

The Nigerian State and the Resource Issue in an Era of Social, Political and Economic Turmoil

ʼBimbo Ogunbanjo, PhD

Department of Government, Lagos State University, School of Basic and Advanced Studies, Lagos, Nigeria

* mbimboogunbanjo@yahoo.com

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8112-8764>

KEYWORDS: Nigerian State, Resource Question, State Fragility Theory, Terrorism, Counterterrorism



<https://doi.org/10.51345/v35i2.905.g456>

ABSTRACT:

Nigeria has responded to its economic, political, ethnic, and religious difficulties by implementing strategies, much like other nations dealing with similar socio-political, economic, and security issues. The diversity of Nigeria's ethnic and religious groups has contributed significantly to the nation's high number of conflicts. The state's reaction to the strife and bloodshed that followed has become more complicated as a result of its homogeneity. For a state to carry out its obligations, it needs strong socio-political institutions. This also applies to the Nigerian state. Waste, misapplication, and misappropriation of funds are inevitable in the face of abundant resources and inadequate governance systems. For economic growth, African post-colonial governments have depended on human and natural resources. Weak state institutions have been primarily blamed for the continent's resource-dependent states' inability to reach meaningful levels of development. The nature of the Nigerian state and the resource question are examined in this paper. It looks at how well public institutions work to forward the developmental goal of the Nigerian state and how beneficial the state fragility theory is for this purpose. Deteriorating infrastructure and widespread resource misuse are revealed by an examination of the nation's economic situation. The geographic, theological, and political factors that affected Nigeria's ability to successfully uphold law and order inside its borders are covered in this paper. The key elements that have maintained armed rebellion and Boko Haram's terror state are also identified. As this paper reveals, several armed organizations have taken advantage of the unintentional openings left by successive administrations for armed insurrections and terrorism since Nigeria gained its independence in 1960. The creation, development, and proliferation of armed organizations in the country may be attributed to the lack of unity among the numerous ethnic groups and the lack of coherence among the political leaders. This paper looks at the institutions that support the state's counterterrorism policies and evaluates how well public institutions perform their service delivery functions. Although an ideal tool to identify what defines a fragile state does not yet exist, the state fragility theory provides a framework for identifying unstable states. In closing, this paper offers realistic and long-term policy suggestions for resilience and peacebuilding. It highlights the "road map" toward ensuring peace, stability and security in Nigeria, and reiterates that the Nigerian government has the responsibility to protect lives and property across the entire country.

REFERENCES:

- Abdulmalik, A. (2021). Shocking: Nigeria Holds World Record in Number of Children Out of School. Accessed on 21st April 2024 from <http://premiumtimesng.com/news/138442-shocking-nigeria-holds-world-record-in-number-of-children-out-of-school.html>
- Aborisade, O. and Mundt, R. (2012). *Politics in Nigeria*. Second edition. New York: Longman.
- African Development Bank Group. (2020). AfDB and Nigeria: Leveraging Partnerships for Economic Transformation and Inclusive Growth. Accessed on 20th April 2024 from http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Nigeria_-_2020_-_Country_Profile_-_Leveraging_Partnerships_for_Economic_Transformation_and_Inclusive_Growth.pdf
- African Statistical Year Book (2020). Economic Statistics in Africa: Status, Challenges and Way Forward.

- Agbibo, D.E. (2023). Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria. *Journal of Black Studies*, 44 (1): 3–30.
- Ahokegh, A.F. (2021). Boko Haram: A 21st Century Challenge in Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, 8 (21): 46–55.
- Ajakaiye, O., Jerome, A.T., Nabena, D. and Alaba, O.A. (2021). *Understanding the Relationship Between Growth and Employment in Nigeria* (No. 2021/124). WIDER Working Paper.
- Akhaine, S. and Tsokar, K. (2015). Army Chief Escapes Assassination as Soldiers Shiites Clash in Zaria. Accessed on 19th April 2024 from <http://guardian.ng/news/army-chief-escapes-assassination-as-soldiers-shiites-clash-in-zaria/>
- Akinola, Adeoye O. (2018) *Globalization, Democracy and Oil Sector Reform in Nigeria*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Akinola, Adeoye O. (2017) Resource Misgovernance and Contradictions of Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Theoretical Conversation, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*: pp. 1–15. <https://doi.org/101177/0021909617722374>.
- Aliyu, S. (2019). Impact of Oil Price Shock and Exchange Rate Volatility on Economic Growth in Nigeria: An Empirical Investigation. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*. Accessed on 15th April 2024 from <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16319/>
- Ayadi, O.F. (2015). Oil Price Fluctuations and the Nigerian Economy. *OPEC Energy review*, 29 (3): 199–217.
- Azumah, J. (2022). Boko Haram in Retrospect. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 26(1): 33–52.
- BBC News, 5th December 2017. ‘Abacha loot’: Switzerland to return \$320 million to Nigeria. Accessed on 6th April 2024 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42237752>
- Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2021). State Fragility and Governance: Conflict Mitigation and Subnational Perspectives. *Development Policy Review*, 29 (2): 131–153.
- Brinkel, T. and Ait-Hida, S. (2022). Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 40 (2): 1–21.
- Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Lekalake, R. (2021). Extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn. *Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 32*.
- Bulus, J. (2013). Police Pension Fraud: A Chronology of Plea Bargain Compromises.... Accessed on 16th April 2024 from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/police-pension-fraud-a-chronology-of-plea-bargain-compromises/>
- Campbell, J. (2018). *United States Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*. Council for Preventive Action. Council Special Report No. 70, November 2014.
- Chizea, B. and Iyare, T. (2022). Nigeria's Raging Ethnic Conflicts: The Role of Small Arms and Private Military Companies (PMCs). *The Constitution*, 6 (1): 71–100.
- Cilliers, J. and Sisk, T.D. (2018). Assessing Long-Term State Fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘More Fragile’ Countries. *ISS Monograph* 188.
- Clapham, Christopher (2022). The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World. *Development and Change*, 33 (5): 775–795.
- Daniel, S. and Omonobi, K. (2021). \$2.9b Arms Deal: My Story, by Dasuki. Accessed on 20th April 2024 from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/11/2-9bn-arms-deal-my-story-by-dasuki/>
- Danjibo, N.D. (2019). Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The ‘Maitatsine’ and ‘Boko Haram’ Crises in Northern Nigeria. *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, 1–21.
- David, J. (2013). *The Root Causes of Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Socio-Economic Determinants of Boko Haram Terrorists in Nigeria*. Unpublished Thesis (M.A). University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Social Sciences.
- Di John, J. (2018). Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature. *Crisis States Working Paper Series 2*.
- Eliagwu, J. (2007). *The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria*. Adonis and Abbey Publishers: London.
- Fafunwa, A. (1974). *History of Education in Nigeria*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd.: London.
- Fund for Peace, (2021). Fragile States Index. Accessed on 30th March 2024 from www.fundforpeace.org
- Federal Government of Nigeria, (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Accessed on March 25th 2024 from <http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/5820>
- Federal Ministry of Education, (2022). Education for All 2020 National Review: Nigeria EFA Review Report 2000–2020.
- GIABA, (2020). *2020 Annual Report*. Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa.
- Harnischfeger, J. (2021). Boko Haram and its Muslim Critics: Observations from Yobe State. In: Montclos, M. ed. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. African Studies Centre: Leiden, 33–62.
- Hisket, M. (2020). The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17 (3): 209–223.
- Ibekwe, N. (2014). INVESTIGATION: How Former Edo Governor, Igbinedion, Lost N3.3 billion to Venezuelan Conmen [Part 1]. Accessed on 16th April 2024 from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/159521-investigation-how-former-edo-governor-igbinedion-lost-n3-3-billion-to-venezuelan-conmen-part-1.html>

- Ikpefan, F. (2021). FG to Enrol 2.9 million Pupils in Schools Annually. Accessed on 25th April 2024 from <http://thenationonline.net/fg-enroll-pupils-schools-annually/>
- Ikelegbe, A. (2011). The perverse manifestation of civil society: evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 (1), 1–24.
- Isichei, E. (1987). The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980–85: A Revolt of the Disinherited. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17 (3), 194–208.
- Kenny, J. (2006). Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a ‘Secular’ State. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 26 (4): 338–364.
- Kaplan, S. (2022). Identifying Truly Fragile States. *The Washington Quarterly*, 37 (1): 49–63.
- Khan, S. (2019). Religious co-existence: Tolerance and contestation amongst Hindu and Muslim faith groups of Indian origin in South Africa. *Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology*, 4 (1–2): 149–157.
- Kirsten, J.F. (2016). Nigeria: A Federation Gone Wrong. *Koers-Bulletin for Christian Scholarship*, 61 (4): 499–509.
- Lewis, P. (2019). Nigeria’s Economy: Opportunity and Challenge. *A Journal of Opinion*, 27 (1): 50–53.
- Loimeier, R. (2012). The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 47 (2/3): 137–155.
- Maiangwa, B. (2022). *State Fragility and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram Terrorism*. Unpublished Thesis (MA). University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Social Sciences.
- National Bureau of Statistics. (2018). *2018 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Report*. Abuja: NBS Publications.
- Obadina, T. (1999). Nigeria’s Economy at the Crossroads: New Government Faces a Legacy of Mismanagement and Decay. *Africa Recovery*, June 1999, 8–17.
- Ojie, A.E. and Ewhrudjakpor, C. (2019). Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies in Nigeria. *Anthropologist*, 11 (1): 7–14.
- Ojo, E.O. (2019). Federalism and the search for national integration in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3(9): 384–395.
- Okibe, H. (2010). *Political Evolution and Constitutional Development in Nigeria: (1861–1999)*. Enugu: Marydan Publishers.
- Okpanachi, O. (2019). *Building Peace in a Divided Society: The Role of Civil Society in Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria*. Paper Presented at the SHUR International Conference on “Human Rights in Conflict: The Role of Civil Society”, Luiss University Rome, June 4–6, 2019.
- Oloyede, I. (2020). *Islam in Nigeria: A Century of National Islamic Societies*. Keynote Address Presented at the International Conference of Islam in Nigeria (COIN) to mark the 30th Anniversary of the Islamic Welfare Foundation (IWF) on Monday, Safar 1, 1436 (November 24, 2020) at the University of Ilorin.
- Omonobi, K. (2021). \$180 m Halliburton Scandal: Two ex-Heads of State Battle Jonathan. Accessed on 12th April 2024 from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/10/180m-halliburton-scandal-two-ex-heads-of-state-battle-jonathan/>
- Omotoso, S. (2017). *ISL 372: Islam in Nigeria*. National Open University of Nigeria. School of Arts and Social Sciences.
- Oni, E.O. (2014). The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, 1999–2007. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 5 (5.1): 1–29.
- Onwujegwu MA (2007). *Indigenous Socio-Economic and Political Organizations and their Relevance to Development in Contemporary Nigeria*. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association on Strategies of Authentic Development in Nigeria, 30th November to 2nd December.
- Osaghae, E. and Suberu, T. (2005). *A history of identities, violence and stability in Nigeria*. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Otobo, E. (2009). Nigeria. In: Adamolekun, L. ed. *Public Administration in Africa: Main issues and Selected Country Studies*. Westview Press: Colorado, 292–310.
- Otu, S.E. and Aro, G. C (2019). Dealing with Professionalism and Acquiring and Managing Legitimacy in a Constitutional Democratic Policing in Nigeria: Where Goes the Procedural Justice Approach. *JIIIS*, 13, 149–169.
- Pate, P. (2021). “Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options.” Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security. College Park MD: START, January 2021.
- Popoola, I.S. (2019). Press and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Discourse on Boko Haram. *Global Media Journal-African Edition*, 6 (1): 43–66.
- Schwarz, F. (2005). *Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race – The Politics of Independence*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers.
- Tajudeen, A. and Adebayo, O. (2018). Religious Fanaticism and National Security in Nigeria. *Journal of Sociological Research*, 4 (1): 49–60

- Tukur, S. (2022). EFCC Reopens Halliburton Bribery Case, Senior Nigerian Lawyer Quizzed, 5 other SANs for Probe. Accessed on 21st April 2024 from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198365-efcc-reopens-halliburton-bribery-case-senior-lawyerquizzed-5-sans-probe.html>
- United Nations. (2020). 'Security Council Condemns Boko Haram Violence, Backs Regional Efforts to Counter Ongoing Attacks' Accessed on April 18th 2024 from www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51513#.Vfwhpdg1hjo
- UNDP. (2020). Human Development Report 2020. United Nations Development Project.
- Vallings, C. and Moreno-Torres, M. (2022). Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? *PRDE Working Paper* 7.

Introduction

Nigeria has put policies in place to address its economic, political, ethnic, and religious difficulties, much like other nations that face similar socio-political, economic, and security challenges. The diversity of Nigeria's ethnic and religious groups has significantly impacted the frequency of political violence in the nation. The state's reaction to the ensuing conflict and violence has become more difficult as a result of its homogeneity. A state cannot carry out its obligations in an efficient manner without strong socio-political institutions. The Nigerian state is not an exception. It is inevitable that there would be waste, improper use, and misuse of funds in the face of abundant resources and inadequate governance structures. Natural and human resources have been essential for the economic growth of African post-colonial governments. Weak state institutions have mostly been blamed for the continent's resource-dependent nations' inability to grow to meaningful degrees.

The nature of the Nigerian state and the resource dilemma are examined in this paper. It investigates the applicability of state fragility theory in evaluating the effectiveness of public institutions in propelling the developmental agenda of the Nigerian state. An examination of the nation's economic situation reveals widespread resource misuse and deteriorating infrastructure. This paper explores the political, religious, and geographic factors that affected Nigeria's ability to successfully uphold law and order inside its borders. It also pinpoints the critical elements that have maintained Boko Haram's terror state and armed rebellion. This paper reveals that, since Nigeria gained its independence in 1960, several armed organizations have taken advantage of the gaps left by their successive administrations to launch armed uprisings and acts of terrorism. Armed organizations have arisen, developed, and multiplied throughout the nation as a result of a lack of cohesiveness among the many ethnic groups and a lack of unity among the political leaders. In addition to evaluating public institutions' efficacy in providing services, this paper looks at the institutions that serve as the foundation for state counterterrorism initiatives. The state fragility theory provides a prism through which to find such fragility, even though there is no ideal tool to assess what defines a fragile state. In closing, this paper offers workable and long-term policy suggestions for peacebuilding and resilience. It emphasizes the "road map" for preserving Nigeria's peace, stability, and security and restates the duty of the Nigerian government to safeguard people and property throughout the nation.

The Nigerian State

The present-day country of Nigeria was home to a number of autonomous communities with distinct cultures and traditional political structures before the British conquest in 1861 (Oni 2014). History documents a variety of interactions between these cultures, from commerce to warfare. There were Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Ijaw, Urhobo, Tiv, Bini, and Nupes living in these sovereign nations. They do, however, actually consist of three main tribes: the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Igbo in the east, and the Yoruba in the west. British forces united the region above the Niger and Benue Rivers in

1900 to establish the Northern Protectorate, then in 1906 they established the Southern Protectorate from the territories in the southern portion.

Nigeria as it exists now was formed in 1914 when Britain combined the two protectorates (Eliagwu 2007). Throughout this process, several nations with disparate historical backgrounds, cultures, and religious customs were forcefully combined. The inhabitants of the various zones were not involved in the integration process, nor were they consulted. Thus, Kirsten (2016: 506) argued that Nigeria was "an artificially constructed state and the result of colonial power enforcement in Africa" from the country's founding. The British prioritized administrative convenience and economic considerations over historical, ethnic, and religious distinctions (Eliagwu 2007). The expense of colonial projects was lowered by the union of the two protectorates. It was intended for the naturally resource-rich southern area to "sponsor" the northern region's infrastructure development. Agriculture was neglected in southern Nigeria as a result of the search for natural riches, despite the northern region being known for its high agricultural production. Oni did note, nevertheless, that:

to amalgamate such nationalities in a marriage of inconvenience was to anticipate a failed relationship, a relationship which no doubt has been characterised inter alia by mutual suspicion, hatred, deep animosity, violence, sectionalism, and ethnic chauvinism till date (Oni 2014: 8).

Even with the slogan of "unity in diversity," the Nigerian state is still plagued by the negative effects of combining several nationalities and distinctive characteristics over a century after the merger. Nigeria is a country in West Africa that has borders with the Niger Republic to the north, Chad to the east, Cameroon to the east, the Benin Republic to the west, and the Gulf of Guinea to the south (Otobo 2009). With a population anticipated at 210.2 million in 2018, the nation has a land area of 923,768 km² (AfDB 2020). (United Nations 2020: 16). With more than 250 ethnic groups and 500 languages and dialects, Nigeria is not only the most populous country of African descent in the world, but it has also been deemed the most pluralistic (Federal Ministry of Education, 2022). According to Onwujeogwu (2007), there were over 3000 ethnic groups in the globe in the 1960s, with 1000 of them living in Africa, Nigeria making up 25% of the continent. There were around 127 ethnic groups living in the former USSR, compared to more than 40 in China and India, fewer than 50 in the USA (not counting American Indians), 4 in England, 7 in France, and roughly 15 in Germany. According to Ojo (2019), Nigeria has a more complicated degree of plurality than other countries. Moreover, Nigeria is home to over a hundred distinct religious organizations, which are often categorized as belonging to Islam, Christianity, and traditional beliefs. As of 2021, the population was composed of around 50% Muslims, 40% Christians, and 10% followers of indigenous African religions (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). Approximately two thirds of the inhabitants identify as Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, or Yoruba (Agbibo 2023). According to Khan (2019), diversity in terms of race and religion is a component of plurality.

Nigeria's diverse population did not prevent the establishment of a federal form of government in 1954, which was driven by the need to promote national cohesion (Kirsten 2016). Still, any meaningful attempts to restructure the government system were postponed due to the independence conflict. To achieve political freedom, the nationalist leaders who battled for independence "suspended" divisions in race and religion. In order to negotiate the end of British rule in Nigeria, a modest unity was reached. Nigeria became an independent nation in 1960, and on October 1st, 1963, it became a republic. The Queen of England, who served as the ceremonial head of state, was formerly represented by the Governor General, Nnamdi Azikiwe (Okibe 2010). In 1963, when the country became a republic, the title "Governor General" was replaced with "President." As a result,

Queen of England stopped to serve as the ceremonial head of state of Nigeria, and Azikiwe assumed that role. Nigeria opted for a parliamentary form of government, with the president serving as the head of state and the prime minister handling executive matters.

When Nigeria gained its independence from Britain on October 1, 1960, it was divided into three independent regional entities: the North, West, and East Regions. The largest ethnic group—the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims in the north, the Igbo and Christians in the east, and the Yoruba majority with about equal numbers of Christians and Muslims in the west—established strong regional administrations that were dominated by them (Schwarz 2005). In an effort to lessen the dominance of the three main ethnic groups, the Mid-West area was established in 1963 (Schwarz 2005), and is mostly home to Binis as well as other minority groups.

The Action Group (AG), a Yoruba-based party, ruled the Western region; the Igbos and other ethnic minorities in the Eastern region backed the National Council in Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC); and the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was well-liked by the Hausa-Fulani, became the ruling party in the North. Up to its democracy in 1999, Nigeria's political environment was characterized by this pattern. Political parties like the People's Democratic Party (PDP) began to develop in the post-1999 era and spread over all of the major ethnic groupings. But this did not imply that ethnic emotion would no longer be mobilized or that the divisions of race and religion would no longer be used as political footballs (Campbell 2018). Ethnicity and prebendal politics continue to be the lifeblood of today's political elites.

Both military and civilian regimes have defined Nigeria's political landscape. Extended military control resulted in repression, misuse of authority, authoritarianism, meritocracy, and the deterioration of infrastructure (Ikelegbe 2011). The leaders of the armed forces and their lieutenants were impervious to criticism, and their governments flagrantly violated human rights while disregarding the constitution. The gradual, limited democracy that started in 1960 was warped by military governments. Since 1966, when Nigeria had its first military coup that brought in General Aguiyi Ironsi's military government, the country has lost around 29 years to military control. Military authority set off this process, even though the nation's social, security, and economic problems stem from the failure of both the military and civilian governments. It undid the progress made toward democracy, obliterated regional borders, and forced centralization on the federal system, which led to the institutionalization of corruption and the emergence of a militaristic society. Prior to independence, political party leaders and other elites set aside differences in ideology and worked together to bring about independence (Okibe 2010). The three main political parties had varying regional and ethnic affiliations.

To lessen minorities' influence and enhance the interests of military elites, the country was further split as a result of the military incursion into politics in 1966. As a result, in 1967, the four areas that made up the country were divided into 12 states. This number rose to 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991, and 36 in 1996 (Kirsten 1996; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). There were 774 local administrations established as a result of the attempt to accept plurality. As a result, some formerly marginalized groups have taken over in some communities, while "emerging" minorities are currently fighting against marginalization. Six geopolitical zones were suggested by the 1995 Constitutional Conference to accommodate states according to their ethnic makeup (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 7). Pate (2021: 2) lists these as:

North-East: Taraba, Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, and Yobe; North-Central: Kogi, Niger, Benue, Kwara, Plateau, Nasarawa and the Federal Capital Territory; North-West: Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano,

Jigawa and Katsina; South-East: Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Abia and Anambra; South-South: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers and Delta; and South-West: Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Ondo and Osun.

The 1999 Constitution did not, however, include the proposal to acknowledge the six geopolitical groups in the nation. Boko Haram's stronghold is in the northeast (within the northern portion), and this region is more severely affected by the group's reign of terror than other regions.

The regional identities that emerged under the First Republic (1960–1966) are still discernible despite the establishment of regional zones. Uneven growth in the various areas was one of this era's characteristics. Growth in the economy was hampered by the regions' independent development. Though this was limited to select regions that concentrated on particular commodities, the nation was known for its great agricultural production. For example, the Eastern Region was wealthy in palm oil production, the Western Region focused on cocoa plantations, and the Northern Region took pleasure in its groundnut and onion production. Significant variations were also observed in socio-religious values. In contrast to the south of Nigeria, where Western educational institutions had a far greater influence, Northern Nigeria, where Islamic education predominated, had less influence from the Western educational system (Fafunwa 1974; Schwarz 2005). Okpanachi emphasized Nigeria's ethno-religious diversity:

The Hausa-Fulani and other communities residing in Northern Nigeria are mainly Muslims while the South-South minority areas and Igbo speaking areas in the South East are predominantly Christians. The Middle Belt (or North – central zone) is a mixture of Christian and Muslim populations, while the Yoruba-speaking communities in the South West are about half Muslims and half Christians. This differentiation underlies the North-South cleavage (in terms of the North being predominantly Muslim and the South predominantly Christian) and sharpens ethnic cleavages in the country, especially in the North (Okpanachi 2019: 7).

This demonstrates how ethnic and religious divides exist in Nigeria. But religious differences are common, particularly in Northern Nigeria where most Muslim tribes distinguish themselves from the minority of non-Muslims (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Thus, Nigeria is distinguished by its complexity of religion in addition to being the world's most ethnically diverse nation (Agbiboa 2023). Because of its closeness to the Atlantic Ocean, the southern portion of the nation was the first destination for European explorers. They brought Christianity, which migrated northward, and Islam, which migrated southward; the meeting point of these two religions was identified by the middle belt (Tajudeen and Adebayo 2018). Although Christians and Muslims coexist in the Yoruba-dominated South, Islam is more common in the Northern Region, which helps to explain Boko Haram's close ties to the religion.

There were difficulties and crises that would lead to military involvement in politics. The politicization of religious and ethnic difference was one of the most evident roadblocks. "Post-independence efforts at nation building have been stifled by Nigeria's complex ethno-religious configuration," claims Agbiboa (2023: 4). The idea that the more than 250 ethnic groups that had been forcibly combined could live in harmony with one another was shown to be false. In fact, political figures both before and after independence have occasionally inflamed ethnic feelings in order to gain political points (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor 2019). For example, before the nation gained

independence, remarks endorsing ethnicity were made by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of the nation, and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of the nation.

"If the British quit Nigeria now at this stage, the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea," Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared at a 1947 Legislative Council discussion (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor 2019: 9). This demonstrated the ambition of the political elites in the north to rule over other regions of the nation. It increased ethnic divisions in the nation and shattered confidence among regional leaderships. Moreover, Nnamdi Azikiwe was recorded as saying the following in the July 6, 1946, *West African Pilot* newspaper:

It would appear that the God of Africa has specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages [and that] the martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver...The Igbo nation cannot shirk its responsibility (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor 2019: 9).

The relationship between Nigerians in the north and east deteriorated after this comment. Violent incidents like the Tiv Riots of 1960, the Western Regional Crisis of 1962, the Census Crisis of 1962–1963, the National Election Crisis of 1964, and the Western Region Election Crisis of 1965 resulted from the inability to manage multi-ethnicity and the parochial and non-statesperson like attitudes of leaders at all levels (Okibe 2010). These heightened tensions between the areas led to the military takeover on January 15, 1966 (Kirsten, 2016).

Army personnel from the Igbo tribe's home region in the east were mostly responsible for the coup. It disengaged the democratic system on the ground, but among other reasons, it failed because the plotters were unable to assume leadership roles (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, became the nation's most senior military officer as a result of later events (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). By virtue of the Unification Decree 34 on May 24, 1966, he dismantled the federal system and instituted a unitary one (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). According to Ojie and Ehrudjakpor (2019), the North saw this as an attempt by the Igbos to overthrow the current government and impose their hegemony on Nigeria.

In July 1966, northern region officers conducted a counter-coup. Known as a "anti-Igbo coup," it elevated Northerner General Yakubu Gowon to the position of authority (Ojie and Ehrudjakpor 2019: 12). Thereafter, there was a pogrom among the Igbo people (military and civilian), particularly those living in the north (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). This ultimately developed into the 1967–1970 Nigerian Civil War, in which the eastern area aspired to become Biafra by seceding from Nigeria. Different integration initiatives and nationalistic stances among leaders and followers resulted after the conclusion of the war. The military went back to its barracks, started the process of democracy, and convened a Constitution Assembly to discuss the Second Republic's legislative framework. During this discussion, it was suggested that Sharia courts should not just be found in the North but should be spread across the nation. One such idea was to create a nationwide Sharia Court of Appeal (Aborisade and Mundt 2012). This proposal, however, was not included in the 1979 Constitution as it was rejected. Rather, it stipulated that requests from Sharia courts might be heard by the Federal Court of Appeal (Aborisade and Mundt 2012). Christians may have accused the nation's authorities of favoring Islam if it had been adopted. The Second Republic was characterized by rampant election fraud and corruption, despite the fact that there was less ethnic conflict during this time (Kirsten 2016). Additionally, as demonstrated by the acts of the Maitatsine group, it saw the rise of religious

fundamentalism (Danjibo 2019). On December 31, 1983, the military returned to politics for many reasons.

On August 27, 1985, as is customary in Africa, a different military faction under the command of Ibrahim Babangida toppled the military dictatorship of Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon. Babangida's primary reasons for toppling the Muhammadu Buhari/Tune Idiagbon regime were economic problems and flagrant violations of human rights. A number of political personalities who had been unlawfully detained and imprisoned by the Buhari/Idiagbon dictatorship, as well as other office holders during President Shagari's civilian rule, were freed. This clarifies the general benevolence shown to President Babangida and helped to validate his government. Nonetheless, organizations supporting Gideon Orka made an effort to topple the Babangida government in April 1990.

The violent character of the attempted coup d'état, which was determined to be driven by religious and ethnic factors, threw the military and the entire nation into political crisis. Some parts of the country interpreted the unsuccessful coup as an effort by a Christian group to overthrow the Muslim-dominated administration since Orka was a Christian and Babangida was a Muslim (Aborisade and Mundt 2012). Major Orka and his group, primarily Christians from the South, announced the expulsion of five Islamic-dominated states in the North from Nigeria, with the caveat that they would only be allowed back if they abandoned their Islamic faith (Kenny 2006). This announcement exposed the ethnic makeup of the coup plotters. The revolution failed, but it did not lessen the hostility in Nigeria between the country's ethnic groupings and the two main faiths. Another instance of unwarranted government meddling in religious affairs was the 1988 cancellation of the appointment of a new Sultan of Sokoto and the subsequent appointment of Ibrahim Dasuki, the government-preferred choice, which set up riots in Sokoto (Kenny 2006).

The mistake made by Babangida in January 1986 to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) furthered the country's religious divisions (Kenny 2006). The objectives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are to safeguard Islamic landmarks, promote Islamic unity among Muslim nations, put an end to colonialism and imperialism, and aid in the liberation of Palestine (Aborisade and Mundt 2012). Nigerian Christians objected to this action, arguing that Nigeria is not an Islamic country (Kenny 2006). The choice called into doubt the sincerity of Nigerian government's support for religious freedom.

Religious divisions were put aside in the events leading up to the Third Republic's collapse. The Social Democratic Party's Babagana Kingibe and Muslim contender Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola prevailed in the 1993 presidential contest (Kenny 2006). The Muslim contender for president came from the South, and his running companion came from the North. Raising latent ethnic emotions in politics, the Babangida military junta's annulment of the June 23, 1993, election was perceived as an attempt to remove the southern president and strengthen the North's sway over politics. Political leadership is still considered a birthright of the northern elites, as the northern oligarchy has long bragged.

After military rule ended in 1999, Nigeria returned to its current democratic system (Ogunbanjo, 2021). The Federal Republic of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution provides the legal framework for democracy in the nation. As Head of State and Head of Government, the President is granted executive authority under the Constitution. The President is chosen by the people to a four-year term, renewable for up to two terms (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The Senate and the House of Representatives make up the National Assembly, which is the name of the legislative arm of

government. The House of Representatives has 360 members who are assigned to the states according to their respective demographics, while the Senate has 109 members, with three senators representing each state. The National Assembly's primary duties include passing laws and supervising the executive branch (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

Heading the judiciary is the Chief Justice of Nigeria, responsible for interpreting the Constitution and resolving legal issues resulting from its interpretation. The judiciary functions autonomously from the executive and legislative departments, and its rulings are legally obligatory on all branches of government (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Ogunbanjo, 2023).

The establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1998 to oversee free and fair elections, the strengthening of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, the National Orientation Agency (NOA) in 1993 to encourage patriotism, national unity, and social integration in Nigeria, the National Assembly Service Commission (NASC) in 1990 to oversee the National Assembly's administrative affairs, the Public Complaints Commission (PCC) in 1975 to look into and resolve complaints against Nigerian government agencies and officials, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) was established in 1930 to uphold law and order, prevent crime, and safeguard people's lives and property in Nigeria, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established in 2003 to investigate and prosecute financial crimes in Nigeria and among others. These are just a few examples of the strides the Nigerian state has made toward strengthening its democratic institutions.

A perfect democratic state is still a long way off, even with institutions in place. Many issues have plagued the nation's political system, including insecurity, election fraud, and corruption (Chibuzor & Polycap, 2021; Ogunbanjo, 2021). The Rule of Law, separation of powers, judicial independence, regular, free, and fair elections, protection of human rights, equality, citizen participation, political tolerance, taking public opinion into consideration, accountability, transparency, and acceptance of election results are just a few of the essential elements of democracy (Becker & Raveloson, 2008). Nigeria's political system exhibits anomalies in contrast to these democratic ideals.

The polygamous union of politics and its two "spouses," religion and ethnicity, has not spared the Fourth Republic, and ethno-religious disputes have persisted (Okpanachi 2019). Zamfara State adopted the Sharia legal system shortly after this Republic's founding (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). Eleven other states in the North did likewise (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). This was against the 1999 Constitution's Chapter One, Part 2, Section 10, which forbids the federal or state governments from establishing a state religion (FGN 1999). Politically, it was perceived as an Islamic instrument to thwart Olusegun Obasanjo's (a Christian) administration (Harnischfeger 2021).

Zoning had a role in the People's Democratic Party (PDP), which was in power at the time, selecting its presidential candidate (Campbell 2018). Other significant political parties have also started to follow this strategy. The differences between Muslims and Christians as well as between the North and the South are now taken into account when choosing vice president and presidential candidates (Campbell 2018). However, because these variables are given precedence over the party program and merit-based selection, this has exacerbated ethnic and religious divisions. For instance, the North felt betrayed when Southerner Goodluck Jonathan was elected president in 2011 since former President Yar'adua had only been in office for three years before he passed away. Northerners believed that their own should have been the next president. Thus, this developed into a Muslim-Christian/North-South dispute that led to post-election violence in the Northern states in April 2011. The northern elite pretended as usual to be against the protests, but they did not openly denounce

them or make a coordinated attempt to put an end to them. In fact, the prevailing opinion was that they provided the violent demonstration with tactical assistance. Such conflicts were the backdrop for the emergence of Boko Haram, which makes it impossible to separate the group from politics and religion.

Nigeria has undoubtedly undergone substantial democratization since the military government ended in 1999. During the previous several decades, Nigeria has seen a rapid improvement in democracy. Following Nigeria's restoration to civil government in 1999, there have been seven rounds of general elections, the current in 2023. Despite this, Nigeria's democracy has proven challenging to manage due to the nation's heterogeneous population in terms of ethnicity and religion, the regularity of military coups, and its undeveloped economy. The Nigerian general elections of 2023 became a critical litmus test for the nation's democratic progress because the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) introduced new technology, such as the Bi-modal Voting Accreditation System (BVAS) and INEC Results Viewing Portal (IREV), to improve poll administration.

The All Progressives Congress (APC) party, which now controls the executive branch of government, the majority of seats in the House of Representatives and Senate, and most of the states, is partially responsible for the current political climate in Nigeria. On May 29, 2023, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu took the oath of office after winning the presidential election in February 2023. Nigeria is still dealing with a number of social and economic issues, such as insecurity brought on by banditry and kidnappings, particularly in the northwest; ongoing terrorist insurgencies in the northeast; and separatist movements in the southeast. President Tinubu has always promised to stabilize the national economy and provide security. The media, civil society, and other civic organizations have vowed to continue pushing for policies and initiatives that will improve the social and economic conditions of the general public.

State Fragility Theory

A state is a political entity having a population, a defined territory, a government, and the ability to interact with other states (Di John 2018). These characteristics are necessary for a state to be sovereign and autonomous. Because the ideas of fragility and weakness are relative, there is ongoing discussion over the appropriate ways to recognize a fragile state (Kaplan 2022). (Maiangwa 2022). One of the main drivers for the founding of a state has been recognized as the pursuit of security and human progress. Its efficacy is determined by its actions and fundamental duties in the areas of security, social and economic development, regulation, and diplomacy (Di John 2018; Maiangwa 2022). If the state is unable to carry out these tasks, it may be weak and unable, or worse, it may not have the necessary resources. Clapham (2022) defines state failure as the non-performance of sensitive functions by a state.

Moreover, problems falling under the purview of a state's essential tasks are the focus of state failure. These are contingent upon the nature of the political system, which might range from one of minimum involvement to strict security, upholding the fundamental rights of individuals, and providing efficient services. Service delivery is the responsibility of state institutions, and the Nigerian state is renowned for its subpar institutional performance. According to Cilliers and Sisk (2018), fragility is a sign of a state that is becoming less capable and doing poorly in terms of development and security. "A state is said to be fragile when it is unable to provide for basic human security or create the public goods and conditions needed for gains in human development," according to Cilliers and Sisk (2018: 7). Most of the time, the state's ability to function may be

severely limited rather than an incapacity to carry out its duties. This explains the hypothesis put out by Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2022) that links state fragility to the government's shortcomings in providing for the needs of its citizens.

There is a vicious cycle created when the results of state fragility are also occasionally its causes. Put simply, the causes of state fragility also result in its effects. A state can be considered fragile if it has inadequate institutions of state governance, economic inequality, poverty, violence, political instability, porous borders, and weak state institutions (Cilliers and Sisk 2018; Di John 2018; Kaplan 2022). Effective state institutions are necessary to address the causes and consequences of state fragility. Thus, their growth and stability are essential to preventing violent intrastate conflict and reining in a state's tendency toward fragility (Brinkerhoff 2021). According to state fragility theory, states can be classified as either fragile or robust based on how strong their state institutions are (Kaplan 2022; Vallings & Moreno-Torres 2022).

An indicator of how fragile the Nigerian state is may be found by comparing it to other nations. According to Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2022: 50) and Brinkel and Ait-Hida (2022), the Foreign Policy Failed State Index and the Fund for Peace have the most commonly acknowledged fragility ratings, which is why they are used as analytical tools. Scholars and authors have provided ample evidence of Nigeria's placement in the Failed State Index between 2005 and 2020 (Kaplan 2022: 112; Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2022: 66; Brinkel and Ait-Hida the 2022). Nigeria has endured decades of war, poverty, and dysfunctional governmental systems (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). Nigeria has experienced abysmal poverty, conflict, and crumbling state institutions throughout the years (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). Each nation's ranking in the fragility index ratings is determined by socio-economic, political, and military variables (Fund for Peace 2021). The following are combined to form social indicators: violence, death, the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the difficulties they face, and the growth of human capital. The ratio of the affluent to the poor, the unemployment rate, service accessibility, and inflation are examples of economic indicators. Political and military indicators include public service delivery, foreign aid, militancy, small- and light-arms proliferation, corruption, and prosecution strategies. Nigeria has done appallingly with respect to these indicators and sub-indicators, as demonstrated by Kaplan (2022: 118), Brinkel and Ait-Hida (2022), and Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2022: 76). For example, there is a great deal of corruption in both the public and private spheres. The socio-economic conditions in Nigeria align with the rankings. The nation has struggled to attain peace and stability, as seen by the ethnic, religious, and political violence that has engulfed it since the mid-1960s.

Furthermore, according to UNDP (2020), Nigeria's maternal death rate in 2018 was 560 per 100,000 live births, ranking it 12th out of 188 nations. This demonstrates how ineffective the nation's healthcare systems are. The Nigerian police force is perceived in the security industry as being dishonest and inefficient. This explains the nation's ongoing violent conflicts, high rates of crime, and unrest. The state's ability to safeguard people and property is impacted by Nigeria's under policing. Nigeria has around 387,000 police officers as of 2017 (Popoola 2019), which was less than the United Nations' recommended ratio of one police officer for every 400 inhabitants. With the population of Nigeria at the time, there were around 504 people for every police officer (UNDP 2020).

The following encapsulates the difficulties encountered by the Nigerian police:

Currently, police organization in Nigeria is facing serious challenges that have continued to affect its legitimacy and the performance of its

functions of crime control, prevention, and management. These challenges include poor funding by the government, systemic corruption and internal decadence, inadequate manpower, partisanship, ethnicity, lack of accountability, defects in constitutional provisions, and apparent lack of public confidence further leading to weak/ or low legitimacy. On the strength of these problems militating against effective policing in Nigeria, police legitimacy and professionalism continue to be recurring issues in the country's criminal justice administration (Otu and Aro 2019: 2).

These difficulties do, in fact, make it more difficult for the police to operate as a successful organization. The public's trust in the Nigerian Police has been further undermined by this. Public trust in the Nigerian police was measured at 21% in a 2016–2017 Afrobarometer policy paper, which is lower than the average for Africa (Buchanan–Clarke and Lekalake 2021). More than half of Nigerians are considered impoverished if they earn less than \$1 per day, with the North West and North East suffering the most (AfDB, 2020). In many regions of the nation, basic social facilities are nonexistent, and in those that are, the Nigerian government is infamous for its lax maintenance practices. Health, education, water, sanitation, and other sectors all exhibit signs of infrastructure deterioration (AFDB 2020; African Statistical Year Book 2020; UNDP 2020). Violent conflicts have broken out in many places of Nigeria since 1960, with the Boko Haram insurgency being one of the most worrisome. These point to the frailty of governmental structures. Continued governmental failures provide armed groups and other ethnic groups the confidence to take advantage of political gaps in Nigeria in order to further their objectives. The state's utter inability to uphold law and order inside its borders is the reason behind Boko Haram's operations in the country's north. Although it is challenging to completely eradicate terrorism, nations have managed to restrict the terrorist organization's destructive and disruptive actions, so confining its power inside a limited area. But Boko Haram's territory has already spread to the eastern portion of the North, and it continues to commit crimes and terror attacks outside of its core operating region. Attacks and acts of violence in other states, including Kaduna and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, have been attributed to the group.

Violence has been documented in both developed and developing nations, but its impact is diminished by the inability to respond to it with courage and accuracy (Di John 2018). The institutional flaws in Nigeria support Ahokegh's (2021) finding that the country's terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram, are a reflection of the internal, political, socio-economic, and, to some extent, religious issues that the Nigerian government and people are dealing with. Stated differently, the deeper issue of state incapacity can be linked to Boko Haram's rise as a formidable danger to the security of the Nigerian state and its people, as well as to the group's ongoing existence and the incapacity of state institutions to curtail its nefarious actions. This supports John's (2018) assertion that terrorist groups' operations are aided by a state's instability. Boko Haram's activities in Northern Nigeria validate this assertion (Cilliers and Sisk 2018).

Nigeria has good public policies and plans, but their poor execution and the governing elites' unwillingness to take strong action when needed provide a difficulty. The government is linked to a lack of a culture of policy implementation since the security-related institutions are viewed as extremely feeble. One such instance is the Halliburton corruption incident, in which it was said that officials in the Nigerian government obtained a contract to build an LNG facility in return for a foreign corporation offering them \$180 million (Omonobi 2021; Tukur 2022). The Nigerian accomplices have not been tried yet, although the international collaborators have been convicted in

their own nations (Tukur 2022). The story of Boko Haram has also shown corruption. About \$2 billion was embezzled by citizens, active and former military officers, and other individuals from the proceeds intended for the battle against Boko Haram (Daniel and Omonobi 2021). The details behind this diversion are still unknown, even after anti-corruption organizations, such as the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC), were established. Nigeria's counterterrorism tactics have been undermined by the lack of funds to stop Boko Haram's terror campaign, in addition to revealing the shortcomings of the nation's anticorruption agencies. Therefore, in order to guarantee efficient policing and the safety of people and property, the state and its institutions must immediately overhaul the security sector. Terrorist organizations will always exploit a state's fragility in pursuit of their goals.

Islamic Religious Movements in Nigeria

From the eleventh to the nineteenth century, Islam spread over North Africa, passing through what is now Nigeria at the southernmost point of the Islamic dominion. But it was mostly limited to the north because Christianity had been deeply ingrained in many Southern regions as a result of European influence (Kirsten 2016: 501). Thus, Islam existed in Nigeria long before colonization. It began in the sixth century in Saudi Arabia and eventually extended over the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and North Africa (Khan 2019). Through trans-Saharan commercial routes, Muslim traders from North Africa and the Middle East reached West Africa, providing a pathway for the spread of Islam into Nigeria (Omotoso 2017; Tajudeen and Adebayo 2018). In particular, Islam reached Hausa territory through academics and traders thanks to the actions of around forty *Wangarawa* (Malian) traders, who are said to have brought the faith to Kano in the era of Ali Yaji (1349–1385) (Oloyede 2020). Islam was introduced to Katsina in the fifteenth century by the eminent scholar Al-Maghili (Oloyede 2020). Islam expanded to other regions of Northern Nigeria as a result of other minor trade routes that connected the Kanem Empire with the neighboring towns (Omotoso 2017).

A *Fulani* named Usman Dan Fodio added a fresh twist when he led a *Jihad* in the nineteenth century that resulted in the overthrow of Hausa leaders who he charged with perverting Islam and infecting it with paganism, as well as the construction of a theocracy (Loimeier 2012; Omotoso 2017). From that point on, religious theology and traditional values were combined to form the administration of northern Nigeria. Due to the establishment of *Sharia* in the majority of the region, this had an impact on the North's modern legal system (Kenny 2006). After seizing complete control of the core North, Fodio established offices in Sokoto and Gwandu and named emirs to carry out political and spiritual responsibilities in order to guarantee strict respect to Islamic law (Okibe 2010).

The British colonial force did not conquer Sokoto until 1903 (Pate 2021). This had two effects: it stopped Christian missionaries from moving north, and it mostly kept Islam in the North and stopped it from moving south (Omotoso 2017). Because of this, Hisket (2020: 212) came to the conclusion that "Islam was greatly nurtured and little harmed by the pre-colonial period and the colonial administration." The British maintained the socio-political and theological structures that were already in place while imposing indirect authority, acknowledging the wealth of the central government made possible by Islam and social reverence for traditional institutions.

This prevented Islam from being undermined in northern Nigeria by allowing the use of pre-existing political institutions in conjunction with British rule in the areas (Okibe 2010; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Because the Northern Emirates remained essentially intact and powerful, indirect control was successful in this area (Agbiba 2023). Even in non-Muslim regions, chiefs of district and village administration were chosen from Muslim ruling dynasties (Omotoso 2017). The British really took advantage of the central government, also known as the *Emirate System*, which existed in the North

and made it simpler to manage the area through the traditional rulers while adhering to a strict Islamic faith. The region's inclination toward Islamic education lessened the impact of Western education. This is still evident today, with the North of Nigeria being regarded as the area with the least advancement in education. The Christian missionaries in the South introduced Western education, which the leaders in the South accepted, but the leaders in the North opposed the missionaries and the introduction of Western education because of their strong Islamic tendencies (Fafunwa 1974; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). As a result, northern Nigeria saw the construction of very few Western schools (Danjibo 2009), giving the South an educational edge. The establishment of the *Sharia* legal system in 12 northern states between 1999 and 2000 is evidence of the continued acceptance of Islam and, consequently, of *Sharia* (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). There were only a few states in the region (such Zamfara State under Governor Sanni Yerima) who had stated their desire to completely follow the Muslim legal philosophy before Boko Haram called for the establishment of *Sharia* throughout the North, and thus in Nigeria. Given Boko Haram's northern basis and its connection to Islam, it is necessary to look at Islamic religious activities in northern Nigeria.

Islam in northern Nigeria is a synthesis of many Islamic organizations and ideas (Azumah 2022). Other than Boko Haram, a few of these organizations have occasionally used violence.

The Izala

The Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Re-establishment of the Sunnah, or *Jamā'at izālat al-bid'a wa-igāmat as-sunna*, is the full name given to *Izala* (Kenny 2006: 343; Oloyede 2020: 21). Ismaila Idris, a Fulani from Katagun who was born in 1937 and is spiritually led by Sheik Abubakar Gummi, formed the movement in 1976 (Isichei 1987; Oloyede 2020; Pate 2021). The majority of devotees were young people from low-income families (Kenny 2006). At first, *Izala* used violence in cities in the Plateau and Niger States against its Muslim competitors (Isichei 1987). The organization and *Derika*, another Islamic movement, engaged in a power struggle in 1978 in Zuru, Kebbi State, which led to the closure of the mosque and the factions' worshiping in two other mosques (Danjibo 2019). *Izala* first targeted Christians for murder, but eventually, ideological disputes with other Muslims in northern Nigeria led to war (Kenny 2006). The group gained notoriety for opposing naming ceremony festivities (Isichei 1987).

The Nigerian Muslim Brothers ('Shiites')

Ibrahim Zakzaky was the group's leader when it first formed in Zaria (Kenny 2006). The movement was inspired by the Ayatollah of Iran, Sayyid Qutb, and Hasan al-Banna of Egypt (Kenny 2006). The violent *Shiites* angrily rejected the Nigerian constitution, flag, and judicial system and demanded the imposition of *Sharia* (Oloyede 2020; Kenny 2006). Due to a purported insult to the Prophet Mohammed in the *Daily Times*, the group assaulted both the Emir of Katsina and its Kaduna office on March 29, 1991 (Kenny 2006). The organization participated in a disturbance on April 19, 1991, during which a major mosque was set on fire (Kenny 2006). More recently, on December 11, 2015, in Zaria, Nigeria, *Shiites* planned an attack against the Chief of Army Staff's convoy (Akhaine and Tsokar 2015).

Maitatsine

This movement was started and was led by an Islamic scholar named Marwa who moved to Kano in 1945 from a place named Marwa in Northern Cameroon (Aborishade and Mundt 2012). His harsh sermons and disdain for people in positions of power led to his imprisonment and eventual

formation, and political control in Nigeria's centralized, state-dominated economy, which was established after the country emerged as a major global oil producer in the 1970s. As a result, oil—which ought to be a vehicle for economic growth—has become a target of ethnic conflict and corruption, turning Nigeria's economy into a monocultural one.

The 1980s saw a dramatic decline in the price of oil globally, capping the short-lived oil boom (Lewis 2019). This had a detrimental impact on the economy and led to a decrease in government income. The Nigerian government adopted the World Bank's and International Monetary Fund's recommended structural adjustment program in the mid-1980s in an attempt to turn the situation around. The principles of this program were the depreciation of the Naira, the removal of import license requirements, the dissolution of commodities boards, the liberalization of the banking industry (Obadina 1999), the privatization of some government agencies, and the commercialization of other state-owned businesses. The middle class was oppressed as a result, and the gap between the affluent and the poor grew. According to the African Statistical Report (2020), as of 2018, the richest 10% of the population had 38.2% of the nation's revenue, while the lowest 10% received just 1.8% of it.

The nation's economic problems have been made worse by the inefficiency of the country's oil refineries, which resulted in a shortfall of domestic fuel supply in the 1990s, as well as deteriorating public infrastructure (Lewis 2019). To the dismay of the Nigerian populace, who find it incomprehensible that a country that produces oil like Nigeria would have to rely on imported gasoline for domestic use, oil prices have been rising consistently since the early 1980s price reduction (Akinola 2018). Nigeria continues to purchase refined oil at higher prices while selling oil at the crude point. According to Aliyu (2019: 2), "an increase in the price of oil should be considered positive in countries that export oil and negative in countries that import oil, while the opposite should be expected when the price of oil decreases." Despite Nigeria having among of the lowest fuel prices in West Africa, the country's populace is still calling for a decrease in fuel prices because of inadequate social security and poor service delivery.

The masses had hopes when the democracy process started in 1999. Nigerians have not enjoyed the benefits of democracy since the military ended it in 1983. Moderate gains were noted despite the failure of succeeding administrations to establish efficient governance that meets public expectations. As of 2015, Nigeria accounted for 55% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the West African area (GIABA 2020: 48). Approximately 70% of revenue and 85% of foreign earnings come from the oil industry (Ajakaiye et al. 2021: 1). According to Lewis (2019), the Nigerian government earned \$490 billion from oil between 1960 and 2016. However, since there are not many Nigerians working in this field, this doesn't convert into gainful employment. Even with declining agricultural fortunes, this industry still employs over 70% of the working force, although it only makes up 30% of GDP (GIABA 2020) and brings in little money from outside. In actuality, poverty has not been successfully addressed by the nation's wealth (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022).

Corruption has spread like wildfire, hurting every industry and depriving people of democracy's benefits (Campbell 2018; Oni 2014). Money meant for building infrastructure is being used for private projects. According to Ajakaiye et al. (2021) 25.1% of the economically active population was unemployed in 2014, indicating that the unemployment rate is still high. Northern Nigeria has a high rate of unemployment, particularly among young people, which makes them vulnerable and inclined toward violence. Despite being present in the North, natural resources such as gold, iron, and tin have not been fully used and have remained unexplored.

In the north of the country, there is no economic modernization or progress like there is in the south. For this reason, Ajakaiye et al. (2021) came to the conclusion that Boko Haram's formation was facilitated by the North's "economic marginalization." Oil is more profitable than farming in the southern portion of the nation. The South's industrialization and oil development have increased the economic divide with the North. Young people who had previously been farmers left the industry. The government's withdrawal of several farmer support programs has made the issue worse and reduced the productivity of small-scale commercial farming. While some restless adolescents chose to enter the criminal world, others chose to become "almanjiri" and beg for alms. According to the World Bank, the reason why unemployment is higher in the North than the South is that the majority of people in the former are self-employed, while over 65% of people in the latter are engaged in subsistence farming (Ajakaiye et al. 2021). Therefore, effective agricultural policies and initiatives are essential to reducing Nigeria's rates of poverty and unemployment (GIABA 2020), particularly in the country's north.

Even with the economic expansion up to 2017, there is still a persistent gap between the affluent and the poor, unemployment, and poverty (GIABA 2020). Nigeria was placed 152nd out of 188 nations in the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2020 (UNDP 2020). According to AfDB (2020), the poverty and social deprivation rates are greater in the North than in the South, with about 63% of the population subsisting on less than \$1.00 per day. Among the geopolitical zones, the North West (approximately 86%) and North East (nearly 78%) continue to have the greatest rates of poverty (AfDB 2020). The presence of Boko Haram in the North East and some regions of the North West shows that there is a connection between poverty and violent conflict.

Nigeria is known for its generally deteriorating infrastructure, but the situation in the North is concerning. Poor service delivery, particularly at the village level, is a defining feature of this zone. While only over 69% of people have access to basic sanitation, access to safe water has increased from 47% in 1990 to 71% in 2015. (AfDB 2020; African Statistical Year Book 2020). With a 52.8-year life expectancy at birth as of 2019, sub-Saharan Africa ranked seventh in the world (UNDP 2020). People's immunity to disease and life expectancy are lowered by inadequate access to safe drinking water and inadequate sanitation. In terms of adult literacy (defined as reading at age 15 and beyond), Nigeria came in at number 113 out of 149 countries in 2015 (UNDP 2020). This shows a lackluster dedication to learning. Of the 263 million people who drop out of school globally, 11.4 million live in the nation (Ikpefan 2021). In Nigeria, one in five youngsters who should be in school are not (Abdulmalik 2021).

Regional variations exist in the rates of school enrollment as well. In the South East, 88.9% in the South, 82.8% in the South West, 79.2% in the North Central, 64.3% in the North West, and 60.7% in the North East, according to the 2018 *National Bureau of Statistics* (NBS) report on the school enrolment rate among children aged 5 to 14. As a result, reduced school enrollment is the cause of the low literacy rates in the North and Northeast. Enrollment in schools to receive a Western education is measured by the NBS enrollment rate. Northern Nigeria has consistently valued Islamic education above Western education, both before and after independence (Fafunwa 1974). *Almajiris* are common in the area in part because of apathy toward Western education. These kids are drawn to ideologies that can encourage terrorism and insurrection because they are "angry" with the government. Another NBS research on the reasons for the low enrollment rate among children in these locations between the ages of 5 and 14 corroborates these facts.

The government and other education sector stakeholders need to take immediate action in response to the low enrollment rate in the North. Rejecting what is referred to as "Western education" has

turned into a justification for obtaining alternative "education," such as "terrorism tutoring." The region's low life expectancy and low literacy rate highlight the lack of infrastructure development in the area. In response to the economically disastrous initiative in Nigeria, Oni said,

despite the abundance of human and material deposits in the most populous black nation of the world, the country and its people still wallow [sic] in abject poverty by manifesting greatly in high levels of unemployment, falling health and educational standards and poor economic financing (Oni 2014: 23).

Nigeria has the financial resources to build the infrastructure it needs, create jobs, and ensure the safety of people and property inside its borders, but corruption and shoddy governmental institutions make it difficult for the nation to run smoothly. Lewis (2019) observes that the corruption web now ensnared both the public and commercial sectors. Oni (2014) exposes the extent of corruption in Nigeria and shows that it has been there for a while. Throughout 2000 and 2004, the nation held the top two spots. The government's efforts to combat corruption at all levels are demonstrated by the progress from 2006 to 2018 brought about by the work of anti-graft agencies (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022).

Notwithstanding, given the quantity of nations assessed between 2006 and 2013 (Oni 2014), corruption is pervasive in Nigeria. Political figures profit from the weaknesses of state institutions (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). Following Nigeria's independence in 1960, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) revealed that around £220 billion had been embezzled by the country's leaders (Chizea and Tonye 2022). Political meddling limits the efficacy of anti-corruption organizations; they have turned into the "stooges" of politicians, launching political smear campaigns against their opponents.

Since the late 1980s, corruption in Nigeria has increased. For instance, \$12.2 billion that was made available to the public from the sale of oil during the Gulf War (1990–1991) has never been explained (Obadina 1999). General Abacha, the former military dictator, earned a net worth of \$6 billion during his more than four-year dictatorship, which ended at the time of his death. Following his passing and the discovery of money stashed in overseas accounts, the authorities tried desperately but in vain to get the money back. The Swiss government pledged in December 2017 to give Nigeria back more than US\$320 from this plunder (BBC News, December 5th 2017). In the end, some of the money was found, but ironically, state employees who were in charge of them improperly and illegally spent and distributed it. Government officials severely squandered a portion of the money allocated for counterterrorism operations, which led to ongoing terror attacks against Nigerians, particularly in the North East. \$2 billion was reportedly set aside for the anti-terrorist initiative, but the military class stole the money with the help of some socio-political elites (Daniel and Omonobi 2021).

The nation has been seeking drastic changes to restore macroeconomic conditions for stability and growth since a government transition in May 2023. The fuel fiscal subsidy was removed in part, and the FX reforms brought about the unification of the FX markets and the creation of an exchange rate that reflects the market. In order to mitigate the inflationary impact of these policies on the most susceptible, the government has been reaching out to 15 million households with temporary cash handouts. Additionally, efforts are being undertaken to concentrate the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on its primary duty of preserving price stability and to tighten monetary policy.

Nigeria must maintain the reform momentum in order to fully benefit from it. While the oil industry is expected to recover, the non-oil economy will develop steadily but slowly as the initial shock from the reforms wears off and macroeconomic conditions improve. Structural changes will be necessary for higher growth rates. Liberalization of exchange rates ought to support external and fiscal balances. As a result of exchange rate stabilization and tighter monetary policy, inflation is predicted to progressively decline. Because of this, it is anticipated that poverty rates would rise in 2024 and 2025 before leveling out in 2026. There are significant risks to Nigeria's future, particularly if reforms falter or are undone. Risks include the inability to correct imbalances in the price of gasoline, to increase non-oil income, and to tighten monetary policy in a relatively modest manner. Economic recovery would also be hampered by growing insecurity, unfavorable climatic shocks, and public unhappiness with inflation.

Even though Nigeria has the biggest population and economy in Africa, most of its people have few possibilities. Nigerians with the 7th lowest human capital index in the world are predicted to be 36% less productive as workers in the future if they have complete access to healthcare and education. The 3.5 million Nigerians who enter the labor field each year are unable to find jobs, and many decide to leave their country in pursuit of better possibilities due to a lack of entrepreneurship alternatives. According to estimates, 87 million Nigerians live below the poverty line, making them the second-largest impoverished population in the world behind India.

There is still a great deal of spatial disparity in Nigeria, where the best-performing states score below the average for low-income nations, but the best-performing areas compare favorably to upper middle-income countries. State capacity is inadequate, service delivery is constrained, and violence and instability are pervasive across the majority of Nigerian regions. Trade protectionism makes infrastructure deficiencies worse by limiting access to power and impeding domestic economic integration, which would enable the nation to capitalize on its sizable market. These persistent development concerns are exacerbated by new issues including the rising intensity and frequency of extreme weather occurrences, particularly in the country's northern regions.

Nigeria's prosperity can benefit from a new social contract that is anchored in recent changes. Restoring economic growth and pursuing structural changes will be possible with strengthened macroeconomic foundations. A better financed and more capable state that offers effective public services, public goods, and a favorable economic climate for the private sector to thrive and produce more high-quality employment for Nigerians might replace the existing low social and economic equilibrium.

Conclusions

The geographical, religious, and political histories of the Nigerian state were all covered in this paper. The ethnic and religious conflicts that have plagued the nation, the failed attempts by succeeding governments to promote unity, and the desire of established and rising elites to preserve the corporate existence of the Nigerian state are all explained by the nature, evolution, and historical foundations of the state. Strong political leadership and functional state institutions are essential for achieving a more cohesive federation. Nigeria's socio-political reality now includes the politics of marginalization, which is connected to regional economic differences.

The dismal situation of the economy and security in Nigeria is due to the bureaucracy. Corruption is partly to blame for state failure, as it has failed to provide Nigerians with enough infrastructure and efficient service delivery. There has been a lot of neglect in the North. There is a group of restless young who are inclined to violent acts due to the region's poor infrastructure, high

unemployment rates, limited access to high-quality education, and the declining fortunes of the agricultural industry. This paper looked at economic variables as the primary driver of terrorism in Nigeria. There is no silver bullet to end terrorism and raise the standard of living for those in the north. The state must work actively to end widespread poverty, as well as put in place sensible measures to involve young people without jobs and make high-quality education more accessible.

In order to address the issues facing the country as a whole and the northern region specifically, government institutions need to be overhauled. The nation won't immediately prosper thanks to its oil riches. The socio-economic environment in Nigeria will be significantly altered by the use of the oil revenues under imaginative leadership. Undoubtedly, armed rebellion is encouraged when an unresourced area is neglected over an extended period of time. This understanding among the elites of the state has been developed by the Boko Haram case.

The Nigerian state has adopted a static and traditional military strategy in contrast to the dynamic tactics of Boko Haram. It is an enormous undertaking to put an end to terror since the terrorist organization constantly stays one step ahead of the authorities. The Nigerian government's seeming incapacity to address important matters of governance, such as security, rule of law, and infrastructure, serves to strengthen the hands of ethnic dissidents and "Boko Haramism." The incapacity of the government to provide for the necessities of its people increased Boko Haram's numbers in the North. The group pretended to be the liberators and took on the function of the state in supplying the means of subsistence and capital.

Furthermore, Boko Haram sought to replace the free form of government with strict Sharia law since the state did not confront persistently bad administration and extensive corruption. Due to marginalization, ethnic and religious diversity has exacerbated strife rather than benefiting the nation. Political elites are so focused on gaining power that they have not really tried to reform federalism. Lastly, the federal or state governments set policy, and the general public has minimal influence on governance and decision-making. Federalism is incompatible with this.

Although the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) and the Acts are commendable, their successful execution is jeopardized by the government's incapacity to handle governance issues. The carnage that Boko Haram continues to commit reveals the shortcomings of Nigeria's fight against terrorism. The inadequacies in the institutions hinder the execution of anti-terrorist policies, regardless of how good they may seem. For instance, certain members of the ruling class and senior security personnel have embezzled part of the money allocated to carry out the counterterrorism measures.

Nigeria uses a combination of physical and soft components and power in its counterterrorism efforts. Nigerian society and the state are now militarized as a result of the military's entry into politics. Because of this, the state is more likely to consistently implement the harsh approach. But the cult has become increasingly aggressive due to military activities and violations of human rights. This was made clear by the dubious killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, by Nigerian police. His passing incited bloodshed and caused Boko Haram to turn to terrorism. It is not the same as combating the sect's terrorist doctrine by fighting and destroying it militarily.

Policy Options

To bring about peace and stability in Nigeria, there is no magic wand. It is the duty of the government to carry out sensible, inclusive policies that would provide strong groundwork for long-term peace and stability in the Nigerian state. Successful initiatives could involve the following:

Good Governance and Infrastructural Development

Nigeria's counterterrorism policies have suffered from the persistent underperformance of successive post-independence governments. Corruption and decades of military control, which began only three years after Nigeria became a republic, are the main drivers of bad administration. In addition to causing unequal resource distribution, bureaucratic failings, and ethno-religious cleavages, these problems alienated residents from the democratic process (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2022). The government's insensitivity and ongoing bad leadership resulted in resource conflicts, terrorism, ethnic, religious, and resource-related militancy, and discontent. These characteristics explain for the seemingly endless nature of terrorism and other types of political violence, in addition to being the cause of them. Identifying the problems is not the challenge; rather the problem lies in government's incapacity to understand them and address their causes.

The provision of fundamental infrastructure, which is essential for human existence and progress, is one of the main functions of government. The legitimacy of a government is primarily determined by this essential component of good governance. Lack of social amenities and infrastructure causes dissatisfaction, which in turn fuels rage and motivates people and organizations to participate in terrorism, insurrection, or violent conflict. This is especially true if the group or persons in question are marginalized and speak for a weaker group that the majority silences. Thus, they believe that using violence is the only option to make the authorities aware of their predicament.

It is not acceptable for a nation with a hydroelectric plant that supplies adjacent nations with energy to be so severely lacking in electricity as to be almost nonexistent. Fuel, a substitute for electricity and power, has become more expensive than the typical Nigerian can afford. Thousands of lives have been lost and significant financial losses have occurred from the crumbling road system that Nigerians refer to as a "death trap." Many road projects have been abandoned, and road infrastructure that has been planned for decades is only half finished. These include the Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, East-West Road, and the Ibadan/Lagos Highway.

The Nigerian Economy

Even if Nigeria's economy has expanded, people's quality of life has not improved. Because resource exploration replaced agricultural development in the middle of the 1970s, industrialization has stagnated. Over the past 25 years, the government has attempted to implement various neo-liberal economic frameworks and draw in foreign direct investment, but domestic goods output has remained extremely low. The absence of infrastructure is a major barrier to industrialization and sustainable growth. The government wants to support the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs), but infrastructure is essential for these companies to succeed. Thus, developing Nigeria's infrastructure is the first step towards expanding its economy.

An increasing number of the working population has been denied meaningful employment, and many have lost their jobs, as a result of declining industry, a decline in foreign investment, and the difficulty to successfully launch SMMEs. As was previously mentioned, it is simple to incite adolescents to commit acts of terrorism when they are unemployed. The government ought to revive loan programs for people and organizations operating in delicate fields like agriculture, which is the primary industry in the North. Additionally, money should be made aside for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs), and awareness programs should be launched to entice people to create SMMEs, particularly in the North. Additionally, this would help create jobs for the nation's restless young.

Diversification is also necessary for the Nigerian economy. Because of patron-client politics and oil corruption, the nation's economic and political systems have suffered from an over-reliance on crude oil. The three areas' robust economic sovereignty in the early 1960s and the existence of comparative advantage between them could serve as a model for shifting from the ideal of "unity in diversity" to the more realistic "economic diversity in unity." This would greatly lessen unrest by reducing marginalization and the units' reliance on the federal system. In the solid minerals industry, additional extractive resources also require attention. For instance, Ondo State in the West has one of the largest deposits of bitumen and gas in Africa, and this resource is under-utilized.

Birth Registration and Documentation of Nigerian Citizenship

Nigeria is among the rare nations where getting a national identity card is not customary for its residents and birth registration is not commonplace. In response, the government has offered a number of substitutes (birth certificate, national identity card, driver's license, voter's card, and foreign passport). But because people from nearby nations mix freely, it might be challenging to tell a Nigerian from a non-Nigerian. This is made considerably more challenging by the cultural variety of Nigerian culture. As previously mentioned, due in part to the high cost of health care services and the high rate of poverty in the nation, many pregnant women choose not to register with hospitals and give birth in diverse informal settings (traditional or religious delivery facilities). Few births are thus registered.

While other states, like Ondo, have built contemporary facilities where birthing services are also provided gratis, there are still a few public hospitals in cities like Abuja that provide free child delivery services. However, these hospitals are forced to close for extended periods of time due to periodic industrial action. Due to the uncertainty this has caused, many women will not risk giving birth in an area where doctors may regularly go on strike.

The government should implement a system to record every birth, and a body should be set up to oversee this procedure, notwithstanding these obstacles. Accessible free child birth would also significantly help with the identification of Nigerian natives and lessen the number of cases where illegal migrants pose as terrorists and militants. It would also prevent Boko Haram from using foreign mercenaries.

Anti-Corruption

One of the biggest issues facing the Nigerian government is corruption, which has also complicated the nation's counterterrorism plans. Prosecution should be meted out to anyone accused of corruption, particularly in relation to the misappropriation of monies intended for counterterrorism and other relevant issues. Parties, religions, or ethnic groups should not have any influence on the anti-corruption initiative, and those who are suspected of wrongdoing should face prompt trials. To handle instances of bribery and corruption in the political sphere, anti-corruption organizations had to be reinforced. Depoliticizing agencies and giving them institutional autonomy is one approach to do this. To expedite prosecution, the government may even think of creating special anticorruption courts. The camps housing internally displaced persons (IDPs) are rife with corruption, as the people in charge of providing humanitarian help take advantage of the displaced people. The harsh lifestyle of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) tempts those who first left the terrorist zones to return and perhaps even join other factions.

Militarization of Counter-Terrorism

The application of force does not always result in peace and security, and might is not always right. It is not a good idea for the Nigerian government to play a violent game with Boko Haram. The

government may prevail in the combat, but using force to win the war will be difficult. It could put an end to insurgency, but if the root causes of this kind of violence are not addressed, relapses are probably going to happen. To demolish and remove Boko Haram from the North and the entire nation, a combination of gentle and harsh tactics are required. In a society that is hostile to terrorism, it cannot flourish. As previously demonstrated, Boko Haram has taken advantage of the animosity that exists between Nigerian society and the government and has no trouble finding disaffected young to support its cause. Had the government been devoted to developing infrastructure, enhancing human capacity, providing efficient services, promoting good education, and ensuring competent administration, Boko Haram would not have been able to gather such a large following and inflict fear on the populace.

Emergency Matters

Nigeria is notorious for its tardiness in responding to crises due to the proliferation of emergency numbers, which causes confusion. There should be a central emergency line or number available for reporting suspected terrorist attacks and the related social or health problems. There are situations where the numbers are difficult to memorize because they include eleven digits. For easier recall, fewer digits are advised. In addition, Nigerians must to be educated about various security precautions, danger zones, and how to react to emergencies and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Intelligence

A solid foundation of Nigeria's security structure need to be intelligence. Nigeria, in contrast to other nations, has received poor IQ scores. The nation's security program is devoid of community policing, the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology, and the deployment of plainclothes personnel to gather intelligence. Regular training on establishing friendly relationships with members of society should be provided to security agents. Some military branches have taken to using harsh techniques, thus security personnel who violate human rights must be held responsible for their acts. This would foster more friendly ties between the armed forces and the general public, lessen brutality, and stop arbitrary arrests and detentions. Consequently, it would facilitate the collection and exchange of intelligence. Other security agencies, such as the Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), and Civil Defense Corps, should be merged with the anti-Boko Haram troops in addition to the traditional state security forces, which include the army, navy, and police.

The effectiveness of CCTVs would increase with a consistent electrical supply. It should be impossible to compromise on the cameras' ideal operation—which should run continuously around-the-clock—their Internet connections, a well-watched control room, and their perfect performance. It is not a good idea to limit the usage of CCTVs to a few large cities like Lagos and Abuja. It is appropriate to conduct surveillance in other regions of the nation that have been recognized as possible targets for assault. Drone deployment should not be limited to the Northeast; rather, it should include the entire nation in order to conduct extensive surveillance and acquire intelligence. This will lessen the criminal activity of armed organizations and allow security personnel to keep an eye on Boko Haram members who attempt to operate outside of the Northeast.

Nigeria must enhance information sharing with other nations and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in light of Boko Haram's international connections. This should focus on a number of issues, including arm smuggling, financing the cult, training Boko Haram recruits outside of Nigeria, and repatriating suspected terrorists. The African Union, a regional organization, and other sub-regional groups with a history of armed involvement, such as the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS), ought to be actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. Both political stability and socioeconomic progress depend on peace and security.

Involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Religious Bodies

When it comes to working with foreign nations to educate its security forces, Nigeria has done well. It has not, however, looked at the chances that foreign CSOs provide in the conflict with Boko Haram. In Nigeria's fight against terrorism, civil society organizations (CSOs) from both domestic and foreign contexts should play a significant role in raising public awareness and managing peace, conflict, and catastrophe situations. In particular, the Red Cross has made a significant effort to alleviate the suffering of terrorist victims. It is important to thoroughly vet these CSOs in order to prevent potential sabotage.

Beyond IDP camps, CSOs and development partners should help victims, reconstruct communities, and empower those people. Peace and conflict resolution should be actively promoted by the National Interfaith Religious Council (NIREC) and other religious and interreligious organizations. Since Boko Haram claims religious ties, it is important to keep an eye on these faith-based groups to make sure no groups sympathetic to the terrorist cause infiltrate them.

The Justice and Prison Systems

The legal system has been criticized for being incredibly sluggish and ineffectual. Due to a lack of staff to handle their cases, many suspects are detained for longer than is required. To expedite terrorist cases, special courts should be formed and more judges hired. In addition, bettering the working conditions of judges will help to avert frequent strikes and other types of labor unrest. To facilitate rehabilitation, prison infrastructure around the nation urgently needs to be improved. In fact, "a state of emergency" in this area need to be declared by the government. Building more jails is also necessary to ensure the deradicalization initiative is successful. Modern alarm systems and monitoring tools like CCTV should be deployed in prisons around the country, and armed guards and prison officials should receive training on how to build stronger bonds with prisoners and avoid jail breakouts.

Fortifying Security Agencies

Security organizations must to have access to up-to-date weapons and ammo that rival or exceed those possessed by Boko Haram. This would raise spirits and strengthen the security agents' resolve to take on the group. In order to manage the nation's borders, prevent unauthorized immigration, and stop the smuggling of weapons, immigration and customs authorities also need the appropriate equipment. In border settlements, drones and surveillance planes should be used. Even if counterterrorism is costly, the price in terms of lives lost and property destroyed is much higher than the necessary financial outlay. In villages and suburbs, ranches must to be set up to keep an eye on and limit the movements of terrorists disguising themselves as herders.

To lessen the flow of weapons and ammunition, stations, airports, seaports, and warehouses should all strengthen their security. In addition, it is imperative that corruption in the security industry be addressed immediately. Security establishments should be protecting people and property, not putting them in danger by "selling" terrorists secret information. To prevent incidents of suspected "renting and selling" of guns and ammunition to criminals and Boko Haram militants, the government must exercise greater caution while distributing firearms.

Education Sector

The North's educational system has been badly impacted by the institutional rot that has plagued Nigeria. Apart from religious preferences, many parents choose to send their kids to religious schools due to the subpar quality of many private and public schools. The clerics in charge of these establishments turned the impoverished students who attended some Islamic schools in the North into *Almajiri*. Every level of government—federal, state, and local—should keep a close eye on the nation's schools, especially the religious and *Almajiri* institutions. All schools ought to operate on a comprehensive set of guidelines and principles. Additionally, the underfunded *Almajiri* education system deserves greater attention from the government. These and other schools could bring back the feeding program. This would increase school enrollment in the North, which is beneficial given the high rates of poverty in the area. Local Quranic instructors ought to be included in the *Almajiri* schools as stakeholders and exposed to civic and peace education. Across the nation, civics and peace education ought to be taught in schools. In order to discourage academics from adopting extremist religious views, it is also critical to assign psychologists and counselors.

Devolution of Politics

One of the main problems of Nigerian federalism is the great concentration of authority and resources in the hands of the federal government, coupled with the states' lack of autonomy. States' ability to thrive economically is hampered by the fact that they exist by "grace" of the central authority. Despite having limited sovereignty, the states are unable to significantly alter their territory due to their poor financial standing. There is now intense rivalry for federal political jobs as a result of this circumstance. Political parties at this level have implemented a rotational policy that has stabilized party politics, although it is wrong for them and other candidates for public office to profit from election processes.

الدولة النيجيرية وقضية الموارد في عصر الاضطرابات الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصادية

'بيمبو أوغونبانجو'

قسم الحكومة، جامعة ولاية لاغوس، كلية الدراسات الأساسية والمتقدمة، لاغوس، نيجيريا

* mbimboogunbanjo@yahoo.com

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8112-8764>

الكلمات المفتاحية: الدولة النيجيرية، قضية الموارد، نظرية هشاشة الدولة، الإرهاب، مكافحة الإرهاب.



<https://doi.org/10.51345/v35i2.905.g456>

ملخص البحث:

استجابت نيجيريا لصعوباتها الاقتصادية والسياسية والعرقية والدينية من خلال تنفيذ استراتيجيات، مثل الدول الأخرى التي تتعامل مع قضايا اجتماعية وسياسية واقتصادية وأمنية مماثلة. ساهم تنوع المجموعات العرقية والدينية في نيجيريا بشكل كبير في العدد المرتفع من النزاعات في البلاد. وقد أصبحت استجابة الدولة للصراع والعنف الناتج عنه أكثر تعقيداً نتيجة لتجانسها. تحتاج الدولة إلى مؤسسات اجتماعية وسياسية قوية للقيام بواجباتها. وينطبق هذا أيضاً على الدولة النيجيرية. إن الهدر وسوء التطبيق وسوء استخدام الأموال أمر لا مفر منه في ظل وفرة الموارد وعدم كفاية أنظمة الحكم. اعتمدت الحكومات الأفريقية ما بعد الاستعمار على الموارد البشرية والطبيعية من أجل النمو الاقتصادي. وقد تم إلقاء اللوم بشكل أساسي على ضعف مؤسسات الدولة في عدم قدرة الدول المعتمدة على الموارد في القارة على تحقيق مستويات ذات مغزى من التنمية.

تبحث هذه الورقة في طبيعة الدولة النيجيرية وقضية الموارد. وتنتظر في مدى فعالية عمل المؤسسات العامة في دفع الهدف التنموي للدولة النيجيرية ومدى فائدة نظرية هشاشة الدولة لهذا الغرض. يكشف فحص الوضع الاقتصادي للبلاد عن تدهور البنية التحتية وسوء استخدام الموارد على نطاق واسع. تغطي هذه الورقة العوامل الجغرافية واللاهوتية والسياسية التي أثرت على قدرة نيجيريا على الحفاظ بنجاح على القانون والنظام داخل حدودها. كما يتم تحديد العناصر الرئيسية التي حافظت على التمرد المسلح ودولة الإرهاب لبوكو حرام. كما تكشف هذه الورقة، استغلت العديد من الجماعات المسلحة الفرص غير المقصودة التي تركتها الإدارات المتعاقبة للتمردات المسلحة والإرهاب منذ حصول نيجيريا على استقلالها في عام 1960. ويمكن أن يُعزى إنشاء وتطور وانتشار الجماعات المسلحة في البلاد إلى عدم وجود وحدة بين المجموعات العرقية المتعددة وعدم التماسك بين القادة السياسيين.

تتطلب هذه الورقة في المؤسسات التي تدعم سياسات مكافحة الإرهاب في الدولة وتقيم مدى أداء المؤسسات العامة لوظائف تقديم الخدمات. على الرغم من عدم وجود أداة مثالية لتحديد ما يعرّف الدولة الهشة بعد، إلا أن نظرية هشاشة الدولة توفر إطاراً لتحديد الدول غير المستقرة. في الختام، تقدم هذه الورقة اقتراحات سياسية واقعية وطويلة الأمد للمرونة وبناء السلام. وتسلط الضوء على "خارطة الطريق" نحو ضمان السلام والاستقرار والأمن في نيجيريا، وتكرر أن الحكومة النيجيرية تتحمل مسؤولية حماية الأرواح والممتلكات في جميع أنحاء البلاد.