



The international and regional position on the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip in 2023

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Abstract:

The study seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the most important international and regional positions on the Israeli war on Gaza. The study will take 2023 as a starting point, as this year witnessed significant events, most notably the launch of Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa on October 7, 2023, by the Palestinian resistance, represented by the Hamas movement, which constituted a significant event in the history of the Palestinian resistance movement. The results of the study revealed that despite the losses that targeted innocent civilians, it also demonstrated the sympathy of Western peoples, represented by condemnations and denunciations of the Zionist entity for its crimes committed against innocent civilians in Gaza and other Palestinian cities subjected to Israeli bombardment.

Keywords: Israeli war, Gaza Strip, Israel, world public opinion, regional and Arab opinion.

The introduction:

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation, which erupted at dawn on October 7, 2023, was a significant and changing factor for the Palestinian resistance, represented by the Hamas movement, which planned, led, and implemented the measures for this operation. Anyone following the events taking place in the Palestinian arena is aware that the objective justifications that led the Palestinian resistance to undertake this operation are due to the Israeli crimes and attacks it committed against the Palestinian people, holy sites, and property. Following the formation of the Benjamin Netanyahu government in 2022, which obtained approximately 120 seats within the framework of a partnership with some parties characterized by being parties with a religious and extremist

character, its directions have since defined its hostile positions against the Palestinian people and the resistance as well.

Importance of research:

The importance and rationale of the research stem from the importance of the topic, which is embodied in terms of understanding and realizing the international, regional and Arab position on the Israeli war on Gaza. Accordingly, the importance of this study comes in order to fill the scientific gaps with scientific knowledge, which we did not find addressed in other research that addressed the topic from specific aspects. In other words, this study came in order to identify the gaps in the literature and to emphasize the importance of addressing these gaps.

Research problem

The conflict in Gaza today is part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that began in 1948. Thousands of Palestinians were displaced, and since then, Israel has targeted Gaza with numerous attacks. Innocent civilians have been the victims of Israeli attacks on Gaza.

The Study questions:

The study aims to answer the main research question:

What are the most important official international, regional, and Arab positions regarding the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip in 2023? To answer this main research question, several sub-questions must be addressed:

- To what extent was the international position on the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip supportive or opposed?
- What is the regional position on the Israeli war on Gaza?
- What is the Arab position on the war on Gaza?

Research hypothesis:

The study hypothesis is based on the idea that international, regional and Arab positions were characterised by condemnation of the war on the one hand, and cooperation with the Zionist entity and providing it with various military aid on the other hand. This was embodied in the American position and the rest of the other Western countries. The Arab

position was also complicit in the war, as some countries provided intelligence information about elements of the Palestinian resistance movement.

This will be demonstrated in the context of the research.

Study objectives:

The main objective of the study is to provide a comprehensive assessment of international, regional and Arab positions on the Israeli war on Gaza. The specific objective of the study is to identify and understand the contradictions in the positions of these powers regarding the war.

Study methodology:

In order to complete the study and answer the main research question as well as the study's objective, the research methodology relied on collecting information and data from various and multiple sources, which provides the best understanding of the study to be achieved. In addition, the research relied on the analytical and inductive approach, which enables us to provide a clear analysis or vision regarding the international, regional and Arab positions on the Israeli war on Gaza.

Research structure:

In addition to the introduction, the research structure will include two sections. The first is devoted to studying the international position on the Israeli war on Gaza, where the American position on the war will be discussed and analyzed, in addition to the Russian and European positions. The second section will address the regional position on the war, and this section will focus on discussing and analyzing positions, including the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Arab position, and the Turkish position, in addition to the conclusion, results, and recommendations that emerge in the context of the research analysis.

Chapter One: The Official International Position on the Israeli War on Gaza

The international position on the war on Gaza has been characterized by a contrast between support for the war, as in the position of the United States of America, and a neutral position, which was embodied in some of the positions of the European Union countries on the war, and a

position of rejection, as called for by the Russian position. This will be discussed in the context of the following section, which will be divided into two requirements. The first deals with the American and British positions on the war on Gaza, while the second requirement is devoted to discussing and analyzing the European and Russian positions, each separately, on the war:

First: The position of the United States

From the first moments of the start of Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa, the United States rushed to provide all forms of assistance, whether it was embodied on the political, military or security levels. According to the Washington Post, the United States was keen to provide military assistance to the Zionist entity and provided aid worth (6.5) billion dollars to the Zionist entity in its war on Gaza. In addition, it concluded nearly 100 deals that included arms sales, which included lethal weapons as well as shells that penetrate fortified buildings, most of which were used to target innocent civilians (Ayman 2024) .

In a survey published by the Arab Center in Washington in cooperation with the Arab Center for Research and Political Studies, on the general American position on the Israeli war on Gaza, the results indicated that the sample that was surveyed When asked about the reactions of international powers to the Israeli war on Gaza, nearly unanimously (94%) considered the American position bad, while (82%) considered it very bad (Arab Centre Washington DC 2024).

In response to a question about: What is the general Arab assessment of the American media coverage of the war on Gaza?

Participants responded to questions about their impressions of US media coverage of the war on Gaza. While (82%) reported that they believed the US media was biased in favor of Israel, only (7%) viewed it as neutral/unbiased, and (4%) reported that it was biased in favor of Palestine (Arab Centre Washington DC 2024). Also, regarding the factors that enabled Israel to continue its war on Gaza, (50%) of the Arab public indicated that American military and political support was the most important factor, while (14%) said that the failure of Arab governments to take decisive action against Israel to stop the war was the most important

factor. Another (11%) of participants pointed to the recent normalization agreements between Israel and some Arab governments, while (10%) stated that Western governments' support for Israel was the main reason (Abu Sakin 2023).

At the security level, the United States provided intelligence information on the leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement in cooperation with intelligence agencies affiliated with Arab regimes, and a number of the most important leaders were eliminated. The Palestinian resistance, for example, was assassinated after he was lured by Egyptian intelligence, where he was located and liquidated (Odeh 2023).

The second requirement: The European and Russian position on the Israeli war on Gaza.

The Israeli war on Gaza elicited mixed reactions from international powers, particularly European countries and Russia. European positions varied between support for Israel and criticism, while Russia sought to strengthen its diplomatic role in the region, a position that will be discussed and analyzed in the following research.

First: The European position:

Although Europe was preoccupied with some internal and external issues, for example, but not limited to, the Russian-Ukrainian war and its security and economic repercussions, it quickly adopted a position towards Operation “Noah’s Flood” on October 7, 2023, the date that made Europe’s attention turn towards the Middle East, as the events in Gaza were among the priorities and concerns of European decision-makers, and this had positive effects that were embodied at the internal political level of some European countries, and in a special circumstance where these countries were witnessing elections that determined the future of the political system of their countries (Salah 2024).

Therefore, European positions varied between support for Israel on the one hand and criticism on the other. Some European countries expressed solidarity with Israel, arguing that it has the "right to self-defense." This was embodied in French President Emmanuel Macron's statement, in which he called for the formation of an international coalition to confront Hamas, similar to the coalition against ISIS (Larous 2023).



The results of a poll conducted by the Arab Center in Washington 2024 regarding European positions on the Israeli war on Gaza showed that the majority of participants in the poll, approximately (79%) They pretended that the French position on the Israeli war on Gaza was described as "bad or very bad" (Arab Centre Washington DC 2024). While he sees (10%) Among the participants, the French position is that "good or very good As for the German position on the Israeli war on Gaza, the results of the poll showed that it is approximately (75%) of participants They showed that the German position was "bad or very bad", while (9%) Of the survey participants, they claimed that the German position was "positive." As for the responses to the British position on the war on Gaza, Nearly (78%) of survey participants felt the British position was bad or very bad, while (8%) felt the British position was "positive." (Arab Centre Washington DC 2024).

Following the escalation of violence and the targeting of innocent civilians, some European countries have resorted to a gradual change in their positions. This was evident in the call by the European Union's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, to adopt a draft resolution imposing trade sanctions on Israel, similar to those imposed on Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Borrell emphasized the need for the EU to adhere to its principles and not adopt a policy of double standards. (Salah 2024).

As a result of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza and the West Bank in general, the European Union called for respect for international humanitarian law and ensuring the return of displaced Palestinians. The EU also called, through a conference held in Brussels, where it discussed with the Israeli government a proposal for the future of Gaza after a ceasefire, and emphasized the importance of supporting reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip (Al-Makimi 2021,430).

Second: The Russian position

Russia has adopted a cautious diplomatic approach to the war on Gaza. It has welcomed any settlement that guarantees security in Gaza, expressing its support for a ceasefire and agreements that contribute to regional stability. Through its efforts in the UN Security Council aimed at stopping the war on Gaza, it has demanded the entry of humanitarian aid

to the people of Gaza. In a statement, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his fears of the possibility of a comprehensive war in the Middle East, affirming his support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and calling for an immediate ceasefire and recognition of the Palestinian state (Al-Sharq News Agency 2023).

The UN Security Council has witnessed several attempts to issue resolutions related to the war in Gaza, amid a clear division among the major powers. In October 2023, Russia submitted a draft resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire and ensuring aid access, but it did not receive sufficient support for adoption. In March 2024, the United States submitted a draft resolution calling for a ceasefire, but it was vetoed by Russia and China, before being later passed after amendments under Resolution 2728. These resolutions reflect the political tensions within the Council, with countries' positions varying between seeking an immediate cessation of fighting and linking this to specific conditions, leading to continued debate over ways to end the crisis (Al-Jubaili 2023).

The question that arises here is: to what extent has Russia contributed to finding solutions to the crisis through its role in the UN Security Council?

Russia has sought to find solutions to the crisis through its influence in the UN Security Council and its use of the veto power in a number of resolutions, the most important of which are:

First: In October 2023, Russia submitted a draft proposal to the UN Security Council calling for a ceasefire (Al Arab Newspaper 2023) in Gaza for humanitarian reasons, as well as condemning the use of violence against innocent civilians and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid. Although Russia was serious about implementing this resolution, the draft was rejected by four countries, supported by five countries, and abstained from six countries.

Second: In March 2024, Russia and China resorted to using their veto power against a resolution that included the release of hostages and, at the same time, a quick ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. However, Russia realized that this resolution was in the interest of Israel and American interests and could not provide a balanced path for both parties as much as it served one party at the expense of the other (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed website 2023).



Third: Russia tried to adopt a firm position on the war on Gaza. In October 2023, Meetings were held in Russia between Russian officials and members of the Hamas movement. One of the most important priorities was working on the file of foreign detainees and their release, as among them were Russian detainees. **And securing exits for civilians in Gaza, the Russian position also called for the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.** (Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies 2023).

Fourth: Russia continued its efforts to find a solution to the conflict between Gaza and Israel. This was evident in 2025, when the Kremlin condemned the airstrikes on Gaza, which targeted innocent civilians. It noted that this represented a dangerous escalation and required diplomatic action to halt Israeli violations in Gaza.

Fifth: Russia did not refrain from supporting solutions to the crisis. In February 2025, it called for a two-state solution through its project to end the conflict. This came in response to statements from the US government regarding the future of Gaza. However, the Russian response was that its position was in line with the UN Security Council resolutions that enjoy broad and comprehensive acceptance (Al-Jubaili 2023).

It is clear from the above that the positions of European countries and Russia on the Israeli war on Gaza reflect the extent of the ambiguity of the political landscape at the international level, in that positions vary according to strategic interests and the nature of the relations that govern the parties in the region.

Although European countries initially supported and stood in solidarity with Israel, under the pretext that Israel has the "right to self-defense," the European position quickly changed following the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Gaza. This pressured European countries due to public sympathy for the Gaza issue, with the peoples of these countries demanding economic sanctions against Israel, alongside demands within the European Union for adherence to international humanitarian law. As for Russia, it sought to strengthen its presence in the region after realizing the existence of a so-called vacuum-filling policy to achieve its goals, under the pretext of its support for the Palestinian cause.

Section Two: The Official Regional Position on the Israeli War on Palestine

First: The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Following the launch of Operation "Noah's Flood" on October 7, the question that is being raised here by regional and international parties is about Iran's role in this war. To what extent were Iranian officials, most importantly the "Quds Force" linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, involved in planning and preparing for it? Was this operation, as planned, aimed at embroiling the region in a comprehensive war, in order to "eliminate" Israel, or in order to confront the normalization efforts that an Iranian plan has taken place between Israel and some Arab countries (Qassim 2024, 2).

The launch of the process has resulted in "Al-Aqsa Flood" On October 7, Iran became part of the tense scene, in order to obtain strategic gains and avoid the repercussions and effects of a possible Israeli military attack on Gaza, in order to "eliminate Hamas." This coincided with the arrival of American military supplies to the region, accompanied by threats, including that any country that tried to stand with Hamas would face military action. Iran tried to base its positions on the statements of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, when he said, "Governments that normalize relations with the occupation have placed their bets on a loser." Furthermore, Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa demonstrated the weakness of Israel's security capabilities and its inability to defend itself (Malate Journal 2023, 2).

Iran has been able to exploit its influence through the process of "The Al-Aqsa Flood" was intended to achieve some goals, perhaps the most important of which was to curb the normalization treaties concluded between some Arab countries and Israel, as well as to support its supporters in the region to fight Israel militarily and the United States as well, not to mention that it wanted to limit Western influence in the region. By showcasing its military capabilities, in other words, Iran was not able to mobilize society for a new war as happened with Iraq in the 1980s. Moreover, Hamas is no longer an Islamic resistance movement affiliated with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Muhammad 2024, 2-3).

Thus, Iran saw Hamas as a force capable of confronting Israel, in addition to the fact that there was agreement between the goals of Hamas

and the Iranian vision regarding Israel. Accordingly, the Iranian government sought to provide all forms of support to Hamas, including logistical support and increasing it with all kinds of weapons and equipment, in addition to financial support, training of movement members, and supervision by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Al-Samadi 2023).

Formed practical "The Flood of Al-Aqsa" is considered one of the signs that are consistent with the vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was expressed by the Iranian leader, who said, "The demise of Israel is an inevitable matter." In most of his speeches, the Supreme Leader referred to defeating the Israeli occupation through Islamic resistance and the Palestinian people's struggle against the methods and practices of the Israeli occupation (Donya-e-Eqtasad Newspaper 2023).

Iranian support for Hamas has focused on financing, training, and military and logistical support. This support has included providing essential equipment and technology, as well as training and qualifying the movement's cadres to enhance its combat capabilities. Therefore, Iran wanted Hamas to play a key role in line with its goals and policies, which aim to exert pressure on Israel and the West. Furthermore, Iran wanted to make clear to Israel and the West that it is an influential party in the regional security equation, especially Israeli security, and that it has the ability to direct armed factions in a way that serves its goals and aspirations in the region. (Saleh 2023).

Second: The Arab position

Most of the positions of the Arab countries, specifically the position of (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, the Emirates, and Jordan), were embodied in the position of rejecting the war and condemning the violations and crimes committed by the occupation forces against innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip and other Palestinian Cities (Abu Sakin 2023).

Solidarity with the Palestinian people was in line with the position of the Arab League, as embodied in the statement of the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, regarding a resolution calling on the Israeli government to stop all military actions and attacks carried out by the occupation forces in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the role of the

Arab League was not limited to protests and condemnation, but rather it adopted the Palestinian cause by raising it within the institutions of the international community to be a pressure factor in stopping the blatant violations and attacks that were and are still being practiced against the Palestinian people (Al-Sahli 2023).

The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., in cooperation with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, conducted a public opinion poll in 16 Arab countries to measure Arab public views on the Israeli war on Gaza, which began on October 7, 2023, and Arab perceptions of the American role and policies toward the war. This poll is the first of its kind to measure Arab public opinion on this topic (Arab Centre Washington 2024). The poll was based on telephone interviews conducted between December 12, 2023, and January 5, 2024, with a representative sample of (8,000) participants in the following 16 Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the West Bank in Palestine, and Yemen. These countries represent more than (95%) of the population of the Arab region (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2024).

Regarding the factors enabling Israel to continue its war on Gaza, (50%) of the Arab public indicated that American military and political support was the most important factor, while (14%) said that the failure of Arab governments to take decisive action against Israel to stop the war was the most important factor. Another (11%) of participants pointed to the recent normalization agreements between Israel and some Arab governments, while (10%) stated that Western governments' support for Israel was the main reason (Arab Centre Washington 2024).

Regarding the future of peace, following the war on Gaza, (59%) of the sample reported that they had become certain that peace with Israel was not possible, (14%) reported that they had serious doubts, and (9%) said they had serious doubts. They did not believe in the possibility of peace with Israel in the first place. Only (13%) reported that they still believed in the possibility of achieving peace with Israel (Arab Centre Washington 2024).

Third: The Turkish position on the Israeli war on Gaza



It probably goes without saying that Ankara was preparing to receive the Israeli Prime Minister before October 7th, to begin a new phase in their relations in light of the American mediation that was hoped to take place between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. However, Netanyahu's emergency health condition prevented this, while the Turkish government stated that the Palestinian issue is among its priorities (Salha 2004).

Following the Israeli aggression on Gaza, the Turkish government adopted a position calling for a ceasefire and denouncing the massacres committed by the Israeli government against innocent civilians. In return, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu accused Erdogan of committing massacres against the Kurds and persecuting journalists, throwing them in prisons. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen also stated that the Israeli ambassador would be withdrawn from Ankara if Erdogan remained in power. On the economic level, Israel classified Turkish goods as “enemy state goods.” On the security level, the head of the Israeli intelligence agency developed a plan to pursue and eliminate Hamas leaders, especially those residing in Turkey (Anadolu Agency 2023).

The Turkish government initially sought to adopt a diplomatic approach in its position on the war on Gaza, in order to convey the idea to the international community as well as the Arab and Islamic world that the Turkish government seeks to create an atmosphere of political understanding and that it seeks calm rather than confrontation in its position on the Israeli war on Gaza. However, the Israeli intransigence and arrogant approach that it adopted in its war on Gaza contradicted the vision of the Turkish government and its position aimed at creating calm and a ceasefire (Odeh 2023).

It may go without saying that the massacres committed by Israel against innocent civilians, as well as the boiling Turkish street mobilizing against the occupation's practices in Gaza, were among the most prominent reasons and motives that led the Turkish president to place the blame on the government of the United States and the European Union for the responsibility for the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the rest of the Palestinian cities when the Turkish president said: "Israel is nothing but a pawn in the region that will be sacrificed when the time comes." The

Turkish President also stated: In another statement, he said, "Netanyahu wrote his name in history as the butcher of Gaza." *The Turkish President's statements were consistent with what was stated by an official.* The Nationalist Movement Party, which called on the Erdoğan government to intervene with the Turkish army to stop the aggression on Gaza and put an end to the suffering of the Palestinian people (Odeh 2023).

Although the Erdogan government continued to demand an end to the Israeli massacres of innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip, the government Ar Dogan He was subjected to some criticism from within the Turkish opposition regarding the reasons for the contradiction in official positions on the Israeli war on Gaza. The Turkish opposition called for escalation at the media and political levels due to the Israeli violations and practices in the Gaza Strip, and called on the international community and international organizations to classify Israel as a state sponsor of terrorism (Al-Jubaili 2023) .

The Turkish position on the Israeli war on Gaza was in harmony with The position of some Arab countries, such as the Saudi, Egyptian and Emirati positions, and the Turkish government was keen to ensure that its position was consistent with the positions of the Arab countries and their regional surroundings, but the events and developments that occurred in the military path, especially on the Syrian front, will determine the paths and scenarios of the Ankara government for the next stage (Donya-e Eqtesad newspaper 2023).

Conclusion:

The research provided a comprehensive assessment of international and regional positions on the Israeli war on Gaza, and it was shown that these positions were governed by a set of considerations and according to the circumstances and situation of these countries, whether at the international or regional level. For example, the American position on the Israeli war on Gaza was embodied between supporting the war on Gaza, on the one hand, and turning a blind eye to the Zionist crimes and attacks, on the other hand.

Results and recommendations:

Results

- The results showed that the United States failed in its management of conflicts and crises, and that there was a contradiction between the concepts it introduced to promote democratic governance and protect human rights and their implementation.
- The results revealed the weakness of Western institutions' stance on intervening to stop the war on Gaza. This was evident in the United States' dominance of the UN Security Council and its use of the veto power to obstruct resolutions calling for an end to the Zionist aggression on Gaza.
- The results also showed that both the United States and Israel are working to neutralize and weaken the Palestinian issue under the pretext of a two-state solution and a settlement process.

Recommendations

1. Working to unify and crystallize international, regional and Arab positions in solidarity with the Palestinian people.
2. Calling for resistance to the occupation's settlement and expansionist policies in Gaza and other Palestinian cities.
3. Pressure the UN Security Council to designate Israel as a state sponsor of terrorism. This can be achieved by mobilizing the role of countries that support the Palestinian cause, as well as through the solidarity of human rights organizations.

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