



## A Corpus-based Critical Discourse Analysis of Islamophobic Propaganda in British and American Media Narratives

### \* Corresponding Author

Ahmed Qadoury Abed  
Mustansiriya University.  
College of Arts

Email:  
[dr.ahmed.qadouriy@uomustansiriya.edu.iq](mailto:dr.ahmed.qadouriy@uomustansiriya.edu.iq)

**Keywords:** Islamophobic discourse, Muslim representation, propaganda analysis, Western media

Article history:  
Received: 2025-03-18  
Accepted: 2025-04-18  
Available online: 2025-05-01



### ABSTRACT

The present study examines the reproduction of Western Islamophobic propaganda in selected British and American newspapers. The discursive, socio-cultural, political, procedural and narrative, and stereotyping frames of Islamophobic propaganda are presented as background. Three models are used to examine 32 purposely-chosen articles from *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, *USA Today*, and *The New York Times* from 2012 to 2023, based on search words such as 'Islam', 'Muslims', 'Prophet Muhammad' and 'Burning Quran'. These models are van Dijk's (2000) notion of ideological squares, especially Western positive-WE representation, Fairclough's (2003) six techniques for intertextuality, which are used as complementary to Jowett and O'Donnell's (2015) propaganda model. Based on a corpus-based analysis via *Sketch Engine*, this data has shown differences in the Islamophobic propaganda in the British and American articles regarding ideology, purpose, context, propagandists, target audience, 'institutional' organisation, media techniques utilised to maximise its effects, audience reactions and possible counterpropaganda. The analysis also revealed that the British articles were behind in displaying integration and agitation propaganda, where politicians, journalists, and individuals involved were supporters of the leading opinions, while the American ones were behind in presenting public diplomacy propaganda. The repetition of violent vocabulary associated with Islam and Muslims was so familiar; a procedure used to convince readers, despite the 'governmental' or 'planned' permissions, to insult their Prophet, to burn their Quran, or to depict them as terrorists.



## تحليل خطاب نقدي معتمد على المتون للدعاية المعادية في رهاب الاسلام في سرديات الاعلام البريطانية والأمريكية ا.د. احمد قدوري عبد الجامعة المستنصرية / كلية الاداب

### المستخلص

تبحث هذه الدراسة في إعادة إنتاج الدعاية الغربية المعادية للإسلام في صحف أمريكية وبريطانية مختارة. وقدمت الاطر الخطابية والاجتماعية والثقافية والسياسية والإجرائية والسردية النمطية على انها الاساس للدعاية المعادية للإسلام. اعتمدت الدراسة على ثلاثة نماذج للتحليل وهي: ميديا van Dijk (2000) للمربعات الايديولوجية و الاستراتيجيات الست ل Fairclough (2003) للتناص، واللذين وظفا كادوات تحليلية مساندة لنموذج Jowett and O'Donnell (2015) لتحليل الدعاية الاعلامية. و اختارت الدراسة 32 مقالا مقتبسا من اربع صحف غربية (بريطانية و امريكية) وهي The Guardian و The Daily Mail و USA Today و The New York Times للفترة من 2012 إلى 2023، بناء على كلمات بحثية مثل "الإسلام" و "المسلمين" و "النبي محمد" و "القرآن المحترق". استنادا إلى تحليل قائم على على لسانيات المتون باستخدام ادوات التحليل المتاحة في موقع التحليل Sketch Engine، أظهرت هذه البيانات اختلافات في الدعاية المعادية للإسلام في المقالات البريطانية والأمريكية فيما يتعلق بالأيديولوجية والغرض والسياق والدعاية والجمهور المستهدف والتنظيم "المؤسسي" والتقنيات الإعلامية المستخدمة لتعظيم آثارها وردود أفعال الجمهور والدعاية المضادة المحتملة. كشف التحليل أيضا أنه تم استخدام دعاية مختلفة في البيانات. فظهرت النتائج ان المقالات البريطانية كانت تهدف لعرض دعاية التكامل والتحريض، حيث كان السياسيون والصحفيون والأفراد المعنيون مؤيدين فعليين للرأى الرائدة، بينما كان الأمريكيون وراء تقديم دعاية الدبلوماسية العامة وذلك بتكرار المفردات العنيفة المرتبطة بالإسلام والمسلمين مألوف جدا كإجراء يستخدم أيديولوجيا لإقناع القراء، على الرغم من التصاريح "الحكومية" أو "المخططة"، بإهانة نبيهم، أو حرق قرآنهم، أو تصويرهم على أنهم إرهابيون.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** خطاب رهاب الاسلام، الدعاية الاعلامية، تمثيل المسلمين اعلاميا، الاعلام الغربي

### Introduction

The last fifty years have constantly witnessed conflicts and events against Muslims and non-Muslims' worlds justified by slogans of freedom of expression on religion, thought, and conscience (Janssen, 2012). Today, Muslim communities are encountering forms of hostile attitudes, or Islamophobic "prejudice and misinformation" (Morey et al., 2019, p.181) and media ignorance, both verbally and physically. *Islamophobia* is defined by Allen (2010, p.190) as:

A cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain the ills of the (global) social order by attributing them to Islam. It is a way of thinking that conflates the histories, politics, societies and cultures of the Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of Islam...It

is an ideology in which the ‘backwardness’ of the other is established through an essentialist Islam.

Different forms and procedures of racism and discrimination (Richardson, 2004) and civil and official calls for human rights and social cohesion have been taken as an excuse for more violent and criminal procedures (Abed & Hameed, 2015; Abed, 2016). For example, within the last decade of this century, and particularly after the events of Sept 11<sup>th</sup>, the anti-Prophet Muhammad controversy is the most usual form of these procedures, where media is manipulated not only to depict his biography but also to criticise his religion and beliefs. Being the opposite of the neutral role of media, these Islamophobic conflicts have unfortunately been ‘democratically’ accepted or legitimised (Liu, 2020). Therefore, the relevant literature of Muslim –West debates/ relations/conflicts is wealthy due to political, social, and economic crises, such as those of Orientalism in the 1970s, the Palestine-Israel crises, gulf wars (1980-2003), USA wars against Muslim countries such as Afghanistan, Sept 11<sup>th</sup> (2001), the appearance of Muslim terrorists such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, massacres and anti-Muslim hate crimes such as the 2019 New Zealand Mosque massacre (Iftikhar, 2021), and applying “restrictive measures and bans on the practice of Islam in the public sphere” (Awan & Zempi, 2016, p.2). This relationship is also inflamed by publications such as Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* (1989) and Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996, 2002). Metaphorically, these, in turn, have coloured the world and the Middle East to be ‘red’, such as the bloody situation in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, where thousands of innocents were killed. Also, there are ‘yellow’ crises or conflicts such as ‘headscarf affair in France (1989) (see Wolfreys, 2016), depicting the Prophet in shameful films such as the American film *Innocence of Muslims* (2012), cartoons such as the Danish crisis (2005) and the Charlie Hebdo crisis (2012), and the subsequent events of burning the Holy Quran in Nordic countries. The last one is in Sweden and Denmark (2023), where an Iraqi refugee, Salwan Momika, and two far-right protesters burned the Quran and the flag of Iraq outside the Iraqi embassies in these two European countries. In all these ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ Islamophobic crises, there are discourse, dominant powers, dominated powers, and propaganda (Cole, 2022, p.3). Abed (2016) believes these constitute a long-term agenda used to consolidate “a particular point of view into the minds of those [ordinary Westerners] they wish to manipulate” (Jones, 2021, p.2). Also, as an ally or not, Muslim leaders have found themselves inside ‘grey’ ‘West-Russia’ and ‘West-China’ crises (see Diesen (2022) and Farley and Johnson (2021), respectively).

Different propaganda models are in the literature; the most common ones are Herman and Chomsky 1.0 (2002), Willcox (2005), a modified version of Herman and Chomsky’s model as 2.0 by Fuchs (2018), and Jowett and O'Donnell (2015). Based on three hypotheses and

filters, Herman and Chomsky's model is concerned with how the political elite manufacture consent, especially "concerned to explore the interplay between power, social structure and ideology" (Mullen & Klaehn, 2010, p.225). Fucks (2018) works on increasing the number of filters related to "the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms" (p.71). These five themes of Wilcox (2005) "transcend the variables between the conflicts, with the dominance of each element shifting concerning the specific [propaganda] requirements of the crisis" (p.77). Based on a corpus-based analysis via *Sketch Engine*, the present study examines the proposed propaganda used to reproduce Islamophobic narratives in selected British and American newspapers from 2012 to 2023. Two research questions are set up:

- 1- How is the Islamophobic propaganda in the selected data represented?
- 2- What are the points of similarity and difference in reproducing the Islamophobic propaganda in the British and American newspapers?

## Literature Review

The relevant literature on propaganda has identified it as a conscious appeal of politicians to motivate the public "to an unconscious desire, normalise the policy or behaviour, and continuously push the narratives to cement a position in the mental space" (Diesen, 2022, pp.18-19). That is, it is to "achieve" and "advance" the cognitive opinion and perception of a target group or the public (in terms of Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent*, 2002). Cole (2022, p.3) states

[T]he aim of any propaganda war is to exercise power over target audiences to engineer consent for a specific point of view or policy. The primary means of doing this is by setting the paradigms and supporting narratives which frame the dominant discourse on that issue. Those paradigms and narratives are essentially stories that explain the issue in crude and often emotive terms, and serve as a framework to interpret and analyse events. The principal actors in the propaganda war then use their influence to build social networks around those paradigms and narratives as a means to engage more minor actors with the issue.

Therefore, the 'proposed' Islamophobic propaganda consists of five frames: discursive, political (or "a dimension of antagonism (Patel, 2022, p.15), economic, social-cultural, procedural and narrative, and stereotyping. These frames will be presented here under three major ones.

### ***The discursive and political frames***

The discursive and political frames for the Islamophobic propaganda cannot be understood unless the long list of crises in the Muslim world, where Islam is seen as the *OTHER*, is taken into consideration. As a direct consequence of this list, Muslims and Muslim communities have been ‘politicised’ by non-Muslims, particularly Europeans (see Renton (2019) and Allen (2019, 2020)). However, there are still governmental efforts to teach Europeans the meaning and negative consequences of Islamophobia on Muslims and other minorities. For example, in 2005, the *Council of Europe* published *Islamophobia and Its Consequences on Young People, referring to a violation and threat to both human rights and social cohesion*. However, these efforts are not convincing due to “a lack of textual sources that consider the phenomenon itself, or its manifestations and consequences” (Allen, 2010, p. ii). Respectively, Richardson’s *(Mis)Representing Islam* (2004) is one of these attempts to study this ‘ideology’, stating “Muslims feel there is a kind of [outside] conspiracy against them; they feel betrayed [inside] whenever they watch and read about their religion, culture, and beliefs” (p.ix). Concrete evidence for such an understanding of Muslims is the subsequent burning of the Quran in Stockholm by an Iraqi refugee, Salwan Momika. Muslim governments and protesters reject and condemn these occasions. Still, no positive actions have been taken by these European governments, as they say, due to ‘rights of expression’, which is the ‘sustainable’ justification of this Islamophobic discourse. To support this ‘conspiracy’, the researcher believes that a double-standard strategy manipulated by the US and some European countries towards Muslim extremists is another reason for the political frame, especially since they ideologically and materially (weapons, money, media, and technologies) support terrorists such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda and ISIS (see Hilal’s examination of Bush’s, Obama’s and Trump’s administration and these terrorists, 2021). Hundreds, if not thousands, of ISIS ‘jihadists’ live in the US and Europe, as in Lizzie Dearden’s “Isis: Up to 5,000 jihadists could be in Europe after returning from terror training camps abroad” published in *The Independent* on Feb 20<sup>th</sup> 2016. For the US, both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton accused each other in the Presidential debates that they support ISIS. Matt Olsen’s “*Why ISIS supports Donald Trump*”, published in *TIME* on Sept 7th, 2016, is one of the articles that support this claim.

### ***The economic frame***

Economically speaking, from the Oil Crisis in 1973 and the subsequent ones, Western governments have moved to focus their plans towards the Middle East, leading to their involvement in wars in the region, such as the Gulf War II. The Western governments, as affirmed by Sutar (2013, p. 26), have started to think of new economic and military strategies



that could help them to exert their control on rich Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Bahrain. The world trade and oil crises led Western countries to have new international financial reforms, which, in turn, are represented by declining government expenditures on public services such as health, education, and employment, and finding new resources on the other hand. The weapon industry has quickly flourished, and to complete the scene, new wars are found, even with false and unauthorised reasons, such as the invasion of Iraq by US troops for Weapons of Mass Destruction lie (Kazi, 2019). Iran's Nuclear Programme and Arab Spring can be regarded as good examples here, especially in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, which are living without infrastructure. Readers have to remember that thousands of Iraqis were killed, thousands are now refugees, thousands are sick due to the US 'new' weapons, thousands were killed by 'trained' jihadists of Al-Qaeda, thousands are illiterate for being orphans, and millions are still living with 'unsuitable' standards of living (Kazi, 2019). This economic frame has moved to be international, and the Ukraine-Russia crisis is just a fresh example.

### ***The socio-cultural frame***

For the socio-cultural frame, Islamic notions have been regarded as strange standards (such as the themes of 'headscarf', 'hijab', and 'house'), and as a substitute, Western new life standards are being called. For example, Zempi (2014), examining the 'criminalisation' of Muslim women's veil, states:

[V]eiled Muslim women are stereotypically perceived as oppressed and subjugated, while Islam is understood as a misogynist and patriarchal religion. To complicate matters further, the wearing of the niqab is not only synonymous with gender oppression but also with Islamist terrorism and a lack of integration. Collectively, these stereotypes justify Islamophobic attacks against veiled Muslim women as a means of responding to the multiple 'threats' of the veil as a symbol of gender inequality, religious fundamentalism and self-segregation (p.2)

Abed (2016) elaborates on this when he examined the Iraqi situation, saying that Iraqis are now under the influence of Turkish and Korean TV serials (these are rich with pregnant women without marriage, an issue that is prohibited and regarded a sin in Islam), dancing and singing shows (such as Arab Idol), entertainment competitions in Ramadan (a holy month for worshipping Allah). The researcher believes that Muslims have become imitators of the Western socio-cultural situation, neglecting their own identity (Ghanim & Abed, 2023). The case of Iraqis on TikTok is very concerning, where women start to imitate Western women in everything, paying no attention to their religious and cultural background, and social and tribal traditions; these are among the main reasons for hundreds

of divorce cases every month. For the fourth frame, the researcher believes that the procedures done by the Western elite in addressing Islamophobic discourse are epistemological details, creating a liberal public sphere, justifying biased media, ideological Western narratives, and televangelism. Two fresh examples are the ‘fake’ profile of Mass Destruction Weapon for Iraq War III (2003) and the profile of ‘Axis of Evil’, where countries rejecting the dominant hegemony of the US are included. Selecting biased material and Western people’s ignorance of the proper standards of Islam have been working in this respect. Quranic Ayas for ‘jihad’ have been rendered by terrorist attacks by extremists such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as in the 7/7 bombing in London. For the last frame, stereotyping Islam as the *OTHER* is ideologically summed up by Creutz-Kämpfi (2008, 296), who states that the following formula is followed in the European discourse in stereotyping Islam:

...the role of Islam in European history is neglected, and Islam is generalised and simplified – Islam includes a variety of traditions, interpretations and cultural routines. Religionisation is also a central aspect – the emphasis is on religion even in cases where aspects other than religion are more relevant...society constitutes the fund of knowledge from which the individual abstracts the material for his conception of the world (p.296).

Attributes such as ‘barbaric’, ‘violent’, and ‘terrorist’ should be used to address Wahabi-doctrine extremists such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and ISIS, not all Muslims; their terrorist attacks included Muslims (as in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen) and non-Muslims (as in London and Paris). Here, it is necessary to emphasise that Wahabis and President Bush use the same slogans in their wars, as in the following extract:

The war is, therefore, not about oil, nuclear weapons, dictators, maintaining America's position as a superpower, rebuilding Iraq, or even free elections in Iraq, but about eternal goodness and our faith in God (Oliver, 2007, p. 7).

## Methodology

The present study is a qualitative discourse analysis of the Islamophobic propaganda used in Western media narratives. *Sketch Engine* is used as a corpus-based tool (<https://www.sketchengine.eu>), where the researcher compiled his corpus by gathering the selected data in MS Word to analyse word collection, concordance and collocations. Jowett and O'Donnell (2015) developed a workable ten-division model of propaganda analysis that is sufficient to examine crisis times such as the *War on Terror* and the one under investigation. The divisions are: “The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign”, “The context in which the propaganda occurs”, “Identification of the propagandist”, “The

structure of the propaganda organisation”, “The target audience”, “Media utilisation techniques”, “Special techniques to maximise effect”, “Audience reaction to various techniques”, “Counterpropaganda, if present, and “Effects and evaluation”. The following figure presents the working circle of the selected propaganda model, which is mainly concerned with a social-historical context like those of Islamophobic discourse and narratives.




Figure 1: Model of Propaganda, taken from Jowett & O'Donnell, 2015

This workable classification of any propaganda is applied to 32 purposely- chosen articles from *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, *USA Today*, and *The New York Times* from 2012 to 2023, based on search words such as ‘Islam’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Prophet Muhammad’, and ‘Burning Quran’. It is essential to mention that the recent models of propaganda and persuasion have taken some critical aspects of discourse, such as those in van Dijk (2000), where his ideological square notion is focused on. van Dijk has shown that each group claims and defends its ideological beliefs as valid and justified. This kind of polarisation, as he believes, “establishes the opposition between Us and Them as two ideologically different groups” (p.65); and this is why ‘We’ and ‘They’ are associated with positive representation and negative representation, respectively. Consequently, Van Dijk states that “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation seem to be a fundamental property of ideologies” (p. 69), the basis of his notion of *Ideological Square*. In this respect, Abed (2016, p.77) states that this dichotomy of positive vs negative representation is an ideology in discourse, which “is not only a matter of one’s explicit and implicit display of his beliefs, but it is used as a persuasive tool to influence the recipient’s mind in line with his/her beliefs and ends”. It is important to mention that the relevant literature on Islamophobia and its



critical discourse studies has mainly focused on identifying macro and micro-levels of representation, where thematic topics (like Hijab, stereotypes of Muslim women, Islamists, etc.), meanings, grammatical structures (like using nominalisation and passivisation), and figurative language are examined. The present study moves in another direction by aiming to put the Western Positive-We representation under investigation by identifying the propaganda tools used in their media. Also, the researcher used Fairclough's (2003) notion of intertextuality to analyse some of these divisions in the propaganda model adopted here. To Fairclough, intertextuality concerns how recent texts (especially those related to burning the quran) are produced about prior texts (like the American film *Fitna*, Charlie Hebdo's caricatures, Danish cartoons) and how texts help construct the existing conventions in producing new texts; and consequently, how these prior and recent texts (written or spoken) blueprint the propaganda. Six techniques of intertextual representation are suggested by Fairclough (2003): (1) Indirect quotations, (2) Direct quotations, (3) Reference to people, documents, or statements, (4) Evaluation of quoted material by using a particular choice of lexical units or even a reporting verbs, (5) Reference to terminology, phrases associated with particular people or documents, and (6) Usage of language typical of certain discourse types, communicative situations.

## Results and Discussion

Analysing the propaganda used is not easy since it requires a good understanding of the history of the topic under investigation, the propaganda message, the media (tools) used, audience responses, the propagandist, and such factors (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2015). Furthermore, propaganda "includes the reinforcement of cultural myths and stereotypes so deeply embedded in a culture that recognising a message as propaganda is often difficult" (p.289). Besides, the reproduction of this propaganda in the selected data can be justified by the following statement:

The propaganda analyst looks for ideology in verbal and visual representations that may reflect preexisting struggles and past situations, current frames of reference to value systems, and future goals and objectives. The resonance of symbols of the past encourages people to apply previously agreed-on ideas to the propagandist's current and future goals (p.289).

### *The ideology, purpose and context of the propaganda*

The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign used in the American and British data can be stated as follows. The thematic topics and semantic macrostructures of the 32 articles show that instances of Islamophobic cartoons, caricatures, films, and the burning of the Quran were all publicly done under the supervision of the governmental authorities. The

Sketch Engine results report the following distribution results of terms such as ‘burn’, ‘Islam’, ‘Muslim’, ‘insult’, ‘cartoons’, and ‘Quran’.




Figure 2: Distribution of ‘Islam’ in the corpus.




Figure 3: Distribution of ‘Muslim’ in the corpus.




Figure 4: Distribution of ‘insult’ in the corpus.




Figure 5: Distribution of ‘cartoons’ in the corpus.




Figure 6: Distribution of ‘prophet’ in the corpus.




Figure 7: Distribution of 'Quran' in the corpus.

The Islamophobic argument reported in these Western narratives was based on their long history of caricaturing and secularism, and, of course, caricaturing is just one of these fundamental human rights in a secular state. The 32 articles are supplied with direct and scarce quotations from many European officials, institutes, and individuals, consolidating this orientation. The purpose of such a propaganda campaign was revealed by calling Muslim imams and communities to follow the laws and civil demonstrations of these secular states. Such a purpose was heard in the rooms of the German, French, Swedish, and Danish governments, especially after the events of Sept 11<sup>th</sup>. It means that the main aims of such European governments' propaganda were to let Muslim communities be more secular than before, in a step towards a dynamic implementation of civic integration inside Europe. The articles have also revealed that the purpose of *Innocence of Muslims* was to criticise Muslims' fundamentalism, represented negatively by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, as far as the discriminatory and racial treatment of Egyptian Coptic Christians is concerned. The articles do not mention any comments or quotations from American citizens. For example, the filmmaker's son stated that the film script was written five years before its first release on YouTube. No American officials were interviewed in the data. Quotations of American officials were lower in quantity and quality than those of Europeans. Therefore, it is possible to state that the propaganda's purpose is to influence European leaders, Westerners, and Muslim communities to adopt secular beliefs, and caricaturing anything is just one of those beliefs. It also aims to engage those three in a specific "smooth progress of propaganda" (Liu, 2020, p.15) that might legitimate the propagandist's activity and the institution it represents. Such an instance of legitimisation has succeeded, mainly in the corpus, by repetition of situations, scare quotations, direct quotations, and the particular registers of 'violence', number register, and persuasion. The anti-Islam/anti-Prophet/ anti-Quran ideology is much more evident in European crises than in America, as far as the reproduction of the events in the data is concerned.






Figure 8: The context of 'Quran' in the corpus.




Figure 9: The context of 'prophet' in the corpus.

However, such secular ideology has shown that there is a direct distinction in the reproduction of these Islamophobic crises between dichotomies Islam vs political Islam, Muslims vs. Islamist, and innocent protesters vs. riot protesters. To consolidate this argument, the first icon was associated with innocence, cooperation, and obedience to the civil laws inside Europe. In contrast, the second icon is characterised by threatening, killing, military attacking, and following terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, even though these European and American officials militarily and financially support those Islamic terrorists. The ideology in Salwan Momika's burning of the Quran four times in front of the Iraqi and Iranian embassies and Swedish Parliament and far-right extremists in Sweden and Denmark is to tell Muslims that Europeans believe in their rights of expression, regardless of any sacred books or authorities. A solid example here is permitting the Old and New Testaments to burn. Therefore, the declared purpose of cartoons is to present Islam in their views, the stated purpose of French caricatures is to criticise the rise of Islamists in Tunisia,



and the declared intention of the American *Fitna* film is to blame the discrimination against Egyptian Coptic Christians. However, such purposes could not be justified to attack or depict the Prophet Muhammad or burn the Quran unless there were/are orientalist, Islamophobic aims that coincided with a political agenda. Thus, this could be titled a form of *integration* and *agitation* propaganda since it seeks to manipulate the officials' interests and to arouse people to participate actively.

Based on the secular ideology and purpose identified earlier, the context is revealed in crises and wars. For example, the titles of articles in *The Daily Mail* included words and phrases such as "7/7 on its way", "France as France ban anyone", "Four Muslims planned to kill", "should be punished", "guarded by riot police", "sentenced to death in Egypt", "Protesters set fire to a copy of the Koran", and "fills a Koran with bacon and burns it outside". The following ones are in *The Guardian*: "Part of a Zionist Plot", "France Prepares for Backlash", "A Dark Demonstration", "How Freedom of Expression is Curtailed", "Salman Rushdie bounty increased", "survived an axe attack", "Iraq protesters breach Sweden's embassy", and "Swedish government condemns 'Islamophobic' burning of Qur'an". All these attract the readers and spark a particular context, which either reveals the background of the Islamophobic discourse or justifies it concerning the official procedures done by the European governments. On the other hand, the American newspapers used fewer words and phrases that reflected the contexts of wars and conflicts. For example, the selected articles of *The New York Times* include words or phrases of neutral reference, as in: "the power of imagery", "spark press freedom debate", "no regret", "runs cartoons", "ban images", and "Sweden Is Condemned in the Muslim World". The exception was the fourth article in the *Appendix*, where "fuels Anti-American attacks" was used to describe a particular context, namely Libya and Egypt. *USA Today* adopts a similar tendency where the following words and phrases appeared in the titles: "Anti-Islam film controversy hits Europe, Asia", "Outrage over film worries Coptic-Christians in Egypt", "reprinted controversial cartoon", "France ups embassy security", and "Popes urges calm". These examples illustrate the finding that American newspapers tend to reflect that the cartoon controversies and burning of the Quran are a European affair, and the film affair is an issue related to the Egyptian Coptic Christians. That is, these crises of Islamophobic discourse are European-oriented, not American.

### ***The propagandists and the target audience***

For the third component, the propagandists for the British data are far-right parties (extremists such as the 'Danish Patriots') represented by leaders, prime ministers, ministers, politicians, and journalists who supported both Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo in their fundamental rights to release these cartoons. Furthermore, the Danish Prime Minister's refusal to meet and discuss the issue with several Arab and Muslim ambassadors (Abed, 2016) confirms this. Also, the insistence of the Swedish police to give support and protection to Salwan Momika in his continuous acts of burning the Quran is another strong evidence

of the Islamophobic propagandists in Europe. For example, Iraqis have regarded these occasions of burning the Quran as ‘planned’ and have taken official permissions, as in:

- “Anti-Islam protesters, one of whom is an Iraqi immigrant to Sweden who burned the Qur’an outside a Stockholm mosque in June, had applied for and received permission from Swedish police to burn the Qur’an outside the Iraqi embassy on Thursday”. (*The Guardian*, Thu Jul 20th 2023)
- “Many Muslim countries have called on the Swedish government to stop protesters from burning the Quran. However, in Sweden, it is up to the police, not the government, to decide whether to authorise demonstrations or public gatherings. The freedom of speech is protected under the Swedish constitution”. (Karl Ritter, *The New York Times*, Jul 20th, 2023)
- “It was triggered by Danish far-right politician Rasmus Paludan’s meetings and planned Quran burnings across the country”. (Jari Tanner/ *USA Today*, Apr 18th, 2022).

For the American data, the analysis reports that the propagandists are several Coptic Christians and Jewish donors. The outstanding ones are Nicholas Basseley Nicholas, the filmmaker, and Terry Jones, the Florida pastor. Hillary Clinton confirmed in more than one article that her government had no relation to filmmaking and directly arrested the filmmaker to decrease Muslims’ anger, even if the arrest was for another criminal act. For the crisis of burning the Quran, Jari Tanner (*USA Today*, Apr 18th, 2022) focused on a very critical source for such Islamophobic crises, namely immigrants or refugees who look to be under the microscope for permanent residence or a passport. Among those are Iraqis such as Salwan Momika and Ali Hassan Al-Asadi:

- “Al-Asadi told the Free Press last month he started burning Qurans after having some disputes involving money with a Muslim man at a local mosque. Al-Asadi said he was raised in Iraq as a Shia Muslim but converted to Christianity and attends local churches. He told the Free Press he has a history of psychological problems and has burned about a dozen Qurans over the past year”.

The two justifications mentioned by Al-Asadi, to be converted to Christianity and have a history of psychological problems, are not acceptable. Any Christian can deny the first justification. For the second one, such immigrants are aware that European officials of immigration consider such cases of psychological problems; therefore, severe actions are required from the Europeans against such ‘illegal’ immigrants and refugees.

Regarding the structure of the propaganda organisation, the present study reports that the elite in European countries are behind such propaganda; therefore, it is possible to call it ‘institutional’ or ‘governmental’. On the other hand, the American data has revealed that it

is related to some Jewish powers/donors and Christian pastors, i.e., individuals. For the European structure, it is possible to state that the far-right parties won the parliamentary elections in many European countries such as France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Also, these parties were/are dominating in Germany, Austria, etc. Consequently, the British newspapers have confirmed a solid centralised authority behind this propaganda campaign—this authority aimed at protecting their secularism from the increasing influence of political Islam.

Moreover, the propaganda organisations preferred to use printed and social media to distribute these aims. Membership of these organisations, as shown in the quotations of individuals, has opened to include ordinary people who believe in their way of life and culture (i.e., beliefs). The data have also confirmed that from 2005 till the latest events of Charlie Hebdo (in 2015), the organisation members followed day-to-day routines and anniversary rituals for the coming activities. In the American data, especially *The New York Times*, the Jewish financial powers and a group of Christian pastors who see Islam as a ‘dangerous’ ideology and a ‘cancer’ are behind this propaganda. Furthermore, the American newspapers showed that no centralised authority was behind the campaign, in comparison with the British ones; the ones behind this Islamophobic campaign aimed at revenge by defamation of Islam and its Prophet. The powers and pastors preferred using social media and YouTube to distribute these aims. However, membership of the organisations was limited to several people since no quotations were mentioned to individuals. Moreover, the data also reported that Egyptian Cops had rejected the film and denied any relationship with its producer. The primary justification is being a reminder of the events of Sept 11<sup>th</sup>:

- “The video gained international attention when a Florida pastor began promoting it along with his proclamation of Sept 11th as “International Judge Muhammad Day” ... “The trailer was uploaded to YouTube by Sam Bacile, whom The Wall Street Journal website identified as a 52-year-old Israeli-American real estate developer in California. He told the Web site he had raised \$5 million from 100 Jewish donors to make the film. “Islam is a cancer,” Mr. Bacile was quoted as saying”. (David D. Kirkpatrick/ *The New York Times*, Sept 11th, 2012)
- “Youssef Sidhom, editor-in-chief of Watani newspaper, which has a large Coptic Christian readership, said Copts in Egypt have expressed anger at the film and denounced it for the same reasons Muslims have. Egypt's Coptic Christian Church denounced the film as "part of a wicked campaign against religions, aimed at causing discord among people, especially Egyptians”. (Sarah Lynch / *USA Today*, Sept 16th, 2012).

The propaganda audience was the European politicians and people because Muslim communities in Europe became a source of fear due to their increasing populations, as shown in the mentioned numbers in *The Daily Mail*. Besides, many scholars of Islamophobia, Iftikhar (2021) among them, affirm a related issue here represented by the

increasing percentages of convert-to-Islam instances which pushed far-right organisations such as the English Defense League (EDL), the British National Party (BNP), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the French Front National (FN), Vkaams Belang (VB) in Belgium, Pro NRW and Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (NDP) in Germany, the Sverigesdemokraterna (SD) in Sweden and the Partij Voor Vrijheid (PVV) in Netherlands, to adopt far-right Anti-Muslim narratives. The main narrative is to support their secularism by presenting Islam and its Prophet in disgraceful positions. For the American data, Muslims in the USA are the target audience; Christians are addressed to consider their ethnic minorities in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. It also identifies the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists to be behind terrorism and discrimination, who are defined as terrorists, extremists and Islamic militants. *USA Today* is the clearest in this issue by relating these militants to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.

- “It is associated with Wahhabism, the sect of al-Qaeda and dominant in Saudi Arabia”. (Paige Kollock/ *USA Today*, Sept 15th, 2012).

### ***Media techniques to maximise effects***

Media tools were both printed and social. The selected newspapers presented photos and graphics supporting the contents of their articles. Websites can add comments, archives, hyperlinks, and updates. Social media was mentioned twice by The Guardian, where the website of Charlie Hebdo was stopped or blocked due to the thousands of visitors after the magazine’s announcement of new caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. It is possible to state that the mass audience was the actual audience of *Innocence of Muslims*, and the 13-minute trailer could be easily downloaded. To examine how media maximises its effects on the target audience, Jowett and O’Donnell (2015) identify eight techniques: creating resonance, source credibility, opinion leaders, face-to-face contact, group norms, reward and punishment, monopoly of the communication source, and visual symbols of power. For the technique of creating resonance in the British data report, 47 voices of individuals and politicians, 37 media channels and tools, 101 places, and 43 direct quotations, while 74 voices, 41 media tools, 114 places, and 74 direct quotations in the American data. These numbers indicate the kind of resonance that occurred. Eleven voices are repeated in both American and British newspapers. Most of these 11 instances show that their mention in the American newspapers outweighs that in the British. Scanning the repeated voices reflects the direct influence of some of these voices in the reproduction of Islamophobic propaganda. Examples are the French magazine (Charlie Hebdo), the French foreign minister (Laurant Fabious), the French Prime Minister (Jean-Marc Ayrault), the editor of the French magazine (Stéphane Charbonner), the Florida pastor (Terry Jones), the Danish cartoonist (Kurt Westrngaard), and Muslim Brotherhood and its spokesman (Muhamoud Ghozlan). The other repeated voices are the US ambassador to Libya (Christopher Stevens), the US President (Barack Obama), and the head of the Paris Grand Mosque (Dalil Boubakeur). Those three voices are either a tragic result of the reproduction, such as the US killed ambassador or of



a 'neuter' role, such as the head of the Paris Grand Mosque, where he both accepted the French slogan of freedom of speech and denied any relation to the Islamists in France. The mention of Barack Obama is related to the killing of his ambassador to Libya, with no comment on the three cases of propaganda.

It is possible to confirm here that Fairclough's (2003, pp.40-45) six techniques of intertextuality are relatively used in the data, as in the following extracts:

- "The suspects intended to attack the offices of Politiken in a Mumbai-style terror attack when the crown prince was handing out awards, it was claimed." (*The Daily Mail*, Sept 17<sup>th</sup>, 2012)
- "'If anyone doubts the Holocaust happened, they are imprisoned, yet if anyone insults the prophet, his companions or Islam, the most [France] does is to apologise in two words. It is not fair or logical," he said". (*The Guardian*, Jan 4<sup>th</sup>, 2010)
- "The newspaper was banking on the fact that unlike the West — where Max Ernst's painting of Mary spanking the infant Jesus didn't raise an eyebrow when recently shown at the Metropolitan Museum — the Muslim world has no tradition of, or tolerance for, religious irony in its art." (*The New York Times*, Sept 19<sup>th</sup>, 2012)
- "Protesters were initially primarily hard-line Muslims, but since Wednesday evening the composition of the crowd seemed to change and police battled young men aligned with a group called "Ultras" — composed of soccer fans who are growing more political." (*USA Today*, Sept 11<sup>th</sup>, 2012)
- "French media showed footage of an embassy protected by soldiers and barbed wire in former French colony Tunisia," (*The Daily Mail*, Sept 21<sup>st</sup>, 2012)
- "The London-based freedom of expression organization Article 19, which takes its name from the UN declaration," (*The Guardian*, Sept 19<sup>th</sup>, 2012)

It is important to mention here that a single instance of indirect quotation, seven instances of direct quotations are found. Also, 12 instances for reference to people, documents, statements, four instances for evaluation of quoted materials, three instances for reference to terminology, phrases associated with particular people or documents and usage of language typical of certain discourse types, communicative situations are reported. This shows the strategy adopted by these newspapers in illustrating these materials; it also shows that references to people, documents and statements are more influential than others. Examples of reference to well-known authorities such as Obama, Ali Khamenei, and Salman Rushdie, religions and holy books such as the Bible, and well-known artistic, historical and legal activities seem to be very convincing not only for their fruitful and varied contents but also for being of direct relevance to Westerners. The other interesting point here is that the three instances of reference to terminology are related to the French colonisation of Tunisia, which, in one way or another, presents indirect blame for the Muslim Tunisians not being



secular or not being acquainted with the French style of life. The data shows in-text relevance to many social and cultural fields of knowledge (such as art, sport, media, politics, and history) and relevance to science. As Allen (2020) mentioned, these disciplines are used intertextually to generate links between the Islamophobic narrative and other types. The frequencies of these fields of knowledge are as follows: anthropology (15 instances), arts (10 instances), history (12 instances), law (eight instances), media (six instances), politics (13 instances), religion (four instances), sport (one instance), and science (two instances). This rich variety of in-text relevance can, in turn, refer to the quantity and quality of knowledge required from individual readers. The question of the negligence of mentioning sociology is not deliberate. Still, it can be justified by saying that sociology has not been seen here because spatial (and also temporal) situations are not restricted to one place/time. Suppose each country and city mentioned in the corpus is considered unique. In that case, instances of sociology will be illustrated. In the present corpus, the sociology of the Coptic Christians and extremists in Egypt, lifestyle in Nordic countries, and angry Iraqis for burning the Quran are very vital examples. Reference to psychology is only used by refugees to justify their Islamophobic acts. The British articles were concerned with presenting those scare quotations that could mirror the situation in Europe, the US, and the Middle East. Such scare quotations and direct speech quotations could be used as a source of credibility if statements such as “7/7 on its way”, “Bin Laden on his way”, and “democracy go to hell” are taken into consideration. Another instance is where Tony Blair’s suggestions for reconciling religion and democracy in a pluralistic society are lightened. A third instance is where Dalil Boubakeur was quoted while he was appealing to Muslims to remain calm and not to “pour oil on the fire”. These examples motivate readers to accept these calls and suggestions since prominent figures cited them; thus, these sources would be credible. The American newspapers were busy confirming the fact that the *Innocence of Muslims* was away from its will, aims, and plans. This is confirmed by Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and other American officials. Not only that, the articles focused on the details of the dramatic riot attacks on the US embassies, leading one of them to the killing of an ambassador. *USA Today* was much detailed in these two stories, relating these riot protests, killing by automatic weapons, and scaling the embassies’ walls to followers of Al-Qaeda, who follow the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. These details and names could be regarded as credible sources for their audience. The names mentioned in the intertextual analysis include different positions and affiliations. It is important to mention here that Arab leaders were presented as dictators and authoritarians, and thus, the Arab Spring is justified.

- “Mr Blair said such problems were an inevitable consequence of the Arab Spring that has overthrown repressive regimes in Libya and elsewhere”. (*The Daily Mail*, Sept 17<sup>th</sup>, 2012).

For face-to-face contact, the details in the selected articles confirm the actual time and place of these anti-Islam controversies and their reproductions. Salwan Momika's repeated occasions are objective evidence. Regarding group norms in the model of analysis, the

British and American articles have focused on presenting two groups’ norms: secularism vs. political Islam.




Figure 10: Distribution of ‘secularism’ in the data.




Figure 11: Distribution of ‘Islamist’ in the corpus.

The first group is presented as educated, democratic and liberal, while Islam is described as including terrorists, extremists, and Islamic militants. Furthermore, the American newspapers had identified Islamists vs Coptic Christians as another group. Descriptions of Muslims are those of terrorists and riot protesters, while the Coptic Christians are victims of the Islamists’ discriminatory and racist acts. The data have shown that these Islamophobic crises have been reprinted and displayed many times for the public, where many European newspapers and individuals interviewed and confirmed their right to press freedom. On the contrary, the riot protesters and instances of targeting officials with heavy weapons were punished by arrest, killing, and banning. The data has also succeeded in repeating a particular ‘violence’ vocabulary. Such repetition led the message to be accurate and consistent; therefore, examples of violence vocabulary in the data are: ‘riot’ (14 instances), ‘anger/angry’ (35 instances), ‘violence/violent’ (49 instances), ‘outrage (22 instances), ‘provocation’ (19 instances), ‘firestorm (4 instances), ‘move’ (2 instances), ‘threat/threatening’ (16 instances), ‘conflict’ (1 instances), ‘fear’ (9 instances),

‘killing/killed’ (52 instances), ‘clash’ (6 instances), ‘attack/attacking’ (61 instances) and ‘firebomb’ (4 instances).

The discussion of global ideology earlier reflected that many icons could be revealed, and Prophet Muhammad may be presented as just one. Besides, the debate over freedom/rights of media/expression is repeated in many articles to convince readers that these caricatures, for example, were just drawings, not provocation (see Figures 12 and 13 below).

The screenshot shows the CONCORDANCE search interface. The search query is 'CQL [word=="freedom"] [word=="of"] [word=="expression"]' with 47 results. The corpus is 'corpus for journals'. The search results are displayed in a table with columns for 'Details', 'Left context', 'KWIC', and 'Right context'. The KWIC column shows the search term 'freedom of expression' in red text within the context of the surrounding text. The results are numbered 1 through 12.

Figure 12: Sample of ‘freedom of expression’ context in the corpus.

Another visual symbol presented is the stereotyping of Islamists as killers, terrorists, and extremists. The killing of the US ambassador to Libya and the Italian priest, on the one hand and the catastrophic life of the Danish cartoonist, on the other, support such an argument.

The screenshot shows the CONCORDANCE search interface. The search query is 'simple extremists' with 28 results. The corpus is 'corpus for journals'. The search results are displayed in a table with columns for 'Details', 'Left context', 'KWIC', and 'Right context'. The KWIC column shows the search term 'extremists' in red text within the context of the surrounding text. The results are numbered 1 through 14.

Figure 13: Sample of the context of ‘extremist’ in the corpus.

The third instance uses agentless passives; even agentive ones were possible. Another visual symbol represents Arab leaders as dictators and their regimes as authoritarian.

- “Following the ouster of longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak came a rise in influence of hard-line Salafist Muslims who have called for an Islamic state and whom some fear will further restrict the rights of non-Muslim minorities”. (*USA Today*, Sept 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012).

### *Audience reaction and counterpropaganda*

The increased rates of selling copies of Charlie Hebdo and Jyllands-Posten, the blocked website of the French magazine due to the announcement of releasing new caricatures, showed an increasing reaction (or motivation) from the audience to see and judge these drawings. People reacted directly towards the airing of YouTube. Thousands downloaded it and then uploaded parts to their Facebook and Twitter accounts. Muslims, as an audience, rejected that film, regarding it as an insult to their Prophet and their religion. Muslim leaders in Europe were presented as supporters of these European governments in denying the existence of political Islam, condemning the rows of killed people due to riot protests, and consolidating civil life in these European countries (see Figure 14 below).




Figure 14: Distribution of ‘protest’ in the corpus.

Their calls for calm and dialogue were heard among their supporters. The editor-in-chief, Stephane Charbonneau, was presented as very democratic and liberal in denying his government’s orders to ban Muslim protests in Paris. No diplomatic counterpropaganda has been mentioned in the two British newspapers; the only one was done by thousands of Iraqis when they burned the Swedish embassy in Baghdad. The American newspapers focused on presenting the European calls for dialogue and peace, especially in France. The US



government, represented by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was very diplomatic in condemning terrorist acts and calling for the submission of terrorists to justice. No sound was heard by the Islamic organisations and personnel in the US. For Salwan Momika's 'planned' occasions of burning the Quran, thousands of Iraqis, for example, demonstrated outside the Swedish embassy in Baghdad before being burned as a reaction to the second burning of the Quran, a reaction condemned by the Iraqi government. Instead, as a diplomatic reaction,

- "Iraq expelled the Swedish ambassador on Thursday in protest at a planned burning of the Qur'an in Stockholm that had prompted hundreds of protesters to storm and set alight the Swedish embassy in Baghdad". (*The Guardian*, Jul 20<sup>th</sup> 2023).

Respectively, Iraqis, for example, know that diplomatic measures are not always working in Denmark, France, and Sweden, primarily since earlier 'peaceful' demonstrations were held, accompanied by 'shy' measures for economic boycotting. Muslims regard the official statements of condemnation, as in the last crisis, as not banning others from insulting Muslims, Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. The researcher believes that such counterpropaganda is not working unless a similar 'sustainable' propaganda is presented to others. Such 'opposite' propaganda must be characterised socially, economically, culturally, and politically. Counterpropaganda needs the cooperation of all members in the Muslim and Western worlds.

## Conclusions

The present study examined Islamophobic narratives in selected British and American newspapers. It was based on three analysis models: van Dijk's (2000) positive-We presentation in his notion of ideological squares, Fairclough's six techniques of intertextuality and Jowett and O'Donnell's (2015) ten-division propaganda model. For the first research question, the analysis focused on identifying and examining concrete, intertextually-consolidated examples of the Western calls for freedom of expression, human rights and democracy. Authorities raised these calls and civil laws to confirm the West's secular ideology, which Muslim communities should strongly follow. In order to consolidate and strengthen this ideology, the Western propaganda had taken both Prophet Mohammed and the Holy Quran as the target, depicting and criticising them under secular notions. Continuous instances of consolidating their ideology publicly and officially (by issuing official permissions to burn the Quran) would blueprint the negative portrayal of Muslims, the Quran and the Prophet. The critical analysis based on Fairclough's six techniques of intertextuality supported the previous conclusion.



For the two research questions, this analysis, which is based on a corpus-based analysis via *Sketch Engine*, revealed that British articles are behind the display of integration and agitation propaganda, where politicians, journalists, and individuals support the leading opinions. Moreover, this Islamophobic propaganda looks to the participation of all levels of society in their crisis times in a way of confirming the unity towards the increasing calls for civic integration, where Muslim communities should be obliged to behave in the same way as Europeans. On the contrary, the Americans are behind in presenting public diplomacy propaganda, where the diplomatic issues have been focused on. That is, the US government has followed public diplomacy to influence the public to believe its government in denying its relationship with the film crew, with solid consideration of Muslim feelings and faith. To scan the two different ways of approaching Islam in British and American data, it is possible to say that integration-agitation propaganda is 'white' since far-right parties represented by the Danish, Swedish, and French governments are known sources of information and their tendencies towards Muslim communities are also stated officially. For public diplomacy, no accurate details have been revealed about the filmmaker and his ally (i.e., the Jewish donors); these lead to state that the American propaganda is 'grey'. Both data sets are relatively different in naming the enemy leading figure of their propaganda, where neither Al-Qaeda nor the Muslim Brotherhood fits this title. Consequently, 'Prophet Muhammad', 'Quran' and 'Islam', as the old and new themes in Orientalism, could fit this title; especially propaganda in conflict needs to personalise the enemy's leading figure negatively to demonstrate essential diplomatic and strategic requirements; and consequently, perceiving individuals belonging to larger groups or communities could legitimise different actions against these leading figures. Moreover, as a necessary essence in any successful campaign, the association between the enemy leader and the conflict is done by repeating the individual name; 98 instances of 'the prophet', 'the Muslim prophet', 'the Islam prophet', 'Muhammad', 'Prophet Muhammad' have been reported in the data. These are collocated with adjectives and participles such as '*denigrating*', '*offensive*', '*mocking*', '*criticising*', '*insulting*', '*depicting*', '*making fun*', '*demeaning*', '*satirising*', '*defaming*', '*disparaging*', '*crude*', and '*ridiculous*'. Such naming could direct Western aggression against a whole ethnic group. The researcher supports another title of 'Islamophobic propaganda' as 'Prophet Muhammad as the *Other*'. When the enemy is identified and linked with specific procedures of personification, the negative connotations associated with this enemy can be enhanced; therefore, these cartoons and caricatures could be justified. Moreover, this campaign, as explained earlier, is politically oriented. The researcher expects to improve the present study by suggesting and incorporating a corpus-based narrative analysis of these diverse viewpoints, including interviews with Muslims, media analysts, and cultural critics. Also, the research recommends incorporating the results of the present study to

accommodate them with issues related to policy-making and Muslim-communities' relations with Western ones.

Conflict of Interest: The researcher has no conflict of interest or financial funding while writing this work.

## References

Abed, A. Q. (2016). *Anti-Prophet Mohammed media*. Lambert.

Abed, A, Q, & Hameed, S. K. (2015). Three cases of anti-Prophet Mohammed media in Islam-

West crisis. *Translation Studies*, 24, 5-23.

Alhousseini, H. E. & Zeidan, A. H. (2024). The concept of hijab in selected political speeches: A

critical discourse analysis. *Wasit Journal for Human Sciences*, 20(4), 610-634.

<https://doi.org/10.31185/wjfh.Vol20.Iss4.602>

Allen, C. (2020). *Reconfiguring Islamophobia: A radical rethinking of a contested concept*.

Palgrave Macmillan.

Allen, C. (2019). *Islamophobia defined*. Religion Media Centre.

Allen, C. (2010). *Islamophobia*. Ashgate.

Awan, I. & Zempi, I. (2016). 'The affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime:

Dynamics and impacts. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 27 (March-April),1-8.

Chomsky, N. & Herman, F. (2002). *Manufacturing consent*. Vintage Books.

Cole, B. (2022). *The Syrian information and propaganda war*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Creutz-Kämpfi, K. (2008). The othering of Islam in a European context. *Nordicom Review*,

29(2), 295-305.

Diesen, G. (2022). *Russophobia: Propaganda in international politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Farley, J. & Johnson, M. D. (Eds.) (2021). *Redefining propaganda in modern China*. Routledge.

Fucks, C. (2018). 'Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model in the

Internet and social media age. In Pedro-Caranana, J., Broudy, D. & Klaehn, J. *The*

*Propaganda model today.* /University of Westminster Press.

Ghanim, S. H. & Abed, A. Q. (2023). A socio-cognitive representation of Muslims in the British

quality newspapers. *Language, Discourse & Society*, 11(2), 24-42.

Hilal, M. (2021). *Innocent until proven Muslim*. Broadleaf Books.

Iftikhar, A. (2021). *Fear of a Muslim planet*. Skyhorse Publishing.

Janssen, E. (2012). Limits to expression on religion in France. *Journal of European Studies*,

V(1), 22-45.

Jones, M.D. (2021). *Disinformation and you: Identity, propaganda and manipulation*. Visible Ink

Press.

Jowett, G. & O'Donnell, V. (2015). *Propaganda and persuasion* (6<sup>th</sup> ed). Sage Publications.

Kazi, N. (2021). *Islamophobia, race, and global politics*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Liu, H. (2020). *Propaganda: Ideas, discourse and its legitimisation*. Routledge.

Morey, P., Yaqin, A. & Forte, A. (Eds.) (2019). *Contesting Islamophobia*. Bloomsbury Academic.

Mullen, A. & Klaehn, J. (2010). The Herman-Chomsky propaganda model: A critical approach

to analysing mass media behaviour. *Sociology Compass*, 2(2), 215-229.

Oliver, K. (2007). *Women as weapons of war*. Colombia University Press.

Patel, I. A. (2022). *The Muslim problem: From the British Empire to Islamophobia*. Palgrave

Macmillan.

Renton, J. (Ed.) (2019). *Islamophobia and surveillance: Genealogies of global order*. Routledge.

Richardson, J. (2004). (Mis) *Representing Islam: The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet*

*newspapers*. John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Sutar, G. (2013). '*Islamophobia*', *exploring the concept and its manifestation among the Dutch*

*in the Hague* [ MA Thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam]. Erasmus University Rotterdam

Repository. <https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/15561/Sutar-C.pdf>

van Dijk, T. (2000). *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. Sage.

Willcox, D. (2005). *Propaganda, the press and conflict*. Routledge.

Wolfreys, J. (2016). *Republic of Islamophobia: The rise of respectable racism in France*. Oxford

University Press.

## Appendix

Data of the study

NO	Newspapers	Title of Article/ News	Date
1	THE GUARDIAN	"France prepares for the backlash to magazine's cartoons of Muhammad."	Sept19 ,2012
2		"The Danish cartoonist who survived an axe attack"	Jan 4, 2010
3		"Innocence of Muslims: a dark demonstration of the power of film"	Sept 17, 2012
4		"Muhammad cartoons: How freedom of expression is curtailed across the globe."	Sept 19, 2012
5		"Salman Rushdie bounty increased amid anti-Islam controversy"	Sept 17, 2012
6		"Cartoons 'part of Zionist plot'"	Feb 7th, 2012
7		"Iraq protesters breach Sweden's embassy over Qur'an burning"	Jun 29th, 2023
8		"Swedish government condemns 'Islamophobic' burning of Qur'an"	Jul 2nd, 2023
1	THE DAILY MAIL	"Cartoons protester chanted '7/7 on its way'"	Jun 11th, 2013
2		"Crackdown as France bans anyone from protesting about cartoons criticising Prophet Mohammad."	Sept 21st, 2012
3		"Hezbollah leader calls for International law against insulting Islam"	Sept 17th, 2012
4		"Four Muslims planned to kill Danish Crown Prince in Mumbai-style terror attack"	April 13, 2012

5		<i>"Seven U.S. Christians including Florida pastor sentenced to death in Egypt"</i>	Nov 28, 2012
6		<i>"Offices of the French magazine that published cartoons mocking Prophet Mohammed guarded by riot police"</i>	Sept 19, 2012
7		<i>"Protesters set fire to a copy of the Koran in front of the Iraqi embassy in Denmark - days after a similar stunt in Sweden triggered fury in Baghdad."</i>	Jul 31st, 2023
8		<i>"Iraqi man fills a Koran with bacon and burns it outside a Stockholm Mosque after police allowed protest."</i>	Jun 28th, 2023
1	USA TODAY	<i>"Anti-Islam film controversy hits Europe, Asia"</i>	Sept 20, 2012
2		<i>"Outrage over film worries Coptic Christians in Egypt"</i>	Sept 16, 2012
3		<i>"Ex-ambassadors point to slow response."</i>	Sept 14, 2012
4		<i>"France ups embassy security after prophet cartoons."</i>	Sept 19, 2012
5		<i>"Pope urges calm as Mideast protests spread"</i>	Sept 15, 2012
6		<i>"Danish papers reprint controversial cartoon"</i>	Feb 13th, 2008
7		<i>"Why does Sweden allow Quran burnings? Such as much of the West, it has no blasphemy laws."</i>	Jul 20th, 2023
8		<i>"Man fined \$400 for burning Qurans near Michigan mosque"</i>	Aug 8th, 2014
1	The New York Times	<i>"Cartoons Spark Press Freedom Debate in France"</i>	Sept 19, 2012
2		<i>"Yale Press Bans Images of Muhammad in New Book"</i>	Aug 12, 2009
3		<i>"A Starting New Lesson in the Power of Imagery"</i>	Feb 8th, 2006
4		<i>"Angry Over a Film Fuels Anti-American Attacks in Libya and Egypt"</i>	Sept 11, 2012
5		<i>"French Magazine Runs Cartoons That Mock Muhammad"</i>	Sept 19th, 2012
6		<i>"From Man Who Insulted Muhammad, No Regret"</i>	Nov 26, 2012
7		<i>"Sweden Is Condemned in the Muslim World for Allowing Burning of Quran"</i>	Jun 23rd, 2023
8		<i>"Protesters Angry Over Quran Burning Storm Swedish Embassy in Baghdad"</i>	Jul 19th, 2023