, Norman Hampson writes of the "growing tendency to see European (i.e., Christian) civilization in a world (i.e., pagan) context. The sixteenth century [was] excited by discovery, as the limits of the known world were driven back" (1968: 25). This is the period of the "rise of the West" (Held et al., 1999: 418), of the invention of printing in the West (1450s), of the European 'discovery' of the Americas, and of the spread of the Gregorian calendar.

Religion and the Phase

World exploration coincided with the exploration of nature through science. Religion contributed to global culture by contributing to the rise of science in the Western world, traditionally dated from 1543 (Copernicus' heliocentric theory). Stark (2013: 121–99) demonstrates the formative influence of Christianity in the rise of science, pointing out that it arose out of incremental developments in the Scholastic universities, and also that it "could only arise in a culture dominated by belief in a conscious, rational, all-powerful Creator (Stark, 2013: 197). Stark constructed a data set of the 52 'scientific stars' from Copernicus' generation to those born in 1680, limiting the list to active scientists who made significant contributions, coding the individuals for nationality and religious devotion (devout, conventionally religious, skeptic), among other things. Stark's conclusion: "those who made the 'Scientific Revolution' included an unusually large number of devout Christians—more than 60 percent qualified as devout and only two, Edmund Halley and Paracelsus, qualified as skeptics . . . these data make it entirely clear that religion played a substantial role in the rise of science" (2013: 163).

Devoted to the Renaissance slogan, *ad fontes*, and sustained by the recent invention of printing, the Protestant Reformation stimulated book printing and circulation, and Luther and Calvin were early advocates of universal education and general literacy (for both sexes). Violence by the religions figured prominently in this phase. The Spanish Inquisition began in 1478. The European Wars of Religion lasted from 1562 until 1648. The Christian witch-hunts developed in this period, beginning at the start of the 14th century, but flourishing from about 1450–1650, and dissipating after 1750. Stark offers a theory for why Christian monotheism alone produced witch-hunts (and for when and where it did so), and for why Islam never did (Stark, 2013: 201–88). The 18th century Enlightenment, though not uniformly anti-religious, launched a secular intelligentsia in the West partly in response to the widespread religious violence of the period. Deism appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries as an attempt at rational religion. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and introduced a nascent form of religious tolerance.

The International Relations Phase: 1815–1870, Mainly in Europe

Defining the Phase

As a result of the "rapid changes brought by the Industrial Revolution" and its resulting urbanization, even in the more backward regions of Europe "from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards many had the sensation of riding a roller coaster to the edge of chaos" (Mosse, 2008: 12). The period of peace, which began in 1815 after the termination of the Napoleonic Wars, experienced such change and innovation that it has been called "the birth of the modern" (Johnson, 2011), requiring "an adjustment of human consciousness" (Mosse, 2008: 13). The proliferation of zoos in this phase contributed to global consciousness, and newspapers became popular from the late 18th century, increasing global awareness and relativizing traditions (Mosse, 2008: 14; Turner, 2005: 47–8). The railroad (1830s–1840s), and the growing use of the bicycle seemed to give a new speed to time (Mosse, 2008: 14). Nation-states became firmly established and global interdependence was perceived in terms of 'international relations'. International agencies developed international regulations and international exhibitions. Greater consciousness of 'humanity' developed, as well as a new concept of 'rights' identified especially with the American Revolution. Confidence in human 'progress' became common currency, a secularization of Christian 'providence' (Turner, 1985: 35–43). The phase spawned two broad reactions to the upheaval of the Industrial Revolution: rational reactions, which sought to apply Enlightenment principles to transform society (such as liberalism and Marxism), and irrational ones (including nationalism and Romanticism) which sought community through finding reality beneath the appearance of things (Mosse, 2008).

Religion and the Phase

Both the rational and the irrational approaches that became prominent in this phase effected religious results. Romanticism gave impetus to a Christian renaissance, which continued throughout the century as both Catholics and Protestants attempted to respond to the problems of the age. Over the century Christians became increasingly preoccupied with social questions (Mosse, 2008: 251). The rational kind of reaction is expressed in a new religious movement which arose about 1805: Unitarianism. The beginning of a broad religiously liberal movement, Unitarians sought to create a rational Christian faith by abandoning the apparently irrational doctrine of the Trinity (Hutchison, 2012: 3).

One response to the widespread sense of chaos was that, "motivated by Christian principles . . . the modern, organized world peace movement began in the United States in 1815 and in England one year later" (Wallbank, et al., 1989: 2:444). The second phase of the movement began in the 1860s, was more secular, and sponsored, among other things, the 1889 Universal Peace Congress.

The new ideas about human rights found expression in 1789 in the US Bill of Rights, the first provision of which was to separate religion from state sponsorship and to guarantee religious freedom. These innovations proved boons to

religious strength, in contrast to the moribund state-sponsored religion approach characteristic of medieval and modern Europe (Stark, 2013: 33–36; Stark and Finke, 2016). Reflecting the new consciousness of the rights of humans, Christianity contributed to two global movements expressing commitment to human rights: the abolition of slavery and defense of the poor. Stark writes (2013: 291), Just as science arose only once, so, too, did effective moral opposition to slavery. Christian theology was essential to both. This is not to deny that early Christians condoned slavery. It is to recognize that of all the world's religions, including the three great monotheisms, only in Christianity did the idea develop that slavery was sinful and must be abolished.

Proposing a theory which accounts for why polytheisms, Islam and secular philosophy failed to effectively oppose slavery, Stark (2013: 291–365) points out that the success of the Western abolition movement set the global modern standard against slavery. New ideas relativized Christian tradition, as reflected in Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799), which combined Romanticism with pietism and argued for an accommodation of traditional Christian beliefs to the newer views of science and rationality (Mosse, 2008: 51–2). The first Vatican Council (1869–70) positioned the Church against the *Zeitgeist*.

The Modern World Phase: 1870–1914

Defining the Phase

The period beginning about 1870 was a 'watershed' in the public consciousness of Europe (Mosse, 2008: 23) and in the USA (Lears, 2006), forming "a period during which the increasingly manifest globalizing tendencies of previous periods and places gave way to a single, inexorable form" of globalization, leading Robertson to dub this globalization's "Take-off Phase" (Robertson, 2013: 59). During this period, cultural patterns were established which persist in the West into the 21st century. Lears describes the patterns as "consumer culture", an anti-modern reaction characterized by "the shift from a Protestant ethos of salvation through self-denial to a therapeutic ideal of self-fulfillment in this world through exuberant health and intense experience" (Lears, 2006: xvi; Rieff, 2007).

During this period consciousness of the 'modern world' developed. 'Modernity' was a major interest of the growing academic discipline of sociology in its classical period (c. 1880–1920), and was attended by a sense of social upheaval and a reaction to 'mass society' (Mosse, 2008: 11–27, 251; Lears, 2006). The urbanization that had characterized the 19th century increased dramatically in the last three decades of the century, reflected in Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). Global communications sharply increased with the invention of the wireless telegraph and the telephone (1876), and together with new technology including the automobile seemed to accelerate time and to abolish space (Mosse,

2008: 14). World time was established, international competitions and events such as the modern Olympic Games (1896) and the Nobel Prizes (1901) began. There was a growing concept of mankind, stimulated in part by great human migrations.

Religion and the Phase

During this period the Protestant liberalism which began in the early 19th century became prominent in American Christianity (Hutchison, 2012). Hutchison defines "the modernist impulse" by three characteristics: (1) conscious adaptation of religious ideas to modern culture, (2) belief that God is present in and revealed through cultural progress, and (3) belief that human society was moving toward realization of the kingdom of God (Hutchison, 2012: 2). The relativizing of Christian tradition by cultural ideas was met by adaptation to the new cultural commitments to progress and rationalism. The increasing preoccupation with social questions, which began in the early 19th century, continued in the transcontinental 'social gospel' movement in Protestant liberalism, which paralleled secular social concern in this period and issued in what Smith has called a "search for social salvation" (Mosse, 2008: 251–66; Smith, 2013). The Roman Catholic Church issued Rerum Novarum in 1891 affirming solidarity with the poor and the working class, continuing a response to the results of the Industrial Revolution which began after 1848 (Mosse, 2008: 251).

The therapeutic impulse became manifest in a new form of Protestantism with the founding of Pentecostalism in 1901 (Synan, 2017). Highly emotional, the movement was deeply committed to intense personal religious experience including direct revelations from God, the seeking of miracles and its best-known hallmark, 'speaking in tongues', believed to be an immediate experience of the divine in which God speaks through the recipient. Global religious consciousness led to attempts at accommodation: Christians created the Ecumenical movement, and clashed over accommodation in the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. American Reform Judaism began in Pittsburgh in 1885, and in 1893 religious leaders from around the globe convened at the first Parliament of the World's Religions.

Another reaction to the times was the despair of finding truth, which came to expression in the work of Nietzsche and the establishment for the first time in Western history of a critical mass of unbelief, both agnosticism and atheism (Turner, 2005; Mosse, 2008; Baoku, 2022).

The World Conflict Phase: 1914–1968

Defining the Phase

This phase is named for the world-wide conflict for dominance of the modern world order, and the attempts to mediate it, which was a dominant concern in the period. World War I painfully focused world attention on the interrelatedness of the entire globe and ended the 'isolationism' from world affairs so popular among Americans. The League of Nations was formed (1920–1946) to prevent future wars

and its failure was signaled by the Second World War. The United Nations succeeded the League in 1945. The 'Cold War' between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated global relations from 1947, peaking and declining after 1968, the high-water mark of the Vietnam conflict, the most notable of the 'proxy wars' between the great powers. Spurred by the Holocaust, the concept of 'humanity' crystallized in this period, expressed formally in 1966 in the United Nations' 'International Bill of Human Rights'. Global consciousness was expressed by reference to First, Second and Third worlds. Finally, the relative influence of the nation-state began to wane after the mid-twentieth century (Scholte, 2015: 185–223; Rudolph and Piscatori, 2019).

Religion and the Phase

In a period characterized by anxiety, and coterminous with the weakening of the nation-state as a source of identity, many turned to religion. Throughout this phase, Protestantism grew exponentially in Latin America (Martin, 2018), Africa and Asia (Jenkins, 2012; Sanneh and Carpenter, 2015), signaling the transfer of the center of Christian gravity from the North to the global South. Christianity has also grown rapidly in China, though there are no reliable figures (Tu Weiming, 2019). Pentecostalism accounted for the lion's share of the growth, popular in the West for its therapeutic appeal, and at least in part in Africa, due to its resonance with animist culture.

Another important reflection of the conflict of the period is the creation of American 'fundamentalism'. Marsden writes of the year 1919 that "An overwhelming atmosphere of crisis gripped America during the immediately [sic] postwar period. The year 1919 especially was characterized by a series of real as well as imagined terrors" (Marsden, 2022: 153). Relativized moral standards, fear of foreigners, the Red Scare, the disorientations caused by war and its end, and other social problems produced an atmosphere of alarm. He continues, "This perception of cultural crisis, in turn, appears to have created a greater sense of theological urgency. Therefore, fundamentalist theological militancy appears intimately related to a second factor, the American social experience connected with World War I. . . . These ideas, and the cultural crisis that bred them, revolutionized fundamentalism. More precisely, they created it (although certainly not ex nihilo) in its classic form" (Marsden, 2022: 141, 149). The year 1959 also saw the birth of neo-Pentecostalism (or the 'charismatic' renewal movement), another therapeutically-oriented form of Protestantism more adapted to the middle classes than working-class Pentecostalism. Whereas Pentecostals had formed a series of denominations, neo-Pentecostalism took the Pentecostal experience into established denominations. Beginning in the Episcopal Church, by 1962 the renewal had spread to the Church of England in Great Britain, and by 1967 the Roman Catholic charismatic movement had begun. Growth of the movement was aided by its emphasis on personal

experience of God, a corresponding de-emphasis on formal doctrine, and its ecumenical spirit (Quebedeaux, 2022).

The 1960s' US was host to an explosion of religion. Some strands were counter-cultural, while others were consistent with the therapeutic ethos of America. Imports from around the world proliferated, such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (1965). New religious movements (NRMs) also sprang up, such as Ron Hubbard's Church of Scientology (1953). Even Europe experienced new religious fervor, giving birth to the Wicca movement in 1954. Partly in response to the violence directed against the Jews in the Holocaust, the State of Israel was founded in 1948, generating heightened religious tension and violence in the Middle East, as well as against the US for being a friend of Israel. Arab nationalism grew in this period as a reaction to colonialism and its marginalization of Islam. Growing global recognition of rights was reflected by the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, led by Christian ministers. It became a major change-agent in American life and consciously drew on religious themes, including the Biblical story of the exodus of Israel out of slavery in Egypt to freedom (Smith, 2013).

Religious groups also worked to respond to the *Zeitgeist* and to ameliorate conflict. Protestants founded the World Council of Churches in 1948 to foster global Christian cooperation. The Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council (1963–65) brought dramatic changes within Catholicism and also a marked reorientation to an irenic spirit toward both Protestants and the world religions.

The Global Consciousness Phase: 1969 to 2001

Defining the Phase

The United States' 1969 moon landing symbolized the heightened 'global' consciousness which had begun in the late 1960s. Global environmental consciousness and concern for global overpopulation grew from seeds planted in the 1960s. The number of global institutions, corporations, movements and advocacy groups sharply increased, as did the regularity, speed and impact of global communications through communications satellites and particularly through the internet. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 generated talk of a 'new world order' and the perceived global victory of democracy was proclaimed as the 'end of history'. Marshall McLuhan discussed "the global village" in 1960, and early academic discussions include Wilbert Moore's, "Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System" (1966) and Roland Robertson's "Interpreting Globality" (1983).

Religion and the Phase

Global consciousness relativized traditions, leading to a sense of threat that is reflected in numerous religious developments in this phase. Perhaps the most dramatic is the emergence of global religious terrorism onto the world stage. In the late 1990s, 26 of 56 recognized terrorist groups in the world were religious

(Juergensmeyer, 2013: 6). While terrorism is a prominent feature of radical Islam, it is also present in numerous other world religions. Partly a reaction against the encroachments of global culture and partly motivated by a desire to advance a particular approach to global order, terrorism is often justified as self-defense by those who perceive themselves as the victims of hostile forces (Juergensmeyer, 2013). Muslim (and other) terrorism is also motivated by antipathy toward changes in the West that have developed out of the Enlightenment and other modern forces, changes which have made the West different from what it once was and different from what is still highly valued by many people less shaped by these changes. Western culture, although in part admired and sought after, is also widely regarded as barbarian because of those perceptions of it as embodying disregard for religion, sexual promiscuity, and lack of honour, among other things (Pearse, 2014). There have also been Muslim attempts to articulate Muslim alternatives to terrorism (An-Naim, 1990, Wickham, 2015).

Global consciousness stimulated the Second Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993 in Chicago. An overarching concern of the conclave was for world peace and the part that religion plays in that quest—for good or for bad. One major result of the Parliament was the signing of a document entitled, "Declaration Towards a Global Ethic" (Küng and Kuschel, 2008). It is based upon the convictions that (1) there is no peace among nations without peace among the religions; (2) there is no peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions, and; (3) there is no dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundations of the religions. The global consciousness characteristic of this phase is evident in the approach to religion of the Dalai Lama. An active participant in the 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions, he is deeply devoted to peace. For his extensive efforts to advance peace in Asia he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. He is also intent on advancing peace among the world's religions, which he compares to items on a menu. Religions are our spiritual nourishment, he believes, and as people have different tastes in food, so people have different tastes and needs in religion. Thus he does not suggest that Americans and Europeans become Buddhists. Instead he recommends that they stick to their own religious traditions, seeing religion as a matter of personal choice (Peterson, Wunder and Mueller, 2019: 73). Global consciousness (of the potential for religious conflict) has relativized the absoluteness of the Four Noble Truths.

Another effect of globalization's consciousness of other religions has been a dramatic change in American religion in this phase. Wuthnow characterized it as a shift from dwelling in established corporate spiritual homes to 'seeking' one's own style of religious experience, cafeteria-style (Wuthnow, 2008), and shows that it has molded established religions and helped establish newer ones. Roof described the new "spiritual marketplace" where redrawn religious boundaries facilitate a

spiritually questing generation (Roof, 2019). Wolfe summarized by saying "we have reached the end of religion as we have known it" (Wolfe, 2020: 264).

Religion continued as a source of identity and a resource for social order in a world rife with pluralism and diversity. Mormonism's growth in the 20th century brought it to the brink of being the newest world religion (Stark, 2015b). The Iranian Revolution (1978–79), the South African Anti-Apartheid movement (1983–90), Poland's Solidarity Party (began 1980) and the American Christian Right represent religiously motivated attempts to change or reconstitute social order (Smith, 2016). This phase experienced the appearance of Liberation Theology in Latin America, a radical Roman Catholic identification with the poor which promoted social and economic justice and opposition to governments which denied it (Robertson, 2016; Smith, 2021). Global environmental consciousness has stimulated religious environmentalism (Beyer, 2014: 206–24). Beyer writes, "ecological issues have shifted from the margins, both in the religious system and in the broader global society" (Beyer, 2014: 206). In 1989 Pope John Paul II issued, "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation", the first papal statement devoted exclusively to ecology. In 1990 the World Council of Churches entitled their global conference in Seoul, Korea, "Justice, Peace and the integrity of Creation". Beyer concludes, "As these examples show, the centre of gravity of religious environmentalism has been very much among Christians and Christian organizations, but certainly not to the exclusion of actors from other traditions" (Beyer, 2014: 207).

The Global Governance Phase: Began 2001

Defining the Phase

The terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001 may have inaugurated a new phase in the globalization process. Dispelling the hope for declining world conflict which flowered after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it initiated the 'global war on terror'. There seems to be growing recognition of the need for 'global governance' as the only viable means to address this new threat (and others). Scholte summarizes it succinctly: "globalization could not unfold without governance arrangements. . . ." (2015: 140). What seems likely is that the next phase will be characterized by a growing recognition of the need for global governance.

Robertson raised this issue in 2013 in his discussion of "images of world order" (75–83). He elaborated four possible arrangements, which he denominates *Global Gemeinschaft* I and II and *Global Gesellschaft* I and II. I propose that the most likely shape of this future global governance is his decentralized version of *Gesellschaft* II, a global federation of nations, but one stronger than the current United Nations.

Five Dimensions of Globalization

Globalization theory is notoriously complex, with at least four or five incommensurable traditions of analysis (cf. Berger & Huntington, 2012; Beyer, 2014; Ellwood, 2011; Freidman, 2010; Giddens, 2000; Hamm & Smandych, 2015; Ritzer, 2014a; Robertson, 2011). There is a tendency, even by some sociologists, to describe globalization in abstract structural terms—as an inevitable, universal, and irreversible process, from which the actions of real people have been removed. What is too often overlooked is the importance of human agency, especially, in our case, how people use religious symbols and narratives to mobilize others. In this paper, some boundaries are rather drawn arbitrarily to frame our discussion. As used here, globalization will be understood as the most recent stage of modernization, in which the processes that have transformed western civilization over the past 400 years have spread to the entire planet. There are five dimensions of globalization which are relevant to our analysis. These form a constellation in which each, while thoroughly interlinked, has its own dynamics and can neither be reduced to nor determined by the others.

First is the revolution in communications and transportation technology. Although television and jet-travel began in the 1950s and 1960s, these technologies became truly revolutionary with the advent of mass air travel, cable and satellite TV, cellular telephones, computers, and the Internet in the 1980s and 1990s. The 90s also saw the rise of global all-news TV networks—CNN and its rivals, not least of which is Al Jazeera—and the institutionalization of the 24/7 news cycle. Paradoxically, increased concentration of media ownership has meant that there are fewer viewpoints expressed within any one country, at the same time as technology has allowed a greater number of voices at the global level (Meyrowtiz, 2005). Modern communications end cultural isolation and confronts even the most traditional people with other values and ways of life—especially western materialism and titillation. Global media tends to relativize, and thus undermine, local values.

The second dimension is the political and military. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War began what many expected to be a period of U.S. hegemony. The much-discussed New World Order never materialized, however. American attempts to secure domination of the world's major oil reserves has led to a series of disastrous military adventures, widespread violation of human rights and civil liberties, increased instability, and the undermining of international law and institutions. As imperial overreach leads to American decline (Kennedy, 1987; Dyer, 2014), China and India are rising as major economic and military powers, regional powers like Iran are asserting themselves, and non-state movements like Al Qaeda have grown in significance. Instead of the expected unipolar hegemony, globalization is increasingly characterized by geo-political fragmentation.

The third dimension is economic: the rise of transnational corporations and the international infrastructure (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank, the World Trade Organization [WTO], etc.) that supports them. The IMF and World Bank were created by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 to bring stability to the postwar economy. Their direction was sharply changed in the early 1980s, however, by the decision of the Reagan and Thatcher governments to use these institutions to foster 'free market' ideology—the so-called Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 2013). The result was an enormous concentration of power and wealth as the transnational corporations came to dominate the global economy. This led in turn to the formation of a militant anti-globalization movement (cf. Klein, 2000).

The fourth dimension is the precarious state of the environment. Population growth and unconstrained technological and industrial development have pushed the Earth's environment to its carrying capacity. The collapse of fisheries, widespread deforestation, protracted drought, and increasingly violent weather have already brought hardship to many parts of the world. Further, the world seems to be at, or near, peak oil production (Deffeyes, 2015), raising the prospect of economic instability and conflict as competition increases for ever-dwindling energy supplies. And, like the anti-globalization movement, environmentalism has arisen as a global social movement in response to the crisis.

The fifth dimension of globalization is religion and culture—the places where globalization is most acutely felt and experienced by most people. There is an unfortunate tendency by many analysts to identify globalization with a single dimension (especially the technological or economic) and to either ignore religion and culture or to subordinate them to something else (as when culture is reduced to 'culture industries'). But far from being just another dependent variable, religion and culture are active forces in their own right (sui generis, as Durkheim would say). As the cartoon crisis demonstrates, religion retains an enormous ability to mobilize people. Nor should religion be understood as a passive or reactionary force, merely 'responding' to the pressures of globalization. On the one hand, imperialists have always brought their culture with them and, deliberately or not, imposed it upon the conquered. Throughout history religion itself as often been a globalizing force (cf. Beyer, 2015). At the same time, religion has frequently been at the centre of resistance to imperialism, either through maintenance of cultural traditions in the face of colonial domination or through various revolutionary hybrid forms, which Lanternari identified as "the religions of the oppressed" (1963).

None of these dimensions of globalization are, in and of themselves, new. Some people used to boast that the 'the sun never set on the British Empire'. Transnational corporations are as old as the Hudson's Bay and East India companies. Even global electronic communication can be traced back to the Atlantic cable of the 1860s. What is distinctive about globalization today is the congruence and over-

determination of all five of these dimensions on a planetary scale. Very few places in the world have not been penetrated, very few not reconfigured to a greater or lesser degree. Sociologists have long commented on the high price the industrialized countries have paid for modernization (e.g. Bellah, 1976); now the same processes are affecting everyone, with the addition that many perceive globalization to be an alien and hostile force being imposed upon them by the West. And just as religion was a major source of resistance to colonialism, it remains a potent basis for opposition to globalization.

Complaints Against Globalization

Religious people engage with globalization in a variety of ways. Some support globalization and identify with the hegemonic culture. Others blend elements of globalization with indigenous tradition, creating hybrid forms. The bulk are passive or indifferent: only a minority oppose globalization. Religious anti-globalists tend to make two complaints: a demand for justice and a defense of tradition. To focus our analysis, we will look at two specific but very different complaints. The first is that of Osama bin Laden, who exemplies the kind of opposition voiced by Islamists in particular and religious fundamentalists more generally. The second is that of Dwight Hopkins, who exempli es the liberal Christian dimension of the anti-globalization movement.

Osama bin Laden's Complaint

Establishing texts for bin Laden is always problematic. Two texts are used, his "Letter to America" of 24 November 2002 and "Resist the New Rome" of 6 January 2004. The former appeared on an Islamist web site, the second was an audio-tape broadcast by Al Jazeera. Both were translated in Britain and published by the *Guardian/Observer* newspapers and both are generally believed to be authentic.

Bin Laden's central argument in both these texts is a demand for justice. "Why are we fighting and opposing you?" he asks. "The answer is very simple: because you attacked us and continue to attack us" (2002: 1). The conflict is portrayed as a defensive and just struggle against the forces of imperialism and aggression: in Palestine, in Iraq, in Somalia, in Chechnya, in Kashmir, in the southern Philippines. In particular, bin Laden denounces the imposition of corrupt and tyrannical regimes throughout the Muslim world; governments which do not institute Shariah law, steal the community's resources and sell them "at a paltry price" (2), and make peace with Israel. The very length of his list is significant. Throughout the document, bin Laden speaks of "us," "our Ummah" (the community of the faithful), and "the Islamic Nation," that is, he claims to speak for the community of all Muslims, everywhere in the world. What is depicted as global aggression will be met by a global response. The rhetoric in "Resist the New Rome" portrays this "religious-economic war" (2004: 1) as a continuation of not only the Crusades, but of the struggle between the Byzantine Empire and the initial rise of

Islam. Here bin Laden appropriates powerful symbols for himself and Al Qaeda while framing the conflict in world historical terms.

While bin Laden's central argument is addressed to the political-military dimension of globalization, in the second part of "Letter to America" he speaks to the economic, environmental, and cultural dimensions as well. He defends Islamic tradition against what he sees as the decadence and corruption of Western civilization. Again, his indictment is lengthy: usury, the use of intoxicants and drugs, all forms of sexual immorality, degradation of women, destruction of the environment, political corruption and hypocrisy. For example, he says: You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools calling upon customers to purchase them. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your pro t margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women (2002: 4).

He concludes that "you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind" (4). Note that while bin Laden castigates corporate theft of Muslim wealth and the American refusal to ratify the Kyoto Accord, most of his complaint is directed toward individual behavior. Sexual immorality is high on his list; exploitation of the poor is not. Running through both his arguments is a strong streak of anti-Semitism. Osama bin Laden does not differ significantly in either his analysis or rhetoric from other Islamists or, in his defense of tradition, from many other forms of fundamentalism (cf. Armstrong, 2011; Lincoln, 2013; Ruthven, 2014). Indeed, there is little in his analysis that was not first said by Sayyid Qutb (2006/1964), one of the founders of militant Islamism, while many of his denunciations of modern decadence are echoed by fundamentalists of other faiths (see, for example, Falwell, 1980; Parsley, 2016; Sheldon, 2016). What sets him apart is his mastery of communications technology. The image broadcast to the world of a lonely ascetic in a cave defying the global power of his enemies—which he identifies as the enemies of Islam itself—has enormous symbolic power and appeals to many people. Al Qaeda is thus not so much an organization as an idea. It provides local Islamists all over the world with symbolic resources (and only occasionally with training and materiel) to mobilize people to act against the local manifestations of what they perceive to be the alien and hostile forces of globalization.

Dwight Hopkins' Complaint

By comparison with bin Laden, the complaints of most liberal Christians are one-dimensional, in that they focus almost exclusively upon the economic dimension of globalization. They are also far less successful. Dwight Hopkins is fairly typical of the kind of response that liberal Christians make to globalization (see, for example: Hawkin, 2014; Stackhouse & Paris, 2012; Stackhouse & Browning, 2011), or critics of globalization from other groups (see, for example: Kelman, 1999;

Russian Orthodox Church, 2016; Stackhouse & Obenchain, 2018). His complaint is also a demand for justice and a defense of tradition, although what he means by each is very different from bin Laden.

Running through Hopkins' essay is a strong demand for justice. Globalization has meant the grotesque accumulation of wealth and power into a few hands and the concomitant exploitation of the world's poor. He notes that: The richest 225 individuals in the world constitute a combined wealth of more than $1 trillion. This is equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population. And the three richest people on earth own assets surpassing the combined gross domestic product of the forty-eight least developed countries. (2011: 10–11). This has led to wholesale corruption of politics and, by curtailing the power of the state, has undermined democracy. This wealth is purchased at the expense of the environment. In saying this, Hopkins' complaint does not differ from secular critics of globalization.

Where he does differ is in his defense of tradition. Globalization, he charges, is idolatry, a false religious system that threatens to supplant Christianity. Any religion, he argues, is a system of beliefs and practices comprising a god, faith, religious leadership, institutions, a theology, and revelation (9). Globalization is characterized by all of these. For example, a god, he says, "is the ultimate concern of a community of believers. This god is the final desire and aim that surpasses all other penultimate realities, dreams, wants, and actions" (9). He goes on: The god of globalization embodies the ultimate concern or ground of being where there is a fierce belief in the intense concentration, in a few hands, of monopoly finance capitalist wealth on the world stage (9). Similarly, the small group of families who own the corporations form globalization's religious leadership, the WTO and IMF are its institutions, and neo-liberalism its theology. The aim of this new religion is to promote a theological anthropology, which redefines what it means to be a human being. Globalization "seeks a homogenized monoculture of the market to transform people being valued in themselves to people being determined by their dependency on commodities" (13). Using the mass media and culture industries, the religion of globalization seeks to propagate itself "throughout every possible nook and cranny of the world" (28).

Although both bin Laden and Hopkins demand justice and seek to defend tradition, at first reading, there are more differences than similarities between them. Bin Laden is a leader in an international revolutionary movement; Hopkins is an academic with little, if any, following among an anti-globalization movement, which is itself small and fitful. Bin Laden's manifestos are—literally—a call to arms; Hopkins makes a brief and undeveloped reference to liberation theology at the end of his essay. Bin Laden is fully prepared to kill civilians in pursuit of his totalitarian version of Islam. Hopkins' liberation theology calls for "a new spirituality of

resistance to domination and a sustained struggle for freedom and justice, anchored in the plight of the poor but yielding a full humanity for all" (29). But as different as their analyses are, both share one thing in common with the protestors during the cartoon crisis—they ground their opposition to globalization in religion. However, differing in details, religion makes its riposte to globalization in the call for justice and the defense of tradition. On the surface, though, these two complaints at first appear to be paradoxical. The demand for justice is a universal cry that transcends globalization; the defense of tradition is protection of the particular. We will examine both.

Globalization and Justice

Opposition to globalization is not uncommonly dismissed in the literature (cf. Friedman, 2010) as backlash by those who either cannot compete in the new world system or by those whose identities cannot transcend purely local attachments. While a backlash to globalization undeniably exists, it would be a serious mistake to trivialize religious opposition in these terms. When religious opponents of globalization demand justice, they are not speaking merely about local grievances but voicing a universal cry that transcends globalization.

Both bin Laden and Hopkins ground their demand for justice in their understanding of God. There are, of course, dramatic differences in their understanding. Bin Laden declares that, "Allah, the Almighty, legislated the permission and the option to take revenge. Thus, if we are attacked, then we have the right to attack back" (2002: 3). Hopkins calls for "the coconstitution of a new human self with the God of freedom for the oppressed" (29). But for both, justice is a universal principle, which transcends every society, nation and socio-economic system. The key to both their understandings of justice is what, in sociological terms, is called agency. Justice demands agency, that is, individuals have to be aware of, and take responsibility for, their actions. To call for justice is to insist that people matter and that they exercise moral self-determination. In contrast to those apologists for globalization who echo Thatcher's dictum that "there is no alternative", both bin Laden and Hopkins see globalization as a conscious exercise in power and not a disembodied, universal and inevitable system. They say that there are *always* alternatives. People must "take an honest stance with yourselves", as bin Laden tells Americans (2002: 5), and change the way they, and their societies, act.

The effect of this demand for justice is that it empowers individuals in two ways. First, it links their specific suffering and struggles to a universal, transcendent principle. They are not left to face an impersonal, overpowering system alone—the Word of God stands with them. Further, their particular struggles are symbolically linked to the struggles of others, creating a strong sense of solidarity. Second, it gives a human face and name to those who are oppressing them. They are the victim not of anonymous forces about which nothing can be done, but of wicked people

against whom action can be taken. Thus a religious demand for justice is a powerful means for mobilizing people to a cause. This, in part, helps us to understand the cartoon crisis. Millions of people in the Islamic world live in hardship and anxiety, filled with growing frustration and anger, and with real and perceived grievances against globalization. The clerics who organized the demonstrations and boycotts were able to mobilize people by tapping into this anger, focusing it around the insult to the Prophet, and directing it towards an identifiable target. In general, Islamists—bin Laden in particular—have been much more successful in using the symbolic resources of their religion to mobilize people than have liberal Christians.

Globalization and Tradition

If the demand for justice is an appeal to a universal principle that transcends globalization, the defense of tradition is protection of the particular. Note that 'the particular' is not the same as 'the local'. All traditions are particular, even if they may be international. Globalization threatens traditional meaning systems. According to both Karl Marx (1974/1848) and Max Weber (1958/1905), modernity was incompatible with tradition. The capitalist, industrial world was one of continuous change (Marx) and ever-greater rationalization (Weber). Since at least the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1950) and W.W. Rostow (1960), the dominant economic theories in the industrialized countries have seen tradition as an obstacle to economic development. Many theorists have echoed Schumpeter (1950: 81ff.) on the "creative destruction" inherent in capitalism and industrialism. But for many people on the receiving end of policies based on those theories, the promise of future economic development is not worth the present disruption of traditional ways of life. Defense of tradition can be a potent basis for mobilizing people against globalization.

Each of the five dimensions of globalization can threaten tradition in various ways. Invasion and occupation is direct and brutal. There is very little left of traditional life in places such as Grozny or Fallujah. Environmental destruction may, in extreme cases, be just as dramatic, for example when refugees flee drought and famine. More often it is insidious, as when traditional communities are displaced or are no longer viable, forcing people into dependency or migration. Cities throughout the developing world are crowded with people displaced from the countryside. Most of the attention in the debate over globalization, however, has been focused on the interplay of the technological, economic and cultural dimensions. The exact relationship between these three dimensions has, of course, been a central question of sociology since its beginning. The current discussion has frequently centered on concepts of "McDonaldization" (Ritzer, 2014b), homogenization, and Americanization (cf. Ritzer, 2014a; Robertson, 2011), none of which are very helpful in understanding the question at hand. Nor does it help our understanding that many religious critics of globalization (bin Laden in particular) focus on symptoms

rather than the underlying causes of what it is that they are complaining about. When we look closely at bin Laden's and Hopkins' arguments, we can see a constellation of four factors that form the basis of their complaints: disembedding, relativism, displacement, and commodification.

Disembedding

The first factor is what Anthony Giddens (1990) and Charles Taylor (2004) call 'disembedding'. Giddens defines 'disembedding' as "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" (21). Both he and Taylor see it as a central characteristic of modernity. In traditional society individuals were embedded in their communities, that is, people's identities were shaped within the bounded context of religion, authority and view of the cosmos. As Taylor puts it, "From the standpoint of the individual's sense of self, [embeddedness] means the inability to imagine oneself outside a certain matrix" (55). The long, complex process we call modernization is in large part a process of disembedding which, according to Taylor, "involved the growth and entrenchment of a new self-understanding of our social existence, one that gave an unprecedented primacy to the individual" (50). But it would be a mistake to see disembedding as just "secularization" or the loss of community, Taylor argues. The process of disembedding involves substituting a modern moral-order for a traditional one, complete with new forms of solidarity, authority, and trust.

The significance of disembedding for our discussion is that a process which began in Europe hundreds of years ago—and which still continues in all of the industrialized societies—has now spread to the rest of the planet. The difference is that processes which took centuries in Europe and North America have been telescoped into decades in the rest of the world, with two results. On one hand, there are millions of people, often young, usually urban, frequently educated, who are strongly attracted to the freedom, individuality and higher standard of living promised by global culture, but who all too often are caught in the alienation and anomie which form the dark side of disembeddedness. On the other hand, those remaining in traditional culture, particularly those in authority, feel profoundly threatened at what they experience as dissolution, immorality and loss of control.

Relativism

The second factor, relativism, both draws from and reinforces the first. It is frequently associated with the development of global communications technology. It is a truism that media, especially its advertising, not only conveys information but promotes beliefs, norms, and values. While there has been a great deal of attention paid to the content of the media, Meyrowtiz (2005) cautions that is not sufficient, that we also have to attend to the structural effects media has on behavior. In our context, these take two forms.

First, global media end cultural isolation. There are few places on the planet that are not linked into global communications media. Even the most remote villages in developing countries often have communal TV sets. However, while much of the media's content originates in the industrialized countries, the United States in particular, relatively little that is shown in the West is produced in the developing world. This uneven ow of information leads some to see globalization as cultural imperialism, Americanization, or Westernization. But what an attention to content alone overlooks is that all countries are affected—the West as well as the developing world. Whatever its content, from whatever source, global media present beliefs, norms and values that will differ from those of any particular culture. This means everything will be compared to, and at least implicitly challenged by, value and belief systems from outside the particularity. When people have knowledge of many moral systems, it becomes increasingly difficult to see as absolute any particular one. The effect is a tendency to relativize all systems of meaning. Those still living within traditional belief and value systems experience this as antinomian chaos. Thus bin Laden charges: You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Shariah of Allah in its Constitution and Laws, choose to invent your own laws as you will and desire . . . You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider them to be pillars of personal freedom (2002: 4). Yet, as many of the debates over moral and social issues in the developed countries demonstrate, no one is immune from this tendency towards relativism.

A second structural aspect is what Meyrowitz calls the revelation of back stage behavior. He explains: While we tend to think of our group affiliations simply in terms of "who" we are, our sense of identity is also shaped by where we are and who is "with" us. A change in the structure of situations—as a result of changes in media or other factors—will change people's sense of "us" and "them." An important issue to consider in predicting the effects of new media on group identities is how the new medium alters "who shares social information with whom" (2005: 55). Following Goffman, he argues that in everyday life our behavior is divided into "front stage", where we put on a performance in accordance with the roles we are playing, and "back stage", where people can relax, plan strategies, and engage in behavior that may not be in keeping with their public roles. While information in the front stage may be controlled, that in the back stage is usually concealed from those outside the particular group. What electronic media have done is blur the distinction between front and back stage. In particular, media tend to reveal the back stage behavior of the powerful and privileged. By changing the relations of "who shares information with whom", Meyrowitz argues, media may affect the power relations in society in ways quite different than analysis of media content alone may indicate. "Traditional distinctions in group identities, socialization stages, and ranks of hierarchy", he says, "are likely to be blurred by the

widespread use of electronic media" (92). Globalization has spread this phenomenon worldwide. One consequence of this makes it increasingly difficult for any group to portray its publicly professed norms and values as the 'real' basis of its actions, when everyone is privy to its "back stage" behavior. To those trying to live in a traditional context, in which front and back stage behavior are typically strongly separated, global society appears both immoral and hypocritical. As bin Laden charges Americans: "Let us not forget one of your major characteristics: your duality in both manners and values; your hypocrisy in manners and principles. All manners, principles and values have two scales: one for you and one for the others" (2002: 5).

Displacement

Intertwined with disembedding and relativism, is the third factor displacement. Displacement is the loss of a 'sense of place', that intricate web of social relationships, symbols, and institutions which ground identity and form the basis of community. Globalization creates displacement by assaulting those institutions and cultural forms that maintain a sense of place. To take an example from the developed world, when Wal-Mart or other 'big box' stores move into a town, small businesses are frequently forced into bankruptcy, eliminating the careers which were the mainstay of the local petit-bourgeoisie and replacing them with part-time, low-wage labour (cf. Klein, 2000). The loss is more than just economic. The elimination of the local petit-bourgeoisie removes community leaders, whose roles are not replaced by the managers of distant and indifferent corporations. The institutional basis of the community is displaced. Meyrowitz describes a parallel effect of electronic media on cultural forms: Electronic media destroy the specialness of place and time. Television, radio, and telephone turn once private places into more public ones by making them more accessible to the outside world. And car stereos, wristwatch televisions, and personal sound systems such as the Sony "Walkman" make public spaces private. Through such media, what is happening almost everywhere can be happening wherever we are. Yet when we are everywhere, we are also no place in particular (2005: 125). Every culture has different symbolic boundaries of public and private space, different ways of signifying sacred and profane time, different ways of designating that which is important from that which is not. But whatever those particular boundaries may be, globalization tends to displace them, without necessarily putting anything in their place. From the standpoint of traditionalists, globalized society lacks a centre.

Commodification

The fourth factor is commodification, the process by which globalization transforms everything into a commodity in the marketplace. "The superiority of the market order" proclaimed by Friedrich von Hayek in his Nobel Lecture (1974), has become an article of faith in the dominant economic theories today. Revealingly, Hayek added, "when it is not suppressed by the powers of government, it [the

market] regularly displaces other types of order". This is precisely the point that both bin Laden and Hopkins attack.

Bin Laden, as we saw above, charges Americans with reducing women and sex to commodities. Hopkins sees free markets, privatization, and deregulation as the threefold dogmatics of neo-liberal theology. But Hopkins' analysis also goes deeper, to see in this blind faith in the market another agenda: The new religion not only wants people to purchase products. It also desires for people to reconceive of themselves as people. To change into something new, people must, in addition to redirecting their purchasing habits, refeel who they are in the present and reenvision their possibilities differently in the future. People are baptized into a lifestyle to fulfill the desire for commodities and to follow further the commodification of desires.

Globalization relentlessly pursues this refashioning of the new man and woman throughout the globe. It seeks a homogenized monoculture of the market to transform people being valued in themselves to people being determined by their dependency on commodities (2011: 13). Globalization, he charges, has "become the vehicle of cultural invasion" (27). It is a project to destroy democracy by reducing citizens to consumers and ultimately "to remake the world in its own image" (28).

Now, some globalization theorists would take issue with Hopkins' depiction of "a homogenized monoculture of the market", arguing instead that "the production and promotion of goods and services on a global scale requires close, ongoing attention to cultural differences" (Robertson 2011: 464). To such theorists, homogenization does not happen because global marketing and advertising are aimed at differentiated market niches. But, Hopkins might reply, that is a superficial understanding of the nature of the market. Hopkins takes Hayek seriously when he says that, left alone, the market would replace every other institutional order in society. This is because markets only recognize exchange value, everything else—from the environment to culture—are externalities and therefore without value. On the surface, there may appear to be enormous heterogeneity as more and more commodities appear in the marketplace. However, beneath the surface the "homogenized monoculture of the market" grows because all commodities are alike in being commodities. Thus these four factors—disembedding, relativism, displacement and commodification—interact together to destroy traditional meaning. In modern society, as Marx said: "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned" (1974/1848). Or as Gwynne Dyer put it: "Globalization puts everybody's culture into an industrial strength blender" (2014). This is not to say that global society lacks culture or meaning, only that traditional meaning is no longer possible. "Tradition, in this sense," Ruthven argues, "consists in not being aware that how one lives or behaves is 'traditional', because alternative ways of thinking or living are simply not taken into consideration" (2014: 16). Under globalization, culture becomes a hodgepodge of imported elements, local

innovations, and hybrids, in which tradition is only one more option, one more choice among others. For those who wish to remain in traditional culture, globalization requires them to consciously choose to be traditional and act in traditional ways, which negates the very idea of what 'traditional' is.

Religion Against Globalization

As we have seen, religious people respond to globalization in a variety of ways. Millions find the stimulation, freedom, individualism and standard of living offered by globalization appealing. Many more are indifferent, busy pursuing other agendas. But some find globalization intolerable. We have looked at two examples, the Islamism of Osama bin Laden and the liberal Christianity of Dwight Hopkins. While very different in style and substance, their complaints against globalization reveal some structural similarities, in a demand for justice and a desire to preserve the particularities of their traditions. We have also noted that Islamism has been much more effective in opposing globalization than has liberal Christianity. The cartoon crisis, while not completely a phenomenon of Islamism, demonstrates the continued ability of religion to mobilize people.

The difference in effectiveness between the two groups raises a final issue. Following Bruce Lincoln's typology (2013), the past few decades, which have seen the rise of globalization, have also witnessed the transformation of liberal Christianity from a *religion of the status quo* towards increasingly becoming a *religion of resistance*. Their ineffectiveness results, in part at least, because liberal Christianity is itself a modern movement and therefore has few means with which to resist globalization. Six decades ago, liberal Christians dominated their churches and spoke with confidence to presidents and parliaments. Today, in part because of the four factors we have been discussing, they are a decided minority in societies that no longer share their assumptions.

At one level, analyses like Hopkins' are emblematic of a group of people who are coming to realize that they no longer speak for a majority. They begin to de ne themselves, as Lincoln argues, "in opposition to the religion of the status quo [in this case the "religion of globalization"], defending against the ideological domination of the latter" (85). But as liberal Christians self-consciously move from shepherding the dominant culture to resisting it, they find it increasingly difficult to use their symbols to mobilize people. In Lincoln's typology, Islamism is a *religion of revolution*. Unlike a religion of resistance, which opposes an ideological hegemony, religions of revolution take direct action against "the dominant social faction itself" (85). Islamists violently oppose globalization, those Western nations they identify as fostering it, and those Muslims whom they see as collaborators, in the name of a tradition which they perceive to be under attack. Paradoxically, Islamism, like other forms of fundamentalism, is itself a modern phenomenon. It is, in large part, a product of the very processes of globalization that it protests against. Islamism

draws its strength primarily from displaced urban masses, not from peasant villagers still embedded in traditional society. As globalization erodes away traditional systems of meaning, it leaves, as Ruthven says, "an emotional vacuum to be filled by iconic, charismatic figures such as bin Laden" (2014: 211). Using the mass media, Islamists employ the symbols of tradition to mobilize people for their revolutionary project. Islamism is an attempt to recreate lost meaning by force of arms.

Conclusions

Religion has played a significant role in human civilizations for both good and bad throughout history, influencing and reflecting a wide range of societal phenomena. It has fought for power, sparked social movements, incited bloodshed, maintained social change, benefited the general welfare, and exonerated the most heinous crimes. Humanity's most admirable and lowest traits have emerged as a result. It has also had a significant impact on social order and been closely tied to the stages of globalization. The West's harsh experience-based belief that it is preferable to keep religion and government apart is coming face-to-face with Islamic and other viewpoints on how to build a just society as a result of globalization. Samuel Huntington (1996) seems correct about at least one thing: whatever clashes the future involves as we seek to negotiate the challenges of a global community, religion will certainly be at the heart of it. The recent phases of globalization have brought the world religious terrorism and Mother Teresa. Religion produces both. Juergensmeyer may be right to conclude his study of religious terrorism by saying, "In a curious way, then, the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself " (Juergensmeyer, 2013: 240).

As we have seen, there are many different ways that religious people react to globalization. The excitement, independence, individualism, and level of life that globalization offers appeal to millions of people. Many more are unconcerned and preoccupied with other goals. Globalization, however, is unbearable to some. We have examined two examples: Dwight Hopkins' liberal Christianity and Osama bin Laden's Islamism. Their concerns about globalization, while quite diverse in tone and content, share certain structural parallels, including a need for justice and a desire to maintain the unique aspects of their own cultures. We have also highlighted that Islamism has been far more successful than liberal Christianity in combating globalization. The cartoon crisis, while not completely a phenomenon of Islamism, demonstrates the continued ability of religion to mobilize people.

A fundamental problem is brought up by the two groups' disparate levels of efficacy. Liberal Christianity has changed over the past several decades, along with the advent of globalization, from a religion of the status quo to one that is increasingly a religion of opposition. They are useless, at least in part, since liberal Christianity is a contemporary movement itself and has few tools to fight globalization. In the 1960s, liberal Christians ruled their churches and confidently

addressed presidents and legislatures. They are now a definite minority in cultures that no longer share their presumptions, in part due to the four variables we have been considering. Islamism itself is a relatively new phenomena. It is a byproduct of the identical globalization trends it criticizes. Islamism mostly derives its power from the displaced urban masses rather than the rural peasants who are still a part of traditional culture. As old systems of meaning are destroyed by globalization, an emotional void is left that iconic, charismatic personalities can fill. Islamists use the media to inspire people to support their revolutionary cause by using traditional symbols. Islamism is an effort to restore meaning by the use of force.

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الدين والعولمة

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الكلمات المفتاحية: الدين، العولمة، الإسلام، المسيحية الليبرالية

الملخص:

منذ عام 1980 تقريبًا، أصبحت العولمة بسرعة واحدة من أكثر المفاهيم استخدامًا وإثارة للجدل في عصرنا. ولكنها اكتسبت أيضًا مكانة الكلمة الطنانة، حيث تم الاستناد إليها في نطاق واسع من السياقات ولعدد كبير من الأغراض. للعولمة أبعاد عديدة في القرن الحادي والعشرين. تشمل تحديات السياسة العالمية ممارسة الحكم والديمقراطية في عالم يتسم بتنوع الحقائق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية. ومع التقاء الثقافات، تعمل الأديان وتتفاعل داخل المناطق الأساسية، على طول الحدود المتجاورة، وفي الشتات البعيد.

إن اللقاء بين الدين والعولمة هو سمة حاسمة لعالمنا. وسنتناول في هذا البحث مراحل العولمة وخصائصها والدين كمصدر لمعارضة العولمة. وسيكون هناك تعريف للعولمة، ودراسة لنماذج مراحل العولمة ومن ثم اقتراح لنموذج شخصي. وبعد الوقوف على مراحل العولمة وخصائصها، اتجه الجهد إلى وصف الدين في كل مرحلة. ستقدم هذه الورقة أيضًا بعض التعليقات المختصرة حول خمسة أبعاد للعولمة، ثم تتناول الشكاوى الدينية ضد العولمة من منظورين متعارضين تمامًا: الإسلامية، التي نجحت في حشد المعارضة للعولمة، والمسيحية الليبرالية، التي لم تنجح. وبقدر اختلاف هاتين الشكويين في الأسلوب والجوهر، إلا أنهما متشابهتان من الناحية الهيكلية. إن المعارضة الدينية للعولمة تقوم على المطالبة بالعدالة والدفاع عن التقاليد.