أفعال الكلام غير المباشرة في اللغة المنطوقة
Indirect Speech Acts in Spoken Language

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الملخص

يتناول هذا البحث فعل الكلام غير المباشر نظرًا لاستخدامه الناجح خاصة في المحادثة اليومية، ســيتم تحليل فعل الكلام غير المباشـــر في النظريات التالية: أولاً؛ نظرية الاســـتدلال لجوردون ولاكوف، ثانيًا؛ نظرية السـعادة التي قدمها جون سـيرل، ثالثًا؛ التضـمين التخاطبي لبول هربرت جريس، مشكلة فعل الكلام غير المباشر هي الأداء الغير مباشر، ويهدف البحث لتسليط الضـوء على حقيقة أن فعل الكلام غير المباشر يستخدم عادة لرفض الطلبات على الرغم من أن المعنى الصـريح لا يفسـر أي نوع من الرفض بسـبب الأدب والسـلطة. وخلصـت النتائج إلى أن نظرية الاسـتدلال توفر أنواع الطلب غير المباشـر التي تختلف بشـكل رئيسـي في أدبها، وتحدد الحدود الفعل المعنوي والميتافيزيقيا، وأخيرا فعل الكلام غير المباشـــر يمكن حســـابه من مبادئ أسلوب جريس.

Abstract

This research deals with indirect speech acts in utterances. Due to its successful usage, especially in everyday conversation, the indirect speech act will be analyzed in the following theories: first, inference theory by Gordon and Lakoff; second, theory of Felicity condition by John Searle; third, conversational implicature by Paul Herbert Grice. The problem of performance in indirect speech acts is metacommunication; the aim of the research has been outlined to highlight the fact that indirect speech act is commonly used to reject requests despite the literal meaning that does not explicate any rejection because of displeased politeness and authority. The results conclude that inference theory provides the varieties of indirect request, which differs mainly in their politeness, and the boundary sets physical action and metaphysics. Finally, the indirect speech act is calculable from Grice-style principles.

1. Introduction

Indirect speech acts are performed indirectly by performing another communicative act; an utterance determines its linguistic behaviour; Gordon & Lakoff (1975:90) have exemplified requests that can be modified with politeness "please", Morgan (1975: 294) has noted the implicature of request, Bach and Harnish (1979: 93) have ratified the sentence with politeness "please" e.g..:

   1- Would you please pass the salt ?

   2- Could you please pass the salt ?

Leech (1983: 108) has asserted that people tend to use indirect speech acts mainly in connection with politeness (please). Thus, they diminish the unpleasant message contained in request and order, for instance. However, politeness is not the only motivation for indirectness; people use indirect strategies when they want to make their speech interesting. Thomas (1995: 233) has discussed that speakers want to increase the force of the message communicated and to reach the goals of indirect speech act different from their partners.

   - Can you pass the salt ?

Searle (1975:347-349) has given the conjecture example " Can you pass the salt" with politeness" please", In every conversation situation is understood as a request, he has agreed with sincerely meant as a request like (*Please*) that is a label of type request. Cole (1975:259) has presented a persuasive discussion of conversational implicature, example shows how the request: " Can you pass the salt" it has a convention and implicature, but it hasn't got grammatical marks of pre-verbal (*please*).

Clark (1979:457) has interposed utterance interrogative form is not a sign of politeness giving the addressee the choice and does not commit them to an order to follow, for example:

   - Can you reach the suitcase ?

Bach and Harnish (1979:107) are forced to reject sentence in which the question co-occurs with (*please*) as ungrammatical. Negative "Not" is not modified with (*Please*) so it does not appear request conventionally, e.g.:

A: Can you shut the door?

B: I can't reach the door.

Morgan (1975: 300) has attested observation that both have illocutionary acts. Vanderveken (1990: 62) has used illocutionary points to distinguish the indirect speech acts of request and question. Perlocutionary Acts performed with the intention of producing a further effect on the

hearer, sometimes, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act are on a simple example request. e,g:

-   Would you close the door ?

Searle (1969: 59) has justified these implicit perfomatives, examples construct an indefinitely long list of ways of requesting an addressee indirectly, Sadock (1975: 301) has maintained that the directive concentrates for illustrative examples:

-   Would you close the door ?
-   Could you close the door ?
-   Would you mind closing the door ?
-   May I ask you to close the door? because it is very cold in here.
-   I would like you to close the door.
-   You ought to close the door.
-   It might help to close the door.

Davidsen & Nielson (1990: 174) have conceived terms "tentative politeness" and " modest uses " of modal would, could and might e.g.:

1- Would you do me a favor ?

2- Could you lend me money ?

3- Might I go along too?

Inference theory proposed by Gordon and Lakoff (1975:97) have discovered the examples that the statement of the sincerity condition of forbidden (*shouldn't*(and impossible (*Can't*) are not used on request e.g.:

* Shouldn't you shut the door?

* Can't you shut the door ?

Searle (1975: 350) has developed felicity conditions proposed in directive utterances that focus on request, offer, and suggestion. In some literature, Searle has only mentioned felicity conditions of commissives.

 I promise   *I will pay your ticket*

illocutionarey clause Propositional clause (futurity condition)

- I will help you with your homework. (Sincerity condition - speaker)

- Steven will repair your car. (Essential condition-hearer)

Goffman (1974:9) has called " face - work " maintained and enhanced face- threatening act, it potentially threatens either the speaker's or hearer's face or both. e.g.:

-You might try to put the key into the slot. (suggestion)

Leech (1971: 32) has come up the meaning "tentative suggestion " past of may (root permission), the speaker manages his assertion saving face (might) expression of politeness conveys permission.e.g.:

1- I might miss something out.
2- I might go back home early.

Might is the weakest of modal series so culture differences indicate the reject in emphatic meaning. e.g.:

- He must not fail.

Brown and Levinson (1987:56) have deduced the idea, embedding is used to explain the block in (composite – request) rule realized with an imperative that is not mitigator, while (marked- ask) rule realized with a question, thus the indirect request interpretation is blocked, e.g.:

- Can you move over ?
- Can you carry that luggage down for me ?

Brown and Levinson (1987:41) have used threating acts, emphatic meaning has " cost and benefit" e.g.:

- I can give you a lift. (offer)
- Can I get a ride ? (suggestion)

Thomson and Martinet (1985:129) have consented " Can " used as an alternative of may permission in informal situation, e.g.:

- He can take my car.

Strawson (1964: 11) has verified to assign through (*can*) content is a realization of the abstract information, or possibility is a relation familiar to metaphysics, and the physical capability (*can*) is force on the part of the doer or some energy, for examples:

1- Can you solve the math equation ?

2- She can drive at 18^+.

3- You can run very fast.

Gazdar (1981:73) and Levinson (1983:5) have followed criticism of various inference theories based on the notion of literal illocutionary force (can) performance. However, indirect speech acts flout blatantly the

felicity condition given this view of conventions about speaker language. Yule (1996:35) has indicated that it is illocutionary force in an implicit way and the communicative value of utterances.

2. Pragmatic Approach of Indirect Speech Act:

Austin (1962: 31) has proposed the middle condition for execution in which the procedures executed correctly and completely, so the violation of this slight modification condition will make the performative utterance unhappy, e.g.:

- I will come to your house.
  Searle (1969:61) has specified category of commissives is similar to Austin's category because the illocutionary point is to commit the speaker to some future course of action, (shall) e.g..

- I shall not steal.
  Searle has approved a more complete account of indirect speech act and presents proposing generalizations associated with major classes of indirect speech act commissives. i.e. Indirectness, e.g.:

1- I will come on Tuesday for sure.
2- Must you smoke?
3- We must leave the old paradigm.
4- The old tradition should be abandoned
5- It must be remembered that the nature of Paris is diversity.
6- You can vote for me.

The performative verb whether are fulfilled or not must be judged by pragmatic inference then illocutionary is entirely pragmatics,. e.g.:

- You can borrow four books.
  Perlocutionary act is the effect of illocutionary act on the listener or addressee, it is the last sequel result in persuasions., e.g.:

- Leave the car or you will be dead.
  Searle (1975: 345) who has divided illocutionary acts into five major categories in Levinson's explanation as the following:

1-Representatives commit asserting, e.g.: You ought to clean the room.

2-Directives commit request, e.g.: Would you make me a cup of tea?

3- Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action (promising) e.g.: (He will deliver the books).

4-Expressives used for you kind offer e.g.: (Can I pay by card).

5-Declaratives effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs which tend to rely on extralinguistic institutions, e.g.: (Korea will go to war)

Moore and Knott (1962:170) have taken (*must and ought to*) from old English data called necessary, (must and ought to) never used in modal past, However(must and ought to) is valid as a real conditional. e.g.:

must
- He ought to go to the bank today

(*Must and ought to*) combine with the perfect in past time context, e.g.:

must
- He ought to have gone to the bank yesterday.

American English seldom uses (*shall*) in future tense, (*Shall*) functions with first pronoun (I, we), e.g.:

- We shall see.
- I shall be there .

Hengeveld (1988:236) has elaborated modals as (peripheral operators) because their function is external to the core layer "Shall" in modern English as a suppletive form of (*will*) they express the likelihood:

- Shall I go ?

Jacobsson (1986: 177) has compiled examples taken from literature, In formal context speakers use (was) for real condition, (were) primarily used for informal context in hypothetical condition, e.g.:

- If I were the prime minister of UK, I would live in Wales.

Dynamic modals happen in the protasis condition" must, could and might ", e.g.:

- If the purity rain water must be stored, the cheapest gutter is cleaning mechanism in the street.

(*Would*) inversion has evidence from English fashionable swearing, e.g.:

- Why on earth would I do that.

Interesting exclamation is partial conditionals which have no verb at all with ellipsis of the apodosis (if… only, if… but):

- If you would only listen !
- If you could but see her !

Palmer (1986: 173) has added analysis expression (if only) e.g.:

- If only Lucy would win a gold medal !

Condoravdi and Lauer (2010:46) have determined that speaker's wishes is infelicitous, e.g.:

-Sue must enroll in three classes this year, Although I wish she would not

Jacobsson(1986: 179) has extracted the sentence, negative inversion is a non-canonical syntax phenomenon in which negative constituent appears a non- canonical position in the left periphery of the sentence triggering subject-auxiliary inversion, e.g.:

- Under no condition would I leave this city.
- On no account could she move to Alaska.
- Not until December can we go to church.
- Not a sound could we hear.
- With no job would Marie be happy.
- On no account should you eat an apple for breakfast.
- Never would I eat palm.
- Under no circumstances will Dan be at this show.

Picallo (1990:310) has pointed out that modal auxiliaries (epistemic) take perfective HAVE+EN due to (Past Tense Replacement) and imperfective progressive BE+ING markers, while root modals (deontic/ dynamic) do not meanwhile deontic and dynamic modals take root ability, e.g.:

-The thief could come in by the window.(deontic)

- Judy could not have left. (epistemic)

The position of high adverbials is indeed very high in the left periphery of initial position, e.g.:

- Next week, he may win a medal.

Kratzer (1981: 56) has dedicated " must" strong force with deontic modal, and "may " for weak possibility, e.g.:

- You must upload your homework as a PDF
- You may have a cookie.

Sweetser (1990:141) has resided (*may*) encodes dynamic force in potential notion and (*must*) encodes compulsion, for instance:

- You may spend this sum any way you wish.

Kratzer(1995:128) has commenced that (must) applies logic sources, he postulates a list of modal bases which include categories such as stereotypical or bouletic feature(*may and must*) related to logic.e.g.:

1- Alice must be Edward 's sister.
2- The criminal must be from this area.
3- Soldiers must do their duty.

So (May) is fronted modal in question, e.g.:

- May you find what you were looking for ?
- May Sally win a medal ?

The difference is often lexically encoded, modal is either deontic or epistemic reading:

1- The train must leave, so it has to lunch according to the time table. (deontic)
2- The train must be leaving, so it kept blowing the steam whistle. (epistemic).

Von Wright (1951:20) has established an alethic modality that is related to logical or absolute necessity. Stalnaker (1996:17) has classified in the case of modals, the operator is the logical relation (entailment or compatibility), the domains of propositions include more constrained systems of law, regulation or rules called regulatory domains, regulatory domains include legal rulings in the common law. For examples:

1-(May) is compatible with the set of all propositions (unspecified), e.g.:

- The butler may have committed the murder in the meantime.   - The branch bank may convert your account into a young student.

2- (Can) is compatible with the set of all propositions (factual), e.g.:

-Computer based instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching.

3-(Must) is entailed by the set of o all propositions (unspecified)

- You must leave the country.
- One ought to respect one's country.

4-(Should) is entailed by the set of all propositions (normative)

- Chief scout should be back by midnight.

Perkins (1983:72) and Coates (1983: 109) has calculated that *may* and *might* indicate the same meaning and can be used interchangeably without changes in the meaning of the sentences. e.g.:

- He might be coming to the cinema.

- You may have left the keys at home.

Coates (1983:117) has underlined the subjectivity of epistemic modality setting in the speaker's attitude to the proposition placed at the two ends of a scale whose extremes represent confidence and doubt, (*Must*) is inferential confident and (*should and ought to*) are doubtful, (*will*) is Non-inferential confident and (*may, might and could*) are doubtful, as illustrated by the following table:

Table (1) Inferential and Non- inferential

Inferential		Non- inferential
Must	Confident	Will
Should, Ought to	Doubtful	May, Might, Could

1-Elisabeth must right now be walking her dog through the English Garden.   2-You should tell your father.

3- You ought to have read the road sign.
4- He will have read the message.
5- He might have got lost.
6- He may have gone.
7- He could be waiting at the station.

Lyons (1977: 113) has concerned the term attitude with subjectivity understood as agent subject or speaker involvement.

- people should read the old books. (subject – oriented)   - The turtle should stay in the bathtub. (Non –subject – oriented)

A weather-it or non- nominative subject no subject oriented is possible.e.g.:

-   It may rain tomorrow
-   It may have rained last night.
-   Bad weather can ruin the crops
    Lyons (1977:115) has showed that the orientation of the deontic obligation is shifted towards the interlocutor under the influence of interrogation. e.g.:

-   Must l leave my platoon, sir?
In deontic obligation, the politician could say:

-   We must object to this issue.(speaker – oriented)
-   The traitor must die. (speaker- oriented)
Palmer (1986: 176) has endured dynamic ability or willingness that is subject – oriented rather than speaker- oriented.

-   She can play chess.
-   They will go to a movie.
    Hyland (1998: 102) has accounted for surface features of hedging in scientific discourse in which assertions are made with objective appraisal of reliability, students tended to shield their interlocutor and deployed hedges, " would " may be described as expanding dialogistic space along slightly stronger lines than " it is probable that" and it is more hypothetical, " might " is tentative degree, "could" is more a maker of scientific status rather than common discourse, " must " expresses potential face-threatening insistence leading to its evidence. e.g.:
- The cause of death would be a cardiac crisis

- Chemotherapy might be used as the first line of treatment of cancer.

- The cause of his death could be internal bleeding.

- Cells and bacteria could stay in harmony.

- You could plant beans there and they could grow.

- The roof of the house must be a half-timbered

- Brake shoes must always be renewed in sets of four.

- to reach orbit an object must accelerate to satellite speed.

3. Discourse Approach of Indirect speech act

Grice (1975: 46) has expanded four categories of maxims that are applicable to linguistic action, " will you action " performs the desired action anyway, rule related to the maxim of Desirability, when negated cannot be future-oriented, it is not likelihood, e.g..:

(a)   You will share the message
(b)   You will not find a similar mask
(c)   Won't you tell me the phone number?

Palmer (1990: 107) has covered the term of dynamic modality for action category that the modals of volition and ability do not express all time the position of speaker and (not) is not future oriented, e.g.:

- He won't see a psychiatrist at all

Moscati (2006: 127- 130) has devoted in modern vernacular English, in which negation scopes raise the modal to a higher head expressing action in informal situation, e.g.:

-Won't you sit down?

- Can't you come ?

The last four maxims represent four classes of implicit-action called Maxims of cooperative principles of conversation, the principles implies decisions in four major areas:

1-Relation: be relevant

2-Quality:

a) do not say what you believe to be false (truth)
b) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
3- Quantity:

 a) make your contribution as informative as is required

b) do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

4- Manner:

a) avoid obscurity of expression

b) avoid ambiguity

c) be brief

d) be orderly.

(Grice 1975: 58) has not assumed that all people should follow these maxims; instead, he found it interesting when these were not respected; there will always be occasions when a speaker decides to quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim in which the speaker may lie. He is rather outright lying half-truths by violating the maxim of quality or being intentionally misleading by violating another maxim. e.g..:

-   I shall get something for my sister

Grice observes that the speaker is not obeying the cooperative principles so he can produce extra information, so Grice refers to this flout as an implicature; conversational implicature deduces to the extra meaning implied on some deeper level. e.g..:

A: Would you like to meet me for coffee in cafe?

B: I have to study for an exam.

Searle proofs that the second speaker has used an indirect speech act to reject the proposal, the literal meaning of (I have to study) does not entail any sort of rejection. (A) has made a suggestion and (B) has uttered a statement, factual background happens between both speakers. it is possible to assume that B means more or something entirely different from what is actually being said.

Yule(1998: 151) has provided hedges as cooperative principle; first, the importance is the maxim of quality for cooperative interaction; the best measured by the number of expressions may not be totally accurate truth. e.g.:
-   I may mistake in the form

The second is quantity produced in the course of speaker's account of exact information, e.g.:
-   I won't bore you with all the details, but it was an exciting cruise.

Third is relevance from the maxim of relation that can be found in the middle of speakers' talk, e.g.:
- It may sound like a dumb question, but whose handwriting is this?

Fourth is manner which leads speakers to produce hedges, e.g.:

- It may be a bit confused, but I remember being in a car

Sacks et. at.(1974: 698) have demonstrated different speech exchange system, according to the organization of turn taking when a speaker takes a turn already the next speaker is usually preserved, there is only one appropriate (Question –Answer) in maxims, e.g.:

A: Tell us about yourself so we can find something bad about you.   B: Yeah, hurry up. (quality)

A:Will you go to the party ?

 B: I'm busy (relation)

A:Hi, do you have size C flashlight batteries

B:sir   B:I 'll have four. (quantity)

A: So I was wondering would you be in your office on Monday ? B:Probably not (manner) (ibid., p.321)

Jespersen (1954:291) has anticipated to "imaginative use" as Modal past manifests in hypothetical conditionals, therefore "imagination tenses " indicate unreality and non- fulfillment without temporal import by merging (not) in spoken situation, e.g.:

- We couldn't bring our dog into the restaurant.

" Should " does not cast doubt on the likelihood by merging (not). It is to be likely tentative meaning that can express advice, e.g.:
1- You shouldn't be in the forest alone.
2- You shouldn't have drunk the wine.

Palmer (1986: 84) has treated for " non- assertion " as prohibition, e.g.:

- You mustn't drive fast.

Jespersen (1954: 294) has noted that modals do not all interact identically with negation root modal (deontic) must and can either take negation on its scope or scope below the negation, e.g.:

- Susie must not miss the bus. (deontic)

- Dork can not retake the exam (deontic)

- He can not swim in the sea. (ability)

Palmer (2001: 19) has traced dynamic capability (can) prompts negative polarity, for example:

- He can't swim.(dynamic capability)

Homer (2010: 280) has reversed the position, deontic *must* and *should* may move out of the domain of negation in an anti- licensing environment, (can) can not escape negation in non- finite clause, e.g.:

- To live with Sophie must not be possible
- To win 1-0 on such a difficult field can not be unimpressive.

Bouletic feature is partly driven syntax and negative head is syntactically banned e.g.:

- Tom may not run for president !

(May) has negation in its scope, bouletic features are high left peripheral position and scope over the negative marker, the left periphery is composed of force head.

-May Diana not be late!

- May Henry not be brave !

Huddleston & Pullum (2002:74) has encompassed some formal features, modal verbs share with other auxiliaries in ways such as ; negation, inversion, ellipsis and emphatic code, these features are known as *nice* properties, for examples:
1- They convey emphatic meaning e.g.: I can't, I am afraid
2- They encode the proposition in elliptic construction e.g.: Sarah can play the piano and so can Bill.
3- They are inverted with the subject in interrogative sentences e.g.: can I … Can I have my hat ?…. May I… May I order a muffin, etc.
4- They take negation directly without the need for Do support e.g.: can't… I can't stand the noise…mustn't… Bob mustn't smoke…etc.
Horn (1972: 94) and Kamp(1973:62) have given entailment (any) and (or) in inference pattern, the former is licensed and the latter receives a free choice, e.g. ;

- Joseph may be anywhere.
- Joseph may be in Paris or in London
- Joseph must be in Paris or in London.

Kadmon and Landman (1993:411) have employed (any) in two different ways. (Any) can function as a negative item, and it can obtain a free choice interpretation, Kadom and Landman correctly predict that any is not licensed in first sentence since it disappeared in the second sentence free choice derived implications of disjunctive possibility statement, in the third sentence the speaker satisfies Grice 's maxim of quantity and the effects illustrates the reasoning for necessity statements.

- You may pick any flower.
- You may pick a flower.
- Any pilot could be flying this plane.
- A pilot could be flying this plane.

Dayal (1998:462) has endured the ordinary indefinite counterparts of these sentences in existential interpretation. e.g.:

- A philosopher may come
- A man may be older than his own uncle.

(*must*) in contrast with (*may*) does not have the ability to change the quantification of an indefinite in its scope, therefore it seems to predict that in necessity statement an indefinite with (a) cannot receive a generic interpretation and any is not allowed, however, the necessity statement in which(a) can be interpreted generically and any is licensed, e.g.:

- A plane must have security belt. (generic reading)
- Any plane must have security belt.

Kratzer (1995: 143) has registered (must) on its generic reading as deontically and with(any) is an epistemic interpretation, e.g.:

- A car must be parked in the garage.
- Any car must be parked in the garage..

Horn (1972: 99) has entailed the alternative grammatical view of implicatures no such Gricean 's cooperative principle is required. e.g.:

- You can take two books
- You should take two books.

There is no analogue of numeral quantifiers; it is an epistemic possibility but nevertheless physically able in the first, and it is an epistemic necessity in the second.

- The dog could be kept outside. it can stay out.
- The next road on the left ought to be Prince Street.
- The flood must have had some impact snow.

The non-personal pronoun and instrumental subject have epistemic reading.

- All dogs must be kept outdoors at night.
- People must go in one at a time.
- The lift must not be used during fire.

Speakers use upward entailing context to talk about matters deontic necessity, the modal of legal requirement and prohibition.

Horn (1972:81) has engendered (*may*) with a relatively weak term in the statement and the participant in conversational exchange strive to make their contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange (first maxim of quantity, Grice1989:25) and that they do not say things for which they lack evidence, (second maxim of quality, Grice1989: 29). e.g.:

1-It may rain tomorrow.
2-It might rain.
3- It might have rained.

In conjunction with the maxim of quality Grice (1989: 29) has motivated epistemic modals with past and temporal orientation.

-The doctor will be in London either next week or the following week.

-Joe will give an **A** to every student who turned in their homework on time.

-Kate might go to Sydney, She 'll have fun.

Thomason (1984:157) has given clear English. For instance epistemic modals easily scope under negation and deontic modals take wide scope with respect to negation (not) licensed because (can't) doesn't have future oriented, e.g.:

- George can't be on his office. (negative + epistemic)

- George must not arrive late. (deontic + negation).

Horn (1978:203) has clarified negative or positive quantifiers that can give rise to negative-split or negative elements, e.g.:

- I can never thank you enough.

It simply assumes that the answer is negative.

Horn (1996:105) has customized the view that inference is a presupposition of an embedded sentence, presupposition projects universally in the scope of negative universal quantifiers, and inference projects universally under a universal quantifier over time. for examples:

- David mustn't run here
- No one must run
- No one must be home.
- Not a single person must run
- Some students must not leave.
- I must go now
- Few boys mustn't read the encyclopedia
- Only Russell mustn't read the encyclopedia
- Not every student must leave
- Eva must not leave.
- Nobody must leave.

Epistemic and deontic categories rife among those obligations/permissions, the problem of the scope of "must" has not received much attention in the literature, could scope is rigidly, e.g.:

- Alfred couldn't run.

- One can smoke in public places.

- One pin can not be knocked down.

Jespersen (1949:10) cited in Jackendoff (1969:223) have founded that speakers accept deontic (*must*) when the modal is shielded by a quantifier like (every) and (always), for some speakers rescuing is very hard if not impossible the same holds that rescuing is harder with (*should*) than with (*must*). Shielding created by an intervening quantifier like (*some*) and (*must*) can be shielded, existential quantifiers are not strong scalar

terms, and they do not trigger a scalar indirect, implicature doesn't shield (*some*) but strikingly the universal quantifier. e, g:

- One mustn't always go with the new to get good.
- Everything mustn't be expensive to be worthwhile.
  Horn (1989: 47) has identified that deontic should is negative- raiser and that must is not new, e.g.:

- Not everyone should get a flu shot
- Not everyone should win the lottery.
- Jim shouldn't leave
- A few people should leave.

The Results:

The present research finds out the following results:

1- ⸺Austin has set up indirect speech acts (ISAs) that are non-truth-conditional. If the participant is not satisfied, then the performative action is infelicitous, which is derived from unhappy instead of false, and vice versa, felicitous which is derived from happy instead of true.

2- Searle implicitly shows remarks about certain indirect illocutionary acts in the non-literal utterance because illocutionary acts are not matters of purely physical facts.

3- A conventional illocutionary act is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which use syntactic devices such as (could). Its illocutionary must differ from the literal meaning of the performative verb   (can), which is physical capability.

4- The gradual models developed epistemic auxiliaries in addition to their root meaning, (Should) loses the past form of shall because should is a purely present form. (Would) conveys the meaning of volition in occasional archaic usage.

5- Certain uses of epistemic modality (*may and can*) clearly serve to encode the first person speaker 's commitment to the permission of action, but (*can*) is an informal alternative of (*may*),(may and might) do not derive "not" forms, and do not have interaction with negation while (not) is typing target space in the middle sentence.

6- ⸺In spoken language, an intriguing pattern is merger (not), which raises a feature to force head, (won't), which indicates the agent's unwillingness to carry out action denoted by the main verb, and merger

(Can't), which expresses impossibility when somebody refuses to do something. They do not have future-oriented action in informal spoken situations.

7- "Not" connotation in (*Shouldn't*) and (*Can't*) in request do not hold condition.

8- Anything remotely approaching request is (would) and (please) because they are super polite, (*could*) shows that the speaker is less sure for an affirmative answer.

9- Academic students appear significant preference for (*would*).

10- The term deontic modal used to organize meaning of obligation, necessity, permission, possibility, capability and volition.

11- The set of epistemic modal auxiliaries in English includes ; *may, might, must, will, would, should and could.*

12- Dynamic and deontic modality are sometimes classified in the same category this is because both deontic and dynamic modality are agent-oriented, whereas epistemic modality is speaker- oriented.

13- Grice 's Maxims are broken by two ways: the former, violation are hedges and prediction, the latter, flouting is called conversational implicature whenever the participant has implicated something else or extra information to flout the maxim.

14- Conversational implicature is a non-truth conditional aspect of speaker meaning.

15- Bouletic features (*may, must, can*) related with logic resources in negative and interrogative sentences, nevertheless, alethic modality is related to logical necessity in private and public law.

16- (*Must*) is speaker's authority meanwhile (*have to*) is external authority, (*should*) bases advice and (shouldn't) implies criticism . (Ought to) is speaker's duty, negative obligation, (mustn't) imposed by the speaker for very emphatic device. Sometime, (mustn't) and metaphysical (can't) mean prohibition beside (Can) merely indicates the physical ability respectively.

17- Dynamic modals can be hypothesized in a conditional protasis, past conditionals refer to English hypothetical conditionals, sometimes (*Would*) inversion vibrates swearing.

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