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Voting Behaviour and Political Institutions in the Twenty-First Century

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Summary:

A common refrain in social science is that "institutions matter." Institutions matter for, among other things, increasing a nation's wealth, reducing corruption, and effective governance. And not least, political institutions matter for a citizen's voting behavior. The political institutions within which a voter exercises his or her vote will structure the choices that are available to him or her. In turn, these choices act to shape the eventual voting decision. The interaction between these system-level characteristics and the voter's own characteristics determines the voting decision. Voting is therefore not simply a personal choice, but one that is shaped by the context within which the choice is made. Since the range of political institutions is vast, and their potential impact on voting behavior substantial, some broad categorization is required. Accordingly, the paper is divided into five sections. The first section examines the impact of electoral institutions on voting behavior, with a specific focus on electoral participation. The second section deals with election rules, such as thresholds and the degree of proportionality in the electoral system, and how they can shape behavior. The third section moves the focus of attention to system performance, which is defined by economic voting, but the logic applies equally well to other issues that concern voters. Partisanship and how it varies by the institutional arrangements of the country is the topic of the fourth section, while the fifth section examines the opportunities particular institutional arrangements open up for strategic and split ticket voting. The conclusion draws some broad conclusions about the total impact of institutions on voting behavior.

Introduction:

In social science, "institutions matter" is a recurring theme. Institutions are important for improving a country's prosperity, decreasing corruption, and facilitating efficient government, among other things. Finally, political institutions have an impact on how citizens vote. The options accessible to a voter are shaped by the political institutions within which they cast their ballot. These decisions thereby influence the final vote outcome. Voting decisions are based on the interplay of the voter's personal traits and these system-level factors. Thus, choosing to vote is not only a matter of personal preference; it also depends on the circumstances surrounding the decision (Anderson, 2017; Dalton and Anderson, 2018; Klingemann, 2019; Adebola, 2020; Wasiu, 2023).

It has long been established that a political system's institutional characteristics have a significant impact on voter behavior. Three categories of institutional variation have been identified by observers: whether the electoral system is majoritarian or proportional; whether the president or parliament has executive authority; and whether there are two parties or more in the party system (Duverger, 1954; Norris, 2014; Shugart and Carey, 2015; Abolade, 2022). These factors have all been found to influence voters' behavior. However, only in the last 25 years, as suitable data sources and methodologies have become accessible, has the discipline of voting studies begun to focus on understanding how and in what ways these institutional variations impact voting behavior.

The realization that methodical data gathering is required to assess an institution's influence is frequently credited to Stein Rokkan's (1970) research, which was conducted over fifty years ago. However, there was no systematic effort to assess the influence of institutions on voting behavior until the 2000s. Establishing a coordinated, international data gathering effort was one of the process's initial phases (particularly through the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems [CSES] project—see Klingemann [2019]). The CSES, which was established in 2005, allows for the systematic study of electoral behavior in a

variety of institutional contexts throughout the world. By coordinating the activities of over 50 national election studies worldwide, the project makes sure that data on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals are collected in every nation and can be compared to data regarding institutional setups. In conjunction with methodological advancements (particularly multi-level modeling [see Kedar and Shively, 2015]), analysts have measured the precise influence of institutions on voter behavior for the first time.

There has to be some broad classification because there is a wide range of political institutions and they have a significant ability to influence voting behavior. As a result, there are five sections in this paper. With an emphasis on voter involvement, the first segment looks at how electoral institutions affect voting behavior. The second section discusses election laws and how they influence behavior, including thresholds and the level of proportionality in the voting system. The third portion shifts the focus to economic voting, which defines system performance; nevertheless, the reasoning is equally applicable to other problems that voters care about. The fourth portion discusses partisanship and how it differs depending on the nation's institutional setup. At the same time, the fifth section looks at the opportunity that different institutional setups provide for split tickets and strategic voting. A few generalizations on the overall influence of institutions on voting behavior are made in the conclusion.

Electoral Participation

While the institutional variables that influence voting behavior are well acknowledged, there is frequently disagreement on the relative strength of their impacts on individual behavior and the best way to categorize them. This section looks at various regulations that influence voting behavior as well as the effect of voter and party registration laws—the traditional "gate-keeping" role of the electoral system—on electoral choice. Every regulation influences citizens' voting decisions in a unique way.

The first institutional element influencing election participation is the rules that specify who is entitled to register to vote. There is some evidence from the United States, beginning with the groundbreaking study by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), indicating that more people register to vote when the registration process is made simpler, which in turn increases voter turnout. But registration laws in the United States are often not the same as those in other nations, especially in Europe. First off, rather than being a procedure that happens automatically, registration in the US is an individual opt-in requirement (Knee and Green, 2011: 314). Second, certain states in the United States have developed voter registration restrictions specifically intended to discourage Black people from registering to vote. In any event, later studies, also examining the U.S., have suggested that the effects attributable to easier registration rules are relatively small (Knee and Green, 2011; Mitchell and Wlezien, 1995; Wasiu, 2023). The more limited international research that has been conducted has confirmed the importance of voter registration rules (Blais, 2000; Norris, 2014; Bolajoko, 2021).

Apart from voter registration, political parties' official registration can also have an indirect impact on election participation by dictating which parties are allowed to appear on the ballot list. In order to prevent voter confusion or duplication, party registration controls political finance as well as the party names (and occasionally the party insignia) that appear on ballot papers. Party registration laws are frequently employed in newly democratic nations to suppress dissent or prevent one party from gaining a monopoly on power (Karvonen, 2017). In Russia, for instance, a political party that wanted to register had to have 10,000 members or more between 2001 and 2006; after that, the number was raised to 50,000. Following mass protests in the wake of the December 2013 Duma election this requirement was reduced to 500 members. Studies in regions as diverse as Latin America (Birnir, 2014) and the Asia-Pacific (Reilly, 2016) confirm the importance of party registration rules.

The electoral system itself is a second institutional issue that may have an impact on electoral participation. One thing to think about is if voting is required or optional; research indicates that nations with mandatory voting have higher voter turnout than those with optional voting. Jackman (1987; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2014; Wasiu, 2023) estimated the increase in turnout caused by compulsion to be around 13 percentage points in the first systematic investigation of the impact of compulsion on turnout. However, the benefits of compulsion tend to be concentrated in the developed democracies with necessary voting, such as Australia and Belgium; in other nations with mandatory voting, especially in Latin America (where it is referred to as "mandatory voting," the benefits are far smaller. The discrepancy appears to be caused by the strict enforcement of compulsory voting in Australia and Belgium, and the political culture that underpins compulsion; most other countries that operate compulsory voting have significantly weaker enforcement (Norris, 2012; Blais, 2017; Birch, 2019).

Another aspect of the electoral system is district magnitude, or the number of representatives that are elected from each electoral district. Larger districts with more candidates encourage greater competition between parties and candidates and therefore generate more mobilizing activity compared to smaller districts (Karp et al., 2017). By contrast, smaller districts are often categorized as “safe” for one party and rarely change hands at any election; there is little incentive for non-incumbent parties to concentrate scarce resources on these seats and therefore turnout is lower. In many democracies, “safe” seats regularly make up the large majority of districts and as a result, the parties concentrate their activities on the minority of marginal districts that they have a chance of winning. However, part of this effect may be due to the electoral system itself, since proportional representation systems generally have larger districts than majoritarian or first-past-the-post systems.

The integrity or fairness of the election system is one aspect that has drawn a lot of attention recently. Voters are more inclined to cast ballots if they have faith in the system and the procedures that support it (Birch, 2020). Believing that the election system is manipulable, especially in transitional democracies, can erode support for democracy and create a window of opportunity for the restoration of "more orderly" and predictable authoritarian government. Direct manipulation, manipulation through election management organizations, and indirect manipulation through skewed electoral laws are all possible (Lindberg, 2019; Levitsky and Way, 2020; Bolajoko, 2021). Studies show that public perceptions of electoral unfairness have a significant negative impact on views of democracy generally across a range of post-communist societies (McAllister and White, 2015).

The legislature is the third institutional factor that affects turnout. Jackman (1987) has identified countries with a single legislature as having higher turnout compared to bicameral countries. This proposition, according to Blais (2017), is based on the concentration of political authority, so "the more powerful the body that is being elected, the higher the turnout." It should therefore also apply to unitary systems, with turnout being higher than in federal systems. Blais and Dobrzynska (2008) provide a more sophisticated measure of the principle, taking into account, among other things, direct and indirect elections and the presence or absence of subnational elections. They conclude that the salience of an institution for voters is indeed a significant influence on turnout.

The general rules that surround the act of voting and whether they make voting easy or difficult are a fourth factor that is known to affect turnout. Turnout is influenced by the day of voting (Franklin, 2014). Higher turnout rates are observed on national rest days (like Sundays, which are popular in many European nations) than on normal work days (like Tuesdays in the US or Thursdays in the UK). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that having postal or absentee votes readily available boosts voter turnout since it gives them more

options for how to cast their ballot. The estimations are particularly sensitive to the nations that are included in the analysis, though, as the effects of these various metrics do not seem to be very significant (Norris, 2014).

Minimum voting age. The age at which citizens are permitted to vote is a fifth factor influencing turnout. Since turnout is higher among older citizens, it follows that, other things being equal, lowering the voting age will reduce turnout. Blais and Dobrzynska (2008: 246) found that "everything else being equal, turnout is reduced by almost two points when the voting age is lowered one year" in their analysis of 324 national elections in 91 different nations. Consequently, there was a roughly 5 percentage point decrease in turnout when the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in the 1970s. After examining a more limited set of nations, Franklin (2014) and McAllister (2014) calculate that the reduction in voting participation brought about by the 18-year-old voting age is around 3 percentage points. The present voting age has little bearing on turnout because the great majority of democracies allow voting at 18 (among the established democracies, only Austria now permits national voting at 16). However, if the age was reduced further, to 16 as some parties and organizations advocate, turnout could be expected to decline.

Voting disparities, such as younger or lower socioeconomic level voters coming out less frequently than older voters or those in higher status groups, are known to be reduced when voting is made compulsory (Gallego, 2020). It has also been shown that a decrease in the patterns of observed voting inequality has an impact on redistributive governmental policies that benefit the less fortunate (Hill, 2012). Governments are less motivated to address the interests of particular groups when formulating policy if they have lower voter turnout (Griffin and Newman, 2015). Thus reducing inequalities in voting—in age, education or income, for example—can have measurable effects on government policies and an impact on whom they are directed.

This summary of the impacts of institutional arrangements on voting behavior suggests that while each has a noticeable influence, these effects are often modest and vary throughout nations. In the words of Holmberg (2019: 167), "the electoral system matters, but not much." As a result, the estimations that are determined greatly depend on the nations that are included in the research. The main variable that has been found to affect turnout in the literature on voting is the kind of electoral system—majoritarian or proportional—which is discussed in the context of election rules in the next section.

Election Rules

Vote counting procedures are governed by a convoluted system of explicit laws and guidelines known as election rules. In the end, this procedure decides who gets elected. Duverger's law (1954), which asserted that multiparty systems would result from proportional election systems and two-party systems would result from majoritarian voting systems, was one of the first classifications of election laws and their effects. This result would have different effects on people's voting habits in each scenario. But election laws also address things like election thresholds and go beyond simple vote counting.

Proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems. The proportionality of the electoral system is often identified as a major institutional feature that shapes voting behavior. As Blais (2017: 113–114) points out, the majority of these studies are based on the established democracies, and when new or emerging democracies are incorporated into the analysis, the results are less robust (Blais and Dobrzynska, 2008). However, there is some evidence that greater proportionality leads to higher turnout (Franklin, 1996; Radcliff and Davis, 2000). In addition to the complicated factor—which was mentioned in the preceding section—that PR systems often have bigger districts than majoritarian ones, it appears that the nations that are included in any analysis have a significant impact on the findings. This indicates that while there will often be more fierce battle for

seats under PR systems, larger districts will not always result in higher voter turnout.

In addition, three categories of proportional representation systems exist based on the structure of the ballot. First, the most candidate-centered systems are those that employ open ballot lists, which allow voters to select from a list of individual candidates. Second, voters can choose to support a specific candidate or a pre-ordered party list in systems that employ semi-open ballot lists. Third, closed-list voting systems make voters pick between parties rather than candidates; as a result, they are more focused on the party than the candidate. Candidates are generally encouraged to acquire personal votes and to effectively serve their constituency under candidate-centered systems (Shugart, 2011; Shugart et al., 2015; Adebola, 2020). By contrast, when candidate fortunes largely rest with the party, party service and party loyalty become paramount considerations for candidates. There is evidence to show that candidate-centered systems generate higher levels of voter satisfaction, net of other things (Farrell and McAllister, 2016; see also Anderson and Guillory, 1997).

Regarding how the election system affects the public's perception of the political system as a whole, the conclusions regarding proportionality are more solid. Research indicates that an election system with higher proportionality leads to a larger number of rival political parties. Voters thus feel more strongly that their opinions are being fairly reflected (Anderson, 2011; Karp and Banducci, 2018). In contrast, a lot of voters in two-party systems believe that the narrow range of options accessible to them unnecessarily limits their opinions. Thus, PR systems provide voters more options and increase their satisfaction with the system overall by generating a greater variety of parties (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Norris, 2014). These popular feelings towards the political system can have significant effects on voting behavior, through stronger partisanship, more information about the available policy choices, and a higher level of mobilization by the parties.

Election thresholds. One specific consideration in election rules is whether or not a threshold is applied. Many nations have election threshold laws that prevent a party from obtaining representation unless a minimum threshold is reached. The goal is to decrease the number of parties in the legislature while enhancing accountability, coalition building, and governance. For instance, of the 34 nations that make up the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 19 have election thresholds, and the majority of these 19 nations use proportional representation in some capacity. Election thresholds are popular because they are easy to implement and comprehend for voters. They are also simple and effective. During their transition to democracy, many of the postcommunist countries introduced thresholds, often with the intention of facilitating the return of noncommunist parties to power, and barring representation from small, extremist parties (Moraski and Loewenberg, 2009).

Thresholds can affect voter behavior in two ways. First, they have been shown to increase disproportionality in election outcomes and to contribute to the number of wasted votes (Anchar, 1997; Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Abolade, 2022). Voters may therefore be discouraged from voting for a small party that looks unlikely to meet the required threshold and instead opt for a larger and more established party. Second, thresholds can act as a disincentive to new parties contesting elections and arguably limit the choices that are open to voters in an election. The ultimate effect may be to reduce representation. Thresholds may therefore act in a subtle way to nudge voter behavior towards support for major parties, and away from minor parties.

Voter behavior is impacted by election rules and their impact on vote counting since they tend to favor the big parties. The main parties will benefit from a majoritarian system if they hold a disproportionate number of seats in the legislature. Although a PR system will provide a more equal allocation of seats, most PR-using nations also employ election thresholds, albeit possibly not to the same extent, which further tilts the system in favor of the big parties. Ultimately,

unless they are choosing a big party, some voters may feel that their vote was wasted in both situations.

System Performance

Public perceptions of the political system are shaped by its effectiveness, which in turn affects how each voter votes. This includes the system's capacity to produce tangible benefits for citizens (like economic prosperity and physical security) as well as intangible ones (like trust in institutions and political efficacy). The scope and complexity of study on economic voting may be unmatched in the nebulous topic of system performance and its political implications. The majority of this section is devoted to this emphasis, but the reasoning behind it is applicable to any subject that voters care about.

Because institutions have an effect on public policy, they offer a significant background for economic voting. It has long been established that electoral systems have significant policy ramifications; proportional systems tend to lead to greater levels of public spending and redistribution than plurality systems (Austen-Smith, 2000; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2012; Morelli, 2014; Wasiu, 2023). Others have noted that there are significant parallels between different forms of capitalism and the nation's election system (see, e.g., Gourevitch and Shinn, 2015). However, the origins of these patterns have been a matter of debate. Rokkan (1970) and more recently Boix (1999) have argued that the adoption of PR systems was a conscious policy of the political right, while more recent work has cast doubt on this explanation and argued that the motivation lay in the right's support for consensus regulatory frameworks (Cusack et al., 2017).

Voters will reward governments that do well economically and penalize them for performing poorly, according to a recurring conclusion in the research. More than any other area, however, voters need to see a direct line of accountability to the government; the "clarity of accountability" (Powell and Whitten, 1993) refers to how obvious or opaque that line of accountability is. Economic voting is often stronger in nations with open accountability, such two-party systems where the

major parties rotate in power, and weaker in multiparty systems where coalition government is the norm. This distinction tends to divide Westminster countries based on majoritarian electoral systems from their European counterparts which are based on proportional representation.

The case for accountability clarity has come under heavy fire in recent years, with some arguing that shifting political and economic landscapes have made it more difficult for people to hold government officials accountable or assign blame. Three somewhat overlapping factors may be identified in the numerous assertions that the clarity of responsibility has been steadily undermined: path dependency, the expansion of the welfare state, and economic globalization.

Path dependency suggests that voters see little difference across administrations, with each government obligated to uphold a particular set of policies regardless of their own policy preferences. For instance, the policy-making process involves interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary, and previous policies frequently institutionalize programs independent of the political party in power. As a result, a number of circumstances might come together to make it difficult or impossible for a government to alter its course on policy. Numerous investigations have supported this finding. For example, Imbeau et al. (2011: 1; see also Schmidt, 1996) talk of "the average correlation between the party composition of the government and policy outputs is not significantly different from zero," while Huber and Stephens (2011: 221) found "a sharp narrowing of political differences" on welfare state policies in established democracies during the 1980s.

A second, related, factor undermining clarity of accountability is the growth of the welfare state in the advanced democracies. The emergence of complex social welfare systems that lessen the political ramifications of subpar economic success is one reason for the declining influence of economic performance on voting behavior. Therefore, the provision of unemployment compensation lessens the adverse effects on the current government as unemployment grows. For example,

Pacek and Radcliff (1995) show that voters in states with comprehensive social protection are less sensitive to the effects of a failing economy than in nations where jobless people are expected to fend for themselves.

A third factor eroding clarity of accountability is globalization, and the view that the international economic environment is undermining the ability of governments to make independent economic policy. According to Hellwig and Samuels (2017), economic voting has less of an influence on nations that are more integrated into the global economy. As a result, voters frequently find it challenging to evaluate the efficacy of their government in the past. These impacts are particularly apparent in medium-sized or smaller economies, when decisions made in Beijing, Brussels, or Washington are seen to have a greater impact on the economy than those made in the national capital (Hellwig, 2011). For instance, Australian economic voting is substantially lower than in comparable nations, mostly because of the belief that factors originating in the global economy have a greater impact on the country's economic circumstances than does the current administration (McAllister, 2011).

The way that political institutions frame economic voting has received the most attention, but the same reasoning holds true for other problems that voters may care about, such as health, education, or the environment (Anderson, 2017; Kedar, 2019; Bolajoko, 2021). Institutions will mediate citizens' opinions on each instance and influence voters' perceptions on whether the current government should be rewarded or penalized for its performance. For instance, although a national government cannot stop global warming, it might be seen that it is promoting or impeding a solution through national policy. To continue the argument, institutions also assist in mediating broader assessments of system effectiveness, such as confidence and trust in political institutions. The government may get rewards or penalties based on how well it performs, provided that a distinct line of responsibility can be established between its actions and those of the institution.

Partisanship

Party identification is one of the few hypotheses for voting behavior that has gained traction. Party identification, which was first proposed in The American Voter Study in 1960, quickly rose to prominence as the primary explanation for voting behavior in the United States and sparked a flurry of studies in the other well-established democracies. With the fall of communism, it was given new life, and academics have studied how partisanship developed in the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Generally speaking, these studies have shown that, under the assumption that comparable institutional arrangements that support open party competition and assist candidates in building a rapport with voters exist, partisanship develops in these emerging democracies in a manner like to that of the established democracies (Brader and Tucker, 2011, 2018; Dalton and Weldon, 2017; Whitefield, 2012).

While group membership and parental socialization are thought to be the origins of partisanship, research has recently shifted to look at the role that institutional structures and the political environment have in the development, direction, and strength of party affiliation. Consequently, we possess a great deal of knowledge on both the systemic and individual-level attributes that influence partisanship. According to Huber et al. (2015), "institutions that encourage retrospective clarity of responsibility" are often associated with a higher likelihood of partisanship. This is more likely to occur in systems that have fewer legislative parties and stronger party discipline, so the choices that voters have to make are more sharply defined. Voters will therefore adopt distinct policy preferences based on what the parties offer, and that in turn will encourage debate, competition, and the accumulation of information about the policy choices that are on offer (Bowler et al., 1994).

It has also been demonstrated that the significance of the various institutional contexts mentioned earlier in determining the partisanship's intensity and direction varies based on people' cognitive abilities. According to Huber et al.

(2015), those with the fewest cognitive resources—as shown by educational attainment—are more affected by the institutional context's influence on partisanship. Partisanship has a larger role in low information situations or among people with less political expertise because, for these low-resource persons, it is a useful heuristic for making political decisions when other information is lacking (Dalton et al., 2011). This has particular implications in new or emerging democracies, especially where literacy may be low and/or the party system has yet to consolidate.

There are specific implications for partisanship depending on the type of electoral system. More proportional systems seem to encourage greater polarization and offer better voting guidance overall. According to Tverdova (2011), partisanship becomes a more significant factor in more proportional systems when the impact of candidates on voting is compared to that of partisanship. Voters feel more fairly represented in PR systems, which is at least partially the result of the more parties in place. In contrast, voters in a two-party system could believe that just one party adequately represents their viewpoints. Voters may therefore feel less inclined to identify with one or other party and if they do, to have weaker identification.

Partisanship is also shaped by other elements of the electoral and party systems. Factors include how often elections are held and whether voting is required or voluntary under the system. Australia's three-year national election cycle and mandatory voting are sometimes blamed for the country's record-breaking levels of polarization. Overall, the great majority of Australian voters consistently cast ballots, placing parties at the top of their considerations (McAllister, 2011). In addition to the number of parties, the party system affects voters' expectations of the coalitions that will be formed after the election, which are typically formed during the campaign, and how important policies are (Curini and Hino, 2014). In multiparty systems where coalition governments are the

norm, voters may alter how far they use their partisanship as a guide to voting depending on what coalition arrangements are likely to emerge after the election.

Partisanship is arguably the most widespread mass political viewpoint; most voters still identify with a political party, even in nations where party affiliation has decreased. The significance of macro impacts on individual voting behavior is confirmed by the fact that the direction and intensity of partisanship are somewhat determined by the structure of political institutions. It also implies that institutional adjustments could be one way to stop partisanship from declining in certain situations.

Strategic and Split Ticket Voting

Voting for a party other than their preferred one is known as strategic voting, commonly referred to as "tactical" voting in Britain and "sophisticated" voting in the United States. This can happen if a voter thinks that supporting a party other than their own would assist to achieve a specific goal, such preventing the election of a certain party. Thus, strategic voting has two components: a voter selecting a party or candidate other than their first choice, and a voter having a realistic expectation regarding the election's result (Blais et al., 2011: 344; see also Cox, 1997). A strategic voter is usually distinguished from a sincere voter, who votes for her preferred party regardless of the consequences, and a momentum voter, who votes for a party because she believes it is likely to win (Blais and Gschwend, 2011: 176).

The empirical evidence supporting strategic voting has been tricky, despite the normative justifications for it having long been recognized and examined (see, for instance, Cox, 1997). A large portion of the motivation for assessing strategic voting came from the emergence of third parties in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. The first attempts to quantify strategic voting relied on self-reports from respondents (Heath et al., 1991) or conclusions drawn from the total election returns (Johnston and Pattie, 1991). More recent methods have included calculating whether voters stray from selecting the party closest to them and

modeling the proximity of voters to the parties on a variety of problems (Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Blais et al., 2015; Abolade, 2022).

According to Blais et al. (2015), in actuality, these diverse techniques often calculate the proportion of strategic voters in any given election at about 4–6% of total votes cast. The primary institutional component that typically affects the degree of strategic voting in any given system is the electoral system. According to most research, plurality systems are most vulnerable to strategic voting because people are well-informed about the parties and candidates running in their area and can accurately predict the outcome of the election. Consequently, a great deal of study has been conducted on strategic voting in the Westminster democracies, particularly the United States and Great Britain (see Alvarez et al., 2016). More recently, European countries based on proportional electoral systems have been the subject of in-depth analysis, in addition to several comparative studies (see Blais and Gschwend, 2011; Gschwend, 2014; Wasiu, 2023). These studies aimed at proportional systems have concluded that strategic voting does exist, particularly when voters are concerned about what coalition government might be formed after an election (Kedar, 2019).

Isolating the common factors that may shape strategic voting in the various studies that have been conducted is problematic because of differences in country coverage, methodology, and the plethora of contextual differences that exist. However, several conclusions seem clear. First, the evidence does suggest that strategic voting is substantially conditioned by the electoral system, with majoritarian systems showing higher rates of strategic voting when compared to proportional systems. Second, the proportion of voters who vote strategically tends to be small, typically much less than 10 percent of the electorate, largely because the opportunity to vote strategically occurs only in a minority of districts. Third, there is good evidence that strategic voting has increased in recent years.

Apart from casting their ballots really or deliberately, voters in some systems can also cast their ballots for distinct legislatures within a single national election. As a result, a voter has the option to support one party in one legislature and a different one in another. Split ticket voting is the term for this phenomena, which has spread to many electoral systems, most notably the US (McAllister and Darcy, 1992). Since the act takes place across various governmental levels, it is known as "vertical" split ticketing (Burden and Helmke, 2019). The alternative is “horizontal” split ticket voting, which occurs in parallel electoral systems, where voters can simultaneously cast a ballot in a constituency contest and a national party list (McAllister and White, 2000). The common feature between the two types of split ticket voting is that voters will be motivated by different things in the choices they make, and these motivations are a consequence of election rules.

Split ticket voting is becoming more common in many nations, and this is typically linked to the public's waning faith in political parties. According to Fiorina (1992), the general mistrust of political parties is mirrored in the desire for divided government, which prevents any one party from having the ability to rule without interference and, consequently, from having the ability to control the majority of voters. The idea that voter incentives are tactical and good as opposed to dysfunctional and bad has been supported by other studies.

Using aggregate data, Bowler and Denemark (1993) contend that dealignment has little impact on the structural options that the Australian upper and lower house electoral systems provide for voters to cast strategically chosen ballots. Bean and Wattenberg (1998) compare Australian and American split ticket voting and find that split ticket voting in Australia is primarily driven by a desire for power sharing between the parties, but in the U.S. split ticket voting is not influenced by this desire. Local variables have been shown to be significant in other countries, such as Brazil (Ames et al., 2019); parties' participation (Elklit and Kjaer, 2019); and measures to reduce policy risk (Burden and Helmke, 2019).

The institutional opportunities that allow different kinds of voting to function play a major role in determining their significance. Furthermore, a minority of voters—and sometimes a very tiny percentage—choose to take advantage of these chances even when they are available. On the other hand, their influence over government performance can be substantial. For instance, a government runs the danger of having its legislative agenda trimmed if it is unable to win control of an upper chamber through split ticket voting among its supporters. In a similar vein, strategic voting has the power to alter the result of several constituency elections, which frequently have little to do with national political voting patterns.

Conclusion:

Institutions have a significant impact on how people vote. It should come as no surprise that institutions shaped public norms, values, and beliefs, which in turn shaped policy results. This was the underlying premise of the "new institutionalism" of the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, North, 1990). Evidence has been offered in support of the notion that political institutions influence voting behavior in each of the five themes discussed here. The extent to which institutions influence political conduct in relation to non-institutional elements, such the personal traits of voters, is still up for debate. This brings up two issues: an empirical and a normative one.

Normatively, endogeneity issues arise when attempting to differentiate between the influence of institutional and non-institutional elements on political conduct. Institutions stop being autonomous actors if they are a result of the circumstances surrounding their emergence. To put it another way, according to Przeworski (2014), "conditions shape institutions and institutions only transmit the causal effects of these conditions." Since institutions are the outcome of what we are attempting to measure, evaluating their influence becomes nearly difficult if this is the case. Thankfully, it seems that the endogeneity issue has been exaggerated; for instance, we are aware that certain institutions have unique

influences on people's conduct. However, we can see the effects of endogeneity when an institution is implanted into one country and works as predicted, while the same institution implanted in another country results in total failure (Przeworski, 2014).

Empirically, a lot relies on the nations and institutions that are considered in the analysis. This position has been made considerably clearer by the CSES project that was previously discussed. For instance, we are aware that institutions mostly have little effect on patterns of voter disengagement, but that party system complexity and type affect ideological voting and issue views, among other things (Klingemann, 2019: 26). This has significant ramifications for the institutions that are examined. As previously said, the nations that are included in any sample will also have a significant influence on the outcomes since each has a different institutional mix and, most importantly, a different age of democracy. Moreover, as institutions change and evolve over the course of time, there may be a lag in the political effects of an institutional change.

Do institutions affect how people vote? Klingemann (2019: 26) states that the findings "evidence that they (mostly) do." However, assessments of their significance need to be nuance-aware, just like any other analysis. Over the past 20 years, there has been significant advancement in the research of how institutions affect voting behavior. These developments have been based on improvements in technique and data collecting. Compiling the results of this study will be the challenge of the next twenty years.

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سلوك التصويت والمؤسسات السياسية في القرن الحادي والعشرين

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الملخص:

من المقولات الشائعة في العلوم الاجتماعية أن "المؤسسات مهمة". إن المؤسسات مهمة، من بين أمور أخرى، لزيادة ثروة الأمة، والحد من الفساد، والحكم الفعال. وليس أقلها أن المؤسسات السياسية مهمة بالنسبة لسلوك المواطن الانتخابي. إن المؤسسات السياسية التي يمارس فيها الناخب صوته هي التي ستنظم الخيارات المتاحة له. وفي المقابل، تعمل هذه الاختيارات على تشكيل قرار التصويت النهائي. إن التفاعل بين هذه الخصائص على مستوى النظام وخصائص الناخب هو الذي يحدد قرار التصويت. وبالتالي فإن التصويت ليس مجرد خيار شخصي، بل هو خيار يتشكل من خلال السياق الذي يتم فيه الاختيار. وبما أن نطاق المؤسسات السياسية واسع النطاق، وتأثيرها المحتمل على سلوك التصويت كبير، فإن هناك حاجة إلى بعض التصنيف الواسع. وبناء على ذلك، تم تقسيم الورقة إلى خمسة أقسام. يتناول القسم الأول تأثير المؤسسات الانتخابية على سلوك التصويت، مع التركيز بشكل خاص على المشاركة الانتخابية. ويتناول القسم الثاني قواعد الانتخابات، مثل العتبات ودرجة التناسب في النظام الانتخابي، وكيف يمكن أن تشكل السلوك. وينقل القسم الثالث تركيز الاهتمام إلى أداء النظام، والذي يتم تحديده من خلال التصويت الاقتصادي، ولكن المنطق ينطبق بشكل جيد على القضايا الأخرى التي تهم الناخبين. الحزبية وكيف تختلف حسب الترتيبات المؤسسية للبلد هي موضوع القسم الرابع، في حين يبحث القسم الخامس في الفرص التي تتيحها ترتيبات مؤسسية معينة للتصويت الاستراتيجي والمقسم. ويخلص الاستنتاج إلى بعض الاستنتاجات العامة حول التأثير الكلي للمؤسسات على سلوك التصويت.