Chapter six describes the economic situation of Iraqi women before and after the Revolution and the major economic changes related to woman's position in society.

Chapter seven studies the political, legal and judicial conditions of women especially after the Revolution.

Finally chapter eight gives the summary, conclusions, and recommendations which may assist in reducing the effectiveness of social,economic,legal, educational and political problems facing Iraqi contemporary women.

Iran during the First World War

By: Fawzi K. Shwayel M.A thesis (1983) College of Arts Baghdad University

Summary

This thesis, entitled "Iran during the First World War", consists of an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter presents a historical survey of Iran's internal affairs and the penetration of the Great Powers at the begining of the War. The second chapter deals with the transition of Iran into a battlefield between 1914-1917, when it was occupied by British and Russian troops.

The third chapter traces the effects of the October Socialist revolution of 1917, and how the United States of America sided with the allies on Iran.

The fourth chapter discusses in short the effects of the War upon Iran both internally and externally.

During the final years of the War and after Russia's withdrawal from the conflict, Iran was transformed into a semi British colony and in time the United States focused its attention here. However the Iranian ruling circles never gave up their craving for territorial expansion at the expense of its neighbours which was well reflected in its maneuvering policy with Iraq. This was apparent during the War and again afterwards in such away to include the regions beyond the Caucasus and Central Asia also.

The World War's events had, no doubt, paved the way for the downfall of the Qajari regime which came to end a few years after its conclusion; it gave rise to revolutionary movements among non-Persian nations of Iran and thus the country entered a new historical era.

Trends of Arabic Poetry in Iraq (656 / 800 Hijra)

By: Balqees A. Mohammed Ph. D. Thesis (1983) College of Arts, Baghdad University

Summary

The object of this thesis is to unveil the ages after the fall of Baghdad and to shed light on their various aspects and in particular, their literary aspects. Although many studies have tackled the epochs of Arabic literature in Syria and Egypt during those ages, Iraqi literary works have been neglected. This research covers about 150 years, beginning in 656 Hij., and ending at the close of the political epoch, in 800 Hij.

Many Iraqi men of letters and poets had opted to emigrate as a result of political and social conditions, to other countries, carrying with them their literary works; so they are included in this thesis because they are Iraqis who were once under Iraqi influences.

This research is divided into three parts comprising nine chapters.

Part One is a study of public life:
Chapter 1 is on political life.
Chapter 2 is on social life.
Chapter 3 on cultural life.
Part Two deals with poetic trends:-
Chapter 1 is on religious trends.
Chapter 2 is on frivolty and perverted love for males.
Chapter 3 is on traditional attitudes.
Part Three is devoted to artistic study. It also includes three chapters:
Chapter 1 is a study of poetic purposes
Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics of poetry.
Chapter 3 tackles the language of poerty and the sources of the poets culture.

Conclusion reached: This period was not an age of darkness, however, this does not mean it was a flourishing age with literary activity in full swing, we can say that literature was on the decline and showed signs of weakness. But time honoured literature does not easily collapse; it continues its march depending on its past and its heritage.

The Planning of al-Basrah City in the First Century of al-Hijra

By: Haddiyya J. al - Idan MA Thesis (1983) College of Arts, Baghdad University.

Summary

This study which is based on information scattered in

talks to give a bird-eye view of those issues. For example there is a brief mentioning of the Atlantic Pact between the U.S.and U.K.of August 14,1941. She also gives an idea of the U.S.aid program known as President Roosevelt Lend Lease Program.

The article has an appendix on the Agreement signed between the two countries October 3, 1943 on the issue of providing Saudi Arabia with silver by the U.S. The second appendix is a Memorandum of Conversation, by Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling).

The Commercial Relations between the Arab Gulf and South East Asia during the Abassid period

By:A'del M.al-Alousi, College of Arts, Baghdad University.

Summary

The research consists of two points:

1. Role of the Abassids in the flourishing of Arab Gulf's trade with south east Asia through the efforts of the Abassids in securing the maritime route leading to the Orient via the Arab Gulf.
2. The commercial materials used in this trade whether the imports of Arab land from the Orient particularly from south east Asia or the exports (Arab products and commodities) to these countries. It is worth mentioning that the balance of Islamic trade was more to the imports than to the exports both in quality and quantity which, generally speaking, was limited and rather local.

The united arab emirates, a study in the political and economic conditions

By:Iptisam A.Hasson M.A Thess (1983) College of Arts, Baghdad University

Summary

The thesis a study of the political, social and economic conditions in the United Arab Emirates whose establishment can be considered as a uniting experiment in the Arab Gulf region.

These Emirates played a historical role in developing British policy in the nineteenth century. They also has a important role in the British and international strategy at the beginning of the twentieth century and in the interwar period.

The establishment of the United Arab Emirates on 2nd December, 1971 was a corrective measure for the divission and disintegrative conditions which had infested the region for a long time. In spite of mishaves and hardships opposing this state, it has resisted disintegration. It continues to support the foundations of the Emirates through fostering political and social integrative plans and making a united army in addition to preparing the draft of the permanent constitution which replaces the temporary one.

It has also issued many laws, decisions and procedures which limit foreign immigration. Since the establishment of the State, its principal work has been to utilize the petroleum treasure to form a hard economic basis for economic and social developments. It can be said finally that the development of this state is a result of two factors which are unity and petroleum.

The Impact of the 17th of July Revolution on the Socio - Cultural Position of the Iraq Woman

By: Ahlam S. Hameed M.A. thesis (1983) College of Arts, Baghdad University

Summary

Since the twentieth century the socio - cultural conditions of Iraq women began to change. But such a change was not so fast as that which came about after the 17th of July Revolution, 1968. The ocial status of Iraq woman had witnessed a remarkable transformation after the Revolution, a transformation with seems to coincide with the overall transformation of Iraq society in all fields. The thesis endeavours to highlight the main changes which occurred in the general conditions of Iraqi women. A special emphasis is laid upon the causes, consequences and problems of those changes.

The thesis is comped of eight chapters.

Chapter one studies the main technical terms connected with the subject.

Chapter two reviews the literature on the subject which handles various aspects of women's conditions, problems and aspirations.

The third chapter revolves around the social structure of Iraqi society and its major changes.

Chapter four studies the nature of the social status of Iraqi women before and after the 17th of July Revolution and the economic, legal, political, social and educational factors related to women's status.

The fifth chapter analyses the educational position of woman and the role of the Baath pary and the Revolution in improving it through the campaign of illiteracy eradication, compulsary education and the diffusion of culture and education among women.

intellectual concern and probably continued with him until his death, is still worthy of examination and study.

The paper at the beginning attempts to discover the relationship which brings together the poet and his country together with his feelings of alienation. This is to support the idea that the poet's love for his country was only the starting point for his concern with the Arab homeland. His intellectual life is divided into three phases:

(1) The period of his party membership.

In this part the reasons behind the poet's political allegiance and its influence on his character and thoughts and his nationalistic feelings are discussed. There is also an attempt to answer some of the questions commonly asked by people concerning whether Al-Sayab detached himself from nationalistic feelings during the period when he was a member of the Communist party; and whether his relation with this party was a mere coincidence or a vogue that took the poet unknowingly in its currents- this in spite of his conservative up-bringing as an Arab.

(2) The stage of breaking away from political involvements.

In this part the reasons behind the poet's breaking away from the Communist party are examined extensively. The researcher concludes that some of the reasons relate to the Communist party's attitude towards the issues of the Arab homeland. It must be added that the study of the nationalistic feelings inAl-Sayab cannot be complete unless an investigation is made of the poet's detachment from his old allegiance, which leads us to the third phase of this poet's intellectual life.

(3) The overflowing of nationalistic feelings.

In this stage of his life, Al-Sayab defended the causes of his country and those of the Arab homeland. His poetry was the sword with which he attacked those who were plotting to destroy his legitimate dreams of liberty and prosperity for his country. A detailed examination of the poems which Al-Sayab wrote during the moments of crisisare undertaken,and some of the poems are examined critically to identify both the truth of and the extend to which his nationalistic feelings went. Also the literary qualities of the poems are examined to detect whether they were simple war poems with distinguishing oratory tones or not.

Islamic History through Iraqi Syriac Sources

By:Dr. Jassim S. Ali, College of Education, Basrah University

Summary

The research deals with the way in which the Syriac sources relate Islamic history. These sources are of Mesopotamian origin, therefore, they should be considered Iraqi sources for such kind of work. The authors of the sources were all influential men who affected the lives of their fellows. The authors of these books either quoted many chapters from books left by their ancestors or they summarised these books. But their contribution was writing down the contemporary events that took place in their own time.

These sources focus on social aspects that is, the problems which the Christians faced under Muslim rule. In these books there are many accounts which are critical of Islam. This is because the authors were free to write as they wanted in Syriac. The interpretation of history in these sources is one in which they see events as being a part of God's overall plan for the world. Many of these sources are principal for information about the relationship between the Caliphate and the Christians.

It appears that these sources are not correct when they state that the first Muslim census of the population was made in the reign of Abd al-Malik. (65-86 A.H.). All Islamic sources agree that the first Muslim census was made in 18 A.H.during the reign of Umar B. al-Khatab (13-23 A.H.).

In regards to the Islamic conquests the Syriac sources give a list of events and dates. Generally, the Syriac sources are not sufficient to give an account on Islamic history, so the scholars should be cautious when using the Syriac sources. Instead both Islamic and Syriac sources should be their primary references for their research.

Issues aiscussed by Amir Faisal Al-Saud with officials in the American Covernment during his visit to the United States in late september 1943.

By:Dr. Najat A.Q. Al-Jassim, College of Arts, Kuwait University

Summary

This article is mainly concerned with the official talks between a delegate from Saudi Arabia headed by Amir Faisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Amir Khalid, both were sons of King Abdul Azziz Al-Saud, together with Shiekh Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Minister in London, with a delegate of U.S. officials. The significance of that visit stems from it being the first formal and official delegate to represent the Saudi King in a discussion of major issues concerning the two countries. It actually laid down the cornerstone of a long lasting friendship between the two countries.

The article covered several historical issues concerning the Arab countries, before and after that visit, as related to Saudi Arabia and how the United States felt about them. It reveals how Saudi Arabia felt toward the efforts of some Arab countries to form a kind of unity of federation such as that between Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Palestine, or the Fertile Crescent.

The author does not mention the issues discussed by the Saudi delegate to the United States, but she went beyond the

an atmosphere of turbulence over a problem which does not exist.

In relation to the Soviet political relations with the Arab Gulf countries, the paper points out that in spite of the fact that the Gulf countries adopt diverse political ideologies, the Soviet Union has worked for the establishment of political relations with these countries without interfering with their internal affairs and on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Its success in this regard, however, has been limited, as it could not resume its political relations with Saudi Arabia and could not establish any relations at all with Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, while its relations with Iraq, Iran, and North and South Yemen remained as they were. The Soviet Union could, however, establish political relations with Kuwait and has developed economic and technical relations with an increase in the size of trade exchange between the two countries. The Soviets, moreover, have repeatedly declared their desire to improve their relations with the Arab Gulf countries emphasizing the fact that the presence of differences in ideologies should not be an obstacle in the way of achieving unified attitudes and positions towards matters of mutual concern.

The events that occured in 1978 in Iran clearly revealed the Soviet's attitude against the Shah and in support of opposition forces.

However, the developments of the Iraq-Iran war and the persecution of the peoples of Iran at the hands of the religious fanatics, in addition to the attacks against Soviet diplomats and the attempts towards the eradication of the Iranian communist Tudeh party all resulted in a change in the Soviet attitude towards Iran.

The paper then moves to examine the dimensions of the Soviet strategy towards the Arab Gulf region whose safety is, to the Soviets, part of the safety and stability of the Indian Ocean. Removal of causes of crisis in the Arab Gulf would improve the situation in the Ocean altogether. Within this respect, the paper points out and examines the Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean which relate to the safety of its southern borders, its importance as a vital economic transportation route, and as an important area for undertaking research. And in spite of these interests, it could be said that the Soviet Union did not, for a long time, have a clear separate strategy towards the Arab Gulf region specifically. However, the Soviets were able in the 70s to formulate a more specific strategy towards the region which was expressed in a speech by the ex-Soviet president delivered in the Indian Parliament in 1980.

The paper then examines the details of the Soviet's response and the implications and the possible interpretations of each of the articles of their original proposition.

With regard to the Iraq-Iran war, the paper finally analyses the Soviet's standpoint and attitude towards the two countries especially with relation to the Soviet's expression of their will as to show no bias for any of the two countries involved in the war-ignoring the roots of the conflict and original causes of the war with Iran's successive attacks on Iraq's borders and interference in its internal affairs and causing great damage to Iraq's internal safety.

This neutral attitude has, however, caused more damage to Iraq than Iran. This is because of Iraq's dependence for some time now on the Soviet Union as a supplier of arms. Iraq has interpreted the Soviet attitude as unfriendly, and President Saddam Hussein has announced that he has found it quite difficult to differentiate between the Soviet and the American attitudes towards the war and its consequences. It is strange that both superpowers have responded simply as spectators with no serious efforts undertaken towards putting an end to the war, Further, the paper sheds light on the possible causes behind this attitude. Finally the paper refers once more to the reasons that affected the Soviet attitude to change in favour of Iraq, which is reflected in the Soviet's decision to resume the arms supply after suspending it for some months, and the visit of an Iraqi delegation in 1983 which resulted in the Soviet's denunciation of Iran's attempts to overthrow Iraq's government and the expression of their conviction that the best solution for the achievement of a just decision that could solve the conflict must be through international law and the Algiers Pact of 1975.

The Nationalistic Feelings in Al-Sayab's Poetry

By:Samir K. Khalil, College of Education, Basrah University

Summary

Badr Shakir Al-Sayab tried to raise his poetry to the level of his intellectual and nationalistic thoughts and to the level of his private psychological sufferings. There have been hot arguments as to Al-Sayab's political allegiance, and some have believed that his political tendencies diverted him from the Arab and from his country's issues. This paper presents the idea that this nationalistic feeling was still present, and though his political allegiance apparently overshadowed those feelings, yet politics could never drag him away. The proof of this is that his nationalistic feelings appeared very clearly in the poems he wrote after the disruption of his political allegiance in 1956.

Some have tried to trace Al-Sayab's direction after that particular year. Where did he find his ideals; and what were the substitutes of that old allegiance? This is what the present paper tries to answer.

The researcher does not rule out the possibility that many of those who undertook studies of this poet, either did not care for the subject of the nationalistic feelings in his poetry, or take this aspect seriously enough as its literary and historic significance. This resulted in the fact that some of the remarks that touch this aspect of Al-Sayab's poetry were lost in the midst of their concern with the study of other features. The researcher believes that this aspect which received much of Al-Sayab's

The Activities of the Arab Gulf Development Funds in the South-Sahara African Countries.

By:Dr. Abdul-Amir R. Al-Aboud & Abdul-Jabbar A. Al-Hilfi, College of Administration and Economics, Basrah University

Summary

Economic Co-operation between Arab Countries and South-Sahara African Countries is vitally important for both sides. Those African Countries are endowed with rich natural resources which have been until recently exploited only by Western interests and toward their benefit leaving as little as possible to Africans.

Oil rich Arab countries have more financial resources than can be invested in projects at their homeland. Since both groups are developing countries and newly emerged political entities, their economic co-operation can be set toward the benefit of both.

This paper studies the extent of the co-operation between the two groups of countries. It goes through the study of activities of Arab Gulf development funds and requirement of developing those African countries, in addition to the study of the problems which face these countries.

The first section of the paper surveys the Afro-Arab economic co-operation. Section two discusses the major problems and the economic conditions of the African states. Section three is devoted to the analysis of the activities of Arab Gulf Development Funds in South-Sahara African countries. Finally section four presents some conclusions concerning the development of that co-operation for the benefit of both sides, which may set an example for a better co-operation in the future among developing countries.

Commercial Relationship between Bahrain and Iraq during Medieval Period

By:Dr. Abdul-Jabbar Naji, College of Arts, Basrah University

Summary

The research reflects the commercial relations between Bahrain and Iraq through ages and in particular through the Islamic period. It deals with several subjects such as: the geographical situation of both countries according to Muslim geographers, the commercial products and exports and imports of both countries, the sea - land routes between them, the custom duties and its economic importance, and lastly the decline of commercial affairs in Arab Gulf area from the twelfth century onwards and its effects on those relations.

The current Soviet policy towards the Arab Gulf region

By:Dr. Inad F.Al-Kubaisi,College of Arts, Basrah University.

Summary

The paper falls into five sections as follows:

1. Introduction
2. Soviet political Relations with the Arab Gulf countries.
3. The dimensions of the Soviet strategy towards the Arab Gulf region.
4. The Soviet attitude towards the Iraq-Iran war
5. Conclusions

With the introductory section, the paper refers to the fact that the special importance of the Arab Gulf region for the Soviet Union arises from the factor of its geographic location. The nearness of the region comprises an essential element in the Soviet Union's policy which relates to its national security.

This, in addition to the fact that the Soviets believe that the Arab Gulf region will assume a leading industrial role in Asia by the end of the century-with the natural exclusion of Japan, of course. And that the production of raw materials, petrochemicals, and refined oil will occupy an important status in the world economy as a whole; and this constitutes a possible economic factor for the Soviets to consider in their policy towards the Arab Gulf region.

The question here then would be "What importance does the Gulf oil constitute for the Soviet Union?" The observation of the Soviet's behaviour in this regard one could say that in the light of their self-sufficiency, the Soviets do not have any real need for the Gulf oil and that they have no cause, presently at least, to think of assuming control over the Gulf.

It is difficult to talk presently of a Soviet threat of agression or interests that may lead towards the control of the Arab Gulf as these would not be based on any realistic grounds-unless we think of the possibility of the West desiring to create

must be recognized as being both positive and remarkable. Mention has been said that before the Revolution of 1962, Yemen's educational sector was backwards. There was no curriculum, and the standard of education was, to say the least, poor. Yemeni students going abroad for education had to enroll in high schools in order to take the science courses they had not had in Yemen. Yemen did not have a university. In pre - revolutionary Yemen, secular education was considered anathema. This attitude changed after the revolution.

The improved educational methods and the fact that education is more readily available to most Yemenis have affected the social outlook of the Yemenis. The view that a woman's place is at home is gradually, with a certain degree of reluctance, changing. As more women are educated, their demands are becoming broader. Their demands on their families have not reached crisis proportions. But they have begun to strain the existing traditional values that have governed the family relationship. This is compounded by the fact that women work and study, even at the University level, alongside men. This trend is likely to continue. The consequence will be the erosion of old social values and the induction of new ones. These inputs, which will eventually alter the social characteristics of the Yemeni society, will affect the attitudes of the populace and their outlook on the future. Social cohesion and coherency will be maintained so long as valued traditional norms are not disturbed abruptly. They must be changed on a gradual basis. It is one thing to allow a woman to drive a car, it is another to allow her to accompany a man to a movie theater. The former can be tolerated, the latter would be intolerable for a Yemeni family to accept.

CONCLUSION

The Yemeni society has gone from a closed, inwardly looking, community to an open one. It has changed politically, economically, and socially in its attempts to catch up to the modern world. In a political and social sense, the Yemeni government since 1971 has been attempting to open up the creative powers of its citizens by making them become more appreciative of their rights and potentialities as individuals in a relatively mobile society. In order to make them realize their capacities for expression, for happiness, and for knowledge, the state has undertaken economic and social programs aimed at breaking old social values, replacing them with new ones more in compatible with the contemporary world. In order to develop and modernize the state, new inputs into the social, economic, and political sectors must be introduced. The road to modernization involves certain economic, political, and social changes, which have been summarized by Charles A. Micaud in his book: **Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, as:**

(1) The authority of the **ancien regime** gives way to the people, and ideally, to the doctrine that they are equal before the law to which they individually consent. (2) The old social units, such as the family, village, or tribe, become subordinated to a national community; they are replaced as agents of social integration by new voluntary organizations, such as trade unions and political parties. (3) An old elite based on birth either dies or becomes assimilated into a new elite based on achievement and education. (4) Traditional values are to a large extent undermined by a new faith - essentially use of human beings and technical innovations for maximum production.

In order for modernization to continue, the Yemeni social revolution, which is a direct by - product of the Revolution of September, 1962, must be maintained and supported at the rate of speed it is now proceeding. We must recall that gradual changes are more suited to Yemen, because traditional patterns need the opportunity to adapt to change. It is through gradual changes that the polity will not be disturbed. Gradual changes in the social structure of a society imply that those changes will retain their legitimacy.

their own society. Those tribes that were republican backers from the beginning of the conflict began to view the Egyptian as the new source of emenation, because it was the Egyptians who were the proponents of Arab nationalism, Arab unity, anti - imperialism, and social progress. The Egyptians hoped to win over to their side everyone, even those recalcitrant. However, their heavy - handed methods and their inability to understand the Yemeni society soon alienated even those die - hard Egyptian supporters.

Positively, the civil war period helped promote social changes that were not the results of destruction. The roads that were constructed in the latter years of Imam Ahmad's reign became channels by which went vehicles, goods, ideas, reaching the hinterlands and areas that had been isolated for centuries. The roads contributed to the creation of a new consciousness on the part of the Yemeni villagers and tribesmen. They were used by both repulicans and royalists in their endeavors to propagate political and economic concepts.

The civil war period witnessed the construction of new factories in Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeidah. These factories employed women alongside men. What the women earned was used to supplement their families income. This trend introduced into Yemen a new concept into the traditional male - female relationship, which has since then expanded considerably.

NATIONAL GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGES

In 1971 the Yemen Arab Republic, having experienced the trauma of eight years of civil war, and having reconciled with the royalists, felt the time was conductive to introduce plans for national growth. Towards this objective, the open - door policy was inaugurated aimed at improving its relationship with the conservative Arab states and with the Western bloc nations. It was hoped that in so doing, Yemen would gain the valuable assistance and interest of those states in its attempts to change. Thus, in the following year diplomatic relations were restored between Yemen and West Germany and with the United States of America. This was followed by formal recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic by Britain, France, and Holland.

Once Yemen's regional and international relations were improved, it turned its attention to addressing its economic problems. The creation of the Central Planning Organization in 1972 was seen as the first positive effort in that direction. It was followed by the Three Year Development Program, 1973 /74 - 75 / 76, and which was immediately followed by the First Five Year Plan, 1976/77 - 80/81. These two economic plans have cultivated the country's infrastructure. More than 1,200 kilometers of paved roads have been completed by the Highway Authority, linking all major cities in Yemen. This has increased mobility and has opened the country not only to the outside, but also internally. Paved roads have facilitated trade, have eased access to markets for agricultural producers, and have allowed new industries to be established. Along with the development of a road network, transportation and communication systems have developed rapidly and are being used significantly to socially integrate the state. Television was first introduced into Yemen in 1972. It has been instrumental in garnering social awareness among the people.

Along with television, radio and newspaper dailies are now reaching the most isolated areas in Yemen. Tribes that once relied upon the spread of news by mouth are now able to hear or read for themselves about events transpiring in their own state and abroad.

The industrial sector of the state has also improved and developing both men and women. Women have taken an active role in contributing to their family income. Women are seen working in factories, in government ministries, in schools, in banks, and in business establishments. The woman work force at this writing comprise approximately 15% of the total work force in N. Yemen. When one considers that before the Revolution in 1962, Yemeni women did not work for wages and did not contribute financially to their families income, the 15%figure looms as a major development

The fact that one - third of Yemen's work force is outside of the country has, to some degree, altered the role of women in the agricultural sector. Women are participating more heavily in previously male - dominated agricultural activities such as plowing, planting, and harvesting. This has affected marginally the traditional patterns of male - female relationship in the rural areas of the country.

The intensive economic developments in the urban centers in Yemen have strongly affected internal migration from the rural areas to cities in search of work. This trend has been largely a male movement. As more males migrate to urban centers, a decline in the population of rural areas is being felt. This has also strained the traditional values within the Yemeni home, and has added to the altering role of women. Yemen's socioeconomic changes have also been affected by the tremendous improvement in the educational sector. The educational system in the Yemen Arab Republic has been broadened and made to conform to modern standards. Schools were opened in even the remotest parts of the state. The number of schools increased from 700 in 1969 / 70 to 2,534 in 1979 / 80. The total schools at this writing have closely approached 3,000. The University of Sanaa, founded in 1971, boasts of five faculties: the Faculty of Law and Shari'a, the Faculty of Commerce, the Faculty of Sciences, the Faculty of Arts, and the Faculty of Education. The University has planned to open three new faculties in the near future: the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of Agriculture and the Faculty of Engineering. Sanaa University presently has an enrollment of 7,600 students with more than 124 faculty staff. Of the total student body enrolled in the University, about 20% are women. The state encourages women to enroll in the University, offering them, as incentives, room and board.

The educational progress in the Yemen Arab Republic school system with a standard curriculum. A school for girls, founded by the Turks, was later closed by the imam. The system seemed inert, lacking in mobility or motion.

An attempt to change Yemen's regional and international positions, and, in so doing, improve the economic and social postures of the state, was occasioned during the reign of Imam Ahmad (1948 - 1962). Imam Ahmad improved his relations with the Arab States, and established diplomatic relations with a number of Eastern and Western bloc countries. In response to Arab nationalism, Yemen became aligned with Saudi Arabia and Egypt when in 1956 it signed the Jeddah Military pact. This alignment was followed in 1958 by the creation of the United Arab States, which confederated Yemen with the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria. As a consequence of these political developments, Yemen was penetrated by more foreigners that ever before. Egyptians, Russians, Americans, Chinese Germans and others entered Yemen either to undertake diplomatic missions, to train the army, or to help the Yemeni government improve the economic conditions of the state. It was during this era that an infra - structure was developing. Paved roads were being constructed by the Chinese and Americans in an attempt to link the major cities in Yemen. The port of Hodeidah was being constructed by the Soviet Union, and Soviet technical and economic assistance were being provided to offset American and Western economic aid. New schools and hospitals were being built in Hodeidah, Taiz and Sanaa. Yet these economic endeavors were largely cosmetic and too late. They also did not conform to the rigidity of the political system, which still revolved around the person of the imam. The imam was seen as the personification of Yemeni conservatiam and traditionalism. He was the greatest emenating personality in the Yemeni society whose personality embodied the Yemeni political structure. As the apex of the hierarchical political system, he was the only one making essential choices and decisions. He presided over the political structure as a parent presides over a household. Nothing was done without his expressed approval. To compound this, many Yemenis, tribal as well as urban dwellers, believed that the imams were not only blessed, but also possessed abstract, spiritual powers derived from being descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. This belief was instrumental in passifying the tribes, and maintaining stability in the state. However, the factor of emenation as a source of stability had eroded considerably by 1961 because of several factors, foremost among them are:1) the huge influx of foreigners entering Yemen with ideas and values different from those in Yemen; 2) the cosmetic economic changes the state undertook to improve the economic plight of the Yemeni society; and, 3) the inability of the political establishment to reform and become more receptive to popular demands. Thus, by the latter part of 1961, Yemen witnessed riots and demonstrations in Sanaa and Taiz demanding changes and reforms. The imam's appeal to the people to restore tranquility and order was not heeded. His aura as a commanding personality had eroded considerably. Thus, one week after he died, the Revolution of September 1962 erupted bringing a definite end to the imamate, sacred - collectivity system.

THE CIVIL WAR YEARS AND THE CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS

When the Yemeni Revolution of 1962 erupted, there were many Yemenis who wanted to make fundamental changes in their society. As previously noted, many Yemenis came into contact with foreign elements, and were impressed by what they learned of the outside world. The 'Voice of the Arabs' was instrumental in making the Yemenis more aware of their own society. There were reports that between 300 and 400 Yemenis were in Egyptian secondary schools in 1961, and an additional 70 to 80 in European and American educational institutions. These students were instrumental in articulating their country's economic, social, and political ills. They, like many others, were demanding changes in their own society. However, the vast majority of the Yemenis went on with their lives as they had for centuries. However, that was soon to change in both negative and positive ways during the civil war period that followed the Revolution. Negatively, the civil war period was traumatic to the Yemeni society. The weapons used by both the revolutionaries and royalists were highly sophisticated and very destructive. The Egyptian intensive bombings of the northern part of the country was devastating and destroyed towns and villages, forcing the inhabitants to flee and seek refuge in caves or other remote areas. This disrupted both the social and economic life of manv Yemenis.

Another aspect of negative change occuring in Yemen during the civil war era, and which was more disturbing to the pattern of relationship in the Yemeni society, was the fact that the internal war was being fought by primarily two factions: royalists and republicans. This fact split tribal allegiance and disturbed the traditional pattern of intertribal relationships. The two tribal confederations, the Bakil and Hashid, split into royalist supporters and republican backers respectively. This was the first time in Yemen's contemporary history that the two tribal confederations had split their support. This phenomenon was coupled by the tremendous accessibility of money that was being distributed generously by both Saudi Arabia, the royalist backer, and Egypt, the republican supporter, to the tribes in their efforts to win their support. It became evidently clear after a short period of time that the tribes tended to switch their allegiance to the party most generous in distributing funds or arms. The consequences of this trend brought the tribes, some of which had never come into contact with modern elements, into the current of modern living. Some of the tribes witnessed the emergence in their territories of refrigerators, gas ovens, and movie cameras. The result of these developments was the increased awareness of the village dwellers and tribal members of the shortcomings of

The Arab Gulf Vol. 16 No (3 - 4) 1984
Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Basrah, Iraq

THE YEMENI REVOLUTION OF 1962 SEEN AS A SOCIAL REVOLUTION

BY : Mohammed A. Zabarah

The Yemeni Revolution of September, 1962 brought the end of the Imamate institution. It was an act profoundly felt by all the Yemenis not only because, in its wake, it produced eight years of intermittent civil war, but also because it occasioned regenerative forces that yielded social changes spanning the entire spectrum of the Yemeni society. As such these changes must be classified as revolutionary social changes.

The aim of this article is to examine the social revolution that occured after the Yemeni Revolution of 1962. The Social changes that resulted are seen here as a by - product of the Yemeni Revolution.

This study will be concerned with first, defining our terms and concepts in light of the Yemeni situation; second, examining the impact of the civil war on the social patterns in the Yemeni society; and, third, analyzing the period of national growth (1971 - 1983) and its involvement in the changing social behavior of the Yemeni people.

CONCEPTS DEFINED

Revolutions have as their primary objectives the transformation of society. They aim to fundamentally change the social living, habits, and values of the larger part of society. They are distinct from coup d'etat or palace revolutions in that a coup d'etat merely changes the people in power or a few laws.

The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 was a movement that had as its fundamental objective the termination of the imamate system that had endured in Yemen since 889 A. D. The imamate system was a sacred - collectivity system which assumed that whatever is good for the community is good for the individual. The community in such a system is above the individual. It is an ethical community that adhere to higher laws (kinship, clan, religion) as the basis for its continuity. In such a system, traditional values were to be maintained and promoted. They are and serve as the basis for the system.

The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (imamate) which came to power when independence was won from Ottoman rule in 1918 was a sacred - collectivity system. The term "Mutawakkilite" evokes religion. Specifically, it means "under the guidance of Allah." The rulers were called imams, hence the term imamate. An imam is a religiopolitical leader who is granted by Islamic law, Shari'a, nearly absolute authority in spiritual and civil matters.

When Yemen won its independence from Ottoman rule in 1918, it maintained the sacred - collectivity characteristics of the system. A hierarchical political system was continued, basing its legitimacy on its adherence to Zeidism (a religio - political sect of the term shii) and to traditional values. These two elements were of profound importance to the imamate before and after independence. They were instrumental in inducing Imam Yahya ibn Hamid al - Din (Imam: 1904 - 1948) to adopt the policy of isolationism after Yemen achieved its independence.

The policy of isolationism was meant to safeguard Yemen's hard won independence and to keep the religious purity of the state from being corrupted by outsiders. In order to secure independence, Yemen had to shun international involvements. Consequently Imam Yahya refused to accept foreign economic investments in Yemen, and rejected becoming involved in regional Arab political movements. Yemen could not be impervious to imperialism or to the competition for outside possessions by the great powers of Europe. It was still crystal clear to the Yemeni political establishment that Yemen had been geographically partitioned by Great Britain in 1839. The British had in that year occupied Aden, and began systematically incorporating areas adjacent to Aden.

The British occupation of Aden was construed by the political regime in Yemen as the gravest outside invasion to have occured, because, it was perceived to be a direct threat to the independence and security of Yemen. Yemen was convinced that Great Britain had designs on it, because it recently witnessed the complete partitioning of Arab lands by both Britain and France immediately after World War I. Thus, when France, Italy, and the Soviet Union tried to cultivate their economic and political relations with Yemen, their attempts were obstructed by the Yemeni political establishment.

However, although the policy of isolationism served Yemen well in the short run, it became a detriment to the development of the state in the long run. During the reign of Imam Yahya, Yemen did not develop any form of an infrastructure. There were no paved roads, no communications facilities, no hospitals, no banks, no telephones, and no

7 . Ibid., p. 40-42.

8 . The two Yemeni leaders were in agreement on the need for immediate amnesty. Naquib Salih b. Yahya favored enrollment of tribal leaders into government service, and governmental support for succession by rule of primogeniture in tribal leadership. Al-Sayyid Yahya al-Qibsi spoke strongly of the need to show no mercy to the rebels. He also suggested forgiveness of back taxes; Ibid., p. 42.

9 . Ibid., p. 45-46.

10 . Ibid., p. 47.

11 . Ibid., p. 55-56.

12 . Ibid., p. 54-58.

13 . Ibid., pp. 58-65.

14 . For both, see Roderic H. Davison, **Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876** (Princeton, 1963), pp. 251-56 and 141-60.

15 . Not a secular law, the Mecelle was in fact no more than a codification in European format of the Hanafi School of Shari'ah law.

16 . Memduh, op. cit., p. 48-49.

17 . Ibid., p. 60-16.

18 . Ibid., p. 63.

19 . For the 1898 Report on this, see Memduh, op. cit., p. 51-52.

20 . Ibid., p. 56.

21 . Memduh, op. cit., p. 81.

22 . Ibid., p. 82.

23 . See ibid pp. 82-83 for his personal note to the Palace explaining this.

24 . Its complete text is published in Atif Pasha, **Yemen Tarihi,** Vol. 11, (Istanbul, 1336 / 1920) pp. 211-228.

25 . Memduh, op. cit., p. 75.

26 . Carter &. Findley, **Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire** (Princeton, 1980).

27 . Notebook mss. of Abd al-Aziz al-Azmah, "Aziz Bey", Syrian Ottoman officer who served in Yemen between 1898 and 1904. The mss. is currently being prepared for publication.

28 . Too much has been made of Syrian resistance to military service against fellow Arabs in Yemen (e.g., Abazah, op. cit., p. 117). By the 1880s, no foot soldier, whether Turk or Arab, was anxious to serve in Yemen. For officers, however, there were attractive opportunities of pay raises or advancement.

29 . The Imperial Yearbooks list him in that position in 1903 and 1904: **Devlet Salnamesi** (Istanbul 1321), 1322H). Aziz Bey was perhaps better known in Syria, where his brother Yusuf died at Maysalun fighting the French as Emir Faysal's Minister of Defense. His sons Muhammad Nabih and Umar Adil served respectively as Ministers of Defense and Interior under Quwwatli.

30 . Aziz mss. p. 41. Aziz Bey brought his family with him to Yemen.

31 . Ibid., p. 40-41.

32 . Note the discrepancy between this and the figures reported in the provincial yearbooks: Klaus Kreiser, "Der Haushalt der Provinz Jemen zwischen 1877 / 8 und 1910 / 1" in **Osmanli Arastirmalari Istanbul** 1980 pp. 213-17, where average provincial income is

33 . Aziz mss. pp. 45-46.

34 . Aziz mss. pp. 13-14.

35 . Ibid., p. 15.

36 . Aziz mss. p. 54.

37 . Ibid., p. 37.

38 . Op. cit., p. 10. The figures seem high, but not impossibly so. The India market was huge, and the Aden salt works had not yet been developed (see Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Divsion. Western Arabia and the Red Sea (London 1946) pp. 529-30. For the workings of the Public Debt Administration, see Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1929).

39 . The Qat Tax income was fairly substantial, however, averaging 209,000 kurus per year in Hodeidah. It might be compared with the average 273,000 kurus collected for education from the Coffee Tax in Hodeidah township: Aziz mss. pp. 5-6.

40 . He describes in detail his early studies in his autobiography; see Ibid., pp. 9-14.

41 . Ibid., pp. 6-7.

42 . Ibid., 43. 45.

43 . The court records of Yemen dating from this period show the success of this system under both Turkish and Yemeni judges.

44 . These Turks, and the military system they introduced, are cited as the major contribution of the Turks to modern Yemen by Robert S. Stookey, **Yemen** (Boulder, 1978), pp. 164-166.

45 . For the further extension of this process in recent times, see Richard Tutwiler and Sheila Carapico, **Yemeni Agriculture and Economic Change** (AIYS, San'a, 1981).

to the Public Debt Administration such as tobacco and general salt tax drained off another two million kurus in 1902 (3.8 million in 1901)[38]. Other taxes peculiar to Yemen at the disposal of the province, such as the Qat Tax, could not begin to match this production[39].

Aziz Bey offers us no comments on railroad or dams projects, and precious little on roads, save to note their state of disrepair. Education, however, was of special interest to him; he was very conscious of the role it had played in his own advancement[40]. He copied into his notebook the decrees of 1899 concerning educational funding, and maintained detailed accounts of the education budgets of Hodeidah. In 1902, a total of 357, 102 kurus was collected in Hodeidah Sancak for schools: 306, 624 kurus from the coffee tax collections of Hodeidah and Luhayyah ports, and 50,478 kurus from zakat[41].

This amounts to about four percent of the total sancak budget - low, but not insignificant.

But while Aziz Bey spoke hopefully in 1904 of the recent establishment of primary schools in Hodeidah, Zabid, Bajil, Raymah, and Bayt al-Faqih, "... allowing the Tihamah to participate in the benefits of education", his overall assessment was, if not sombre, then at least subdued.

"The level of education", he noted, "is extremely low. Though one cannot fault the education of the likes of al-Sayyid Muhammad Bari of Hodeidah, or the Mufti of Zabid Abd al-Rahman al-Anbari, unfortunately they are not training successors... A town like Zabid has long been known for its learning and scholarship,... but in general, teaching is done in the old way, first learning the Qur'an and a little writing, then continuing with classes in the mosque on some fiqh and hadith. No more than five percent of the population ever comes into contact with education, leaving most in ignorance"[42].

The Memduh Commission spoke of reform and development projects; Aziz Bey spoke of taxes. The two contemporary Turkish histories dealing with Turkish Yemen described war. The legacy of Ottoman Yemen was a little of all of these, and a few more things besides. The first printing press came to Yemen in these years, and produced the provincial yearbooks, complete with almanac, and Yemen's first newspaper. For the first time all Yemenis shared a common source of national information. A few thousands Yemenis exerienced a secular approach to education. Roads and ports and telegraph lines, though ill-maintained, physically knit the country together. The introduction of a common and semi-secularised court procedure and law applied to all throughout Ottoman controlled territories regardless of religious persuasion undermined the traditional Sunni / Shi'i divisions of the population[43]. The experience of modernized government service shared by both Sunnis and Zaydis in the Gendarme Service, local, municipal, district and provincial councils, and the army militia further helped to lay the manpower foundations for a national government. Many of these features were dismantled in the first decades of modern Yemen's independence; but the experience remained to draw upon. That, and the experience of the thousands of Turks who elected to stay when the Turkish Government was gone.[44]

There was more to this experience than the ability to direct modern artillery or drive an automobile. Less immediately obvious, but implicit in all of the projects, new taxes, and battles, there was the inexorable movement of Yemen toward a market economy, with all the social changes which followed from it[45]. Already the development of Aden had its effect on the economic patterns in the south. With the flow of troops and capital into Hodeidah, San'a and other Turkish administrative centers, market demand rose. At the same time, pressure from tax collectors for cash payments further encouraged the planting of cash crops. Ultimately, this shift to commercial agriculture, in a land where agriculture dominated the lives of the people, was a factor for change more firmly set than any administrative reform dreamed by Constantinople or attempted by Aziz Bey and his fellow officers.

Finally, there was also the matter of changed attitudes toward the world, toward knowledge and the potentialities of man. Perhaps only a few were affected by this.. but they were the first generation of Yemen's modern leaders and carried an influence far beyond their numbers. Aziz Bey, Memduh Pasha, and the Turkish soldiers each had their own experiences in Yemen; Yemen lives those experiences today.

FOOTNOTES

1 . For this Cairo-Constantinople rivalry, see Faruq Uthman Abazah, **al-Hukm al-Uthmani fi'l-Yaman**: 1872-1918 (Cairo, 1975), pp. 68-80.
2 . The delegates were al-Shaykh Ali Efendi and al-Sayyid Muhammad Efendi; see Robert Devereux, **The First Ottoman Constitutional Period** (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963) p. 265. Devereux offers no information beyond their names.
3 . G. Wyman Bury, **Arabia Infelix** (Macmillan, London, 1915), p. 205.
4 . Ibid., loc. cit.
5 . Memduh, **Yemen kitasi hakkinda ba'zi Mutalaat,** (Istanbul, 1324 / 1908), p. 51.

The perception of the Yemen problem primarily as a military issue was reinforced by the two standard Turkish histories of the 19th century reoccupation, in Atif Pasha, **Yemen Tarihi,** 2 vol. (Istanbul, 1326 / 1910) and Ahmed Rashid, **Tarih-i Yemen ve San'a,** 2 volumes, (Istanbul, 1291 / 1875). Both were written by military officers who had served in Yemen. The only recent Turkish scholarly approach to the problem is broader in its approach than the title implies, however; see Ihsan Sureyya Sirma, **Osmanli Devletinin Yikilisinda Yeman Isyanlari** (Istanbul, 1980).
6 . Ibid., p. 39.

the suppression of the revolt will have only a temporary effect; revolt will break out again[21]".

In the last line of the Report, a last recommendation was made: a permanent commission to review Yemen affairs should be established in the Ministry of Interior[22]. It was not. Memduh Pasha withdrew from further activity on Yemen affairs in protest of the apparent lack of action by the Prime Minister on the Commission's recommendations[23].

It would in fact have been difficult for the Prime Minister's Office to use the Commission's report as a basis for action, though it contains a useful collection of previous reports and studies. The 1901 Report of Husayn Hilmi Pasha, Governor of Yemen during the years 1898-1902, is far better reasoned and sensibly presented[24]. Memduh Pasha dismissed it as "impractical under the present circumstances[25]". The personality of Memduh likely had something to do with this statement and with the reception of the Commission's report; he was a palace politican "known for servility toward his superiors and for hauteur he showed his subordinates[26]".

In the meantime, while the Prime Minister's Office and the Council of State reviewed and discussed action to take on such reports as these, provincial officers in Yemen waited impatiently and often angrily for some sign of action by the capital. The perspective on priorities for resolving problems and initiating development programs in Yemen were worlds apart between field headquarters in San'a and the Palace walls of Constantinople.

"I wrote a great many strong cables and reports for the Field Marshal", wrote Aziz Bey, Deputy Director of Military Supplies and Communications Officer in San'a in 1901, "but the fact is, I moderated his opinion and words by more than half, to the point where, upon submitting a draft to him he would say, Has the nobility of the pen struck again, friend? Why won't you ever write it all?![27]."

There were many Syrians among the many thousands of Ottoman officers assigned to or volunteering for civil or military service in Yemen[28]. One such was Abd al-Aziz al-Azmah, who served in several military capacities in San'a between 1898 and 1902. His career in Yemen culminated with his appointment to the post of Deputy Governor (mutasarrif) of Hodeidah, where he served between 1902 and 1904[29].

Aziz Bey, as he was known, made no major changes in administration during his Yemen years. The notes he took down then, however, together with the brief autobiographical sketch he attached to them describing this period, offers us a distinctive personal view of how Ottomans in the field, as opposed to the Palace, saw Ottoman Yemen's problems and future. Aziz Bey's views of administrative problems contained no thoughts on provincial redistricting. For him, personnel was a major issue.

"The administration (memurlar) of Yemen could be divided into two parts: the foreigners and the locals. The foreigners were small camp follower types who could not make a living in their own countries and so came to Yemen, where even there most were incapable. The locals, though there were bright ones, hadn't sufficient education and so hadn't the means of carrying out their tasks. A third group are the children and relatives of officers. They chose to accompany the head of family to Yemen, then found no escape when their head died; or they chose to stay. These are the ones who produce the most work[30]".

The notebook contains thoughts on the perennial deficits run by the provincial government. Aziz Bey's first concern focussed on the deplorable state of personnel and supply accounts and records, his first official responsibility.

"Shakir Efendi", he notes disapprovingly, "Director of Records and well-known as the most knowledgeable person for accounting and business, set up the accounts for 1896 and 1897 on just two or three forms. When asked for an accounting he simply changed the income and expenditure lists with discounts and the like until they balanced... I checked the cashier's account, and although there was 810,000 kurus recorded, there was in fact no more than thirty-five kurus in hard cash. The rest was in the form of standard payable chits (senedat-i adiye)"[31].

The same budgetary problems applied to the province as a whole, as well as the make-shift methods of their resolution. According to Aziz Bey, the province never produced more than thirty million kurus in income, while military expenditures alone absorbed twenty million at minimum[32]. In 1899 provincial income on paper reached thirty-five million while military expenditures topped twenty-five million. The military figures were real; the income figures were not, since more than five million in taxes could not be collected. Since military expenses took precedence, very little money was left for school and other civilian expenses[33].

The tax notes taken by Aziz Bey during his first year of office in Hodeidah documents the problem of collection. In that sancak, the tax assessment base was 15.5 million kurus. However, in 1901 only 10.3 million was actually collected, and in 1902 only nine million[34]. The kaza of Abu Arish was the best-or worst-example. With a tax base of 1.1 million kurus, 70,000 was collected in 1902; all but 6,000 of it in market taxes[35]. Why the discrepency? The entire kaza was in rebellion. Jayzan, the seat of kaza government, was conducted from Farasan Island[36].

Further complicating all of these financial matters, Ottoman coinage was refused by most of the countryside, save in the large cities; the Maria Theresa riyal, minted in Trieste, was the standard market coin. Taxes assessed in Ottoman currency always lost when paid in riyals, because of the unfavorable exchange rate[37].

Under budgetary circumstances such as this, there must have seemed little point in considering grand schemes of improvement. Ironically, the sancak of Hodeidah contained Yemen's only major source of large capital to fund such projects-the salt works of the Salif region. If Aziz Bey's figures are correct, exports of salt to India and Djibouti in 1902 brought in an impressive 78 million kurus gross, nearly eight times the real tax income of the sancak. It could not be touched; the income belonged to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, to be used to pay off European investors in the Ottoman Government. Other state monopolies attached the upkeep of early primary schools and the vocational schools in Hodeidah and San'a. The education budget, derived from 5% of the zakat, paid for the school maintenance and teachers' salaries (including those of teachers of religion) to the rest of the primary, and secondary schools and teachers' institutes[12]. The Public Education Law also called for the appointment of a Director of Education to each provincial district (sancak). The administration of education of the province as a whole was to be carried out by a Chief Director, advised by an Educational Council made up of appropriate citizenry and presided over by the Deputy Governor.

The Memduh Commission found after reviewing all relevant documents that the system as a whole worked well. Suggestions that a separate Education Inspectorate Office be set up in San'a were rejected as unnecessary and expensive. It was noted that in 1901 two night schools for vocational studies, two night middle schools, two teachers institutes, six early primary and three later primary schools were open, serving 1600 "enthusiastic and supportive" students. In short, progress was being made. It was noted, however, that special care should be taken by the Ministry of Education to design the curriculum for these schools to conform to local requirements and in cooperation with provincial officials[13].

While the Commission expressed general contentment with the education system, offering no major plans for revision, it offered no pretense of satisfaction with the reformed Ottoman judicial system as applied in Yemen. This system had taken its procedural form in 1869 at the same time that the Provincial Administration Law of 1871 was taking shape[14]. Like that Administrative Law, it also introduced an element of elected local participation, decreeing that courts at every level would have three elected members to assist the judge. Further, it set up three separate courts, civil, penal, and commercial, and paralleled each with an appeals system. This procedure represented a significant departure from that of the traditional Shari'ah court in Yemen.

But a still more radical departure was the Ottoman reformed law itself. Already by 1971 commercial codes drawn almost entirely from French codes and thoroughly secular in nature had been instituted. Penal codes as well had been secularised. Only civil law remained of the Shari'ah proper; and after the de facto government authorization of Cevdet Pasha's Mecelle as a sole source of opinion for judicial reference in civil matters, it appeared that civil law as well had become Europeanised[15].

Both the electoral procedures of the judicial councils, as modest as they were, and secularization of law were intended by the Ottoman reformers to create an impartial administration of justice for the multi-religious population of their state. Both, however, by the same token directly undermined the basis of the legitimacy of the Zaydi Imamate. The application of Ottoman reform law became, therefore, the central point of contention in Ottoman-Zaydi relations. The Memduh Commission went through report after report dealing with the courts. The first major document utilized, issued in 1882, dealt with modifications of the system to accommodate the lack of judges in Yemen trained in the new laws and procedure and with the necessity of establishing an Inspectorate of Courts to reinforce the application of the system[16]. Still another emerged from the Reform Committee of 1898[17], and another in 1901[18]. There was no lack of documents on the perennial difficulties of applying a secularized judicial system for the first time in Yemen.. or on the use of the issue by the Imam to justify revolt.. but neither was the Commission willing to suggest even minor modifications to ease the problem. There was no room for grand schemes there.

The Commission's approach to provincial administration was the same. While noting the usual problems of corruption and mismanagement, it offered no specific recommendations. It did, however, largely agree with the recommendation of the Reform Committee of 1898 to divide the province of Yemen into four: the province of San'a, with the districts of Dhamar and Hajjah; of Ta'iz, with the districts of Hujjariyah and Qa'tabah; of Hodeidah, with the districts of Zabid and Abu Arish (including Sabya); and of Asir, with the districts of Makha'il and Ghamid[19].

This recommendation had been passed on favorably by the Civil Service Office of the Council of State in 1900, with the proviso that the Governor of San'a be paid twice the salary and hold veto power over any of the other three governors[20].

The redistricting of Yemen probably would have improved the responsiveness of government to the local needs. Yet the basic sources of discontent with administrative procedure would certainly have remained, and with this the Commission refused to tamper. No thought was given to devising a code of administration specific to Yemen; only to creating the conditions needed for the successful implementation of the administrative system already in effect. The key to that work was seen as economic development, which in turn would produce on the one hand sufficient taxes to run the government effectively, and on the other sufficient prosperity to eliminate most of the basis of support for rebellion. The final paragraph of the Commission's report focuses upon this rebellion; written as it was in the fall of 1904 it could scarcely do otherwise.

In that paragraph it was argued that there were three groups of people in Yemen in a state of rebellion. One received monthly salaries from the rebel chief; the second profited from the unrest by raiding and looting; the third group was loyal to Ottoman Government but was overwhelmed by the threats and force of the rebels due to the lack of troops to defend them. If the Ottoman Government were to offer the first two groups one or two riyals a month more than they receive from the rebels, they would join the Ottoman Army. If they were sure of a steady income through trade and agriculture, they would immediately turn all thought to that.

"Yemen under local shaykhs and leaders offered no security and justice; thus, the people are prepared to accept firm and just rule. Once the rebellion is put down, institutional measures for useful reform should be pursued... but... Unless money is appropriated for these long-term measures, maceuticals and clothing sent, more transport animals.. mules.. sent. To support this military activity, the telegraph lines should be extended from Luhayyah up through Hujur, Hajjah and Amran to San'a, and also north from Luhayyah along the coast to Asir. Finally, leading supporters of the Zaydi Imam were to be exiled from Yemen[5]. This emphasis on military action continued in the numerous reports which followed.

The Memduh Commission of 1904 represents the beginning of a shift of policy. Hastily put together under the chairmanship of Memduh Pasha, Minister of the Interior, in response to the young Imam Yahya's revolt, it was charged with the task of finding alternatives to the simple use of force in dealing with the rebellion. It was, in the words of Memduh Pasha, to develop a program which would allow Yemen to benefit from "progress and civilization (terakki ve temeddun)... just as other provinces had", a program which would win the people away from the rebels[6].

Because of the extensiveness of its report, it is worth discussing in some detail as an example of the official view of Yemen from Constantinople more than thirty years after the reoccupation.

The sources reviewed by the Commission in compiling its report offer a useful survey of the main points of concern raised over the period 1898 to 1904.

1 . Documents presented to the Council of State by the Reform Commission of 1898 detailing the need to build a railroad between Hodeidah and San'a, the Yemeni perceptions of criminal law procedure and how the present-day Shari'ah courts ought to be organized, and steps needed to establish peace and law and order.
2 . A telegraphed report of 1898 received from the Governor of Yemen discussing a proposal for the restructuring of Yemen into four provinces.
3 . A report from the Governor of Yemen dated 1898 concerning agriculture and the development of local wealth and state income.
4 . A report from the Civil Service Office of the Council of State based on intelligence reports concerning progress on administrative reform in Yemen.
5 . Dispatches to the Palace from Yemen in response to queries from Sultan Abd al-Hamid concerning delays in settling Yemen's problems.
6 . Dispatches from Yemen concerning implementation of orders to separate the Gendarme Service from the Army.
7 . A collection of general status reports on Yemen from the Ministry of Interior dated 1902 to 1904[7].

Two members of the Commission had previously visited Yemen as members of the earlier Reform Commission of 1898. To supplement their experience, testimony was obtained from two Yemeni leaders who had been exiled to Cyprus some months earlier: the Shaykh of Bani Dhi Husayn, Naqib Salih b. Yahya, and al-Sayyid Yahya b. Ahmad al-Qibsi[8].

The Memduh Commission was quick to recognise that most of the problems of government arose from the general poverty of the population, and therefore that the primary need was for economic development. Poverty drove many of the people to become soldiers in the army of the Imam; as such they received at least daily food rations. Poverty also meant a weak tax base, which in turn led to a drain on the central treasury. The sources of this poverty, the Commission reported, were ignorance of better methods of production, a poor road system for marketing produce, and very complex land laws[9].

For the marketing system, the Commission recommended at minimum the further development of the Hodeidah-San'a highway. At the same time, it was recognised that this road was too difficult an ascent to function adequately as a regular transport route. Consequently, the 1899 proposal for a 300 kilometer Hodeidah-San'a railroad by way of Hujaylah was revived and strongly recommended:

"The agriculture of San'a and Hodeidah, and the trade and commerce between these two points, would easily pay for the capital investment and make a profit for the State... This matter is key to the foundations for reform in Yemen; the faster it is carried out the sooner will its beneficial results be seen[10]".

To increase agricultural production, a team of agriculture training experts was proposed. It would include an agriculture researcher to study land conditions, the current land tenure system, and current agricultural practices and propose reforms based on this study. There should be a specialist in tobacco cultivation, a number of farmers knowledgeable in fruit tree cultivation and grafting. Model farms should be established, and the team should carry out training programs. Selected imported seeds and young plants should be imported and distributed free to the people. On the Tihama, special efforts were to be made to develop the cultivation of cotton. An expert in its cultivation was to be appointed, and seeds imported from Egypt, America, Izmir, and Adana for free distribution. Indigo, the Tihama variety of which should have been competitive with the Indian variety, was not; an indigo expert was to be appointed to teach the people better cultivation and refining methods. He, as well as all of the other trainers, was to be on long-term appointment.

Without the development of water supplies little increase in agricultural productivity was possible. For this, old water courses in the mountains were to be cleared, and wells drilled in the high valleys and plains Engineers for this as well as for surveying and building roads to water supplies, were to be appointed and drilling machinery and supplies sent with them. In this, it was felt that a minimum of manpower support would be needed, since the population there had a good deal of experience in such work[11].

Education to combat ignorance drew the Commission's attention, although here their recommendations amounted to no more than an expansion of existing programs. Already by 1900 the Ottoman Public Education Law had been applied in Yemen. According to it, all education, from primary schools up to the secondary level, was to be provided free to all children. In 1899, recognising the inadequacy of the Education Budget to provide this in Yemen, a decree was issued which dedicated 30% of the coffee tax (simsariye) to

The Arab Gulf Vol 16 No (3-4) 1984
Centre for Arab Gulf Studies University of Basrah, Iraq

MEMDUH PASHA AND AZIZ BEY: OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE IN YEMEN

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The weather stays cloudless
- But why, then, this smoke?
Nobody dies there
- But what, then, this scream?
These Yemeni hands-ah, they are capable.
This, then is Yemen; its flower sharp cummin.
Those who go out there don't return from there.
I wonder why.
This, then, a fist; its road precipitous.
Those who go out there don't return from there; What's going on?
Yemen Turkusu-Ruhi Su

Yemen today is no stranger to the Turks, nor the Turks to Yemen. One hundred years of Ottoman occupation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked the Yemeni countryside with buildings, cisterns, roads, and gravestones in the Ottoman manner; it left the Turks with the beginnings of a tradition of melancholy folk songs about military service in the mountains of Yemen. After an hiatus of two hundred years, Ottoman Government returned to Yemen in the nineteenth century, first at the hands of Muhammad Ali's troops and then in 1849 with troops directed by Constantinople. Only the Tihama was held initially. Then, in 1871, the decision was taken to undertake a fullscale occupation. This decision, made possible in large part by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, reflected a desire to preempt renewed Egyptian expansion into the Red Sea and Arabia[1].

It was also a challenge to expanding British influence along the Gulf and Red Sea coastlines of Arabia; a similar extension of Ottoman commitment took place that same year in al-Hasa on the opposite coast of Arabia. Behind both these factors of regional strategy lay a broader determination of the Ottoman Government to reintegrate the old provinces of the empire into the new modernising Ottoman state. Yemen was to be as much a part of that state as the provinces of Syria, Bursa, Adrianople, or Tuna. All the reform legislation of the Tanzimat was to be applied there.. and from 1871 until the withdrawal of Ottoman Government in 1918 it was, to the best of the Ottoman administrators abilities and provincial budget. There was no better symbol of the determination behind this integration than the election of delegates from Yemen to the first Ottoman constitutional assembly in Constantinople in 1875-76[2]. But how much, in fact, did the reforms mean to Yemen? G. Wyman Bury, well-known observer of Yemen at the turn of this century, noted in 1914.

"The proper development of Yemen, with its difficult terrain, is a task of magnitude... well worth attempting[3] .

And he was close to the mark when he commented on Ottoman public works there,

"many schemes of theoretical excellence have been inaugurated in Yemen only to die of inanition for lack of sustenance and support".

Yet he was only close. Schemes and projects and new institutions there were aplenty, but not all of them died; many, in fact, lived on into Yemeni independence after the First World War. Though not measuring up to the attractive goals proposed by policy makers in Constantinople.. and certainly not to the image of modernity held by a British Officer of the Empire.. even their more limited realities were important enough. Taken together with the reformed Ottoman provincial system which administered them and the economic assumptions implicit in that system, they began that complex of change we call modernization in Yemen. True enough, the initiation of this process was littered with setbacks. And no small part of the difficulty lay in the disagreements and misunderstandings on priorities which quickly developed between Ottoman officials in Yemen and their home ministries in Constantinople.

From the point of view of Ottoman officialdom in Constantinople, a broad spectrum of reform programs and economic projects were needed to bring Yemen up to the level of development already reached in her other provinces of the empire. The deadly and expensive cycle of revolt lead by the Hamid al-Dins, however, forced most of the early reports and proposals for development into a focus on pacification measures.

The recommendations of the Reform Committee of 1898 reflect this short-term military approach, although their charge was a far broader one. Military forces were to be concentrated on the Zaydi tribes and regions influenced by the Imam. The Hujur and Hashid territories, then Midi, Jayzan and al-Wasim coastal territories should be occupied and put under tight administration. Then the occupation should be extended from Jayzan up to Sa'ada and neighboring territories. To carry this out, it was recommended that more troops should be sent, more barracks and hospitals built, pharto the "continental shelf" in the Iranian Law of 1955 might have been relevant to Iran's previous claim over the Bahrain Islands. This means that the legal doctrine of the continental shelf, which justifies the right of coastal States on the basis of natural prolongation, would have been deemed to assert Iran's claim over submarine areas adjacent to Bahrain.

The Omani Decree of July 17, 1972 was, however, more in line with the legal definition of the continental shelf. Article 4 of the Decree specifically defined the Sultanate's continental shelf as the sea - bed and natural resources upon and beneath the sea - bed adjacent to the coast of Oman to a depth of 200 metres or to such greater depth as may admit of the exploitation of the natural resources. Oman is the only Gulf State which has adopted a certain objective criterion such as 200 isobath, plus dynamic criterion of exploitability teat, as to the limits of its continental shelf. Oman, though not a party to the GCCS has obviously stuck to the criteria provided by Article I of the Convention. This is very important especially because Oman's continental shelf in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea is sometimes deeper than 200 metres.

CONCLUSION

The Gulf is a "Semi - enclosed" Sea as this term is defined in the law of the Sea Convention 1981.

fishing in their overall undefined exclusive fishing zones. After Oman and Iran, other Gulf States put forward similar claims with respect to fishing. In May 1974, Saudi Arabia issued a Royal Pronouncement which fixed the Kingdom's exclusive fishing zone in the Gulf (as well as in the Red Sea). This Pronouncement contained no fixed limit up to which Saudi Arabia's exclusive fishing zone extended. However, it stated that for the purpose of determining the boundaries of the fishing zones between Saudi Arabia and adjacent or opposite States the median line would be used as the method of delimitation.

A month later Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Pronouncement on June 2, 1974 which fixed Qatar's EEZ. The Pronouncement stated that the outer limit of Qatar's EEZ would be delimited by mutual agreement, Qatar's EEZ would extend up to the outer limits of Qatar's continental shelf or to a median line. Article Two of the Pronouncement claimed exclusive rights for the State of Qatar to control, search, explore, exploit, fish and construct installations within the waters of the Gulf adjacent to Qatar's territorial sea up to the limits of Qatar's continental shelf.

The Continental Shelf:

The marine and sub - marine areas within the Islamic legal system fall within the definition of "anfal" or public assets which belongs to God, the Prophet, and the Muslim community. The position of the marine and sub - marine resources, therefore, may be considered as "no man's land", capable of appropriation on behalf of the Muslim communities. However, on the advice of the United Kingdom, all Protected Gulf States issued in 1949 separate Proclamations asserting exclusive rights over the continental shelf adjacent to their coasts. The operative clauses of all these British - sponsored Proclamations were virtually identical. Each State declared the respective adjacent continental shelf to be subject to its exclusive sovereignty. These claims could be interpreted as greater than mere exclusive jurisdiction over the seabed resoures such as purported by the Truman Proclamation of 1945. The Gulf States Proclamations stated that there was nothing in them that might be interpreted affecting dominion over the islands or the status of the seabed and sub - soil underlying any territorial waters.

The British and American policies on maritime issues were reflected in tendencies to assert continental shelf rights and to disclaim any effect on the waters above the area annexed. It is of signifcance to consider what criteria were taken into account when the early claims over the continental shelf arose.

As early as 1942, the United Kingdom and Venezuela divided the submarine areas beneath the high seas of the Gulf of Paria between themselves. In 1945 President Truman of the United States asserted the unilateral extension of the United States' jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf adjacent to its coasts on three basic grounds. The most important reason was that the "continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the mainland of the coastal nation, and thus naturally appurtenant to it". This geograhical phenomenon was supported by the fact that the continental shelf resources "frequently from a seaward extension of apad or deposit lying within the territory" of the coastal States. The second reason was that "the effectiveness of measures to utilise or conserve these reaources would be contigent upon co - operation and protection from the shore". Finally, referring to security reasons, the proclamation stated that "self - protection compels a coastal nation to close watch over activites off its shores".

The Saudi Arabian Royal Pronouncement of May 28, 1949, dealing with the subsoil and seabed of areas of the Gulf outside of territorial waters was basically justified on a concept of contiguity, which was not precisely defined. Also the Proclamations of the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait Abu Ahabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman Umm al - Qaiwain, and Ras al - Khaimah were all based upon the same concept of contiguity without further explanation.

Claims over contiguous territories have a long history in the practice of States. However, it is doubtful in international law if territorial acquisition is justified solely on the basis of contiguity. It is argued that contiguity is an aspect of possession, not the basis of title independent of possession. Whatever the validity of the doctrine of contiguity as regards onshore acquisition may be, its enforcement is definitive concerning claims to extend continental shelf regions and fishing ruling in the North Sea Continental Shelf Shelf Cases (1969).

The formulation of the pronouncement of Saudi Arabia, was similar to the Truman Proclamation. It was justified on the ground of self - protection and because the exercise of jurisdiction over the shelf resources was (reasonable and just). It also went on to affirm that the effectiveness of measures to utilize these resources would be contingent upon co - operation and protection from the shore. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar have also specifically referred to international practice on this issue within their proclamations dealing with the subsoil and sea - bed of areas of the Persian Gulf outside territorial waters.

Saudi Arabia and all nine Arab Emirates avoided the use of the term "continental shelf". This was apparently the result of arguments over the existence or non - existence of a continental shelf in the Gulf. Iran and Oman were the only two Gulf States which specifcally referred to the term "continental shelf" in their shelf proclamations.

The Iranian draft legislation of 1949, which was finally passed as the Law of June 19, 1955, was designed to conform to the concept of the "continental shelf". While other coastal States of the Persian Gulf avoided the use of the term "continental shelf" in their 1949 Proclamations, Iran asserted its rights to the submarine areas of the high seas of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman with particular reference to the English and French terms of "continental shelf" and "plateau continental". It is suggested that the reference the 1949 proclamations issued by the Gulf States asserting their continental shelf rights, specified that these did not affect the traditional rights of fishing and pearling in the superjacent waters above the continental shelves.

It was generally submitted that the fishing activities in the Gulf were governed by customs and usages of immemorial standing. However, the nature and the scope of these traditional rights and customs are not precisely defined. The 1949 proclamations, not unlike the Saudi Arabian proclamation of 1958, effectively conceded that fishing rights were accorded equally to all the various peoples of the Gulf and only to them. Foreign nationals had no fishing rights in the area. Intrusion by outsiders except possibly kinsfolk of the coastal people of the Gulf, has always been resented and was discouraged by the British prior to their 1971 withdrawal from the Gulf. However the British protection of pearling has been based on British political and naval predominance in the Gulf and beyond, rather than on any legal authority.

A survey team under the auspices of the United Nations food and Agticulture Organization (FAO), has been set up to look at the non - oil reserves available in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar all cooperate in the above - mentioned survey, the centre of which is based in Doha (Qatar).

Oman was the first state in the Gulf region to claim an exclusive fishing zone. Article 5 of the Omani Decree of July 17 1972 states that Oman exercises sovereign rights over the exclusive fishing zone of the Sultanate for the purposes of exploring, developing, and exploiting its living resources, including but not confined to fish. Article 6 provides that the exclusive fishing zone of Oman extends 38 miles seaward, measured from the outer limits of the territorial sea of the Sultanate. This was altered when Sultan Qabus issued a decree on June 16 1977 which extended Oman's exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles. It is assumed, however, that the provisions of Article 7 of the 1972 Decree on overlapping jurisdiction remain in force. Accordingly, where the coast of another State is opposite or adjacent to the coast of Oman, the outer limit of Oman's exclusive fishing zone may not extend beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of the territorial sea.

Soon after Oman's claim of an exclusive fishing zone in 1972, Pakistan put forward a similar claim to an exclusive fishing zone of 50 miles from the coastline (March 20, 1973). At the same time, in Summer 1973, Iran's Council of Ministers decided to extend Iran's exclusive fishing zone within both the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. This decision was manifested a few months later in the (Proclamation of October 30, 1973 Concerning the Outer Limit of the Exclusive Fishing Zone of Iran in the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Oman), which was delivered by Mr A A Howayda the late Prime Minister. The Iranian Proclamation, similar in outline to the Declaration of Pakistan, justified the claim to an exclusive fishing zone on historical, economic and legal grounds.

It stated that:

Whereas the coastal communities of Iran have throughout history been engaged in fishing activities in the seas adjacent to the Iranian coast; and whereas under Article 7 of the Law of 12 April 1959 on the territorial Sea of Iran, fishing and other rights of Iran beyond the limits of its territorial sea have been reaffirmed; and whereas the natural resources of the seas adjacent to the Iranian coast are of vital importance to the economic and social progress of Iran; Now, therefore, in order to safeguard the fishing rights and interests of Iran in the seas adjacent to its coast and the coasts of its islands, it is hereby declared ...

Article One of the proclamation fixed the outer limit of Iran's exclusive fishing zone at the outer limit of Iran's continental shelf in the Gulf, and at 50 miles from the base - points of the territorial sea in the Sea of Oman. Article One (a) provided that where the shelf boundaries of Iran with the neighbouring States had been demarcated, the outer limit of Iran's fishing zone would be the superjacent waters of the same boundaries as specified in mutul agreements. The principle of median line was adopted, in Article One (b), for the delimitation of Exclusive Fishing Zone boundaries with those States whose shelf boundaries were not yet determined. As already mentioned above, the 50 mile limit claimed by Iran with respect to the Sea of Oman (in Article Two) was at that time identical to that claimed by Oman and Pakistan, Iran's two neighbours in the Sea of Oman. Article Two provided that where Iran's exclusive fishing zone overlapped those of other States, the boundary line should be a median line.

The proclamation was submitted to Majlis, Iran's lower house of parliament, by Dr AA Khalatbary, then Iran's Minister of ForeignAffains,October 29,1973. Introducing the bill to the Majlis, he said that failure to adopt provisions by the developing States on exclusive fishing zones had resulted in abuse of the situation by fishing zones had resulted in abuse of the situation by the developed, industrialized States. However, Article Five of the 1973 Proclamation specifically guaranteed freedom of navigation through the marine areas of the Iranian exclusive fishing zone.

Iran's Council of Ministers issued a a second Pronouncement on May 22, 1977, which further extended Iran's exclusive fishing zone. This extension was, however, confined to the Iranian fishing zone in the Sea of Oman. The Pronouncement, referring to the previous Proclamation of October 30, 1973, stated that the outer limit of Iran's exclusive fishing zone extended up to the limits of a median line every point of which was equidistant to the base - points of the territorial waters of Iran on one side and of Oman on the other. It was not confirmed whether Oman had recognised Iran's exclusive sovereignty over certain small rocks and reefs hitherto considered as "terra nullius". Nor was it clarified whether some "insignificant" Iranian islands in the Sea of Oman were claimed as base - points for Iran's exclusive fishing zone. It is, however, understood that, with Oman now claiming an exclusive fishing zone of 200 miles, Iran and Oman are acting in collaboration to prevent foreign vessels from than low - water mark baseline" affects greatly the delimitation of the marine areas of the enclosed or semi - enclosed seas between adjacent or opposite States. An example of such a case is the Saudi Arabian Decree of February 16, 1958. Article 2 of this decree states that the waters between the coasts of the Kingdom and the shoals and islands extending out to 12 miles are internal waters.

Another crucial issue, with respect to internal waters, was the disagreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the borders of the Shatt - al - Arab. The position of the Shatt - al - Arab is the most important frontier dispute between Iran and Iraq and affects, both politically and legally, all marine issues of concern between the two States. The position of the Shatt - al - Arab is also important to Kuwait because of her interest in the implementation of the Shatt - al - Arab water scheme.

The boundaries of the Shatt - al - Arab which flow directly into the Gulf are extremely important because of their effect on the delimitation of the territorial sea. The water border between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt - al - Arab was defined according to the median line principle by the Algiers Treaty of 13 June 1975. Accordingly the border line was to follow the median line of the main chanel. Protocol III of the Treaty indicated the specific points of the water boundary line between the territorial waters of each State. The median line principle, in effect, moved the Iraqi border from the Iranian side of the Shatt - al - Arab to the middle of the waterway, beginning from the point where territorial border line is projected at the Shatt - al - Arab, through the Gulf. The Algiers Treaty and its protocols were duly ratified by both States and there were no disputes between Iran and Iraq over the boundaries for five years. However, this Treaty was abrosated by Iraq in September 1980 when the Gulf war began.

The question of internal waters of the archipelagic State of Bahrain require some consideration. Article 50 of the ICNT/ REV 1 provides that the archipelagic states may draw closing lines for the delimtation of internal waters. However, Article 8 of the Text expressly states that waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea of archipelagic States do not form part of the internal waters of the State. The internal waters of Bahrain, therefore, are confined to rivers, bays, and ports.

TERRITORIAL SEA IN THE GULF

Coastal States have the right to exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea subject to the rights of innocent passage and the jurisdiction of flag States. The width of the territorial sea, which by definition extends beyond internal waters, is one of the most controversial issues in international law. States claim territorial seas ranging from 3 to 200 miles. However, in the semienclosed Gulf none of the littoral States claim any territorial sea beyond 12 miles.

The Council of the League of Arab States, in its 31st Session (Cairo - March 1959) within a Report on the Resolution of the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea recommended to its members a movement towards a 12 mile territorial sea. In the area of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq has already extended the breadth of their territorial sea to 12 miles. Other Arab States in this area did not then take an interest in the recommendation apparently because of the British protectorate influence. The aim behind the Arab League recommendation was to achieve a 12 mile territorial sea in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as a security measure during the Arab - Israeli conflict. Later, significant economic interests caused the extension to 12 miles of the traditional 3 mile limit of the territorial sea by more Arab States in the Arabian Gulf: Kuwait in 1967, Sharjah in 1970 and Oman in 1972 all extended their territorial seas to 12 miles. So apart Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sharjah and Oman, other Arab States in the Gulf has territorial seas of 3 to 6 miles until 1972. At present, however, 12 miles may be regarded as the general Gulf standard.

In 1960 Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, were among the "eighteen power" developing States at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which proposed to fix the breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles. This proposal was rejected by 39 votes, to 36, with 14 abstentions. Iraq and Saudi Arabia voted against the joint proposal of Canada and the United States of a six plus six formula while Iran abstained. The legal controversy over the breadt, of the territorial sea has arisen because of the conflict of interests between different States. The nature of the national interests involved is obvious in the event of any extension by the coastal States of the Gulf of their territorial sea. The early oil concessions in the region such as Arcy (Iran 1901), IPC (Iraq 1925), and AIOC (Iran 1933) made no reference to territorial waters, and only from 1933 onwards were territorial waters included in oil concessions. From the mid 1930 onwards when technological advances made the exploitation of the mineral resources of the submarine areas a reality, the coastal States in the Gulf extended their territorial sea.

Iran in 1934 and Saudi Arabia in 1949 were the first among the Gulf States to extend their territorial seas to six miles. Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 1958, Iran in 1959, Kuwait in 1967, Sharjah in 1970, and Oman in 1972 extended their territorial seas to 12 miles.

As a result of Oman's extension of its territorial sea, the strait of Hormuz is now contained within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. It is, therefore of great significance to investigate the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz. The contemporary rules of international law provide that the extension of the territorial sea limits does not change the legal status of international straits. Hence, the Strait of Hormuz should be subject to the regime of transit passage as incorporated in the latest proposed Law of the Sea Treaty (ICNT/ REV1).

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ)

Article 7 of the Iranian Act of 12 April 1959, which extended Iran's territorial sea to 12 miles, specified that fishing and other rights of Iran beyond the limits of its territorial sea should remain unaffected. However, despite the traditional fishing activities of the coastal communities in the high seas adjacent to territorial waters, Iran did not specifically claim any fixed exclusive fishing zone until 1973. On similar lines, Strait of Hormuz will be under the regime of international straits and subject to the right of (transit passage), and not territorial sea.

The question is whether a revolutionary regime such as Iran's will submit to these provisions. Jn April 1980, threatened by military action from both the United States and Iraq, Iran considered the option of closing the Strait to international shipping, regardless of the legal position of such an action. Later, in September 1980, Iran actually suspended any passage through her 12 - mile territorial sea limit in the northern section of the Strait. However, on October 1, 1980, Mohammad - Ali Rajai, the Iranian prime Minister, issued a statement indicating that Iran was committed to guaranteeing the freedom of passage of all non - hostile ships through the Strait. The statement specifically acknowledged international law and customs concerning freedom of passage through international straits. It is clear that this statement was merely made to deny reports suggesting Iran's intention to close the Strait. Despite this, on October 9, 1980 president Bani - Sadr of Iran, in an interview published in Le Monde, stated that Iran would not hesitate to close the Strait if other countries entered the war against Iran. Furthermore, on October 15, 1980, the Commander of Iran's Navy publically announced that Iran was prepared to mine the Strait in case any of the Arab States entered the war against Iran. Although none of the Gulf States made any comment, the United States declared that if the Iranian threats were carried out, the American Air Force helicopters would take immediate action to remove the mines. However, the Anglo - American naval presence in the Arabian Sea forced the Gulf's lanes to stay open to international shipping.

Iran's present position is not clear with regard to the legal regime of the Gulf. Under the Shah, Iran favoured a national appropriation of the Gulf by the coastal States. Mass'ud Ansari, the Iranian representative at the United Nations Sea - Bed Committee, defined "marginal seas" as true microcosms, necessitating different regimes and thus justifying certain unilateral appropriation of marginal seas. He stated that the intrusion into these types of seas by fishing fleets from distant fishing states would create an abnormal situation which would seriously disturb the economy of the coastal region. Similarly, the late Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A A Khal' atbary, introducing a bill on an Exclusive Fishing Zone to the Majlis (October 29, 1973), stated that failure to adopt provisions on this issue had resulted in abuse of the situation by the industrialised states.

In addition to the reasons mentioned above, one must not overlook the significant strategic interests sought by Iran under the Shah in advocating the national apportionment of the entire waters of the Gulf among the littoral States. This policy was çonsistently followed by Iran since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. One of the main objectives of the Conference of Gulf Foreign Ministers on Gulf Security (Muscat, November 1976) concerned the territorial division of the entire waters of the Gulf among the littoral States. The Gulf's security was highligted during the 1979 - 80 Soviet - American rivalry in the Arabian Sea. Iran and Kuwait maintaines that the Gulf's security had to be guaranteed exclusively by the littoral States, thus preventing the region from becoming an area for conflict between the Major powers.

The territorial apportionment of the Gulf has basically been justified on economic grounds. All of Iran's oil is shipped out through the Gulf. Iran also receives well over half her imports via the same route. Equally, all other Gulf States are heavily dependent on the Gulf for their development and prosperity. These economic interests added to geographical, geological, strategic and historical reasons all call for the establishment of a special regime constituting an exception to the general rule of the freedom of the high seas.

THE LEGAL DIVISION OF MARINE AREAS OF THE GULF

Moving from land seawards, the Gulf is legally divally divided into internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zones, and exclusive fishing economic zones. These legal divisions of the maritime areas are studied in detail in the following sections.

Internal waters in the Gulf Area

Internal waters in the Gulf consist of those on the landward side of the baselines used for measuring the width of the territorial sea. The waters of regional ports, harbours, rivers and canals are also parts of the internal waters, plus the waters between islands not farther apart than the limits of the territorial sea.

The 1949 Decree of Saudi Arabia included the following waters as the "inland wters"'of the the Kingdom:

a . bays along the coasts of Saudi Arabia.

b . the waters above and landward from any shoal not more than twelve miles from the sand: the Arabian mainland or its islands.

c . the waters between the mainland of the Kingdom and a Saudi Arabian island not more than twelve miles from the mainland, and.

d . the waters between Saudi Arabian islands not farther apart than twelve miles.

Also article 6 of the Iranian law of April 12 1959 on territorial sea proclaimed the waters between the Iranian islands not farther apart than twelve miles as internal waters.

Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of the Territorial Sea and the contiguous zone (1958) allows the method of the "straight baseline" to be employed in measuring the territorial sea.

Article 5 provides that the waters on the landward side of the baseline form part of the internal waters. These provisions are also confirmed in Article 7 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text prepared by the third United Nations conference on the law of the sea.

The implication of the straight baseline method is of great significance as far as the shelf - locked states of the Gulf are concerned. That is to say, the drawing of baselines does not make much difference in cases of coastal States bordering the open seas, which will have an economic zone of 200 miles. But the application of the "straight baseline" "rather

The Arab Gulf Vol. 16 No (3 - 4) 1984
Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Basrah, Iraq

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARAB GULF*

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The Gulf's "Semi - Enclosed" Status

The legal status of the Arabian Gulf was previously recognised as the same as that of the open seas. Within Continental Shelf Proclamations of 1948 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States specified that these proclamations were not to be interpreted as affecting the freedom of fishing, shipping and overflight in the high seas of the Gulf. This clarification was made because the continental shelf area in legal terms extends beyond the limits of the territorial sea of a coastal state. This "open sea" status was disputed in the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958) by Iran, as well as some other States, who pointed out that the status of the oceans and open seas should be distinguished from that of the enclosed or semi - encloed seas.

The concept of "enclosed or semi - enclosed seas" is now recognised and defined by Article 122 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1981. The Arabian Gulf falls within this definition of the term "enclosed or semienclosed sea". However, the Gulf States themselves are divided with respect to the legal status of the Gulf. On the one hand, Iran strategically placed at the entrance of the Gulf, advocates a special semiclosed status for the Gulf and even claims that the Gulf should be considered "closed or inland sea" or analogous to one. On the other hand, other Gulf States favour the traditional open - sea status of the Gulf which guarantees that the waters beyond the territorial sea are part of the high seas. This view supports an unrestricted right of navigation for the international community within the Gulf. The difference of opinion is clearly seen in different draft articles submitted by Iarn and Iraq to Unclos III as regards the provisions on enclosed or semi - enclosed seas.

Iraq occupying a narrow sector on the northern edge of the Gulf has access to open seas only through the Strait of Hormuz, between Iran and Oman. The maritime policy of Iraq is influenced by her limited access to the Gulf waters. Iraq, more than any other Gulf State, advocates the regime of "transit passage" in order to quarantee free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. During the Iran - Iraq war of 1980, Iran closed the Strait to the Iraqi vessels and Iraq had to stop all shipments out of the Gulf. Iraq, who exports some 2.8 million barrels of oil a day, was unsuccessful in exporting any of its oil through Mediterranean oulets. Iraq then suspended her oil export contracts because of **force majeure.** To export its oil by pipelines to the Mediterranean, Iraq had to depend on the good will of its neighbours.Jordan gave the Iraqis use of the Port of Aqaba, on the Red Sea, as a substitute for the Iraqi port of Basra.

Apart from these strategic considerations, Iraq's maritime policy is affected by economic interests. Iraq's fisheries would be the worst affected by a territorial appropriation of the Gulf. At present Iraq's total catch is 26,000 tons compared with Iran's 20,000 tons. It is on these lines that draft Article 5 of Iraq defines the term 'semi - enclosed sea which constitutes part of the high sea' as 'an inland sea, surrounded by more than one State, and connected with other parts of the high seas by a narrow outlet'. Freedom of navigation, according to the Iraqi draft articles 4 and 6, should be maintained in semi - enclosed seas which constitute part of the high seas even where the establishment of a 12 - mile territorial sea has the effect of enclosing areas previously considered as part of the high sea. These provisions have direct effect in the Strait of Hormuz.

Since both Iran and Oman have a 12 - mile territorial sea, the entire waters of the Strait of Hormuz (except a narrow opening) are claimed as territorial seas by Iran and Oman. Almost all the oil produced in the Gulf region is exported in tankers which have to traverse the Strait of Hormuz. Richard Young points out that if the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs are recognised as Iran's territory, the Iranian territorial sea will embrace most of the normal shipping routes up and down the Gulf. He also suggests that strict controls on traffic by Iran and Oman within their "territorial sea Strait of Hormuz" present a serious hazard to navigation. This possibility was highlighted during the early stages of the Iran - Iraq war in September 1980. Iran designated its 12 - mile territorial sea within the Strait as the "war zone" The Iranians emphasise the exclusive responsibility of States bordering the enclosed and semi - enclosed seas, as indicated in the previously mentioned Iran's draft articled to UNCLOS III. Of course, if the convention is ratified the

* The paper was received on 3 / 1 / 1983.

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NOTES

1 . The countries this study is concerned with are. The state of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Iraq are excluded mainly because it was impossible to obtain the necessary information. Needless to say, obtaining information from Saudi Arabia was extremely difficult. However, thanks to the students of the Political Science Methodology Class 401, we were able to collect the information secretly.

2 . J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, **Arab Manpower; The Crises of Development,** (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1980).

3 . Ibid. p. 1.

4 . Ibid.

5 . Henry Azzam, "Nataig Wa Ihtimalat Intigal Al-Aydi Al-Amila Fi Al-Aktar Al-Mustawrida Wa Al-Aktar Al-Musadra" (Results and Possibilities of Man Power Transformation in the Exported and Imported States) in **Al-Mustakbal Al-Arabi**, No. 23 (Beirut. 1981) p. 35.

6 . Nadir Firjani, "AlAmala Al-Wafida ila Al-Khalig" (Expatriate Labor in the Gulf States) in **Al-Mustakbal Al-Arabi,** No. 23 (Beirut: 1981) p. 64.

7 . Social and Economic Impacts of the Kuwait Government Compensation Increase of 1971-1972 and Recommended National Compensation Problems (Report and Project No. 2340), California. Stanford Research Institute, May, 1974), pp. v. 28.

8 . Tawfik Farah, Faisal and Maria Al-Salem, "Alienation and Expatriate Labor in Kuwait", (MIT. Migration and Labor Study Group. Boston, 1979).

9 . Walid Moubarak, Kuwait's Quest for Security (Dissertation. Bloomington, Indiana University, 1979), p. 144.

10 . Abdul Rasul Al-Mosa, "No Arab Immigration to Kuwait with Special Reference to Asian Immigrants", **Journal of Social Sciences,** Vol. 8, No. 4 (January. 1981), p. 144.

11 . Yosef Al-Zinkawi commented in **Al-Anbaa** Newspaper of Kuwait on June 29, 1981 on the issue as: The Criminal acts that occur in Kuwait (as well as the Gulf area as a whole) are, in essence, the price of development. Development brought all kinds of people with different backgrounds, cultures and religions. All opposites and contradictions existed in the Gulf which in turn would lead to social disturbances.

Mr. Al-Zinkawi added that one could understand the individual criminal acts, such as theft, drugs, car accidents, rape or murder, which might be considered the price of development. However, how can one explain a bomb explosion which kills 5 people? This kind of act cannot be considered as the price for development...

It is true that we (Kuwaitis) live in the Arab world in which every state of it has its own ideology and type of system that goes from the extreme right to the extreme left. Since Kuwait had opened her doors to different laborers from these contradicting societies, one has to expect violence in the Gulf. The writer concludes that it would be the responsibility of the governments in the Gulf to handle the problem of the expatriates carefully.

Table V
Citizen's Sex (X5) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

Regression

	X2	DF	X25	CC	S	CCS	MR	SR	B	BETA	F
Y1	2.972	2	.231	-.016	8581	.216	.130	-.016	-.034	-.052	2.534
Y2	9.396	2	.009	-.031	8581	.071	.130	-.031	.000	.000	.000
Y3	.566	2	753	.010	8581	.321	.146	.010	.045	.076	5.801
Y4	.701	2	.704	-.011	8581	.291	.146	-.011	.011	.019	.364
Y5	11.889	2	.220	.013	8581	.264	.147	.013	-.014	-.021	.461
Y6	12.456	2	.002	-.049	8581	.011	.165	-.049	.035	-.053	2.715
Y7	2.105	2	.349	-.025	8581	.120	.165	-.025	-.006	-.011	.116
Y8	2.411	2	.299	.006	8581	.384	.166	.006	.014	.023	.515
Y9	13.422	4	.009	.038	8581	.036	.166	.036	.000	.001	.004
Y10	3.910	4	.418	.006	8581	.389	.174	.006	.026	.054	3.135

Marital Status

In terms of the expatriates perceived threat to the standard of living in the Gulf, marital status made a significant difference in outlook. Only 24.7% of the married perceived such a threat as opposed to 48.3% of the single, 47.2% of the divorced and 32.6% of the widows. Results are given in Table VI which reveals that the widowed are the most sympathetic to the plight of the expatriates, perhaps because their position in society is also marginal. Of the total sample, 60% believe that they could maintain their standard of living with fewer expatriates. In some ways, this appears to be wishful thinking because labor statistics reveal that the expatriates greatly outnumber Kuwaitis in all service occupations, as well as others.

On the question of inviting expatriate Arab manpower to the Gulf, 52% of the entire sample gave a positive response-a majority, but slight. The majority of the sample also indicated that they felt the expatriates were a threat to the culture of the area. The various groups in slightly differing majorities agreed that citizens do receive preferential treatment in labor conditions, but felt no qualms about this privileged status vis-a-vis the expatriates. All catagories of marital status admitted that the expatriates were more productive than the citizens.

Educational Level

Table VII indicates an inverse relationship between the economic views of those with less education compared to those with more. The less educated do not object to an influx of expatriates; those with more education, feel that the expatriates threaten the citizens' economic opportunities. The F value of .934 in Table VII rejects the hypothesis that both educational levels would share the same opinion. A slight majority of both educational levels favors inviting expatriate Arab experts living in the west to work in the Arab world, but not a permanent basis. Interestingly, the less educated were more in favor of inviting Arab experts living abroad to their countries than were the more educated.

Table VI
Citizen's Marital Status (X8) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

Regression

	X2	DF	X25	CC	S	CCS	MR	SR	B	BETA	F
Y1	11.287	6	.079	.011	8581	.289	.167	-.011	-.037	-.039	1.416
Y2	14.352	6	.025	.023	8581	.133	.169	.023	.032	.037	1.289
Y3	20.603	6	.002	.063	8581	.062	.169	.063	.011	.013	.189
Y4	15.209	6	.018	.025	8581	.119	.171	.025	.029	.032	1.048
Y7	4.447	6	.816	-.046	8581	.015	.202	-.046	-.104	-.108	11.727
Y6	15.166	6	.019	-.001	8581	.469	.204	-.001	-.027	-.027	.750
Y7	11.482	6	.074	-.027	8581	.103	.206	-.027	-.019	-.023	.518
Y8	12.073	6	.060	-.043	8581	.022	.218	-.043	-.065	-.073	5.240
Y9	18.948	12	.069	.072	8581	.001	.232	.072	.081	.089	8.440
Y10	25.925	12	.011	.018	8581	.197	.232	.018	-.012	-.016	.343

Table VII
Citizen's Education (X9) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

Regression

	X2	DF	X25	CC	S	CCS	MR	SR	B	BETA	F
Y1	23.478	8	.002	-.035	8581	.060	.298	-.035	-.133	-.076	5.934
Y2	15.153	8	.020	.022	8581	.144	.301	.022	.070	.048	1.959
Y3	8.350	8	.004	-.043	8581	.022	.304	-.043	-.040	-.031	1.099
Y4	40.129	8	.090	-.088	8581	.001	.311	-.088	-.052	-.031	1.09
Y5	28.047	8	.099	-.020	8581	.170	.311	-.020	-.012	-.008	.06
Y6	29.721	8	.090	-.008	8581	.324	.313	-.009	.062	.045	2.91
Y7	21.618	8	.005	-.056	8581	.006	.320	-.056	-.091	-.058	3.00
Y8	15.378	8	.062	.002	8581	.481	.322	.022	.054	.032	1.1
Y9	19.983	16	.221	.080	8581	.001	.339	.090	.124	.096	11.1
Y10	23.862	16	.092	.033	8581	.061	.344	.033	.065	.050	2.9

The more educated object also to Asian expatriate lab (58.6%), while the less educated object by a minority 47%. Actually their objections are academic; there is li social intercourse between expatriates and citizens.

Among the less educated, there is a 47% perception t the expatriate has a less favored position. The more e cated are more aware of the discrepancy - 56% admi that the expatriate was less priviled. Both groups, b majority, agreed that the expatriate is more productive t the native. The reasons are many; some of the fault of productivity lies in cultural reasons. Manual labor is spised; then, wasta - connections - is more important merit. On the other hand, labor laws themselves provid incentive; a Kuwaiti cannot be fired and productivity is n lated to salary. Finally, there is no accountability. No wishes to take decisions for fear of making mistakes. productivity among the expatriates, when it does exist, lated to a sense of alienation.

the emigre Arab's help in development suggests that Arab nationalism, if it exists, is very weak indeed. Tribalism breeds isolation and suspicion of others, even if they are fellow Arabs.

Asian expatriates are even more isolated than the Arab ones. Asians are considered more "alien" to the culture. A general feeling among the respondents was that the area is saturated with foreigners(12).

Concerning salary discrepancies between citizens and expatriates, 57.7% of the Kuwaitis did not feel that they were unfair. Among the Saudis, 44.1% felt the situation was acceptable, as did 25.3% of the Bahrainis, 33.3% of the Emiratis, and 36.4% of the Qataris. When asked specifically if they agreed that expariates and natives should receive equal pay for equal work, 32.9% of the Kuwaitis responded positively, as did 32.4% of the Saudis. Agreement among the Bahrainis was significantly higher, at 53.7% followed by the Emiratis, 41.7% the Qataris were least emphatic, at 24.2%. A large proportion of the sample declined to indicate an opinion - among the Qataris, 40% professed no opinion on this delicate question. It would appear that the Bahrainis are the most sensitive to the expatriates' situaton and the most inclined to an equitable salary scale, followed by the Emiratis. The Kuwaitis, closely followed by the Saudis, are the most protective of their privileged status. They feel that they have the right to higher salaries by virtue of their citizenship.

The Kuwaitis, Qataris and Saudis admit that the citizens are less porductive than the expatriates, whereas the Bahrainis and Emiratis disagree. This reflects their greater sensitivity to the expatriates and their awareness of discrepancies in salary and work. The general consensus was that the native is less productive than non - native because the former rely on 'wasta' rather than merit. A drop in the productivity of the non - native comes about from alienation.

Occupation and Economic Status

As a whole, 44% of the sample (specifically the bureaucrat, merchant and worker categories) state that an increase in expatriates does not mean a decrease in income for them. The professionals, however,were more emphatic; 55% of them felt that an influx of expatriates represented an economic threat to them. TableIV shows the inverse relationship between occupation and economic status. F test of 1.210 indicates the different viewpoints of the sample. The sample also agreed that importing foreign labor constituted a threat in the ratios of 52.1% of the worker, 56.6%of the merchants, 54.9% of the professionals and 52.6% of the bureaucrats. Thus, more than half of the respondents were opposed to inviting Arab experts living in the West for economic reasons. Questioned about the importation of Asian labor, the sample was less opposed; 46.9% of the workers,42.3% of the merchants, but 58.9% of the bureaucrats, and 63% of the professionals. The professional class in each case disagrees with the other socio - economic strata. The professionals, by a majority, oppose importing Asian labor (63%) and by a greater ratio than they oppose Arab experts living in the West (54.9%). Not more than25%of the various strata agree on the issue. In general, the respondents perceive the Asians as less of a threat to their culture than other expatriates.

Table IV
Citizen's Job (X4) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

Regression

	X2	DF	X2S	CC	S	CCS	MR	[illegible]	[illegible]	BETA	F
Y 1	58.757	8	.000	-.071	8561	.001	.215	-.071	-.049	-.035	[illegible]
Y 2	28.109	8	.000	-.043	8561	.062	.215	-.043	-.009	-.008	[illegible]
Y 3	19.363	8	.100	-.066	8561	.001	[illegible]	-.066	-.078	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y 4	20.987	8	.007	-.038	8561	.036	.223	[illegible]	.007	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y 5	37.257	8	.000	-.006	8561	.361	.225	[illegible]	.046	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y 6	44.425	8	.000	-.057	8561	.044	.226	.057	-.009	-.067	[illegible]
Y 7	27.925	8	.000	-.043	8561	.021	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y 8	30.042	8	.000	.046	8561	.015	.238	.046	[illegible]	.077	[illegible]
Y 9	29.290	16	.018	.049	8561	.010	.240	.049	.029	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y10	24.225	16	.084	.026	8561	.094	.241	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

The various socio - economic levels do not feel ashamed of the disparity in pay between the citizen and the expatriate, nor do they believe that there is a difference in productivity between them and the expatriates.

Gender and Economic Status

The sample was approximately 1/3 females, 2/3 males. The majority of both sexes believed that the greater the number of expatriates, the fewer economic opportunities for the citizens, although the females agreed by a larger percentage; statistical analysis reveals acceptance of the null hypothesis that both groups object to the increase in foreigners. Both sexes further stated that they could maintain their economic status if their respective government regulated immigration.

There was little difference between the males and females in feelings toward expatriate Arab experts; almost half of the sample as a whole were receptive to the idea of inviting them back to the Arab world. Those opposed to the idea represented a slightly larger proportion of the total sample.

Females were more opposed to the continued influx of Asian labor than men, though the majority of both sexes were opposed to an increase in Asian expartriate man power, over non-Arab labor. Neither gender expressed discomfort with the fact that citizens earned more than expatriates for the same work, nor did they find the discrepancy in their legal status disturbing. Both sexes feel that productivity is low for citizens. Citizens are non-productive because of personal relations; expatriate non- productivity is due to feeling of alienation.

9 - Can you think of reasons for the citizens' low productivity?

10 - Can you suggest reasons for the low productivity of the expatriates?

These responses were tested against the independent variables of age, nationality, occupation, sex, marital status, educ tion and income. The hypothesis is that the Gulf citizens believe they are doing the expatriates a kindness in giving them jobs; that the expatriates are in the Gulf to render a service; and that the citizens believe themselves quite capable of developing their country without any external assistance.

Age

The citizen sample was divided into2 groups, junior (20 - 40 year old) and senior (40 - 70 year old). Both groups shared the idea that expatriates are a threat to their well - being; however, the junior group was more insistent (see Table II). The younger generation was not convinced of the necessity of foreign labor. In question 2 the natives revealed their belief that their economic status could be maintained even with a decrease in foreign labor. It would appear that the Gulf citizens do not associate their high standard of living and services with the presence of a huge, skilled expatriate labor force.

In response to the question of attracting emigrant Arab brain power to the Gulf, 50% of the junior group and 40% of the senior group were in favor. The fact that those hypothetical expatriates were Arabs did not appear to make them any more welcome among the sample as a whole. An equal antipathy surrounds the Asian professionals, although Asian domestics are much in demand. The general attitude of the citizens seems to be, we can do it alone.

Neither age qroup felt embarassed by the discrepancy in income between native and expatriate, a guaranteed income is deemed their right. Both groups admitted that labor laws are in their favor compared to the expatriates. They also admitted, very candidly, that the expatriate is more produtive than the citizen.

Table II

Citizen's Age (X2) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

	X2	DF	X2S	CC	S	CCS	MR	SR	B	BETA	F
										Regression	
Y1	18.342	10	.849	.095	8581	.085	.235	.095	.082	.085	3.897
Y2	7.056	10	.876	.024	8581	.127	.242	.024	.072	.061	3.656
Y3	15.494	10	.115	.024	8581	.123	.242	.024	.009	.008	.072
Y4	24.052	10	.907	-.029	8581	.090	.243	-.029	-.015	.013	.169
Y5	15.802	10	.111	-.001	8581	.482	.243	-.001	-.006	-.004	.022
Y6	29.929	10	.021	-.008	8581	.446	.243	-.008	.021	.016	.259
Y7	11.138	10	.346	-.002	8581	.452	.244	-.002	.037	.033	1.076
Y8	9.886	10	.450	.042	8581	.024	.247	.042	.080	.050	2.460
Y9	25.805	20	.172	-.012	8581	.391	.243	-.012	.000	.000	.000
Y10	35.117	20	.009	.048	8581	.024	.251	.042	.040	.042	1.948

Causes for the low productivity of the native are many. The younger generation attributed it to the lack of a merit system within the bureaucracy.

'Wasta' - connections - is the basis of appointment and advancement rather than merit or qualifications. The older generation suggested, however, that low productivity stemmed from the absence of accountability. There is no punishment for non - performance, indeed, legally, the citizen's job is guaranteed, whether he performs or not. There is thus no incentive to work and no one assumes responsibility. Those of both age groups who felt that the productivity of the expatriates was also low, ascribed it to their feeling of alienation.

Nationality

The variable of nationality revealed some interesting differences on the question of economic opportunity. Some 44.2% of the Kuwaitis agreed that the greater the number of expatriates, the fewer economic opportunities for Kuwaitis. Among the other Gulf States 59.5% of the Bahrainis agreed concerning their own country, as did 45.5% of the Qatari's, 40% of the Emiratis, and 28% of the Saudis. Only in Bahrain, then, are expatriates seen as an economic threat by more than half the population. In Saudi, by contrast, they have a negligible effect. Correlation coefficient results as well as chi square and F test shown in Table III reveal that the increasing number of expatriates is not perceived as an economic threat to the citizens. This finding is corroborated by the citizens' general belief that their standard of living could be maintained with fewer foreigners.

Table III

Citizen's Nationality (X3) Related to Economic Aspects (YS)

	X2	DF	X2S	CC	S	CCS	MR	SR	B	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y1	95.626	12	.000	.083	8581	.001	.295	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y2	14.339	12	.279	.088	8581	.001	.297	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y3	42.045	12	.000	.035	8581	.047	.301	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y4	50.038	12	.000	.030	8581	.076	.302	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y5	44.143	12	.000	.036	8581	.036	.305	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y6	145.918	12	.000	.095	8581	.001	.306	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y7	44.512	12	.000	.067	8581	.001	.310	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y8	50.222	12	.000	.030	8581	.060	.310	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y9	43.285	24	.009	-.013	8581	.260	.313	-.013	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Y10	26.575	24	.324	-.014	8581	.258	.316	-.014	.044	[illegible]	[illegible]

The various Gulf nations also hold different opinions the advisability of inviting emigre Arab brain power in West, back to the Arab Gulf. Among the Kuwaitis, 53.6% this should be encouraged, as opposed to 62.6 % Bahra 36.4% of the Qataris, 41.7% of the Emiratis and 58.8 the Saudis. The somewhat surprising lack of enthusiasm