

The Governmental Institutions and Distributive Justice
A Sociological Analysis of Institutional Inequality in the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG)

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المؤسسات الحكومية والعدالة التوزيعية: تحليل سوسيولوجي للمساواة المؤسسية في حكومة إقليم كردستان

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الملخص:

ينطلق هذا البحث من أهمية المؤسسات الحكومية بوصفها ركيزة أساسية لتحقيق العدالة التوزيعية وضمان المساواة في الحصول على الموارد والفرص. غير أنّ الواقع في إقليم كردستان - العراق يكشف عن تحديات متزايدة تتعلق بآليات عمل هذه المؤسسات وما ينشأ عنها من أنماط لا مساواة ذات طابع مؤسسي. وتستند الدراسة إلى إطار نظري سوسيولوجي يفسر العلاقة بين البنية المؤسسية والعدالة التوزيعية، مع محاولة الكشف عن ديناميات إنتاج اللامساواة في سياق سياسي واجتماعي معقد.

اعتمد البحث على منهج نوعي قائم على المقابلات شبه المنظمة مع عينة من القادة المجتمعيين والسياسيين والأكاديميين، إضافة إلى تحليل محتوى البيانات والتقارير المنشورة عبر المنصات الرقمية. وقد تركزت الأسئلة البحثية حول ثلاثة محاور أساسية:

١. توصيف أنماط اللامساواة السائدة في مؤسسات الإقليم.

٢. تحديد الآليات المؤسسية التي تسهم في إعادة إنتاج هذه اللامساواة.

٣. استجلاء التداعيات الاجتماعية والسياسية المترتبة على استمرار هذه الظاهرة.

أظهرت النتائج أن عدداً من الإجراءات والممارسات المؤسسية تقضي بصورة غير مباشرة إلى اتساع فجوة اللامساواة، سواء من خلال التدخل في عمليات صنع القرار أو عبر أنماط التحالفات بين النخب السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية. وتبرز أهمية هذه النتائج في لفت الانتباه إلى ضرورة بناء مؤسسات أكثر شفافية وخضوعاً لمعايير المساءلة، وتعزيز سيادة القانون، وترسيخ النزاهة الوظيفية بما ينسجم مع متطلبات العدالة التوزيعية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: نظرية العدالة، العدالة التوزيعية، المؤسسات الحكومية، عدم المساواة المؤسسية، التحليل المؤسسي، الحوكمة.

Abstract

This study stems from the importance of governmental institutions as a fundamental pillar for achieving distributive justice and ensuring equality in access to resources and opportunities. However, the reality in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq reveals growing challenges related to the functioning mechanisms of these institutions and the institutionalized patterns of inequality they generate. The research is grounded in a sociological theoretical framework that explains the relationship between institutional structures and distributive justice, while attempting to uncover the dynamics of inequality production within a complex political and social context.

The study adopts a qualitative methodology based on **semi-structured interviews** with a sample of community leaders, political figures, and academics, in addition to a content analysis of publicly available data and reports on digital platforms. The research focuses on three core dimensions:

1. Describing the prevailing forms of inequality within the region's institutions.
2. Identifying the institutional mechanisms that contribute to the reproduction of inequality.
3. Examining the social and political implications resulting from the persistence of this phenomenon.

The findings indicate that a set of institutional practices and procedures indirectly contribute to widening the gap of inequality, either through interventions in decision-making processes or through patterns of alliances among political, social, and economic elites. The significance of these results lies in highlighting the urgent need to build more transparent institutions that are subject to accountability standards, strengthen the rule of law, and promote institutional integrity in line with the requirements of distributive justice.

Keywords: Theory of Justice, Distributive Justice, Government Institutions, Institutional Inequality, Institutional Analysis, Governance.

1. Introduction

Inequality in human society is undeniable, because the nature of society tends to create inequality (Charon, 2009: 74). Thinking about inequality leads to the necessity to reduce the range of inequality or to determine it to create and maintain social order in society. In the enlightenment, the main idea of philosophers is to answer questions that are related to the origin of inequality in society. The questioning of social inequality becomes the concern of scholars in social sciences to understand the inequality and find the ways that it appears in society.

If we glance at our society especially in the field of wealth distribution, we see that the gap between ruler and ruled expanded. We can evidence to unequal distribution of wealth in Kurdish society, by referencing to the speeches of one of the top PUK leader in Sulaymaniyah³ and the deputy general of taxes of Kurdish Regional of Iraq

(KRI) in Erbil⁴, they mentioned about 13 billionaires and over thousands of millionaires emerged after 2013⁵.

The main argument of the research is to provide that the inequality that exists in the Kurdish Region of Iraq, is produced by institutions. More precisely, the misuse of institutions in privileging someone who is loyal to the dominant political parties (KDP & PUK) in institutional government more fortuities than those not dedicated to those political parties. The more privileged Individuals and groups related to bureaucratic leaders, generals in peshmerga forces, the social and tribal chiefs, and investors are in alliance with dominant political parties. The institutions are constructed for governing the commons, but these institutions may have limited access which prevents people that are not loyal to dominant political parties. In this research, we generate data collection to evidence the existence of inequality in the distribution of income, opportunities, positions, capabilities, and welfare facilities, knowledge, and information, in addition, to deprivation because of political beliefs, and the biased enforcement of administrative regulations.

The research objectives include:

1. explanation of the concept of institutional inequality Theoretically.
2. Providing that KRG institutions contribute to the creation of opportunity and status inequality.
3. Identification of mechanisms involved in the production of institutional inequality
4. Illustrating some of the social consequences of institutional inequality

Therefore, the research questions are: How can we demonstrate the existence of inequalities within Kurdish regional institutions? How are these inequalities produced by these institutions? What are the consequences of institutional inequalities on governance in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG)?

2. Conceptual and Operational Definitions

The concepts of distributive justice, institutional inequality, and institutional governance represent core themes in the study of social structures and organizational dynamics. To ensure conceptual clarity, this study presents both theoretical (linguistic) definitions, derived from established literature, and operational definitions that specify how each concept will be applied and measured within the research framework.

1. Distributive Justice

Theoretical Definition: Distributive justice is defined as the perceived fairness in the allocation of resources, responsibilities, and benefits within a society or organization (Rawls, 1971; Deutsch, 1985). It emphasizes the moral principles guiding how goods and opportunities should be shared among members of a community.

Operational Definition: Distributive justice refers to the fair and equitable allocation of resources, opportunities, and responsibilities among individuals and social groups within a given context. In this study, distributive justice is operationalized through the

extent to which institutional policies and practices ensure equal access to social, economic, and educational benefits without discrimination or bias.

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2. Governmental Institution

Theoretical Definition: A governmental institution is broadly defined as an established organization created and regulated by the state to carry out public functions, enforce laws, and provide services to citizens (Oxford English Dictionary, 2023). It represents a structured entity through which governments exercise authority and implement policies.

Operational Definition: For the purposes of this study, a governmental institution is operationally defined as any formal state-controlled body—such as ministries, directorates, and public agencies—that is responsible for implementing laws, delivering public services, and managing resources. In this research, governmental institutions will be measured through their effectiveness, accessibility, and role in promoting fairness, equality, and accountability in serving citizens.

3. Institutional Inequality

Theoretical Definition: Institutional inequality is described as the systematic patterns of advantage and disadvantage embedded within organizational structures and practices, which produce unequal outcomes across social groups (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Bourdieu, 1990). It highlights the structural reproduction of inequality through rules, norms, and institutional arrangements.

Operational Definition: Institutional inequality denotes the systematic disparities that arise from organizational structures, rules, and practices which privilege certain groups while disadvantaging others. For the purposes of this research, institutional inequality is measured through indicators such as differential access to services, unequal

distribution of benefits, and persistent structural barriers that affect marginalized groups within institutions.

4. Institutional Governance

Theoretical Definition: Institutional governance is broadly defined as the system of rules, practices, and processes by which institutions are directed and controlled, ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency in decision-making (OECD, 2004; World Bank, 2017). It is concerned with how institutions exercise authority and manage resources to achieve their objectives.

Operational Definition: Institutional governance refers to the set of processes, rules, and decision-making mechanisms through which institutions are directed, controlled, and held accountable. In this study, institutional governance is operationalized as the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of institutional frameworks in managing resources, formulating policies, and ensuring inclusivity in decision-making.

3. Literature Review

It is worth mentioning that the research on inequalities in the Kurdistan Region is focused generally on gender inequality, which is always sponsored by the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Several years ago, gender inequality studies taught as lecture in all higher educational institutions. What is remarkable, however, is that less attention has been paid to institutional inequalities. In general, we can mention some of the studies that deal with social and economic inequalities in the Kurdistan Region. For example, one of those studies is (Habib & Shahab, 2019) which is a quantitative study for the income injustice and inequality and its social impacts. The sample of the study included (2351) families in Erbil for year (2018). The most important findings of the study are that inequality appears in low-income among those families. They found the Gini Confidence is (0.22). The reasons for this condition for families are the decline in oil prices, conflicts between Baghdad and Erbil that have led to cuts in the budget of the KRI, as well as unproductive policies in paying salaries, with the increase in population are among the factors that contribute to the income inequality between families. While Khalid (2021) in his study insists on Kurdish conservative social norms and values which produced gender inequality in the spheres of political and economic. In this context, social and political power concentrated in the hands of political and tribal leaders who do not abide by laws and regulations. Whereas Noori (2012) devoted her thesis to studying main aspects of economic inequality in Kurdistan, especially in the period (2004-2010). Noori believed that inequality first is inherited from the past of the families. The background of the families transmits the abilities and skills to their children. She sees another cause of inequality in Kurdistan is the nature of economy and political system which was dominated in Iraq and Kurdistan for three decades ago. After removing Saddam's Regime (2003) the political system has shifted to the free market but hasn't brought the profits of that change to the people. The injustice

distribution of incomes in society also (is) another dimension of inequality in Kurdistan.

It is worth mentioning that one of his recently published studies on the institutional conditions (Omar, 2025) of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the researcher believes that these institutional conditions work unequally. The paper examines the historical conditions of the Kurdistan Regional Government institutions by using the framework proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2014). The research adopts a qualitative institutional analysis method, utilizing both historical and current data, to investigate the role of institutions in the Kurdistan Region. This research aims to investigate that historical inequalities are deeply rooted in the region's past, particularly in the dynamic conflicts between the two predominant political forces, the KDP and PUK. The findings reveal that divided administrations have disrupted the normal progress of institutions, creating a unique condition that favors a particular political and familial elite, benefiting those who support them. On the contrary, most Kurdish people wish for their lives and those of their children in terms of welfare and richness of necessities, life and services (Omar, 2025: 515).

So, it is to be noted that previous studies generally focus on these aspects of inequality, as well as the causes of inequality in Kurdish society. In other words, previous studies emphasized social inequalities as a natural consequence of social life. But they do not discuss the role of institutions that should work in controlling inequalities. While, what we see in the Kurdistan Region is that institutions have not only reduced inequalities but are also contributing to widening and increasing them in a dangerous way. Therefore, the task of this study is to work on the mechanisms through which institutions contribute to the creation of inequalities, because the main order of institutions is to improve people's life through good governance.

4. Theoretical Background

More precisely, institutional inequality is the core concept of this research. The concept, generated by functionalist sociologists such as Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (2008) and Malvin M Tumin as a positive thing (2008). By the words of Tumin, "positive functionality of stratification. Or institutionalized social inequality" (Tumin, in: Grusky, 2008: 48).

Sociologists in their research about inequality focused on social stratification or stratified society and believed that the reason for inequality is the social interests such as wealth, power, and knowledge which are unequally distributed among social groups. Western sociologists are interested and have common tendency to use social stratification rather than the use of social class concepts, because the inequality in these societies comes from gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality (Sernau, 2017). The theory of stratification may contain a distinct trait known as social position which is a place of possibility and limitation on the opportunity network; social position contains: social rank, social mentality, social capital, and social role (Chalabi, 1394: 170). In more

precisely word: “social stratification is referring to a situation where people have unequal access to various resource based on the group they belong to, including material goods, power, symbolic goods, and social status” (Hurst, et. al, 2020: 22).

As stated in the inequality theory research literature, inequalities are generally classified into two main types: nominal and natural. Sociologists are interested in studying natural inequalities when they lead to social inequality. Originally, man create the institutions in society to deal with the inequality not to ignore it. Natural positions of man such as its birthplace not injustice, but how the institutions deal with this injustice is matter (Rawls, 2005: 102).

In other words, if the inequality comes from the nature of society, by the following of Johan Rawls’s thesis, need to distinguish between two kinds of inequality: Justice inequality and injustice inequality, because some inequality may be justified on the ground that institutions give individuals what they deserve (Scanlon, 2018: 41). The main goal of this research is to analyze the injustice inequality produced by Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) institutions.

Goran Therborn defines inequality as “differences that we consider unjust. Inequality is a negative of equality. Behind a perception of inequality there is a notion of injustice, a violation of some equality” (Therborn, 2006: 4). So, what is the meaning of equality? By equality⁶ meant the idea “that all people should be treated as equal in all institutional spheres that affect their life-chances”, which maybe label in two controversial matters; equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, equality of opportunity holds that everyone should have an equal chance to achieve the various benefits and rewards those social institutions makes available, that there should be no special privileges giving to others in an unfair advantage (Outhwaite, 2003: 204). Equality of outcome needs to be considered three aspects: equality of what? How should we judge how egalitarian or inegalitarian a particular distribution of benefits is? Should we value equality of outcome, and if so, why? (Ibid). Therefore, Inequality is a situation in which people have unequal access to resources, services, and positions (Kerbo, 1996: 10).

American sociologist at Berkeley University defines the institutional inequality as: “the ways in which institutions incorporate and perpetuate historically contingent social practices that define certain identities as subordinate to others. This concept considers how the objects of legal reforms designed to address these inequalities also influence the process of social change through law” (Albinson, 2010a: 17).

Accordingly, in this research, the institutional inequality concept used as: those in institutional positions, use the institutional rules and regulations, in various ways to their concerns and interests or to others those are related directly or indirectly to those who occupied such positions. Or by following organizational theory, which is insists on relational networks, those who occupied institutional positions use their relations directly or indirectly for themselves or for others who related to their interests.

Generally, sociological theories of inequality can be divided into three mainstreams:

1. Those who support social inequality see it as a necessity thing in society. According to scholars of this theoretical approach, inequality stems from differences in work and effort. In other words, some people work harder to do good things, but others do not work hard. This creates a wealth gap in society, which in turn heats up the need for trade and labor markets. Some sociologists support the free market with the view that class and social hierarchy as normal in society are necessary for society to survive and function. If there is some truth in this view, they ignore the fact that those in the lower classes cannot compete and change their social and economic status (Davis & Moore, in: Grusky, 2008, 33).
2. Other theories support the idea that social inequalities are unnecessary and need to be addressed. That is, inequalities are the result of authoritarianism between people, and we must confront them. Sociologists who support the state market believe that the state must redistribute wealth in order to establish social justice. The theoretical approach believes that to establish justice, we must eliminate inequalities, including private property. Here is a serious criticism of theorists who argue that the abolition of private property will eliminate the motivation for competition, as we saw in the former Soviet Union, which eventually led to economic and political collapse (Ibid, 34).
3. The third approach is known as social justice to solve the inequality matter. This is the moderate approach that advocates that the state should regulate the economy on the pretext of achieving justice, but not in an absolute way that undermines the sphere of individual's freedoms (Ibid).

Although the third approach to social justice theory relies on equality and the principle of competition, the issue of redistribution has not yet been resolved among philosophers and scholars. In this regard, Jonathan Hearn (1996) raises three important questions: What should be distributed? Who should it be divided among? What criteria should it be divided? (Hearn, 2016: 121-122; Outhwaite, 2003: 204). Norberto Bobbio asks on what basis should goods be treated fairly? Necessity, merit, social status? Is redistribution aimed at equalizing opportunities or outcomes? Is justice more a matter of redistribution of resources or procedures, up to and including equal treatment in court? (Bobbio, 1996: 60-61).

The problem of what basis the inequality should be accepted, formulated in different direction in social sciences. The system of distribution and redistribution of social goods, and to what measure should be done, John Rawls proposed "difference principle" which holds that inequality can only justified when inequality in institutions lead to better of the well-off (Rawls, 2005; Scanlon, 2018). Scanlon believed that inequality-generating institutions held to be justified on the base of they give individuals what they deserve (Scanlon, 2018: 41).

Micheal Walzer in his book “distributive justice” formulated “complex equality” to resolve the problem of distribution. He says: “human society is distributive community” (Walzer, 1984: 3). So: “there has never been a single criterion, or single set of interconnected criteria, need all distributions” (Ibid). From the point of Walzer “different institutional spheres concern different kind of goods” (Hearn, 2016: 122), to appropriate different needs, desert, and free exchange. So, the relation between justice and equality may have different dimensions. In one sense, the justice contain equality, because should be treated man equality.

The study of inequality by sociologists not focused on the social differences, but they concern the differences in access and opportunity and the limitation of people’s choices (Sernau, 2017: 4). Some sociologists are aware that difference makes equality impossible. It is a logical fallacy (Blackburn, 2008: 253), while most classical sociologists, such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber wrote most of their works on inequality (Antonelli & Rehbein, 2017: 1). Karl Marx is a prominent figure among sociologists in analyzing social inequality. He believed that conflict between social classes is based on control of the mode of production. In his idea the history is driven by material and economic relation and production, not by abstract ideas (Sernau, 2017: 41). The expansion of private property, or capitalism, lead to more production and generated more wealth from previous stages in history, but at the same time create serious problems for humans and more misery (Ibid, 42). So, Marx helps us to see the control of production in society lead to unequal distribution of wealth between social classes. Ralf Dahrendorf contended that Marx was wrong in seeing that the conflict was based solely on ownership of property. Dahrendorf believed that the real issue is authority relations (Ibid, 44).

Max Weber, take another step in the studying of social inequality. Some sociologists thought his theory is in the direction of Marx’s view to inequality. He agrees with Marx based on the control of property which determines the life- chance of individuals. Weber invented and linked to the economic dimension two another dimension in studying social stratification and inequality: power or status and prestige; While control of property creates social classes, the power generating political power, hence prestige produces status grouping or strata (Tumin, 1967: 6).

According to Emile Durkheim the inequality caused by complex division of labor. New modern society which is based on social norms (organic solidarity), directed and continued by inequality that was created by division of labor. More precisely, in Durkheim’s viewpoint, the existence of inequality in society has function to maintain social order by helping place people in the division of labor and motivating people to work hard (Sernau, 2017: 54).

Sociologists attempted to classify inequality into three types: vital inequality, resource inequality, and existential inequality. Vital inequality refers to inequality related to life, health and death or in other words name as life expectancy at birth or

infant mortality. Hence resource inequality, identify the unequal distribution of resources (societal, economic and cultural). Whereas existential inequality means the unequal recognition of human individuals as a person. This inequality is caused by oppressive and restrictive actions by those in upper stage of the stratification ladder (Therborn, 2006; Carmo, 2021).

Sociologically, inequality is a social problem, produced by structural conditions and social actions. The structural conditions determine or facilitate by economic such as wealth, poverty, occupation. These conditions may be distributed unequally. Whereas social actions in the forms of civil society can help to reduce inequality if they are independent in their activities and movement, but if they do not so, they help to continue and robust social inequality in society.

More sophisticated analyzing of institutional inequality provided by John Rawls as a political and moral philosophy, investigated the principles of justice in his major book "Theory of Justice", which is related to basic structure of society, that is: "the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation" (Rawls, 2005: 54). These principles are about assignment of rights and duties in these institutions and the appropriate distribution of the costs and benefits in social life (Ibid).

Justice has been one of the very important matters to human beings in society for a long time. As Rawls say, justice is essential for social institutions (Ibid, 3). The core idea of Rawls is that all social values -such as Liberty and opportunities, income, wealth, and respect, should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution one or any of them in advantage to all (Ibid, 62).

From sociological perspective, inequality produced by institutional processes, they also resulted from structural and historical conditions (Albiston, 2010: 1094). The economic and political origins of inequality studied by Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, the two of MIT scholars. They studied the importance of institutions to generate inequality. They focused on the institutions and social arrangements in society in producing inequality. For example, they studied the inheritability (inheritance institution) that produced wealth inequality in society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009: 678). In the most reviewed and cited book, *Why Nations Fail* (2012), they ask why nations today have differences in wealth or inequality? To answer this question the go to study the origin of institutions by historical comparative analysis. They see the origin of institutions, contradicting to Barington Moore (1973); the political origin of democracy and dictatorship, attempting to analysis economical background of institutions (open or closed institutions) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Also, they mentioned: "the great differences in world inequality are evidence to everyone, even to those in poor countries, though many lack access to television or the Internet. It is the perception and reality of those differences that drive people to cross the Rio Grande and Mediterranean illegally to have the chance to experience rich country living standards and opportunities" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 41). They rejected the

unitary analysis of inequality that exists between wealth of nations (according to Adm Smith). They introduced in their study three hypotheses: geography, culture, and ignorance of leaders of the countries) (Ibid, 48-68).

Another issue which is very important in the study of institutional inequality is the quality of institutions. As mentioned by Davis & Hopkins, they believed that the institutional quality is basically about distribution, as the quality of economic institutions is strongly related with the performance of economic institutions, the equality of political institutions measured by power and participation (democracy) of the people in political institutions (Davis & Hopkins, 2011: 979-980). They continue: "our emphasis on the distributional dimension of institutional quality, and our claim that low quality of institutions is associated with the inequality of economic and political right." Further important that is they say inequality not simply an unintended consequence of weak institutions, rather a deliberate attempt by those who design those institutions to maintain high disparities of economic and political power (Ibid, 980). However, inequality is deliberate consequence of weak institutions and actions of those who design the institutions.

In the direction of quality of institutions, some scholars by relating between social order and inequality, stated that if inequality is necessary for order and protection society from failing, on other hand this social inequality must be limited on appropriate range to prevent its social negative side effects. For example, Emil Durkheim is interested in what creates and sustains order in society (Norms and Values), while Karl Marx questioning the order of society according to its justice (Inequality in economic resources).

Institutions reflect and promote ideas and values (equal opportunities and meritocracy etc.), that affect the way people should think about their social world and to conduct in a manner of public benefits, but at the same time, reflect the benefits of dominate political and social groups, thereafter, producing the social inequality (Autin & Butera, 2016: 4).

From these points of view, need to say that the institutions work in two directions about inequality: institution generate inequality that can be justified on one side (Scanlon, 2018: 41), and on another side, institution work as a circumstance to generate inequality (Albiston, 2010: 1094), not to be justified or more precisely, injustice.

Inequality may be defined as a social problem that has more consequences than the economy itself. In the long term, it leads to social shock, which leads to the collapse of social welfare, increases poverty and unemployment, and destroys the quality of health and education of the population. Inequality affects social development such as health and education (Taresh, et. al, 2021: 103).

The outcomes of inequality tend to have relatively level of social and health problems (Amis, et. al, 2018: 1132). On the other hand, inequality itself causes or creates many problems for government institutions. Trust in government institutions

may be critical matter in this field. Trust in institutions related to the quality of government or governance. Hence Governance refers to the way public authority is exercised (Kyriacou, 2019: 3) or the ability of government to enforce laws, provide services, regardless of whether the government is democratic or not (Fukuyama, 2013: 350), because the governance is distinct from democracy. Democracy is a determinant of governance rather than governance per se: "Governance is also related to, but distinct from, state capacity that is more concerned with government's ability to raise taxes and includes tax compliance by citizens" (Kyriacou, 2019: 4). The main idea in governance is impartiality, or without regards to personal relations and preference that can be appear in independent and professional public administration, equality before the law, and controls of corruption (Ibid, 3).

The connection between trust in government institutions and equality was well highlighted by Bo Rothstein. According to him, the first, causally related to two different but interrelated types: economic equality and equality of opportunities. Second, both variables depend on the existence of impartiality, trustworthy, reasonable, reliable, and competent government institutions. Third. Universal social policies are more effective than selective ones in creating economic redistribution (Rothstein, 2011: 151-152). Good governance leads to better health and education (Kyriacou, 3).

The costs of inequality discussed by Wilkinson & Pickett. They ask: does inequality decay trust and divide people; government from citizens, rich from poor, minority from majority? (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010: 51). Inequality is powerful social divider (Ibid). There are some scholars who insist on the role in inequality in decreasing trust (Uslaner, 2002: 207; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005: 44). Because it is economic equality, not economic welfare, that create social trust to citizens (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010: 55). On the other hand, the costs of inequality appear on the health. The strong relationship between inequality and mental illness discovered in research in unequal countries (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010: 66-67). Health Inequality can be bad because it put people in unequal status (Venkatapuram, 2011: 21). Our place in social stratification affects our health. Where we are placed in relations to other people is matter "those below us have worse health, from the very bottom to the very top" (Wilkinson & Pickett. 76).

Analyzing the institutional environment can help to better understanding of factors of inequality and poverty and the decreasing of institutional inequality and proposed efficient strategies to decrease the inequality (Naini & Ghafari, 2015: 146). More precisely, each society works by a set of economic and political rules which created by state and citizens collectively: economic institutions shape economic incentives: incentive to education, to save and to invest, to innovate and to adopted new technologies, hence political institutions dominate and determine how the economic institutions work (Acemoglu and Robison, 2012: 42).

Institutions can then be linked to conditions, that is, conditions can both be equal and welfare for citizens, but at the same time, they can be imposed unequally on individuals and groups. So, institutions are like the rules of social organization, but the hobbies and interests of institutional officials can turn institutions from closed to open or vice versa (Omar, 2025: 523).

In general, we can say that the work of institutions is related to the circumstances in which they appear. These circumstances can be social, economic, political, cultural and environmental that change the type and quality of institutions from open and democratic institutions to closed and rigid institutions.

5. Research Methodology

This research follows the directions of qualitative research. The fact that we tracing to resort and generate data, by the following stages such as:

1. **Interviewing Elites:** this research, following qualitative research design. By qualitative research design, we can dig into reality to reach the deep unseen lyres of social reality. The questions are semi-structured, which gives the interviewee more freedom to narrate his/her experiences in the institutions. The quality of institutional inequality can be uncovered what researchers need to know. By reviewing theories of inequality, the questions are constructed to conduct deep interviews. The questions classified into four types of spheres: 1. The **origins** to formation of KGR institutions; 2. The **reality** of distribution of organizational opportunities in KGR; 3. The **outcomes** of institutional inequality in KRI.
2. **Information from Digital Media:** any video and secondary data that is provided by semi-independent media and civil society organizations (CSOs), helped to identify the samples to interview.
3. **Researcher Experience:** my observations as an employee in university for more than twenty (20) years, formed my attention to study of origin of institutional inequality.

In interviews, the answers to questions lead to racing evidence by focusing on new points, that emerge new questions. So, new problems related to institutions of government were discovered.

The choosing sample for interviewing depends on one criterion: Have a high position in government institutions or in two dominant political parties (KDP-PUK) which enabling them to witness some facts and events that uncover the injustice distribution in government opportunities and positions.

All the samples interviewed directly or face to face, but one of them interviewed by online WhatsApp caller (from Sulaymania)⁷. Two of them refused to get ready for the interview. They were pessimistic about the situation that exists and what happened in the institutions.⁸ Generally, the interviewees provided facts from their experience in institutional circumstances, and their analysis of those experiences. But the facts that they provided are more important than analysis. Another point is, to some interviewees,

we provided some facts, to evaluate them according to their viewpoints for the aim to reach real facts.

In presenting some secondary data popularized in social media which reveal the deep roots of inequalities in the KRG institutions. This popularized data, introduced by civil society organizations and opposition political leaders, or by former bureaucrats who can uncover the information about the working of government institutions without any fear of threats that face them.

Discussion

1. The Origin of KRG Institutions:

The origin of KRG institutions go back to the year 1992⁹. After the destruction of Kurdish villages¹⁰ and bombarding Halabja by chemical weapons and Anfal campaigns, the Kurdish Front of political parties¹¹ (1987-1993) formed to control the situation after withdrawal of Iraqi administrations. In these circumstances, *"After the formation of first cabinet in (1992), unfortunately, face serious trouble. The prime minister changed. the PUK and KDP were in trouble in less than six months"* said Bakhtiyar. The civil war between KDP and PUK blasted (1994) and continue before (1998). This war destroyed the rest of what remained after the withdrawal of Iraqi regime administrations.

This situation of 1990s declared another by another interviewee: *"in (1991-10-23) the Iraqi government deliberately withdrew its administration on its will. The autonomous administration (legislative and executive assemblies) abolished. The managers belonging to the Iraqi government withdrew. Every resource material and financial cut off. Pensioners should have gone to Baghdad and Mosul even though their salaries did not send them. This was pressure to thwart the Kurdish experience. But because the national spirit was so strong, the people were willing to tolerate the situations that were caused by the blockade. There was no bread to eat. A salary was paid in six months"* said Abdulghadir. We understand from these statements that the situation did not adjust to institutionalization. This period, politically characterized by the civil war between KDP and PUK, and KRG institutions divided into yellow zone government, which constituted of two governorates (Erbil and Dahuk) dominated by KDP and green zone government, dominated by PUK in Sulaymaniyah governorate and Garmian administration.

The economic blockade duration continued until 2003. After the collapse of Iraqi Regime (2003), new conditions appeared which were facilitated and promoted unifying number of divided institutions. Socially, Kurdish society: *"inherited the culture of past centuries. Even now, the Diwankhane¹² and tribal chiefs dominated on the army and the institutions"* said Bakhtiyar. Similarly, pre-existed situation: *"The pre-legal and institutional military ranks (military college) are distributed according to the years of Peshmerga service or position within the Peshmerga forces. When the ministry was established in 1992, the ranks were distributed as described,"* said Manda.

Therefore, we can understand that the pre-condition or background of Kurdish institutions has decisive influence for the formation of next generation of institutions. From this point of view, today, we have serious problems with design institutions. For instance, designing the institutions is also directed by the particularistic interests of dominant parties. by the writing rules and regulation for institutionalization in Kurdish region reveals that: *“That’s exactly like why you say they wrote law for themselves... For example, if we look at investment law. This law is like it was written by four contractors. That law has created this disorder in the region. If you want to build a residential unit owned by a company with a base money of 3 million dinars. You get a piece of land free. I am exempt from customs duties. Then, I will divide the land, and advertise it and charge people. I’ll build it with people’s money. I don’t pay taxes for ten years and I can import things without paying customs. So, I came and raised money... They say this is an investment project. The law has done that injustice. Otherwise, this cannot be done without the law. They have even excluded investment projects from the auction law. They say that because the auction law is difficult to regulate, things will not come out easily. The law has created that reality of inequality,”* said Abdul.

2. Unequal distribution of wealth

We live in today Kurdistan with the rise of happy millionaires. I use the happy millionaires as a concept to denote those who create wealth in the pockets of poor people. They appear in a time they have in nice living and build good future for their children, while the rest of the people living lack of decline of public services.

The origin of wealth comes from a lot of money that flowed from outside the Region and has gone into the real estate sector. About 94 housing projects have been built in Erbil alone, which is the first city in Iraq to have so many housing projects. So, the origin of unequal distribution of wealth caused the rise of more than thousand of millionaires and 13 billionaires in short period of time (2013-2023)¹³. *“After the uprising, looting became common. A thousand meters costs a thousand dinars (Swiss Dinar). Now a thousand meters in Erbil costs three million dollars”* said Bakhtiyar.

Over thousands of millionaires emerged after 2013. This appearance of new strata of about millionaires which benefited from the public institutions. In fact, this was echoed in media and insisted by former tax deputy manager of KRI in Erbil, and he also mentioned about 13 billionaires at this moment that we live in¹⁴.

Unfortunately, this is because of the weak institutions that cannot control corruption. In a situation where government institutions lost to monopoly the force to control the benefits of resources, and to build public saving the capitals, and groups might challenge the institutional power, the looting of resources happen. The Peshmerga forces under the command of KDP and PUK parties. The weak establishing of government institution, dates to the decisive decisions made by the Kurdistan Front in (1991), because none of the parties that constituted the Kurdish front, could not

ignore their particularistic interests when they decide to the creation of institutions: “Any experience of governance where expenditure exceeds revenue will fail. That is our experience. Why are we like this? Because we were looting from the first day of the Kurdistan Front's rule. Which party did not loot the Kurdistan Front? There was the KDP, the PUK, the People's Party, even the Socialist Parties, the two leftist parties (the Zahmetkeshan and the Communist Party), both of which had their share. Even worse from that, they looted all government big machines and equipment, took them to Iran, to sold them, and divided the money among themselves. They received the customs for the government, but they divided it among themselves. This is a normative rule that continues to this day. After the uprising (1991), looting became common” said Bakhtiyar.

The rapid and sudden appearance of such capitalists illustrates one fact: politicians have become businessmen by taking advantage of their positions to ride institutions or in the shadow of legal canopy work for their interests. Also “There is one reason to became millionaire, that is these are take their hand with the hand of power. Their interests are united altogether. With this qualitative data, we can conclude that distribution of wealth does not follow normal distribution, because these billionaires reach their wealth by working in the shadow of dominant powerful parties.

There are few families that have economic origin in the region, who cannot compete with political families, which emerged three decades ago in collecting wealth. These types of political families collected their wealth by exploiting and benefiting from government institutions. This is amalgamation between politic and economic spheres. The consequences of this type of wealthy families, control the sources of generating wealth in Kurdish Regional of Iraq. For example, the estimated income of the son of one of the top Kurdish political leaders in Iraq, for only three month (70) million dollar in three months in 2023 (Bazyani, 2023).

3. Procedural Inequality:

there are some evidences clarified the arbitrary in implementation of rules and regulations or omitting them for some interests: “The university is gradually becoming a public thing; everyone can become a university member. In addition, everyone can come and become a graduate, by decision to apply those who did not pass in the efficiency exam for a higher diploma the follow of criteria and filters for accepting in higher levels was removed” Smaghaey said. Simultaneously “Going to get a license for a residential project from the Investment Board, the head of the boss asks who is behind the project? However, there was no official behind it, so he did not give the license, but in another way outside the Investment Board with a lot of money but with the signature of the same agency received the license” said Abdulghdir. “There is something called a pension deduction. For example, if you are a second-class person, 7% of your salary will be deducted. See where the injustice lies? That is, if an employee's basic salary is 140,000, it will be deducted 7%. If an employee's basic

salary is 948,000, it will be deducted 7%. The highest grade (1,148,000) not to mention the special grades, (7%) does not do much for that, but for (140,000) does much. He had done it by rank, that is, the higher his rank, the more he was cut off. If he was less, why less? If he (1,148,000) that if I am a law graduate in (45%) my degree will do. However, the rest do not have a degree (15%) but do a lot for it". said Abdul; also (Abdul, 2020: 123). The interference in decision making committees to omitting the institutional rules, well known to the public. A Kurdish proverb was well popularized in society: If want to dead the decision making, let him to the committees. This reveals the fact that the deal with guidelines and regulations in any institution can by change according to particularistic interests of authority.

4. Unequal distribution of opportunities:

"80% of the directors in schools are cadres of party (dominant political parties)" (Muhammad, 2024; xelk. org) or appointing by those parties. More precisely, deprivation from valuable positions in institutional offices, become normal and expectable. "I have more than 20 books and more than 20 papers. I will never be appointed to a scientific committee. I can't even be a department decision maker, department president or dean" said Smaghaey. "The level of opportunities for employment in institutions is not the same. The criterion is party and within the party it is personal" Salih said. In the business sector, also we have: "the investment opportunities are not equal to all. A thousand investors who apply for a residential project permit in a suitable location will never be given one. Instead, a group of companies, each of which has a party, receives it. Each company must be given a share between (15% -20%) to the ruling party. For example, there are a number of companies at the border points, some of them which sell paper only and collect money under different names such as manifests and customs. This is not for himself but for someone else. Yet it is also at the expense of society. This extends to all institutions. You see the same thing" Salih said.

According to Saro Ghdir, the interests of penetrated personals in the two ruling parties have created problems for the formation of cabinets of government, which is finally has prevented the rule of law and the work of an inclusive government in all three provinces of the Kurdistan Region (K24, Mar 13, 2019).

5. Income inequality:

"A number of injustices have been practiced against teachers like all other employees in the region: including compulsory salary arrears during 2014-2019, non-payment of salaries for the first three months of 2023, non-payment of salaries on time, suspension of salary increases" Smaghaey said. "Those who were not officially high ranking have been revoked their ranks. Some have retired as ministers and have not been ministers for a single day" said the deputy head of the Kurdistan Parliament's Anti-Corruption Committee. Another issue is illegally cutting and saving salaries of employees.

The inequality in allocating of income to those who do not deserve it. The most contentious problem in income inequality related to retirements: “Previously, for example, if a person was a member of parliament for a month, he would retire with a salary of 6 to 7 million dinars until the end of his life, but it was reformed. For example, someone who did not have a job for a month was made a director general in order to retire. That is what has been done by law. That corruption has been legalized. That is, the law was as elastic statement” Abdul said. He continues: “At the time, the KRG did not have detailed information about this. I don't know whether it meant it or not. how? That is, if the person had completed four years, he would have been promoted. Do I have a job title, is the person qualified and capable? This was not the case. A lot of people went forward. For example, we had a senior manager who didn't know how to write a letter, what happened when we chose to manage or run a big institution?! Why did we do that? We brought forward a group of people who had some big titles that created some financial developments for ourselves without knowing that person is qualified and capable of doing so”. There are a lot of high ranked retired illegally (see table. 1).

Subject	High-rank Pensioners	Ministries Pensioners	Deputy Minsters pensioners	The consultants	General managers
Those who receive salaries legally	703	33	67	177	309
Those who receive salaries illegally	715	150	81	154	477
Those under scrutiny	52	6	20	11	15
Total	1470	189	168	342	771

Table (1) Number of High ranks retired (Kurdistan24, February 14, 2024)

Inequality in salaries is so dangerous that it gets to border of oppression. According to the statistics of Draw Media the debts of employees on government (2015-2023) is more than 21 billion dinars (see table. 2).

Table (2) The debt of the salaried employees is on the government (Draw Media, 27/01/2024)

Government Cabinet	paid Salaries	Unpaid Salaries	Deductible Salaries	No. of Months	Debts of employees (IQD)
Eight Cabinet (2015-2018)	15	5	34	54	10,597,997.000.000
Nine Cabinet (2019-2023)	34	10	10	54	10,986,000,000,000
total	49	15	44	108	21,583,997,000,000

6. Health inequality:

“The health services were good until the (2013), but after that time, then it got worse day by day, and health services have declined in the public sector. In contrast, the private sector has grown rapidly and operates in most cities and towns without being well regulated by the law” Mahmood said. Also, she mentions that *“Companies set drug prices. They are the ones who determine what medicine to take. I have not made any decisions about taking or choosing that medicine. Those who work in the health sector are the ones who want to move the minds of the citizens. The same medicine may have the same effect, but he will sell me one expensive and the other cheap. The market determines the price of drugs. They do that not laws, but by guidelines”*. According to Mahmood, the government never devoted a salience share for health sector in general budget: *“the government had no public policy and budget to develop this sector”*. She declared that fundraising campaign was formed for cancer patients, and save the amount in bank, but for no reason the disappeared.

Cancer statistics in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region indicate a poor health sector and injustice in the areas of services and medicines needed for cancer patients. According to statistics provided by Rudaw Digital Media, cancer rates are increasing dangerously in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region (see table 3):

Table (3) Statistics of cancer cases According to three goernarate (Rudaw, 04-02-2025)

Years	Erbil	Sulaymaniyah	Dohuk
2020	3050	2543	700
2021	3808	3080	1016
2022	9000		
2023	5457	2796	1250
2024	4983	3310	1303

7.The outcome of Institution Inequality

The 30 years of institutional distribution of wealth and income caused serious problems for government. Consequences of institutional inequality appeared in three fields: 1. In public services; 2. In social problems; 3. In the field of rule of law. The quality of governance depends on identifying and evaluating the quality of institutions according to their institutionalization. In public services can be indicated to the unemployment of university graduation since (2015-2023).

Rather than what said, we are as participant, working at university, and living in its circumstance for more than (15) years, make researchers hold some observations: for instance, we witnessed inequality in the distribution of opportunities in all posts in university. Positions are given to people who obey the ruling party, therefore, the interference to change the guidelines and regulation for the committees and admission to higher education for the sake of a few people, led to lack of independent of university organizations. The pressure to change the criteria for assessing university students and

pass them in the easiest way. The level of university research has declined to the point where it is accumulated in university libraries. Not paying extra tuition fees and salary cuts for months, which makes university lecturers go into debt, and they must waiting 40 to 50 days to receive a salary, which has caused teachers to think about second jobs. In terms of government inefficiency, as a citizen of the Kurdistan Region, I can point to the state of services, so that people are still dying because of the poor roads. Due to rainfall, floods and destruction in cities and towns due to poor drainage. Fuel does not reach citizens during the cold weather.

People's trust in the institutions of parliament and government has weakened (Politic Press, 2020), because one of the basics that citizens' trust depend on is the election of their officials for a certain period, accountability of the officials before the law and the efficiency of the government and its ability to implement its decisions. The legislative institutions have now completed their legal term. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has held five rounds of parliamentary elections and two rounds of provincial council elections (DMO¹⁵, 2023: 13). The lack of trust to government institutions itself, *"the man is not ready to defend that power in the face of danger, because the lack of confidence in institutions"* said Abdulghdir. "The current national intimacy of the Kurdistan Region's citizens is the result of the current unfavorable economic and political conditions in the Kurdistan Region. If these conditions are not reformed, the foundation of the nationalization process, which is the economy, is likely to collapse" (Omar, 2023: 256).

Another base of people trust in government institutions is efficiency. The poor public services in all areas of roads, sewage, electricity, hospitals uncompleted project, and insufficient infrastructure of building of the schools, are best evidence of inequality in providing public services. In more precisely word, all of insufficient in providing public services reveal that there is inequality in justice distribution in all over the cities of Kurdistan region. Finally, we can say that the absence of constitution in KRI created an environment of chaos for institutions which do not work for the public interests.

Another outcome of institutional inequality in KRI is the tragedy of public resource (Commons) and decrease the possibility of sustainable development for any next government apparatus. The thesis of the tragedy of common sources is originally attributed to Garrett Hardin (1968). Shared resources include resources that everyone can use, and it is in everyone's interest that those resources are not destroyed. He depicts a pasture open to shepherds. It is expected that each rancher will try to raise as many animals as possible on that public pasture. Such action may be reasonable and satisfactory for many years. Ultimately, the logic of common resources regrettably creates disaster (Hardin, 1968: 1244). Shared resources such as water, air, soil, parks and public places, institutions, etc. If everyone uses these resources according to their own interests, they will at least use these resources, because no one can prevent the other. At the same time, if there is no one who thinks of public interests and the

protection of resources or tries to promote them (Rothstein, 2005: 48), then the situation in which resources are in danger of being depleted could be the same state of nature as Thomas Hobbes pointed out, which needs to be overcome.

Altogether, institutional inequality empowered tribalism in KRI, because the one of the capacity-building of government features is successful control of wealth and its distribution in society, but tribalism tends to particularistic interests on the expense of the public interests. The big Kurdish tribes, who, with dominant political parties in each zone, benefit from gifts that are provided by dominant parties. This led to clientelism relations between the two which gendered the power of the two.

Finally, institutional inequality violates the rule of law and has weakened the functioning of the courts due to the interference of political-tribal leaders (Shkarchi and Omar, 2020: 181). *“When a case comes the court, the interference of personals in the dominant parties starts. Unfortunately, this is bad culture, deal with the judges as chief of tribe. The party personals call to the judges to simplify the case. This is become the bad norm”* Abdulghadir said.

Conclusions

1. The most important reason for inequality in the KRG institutions is the interference of the ruling parties in the organization, decision-making and implementation of legal procedures. This interference in the institutions is carried out directly through party and government officials, or through the party cadres who hold important and valuable positions in the institutions.
2. The creation of two zones of government administrations, due to the civil war is an important factor in the emergence of inequalities of all kinds. The continuity of these two zone administrations has exacerbated inequalities in a dangerous way.
3. Inequality in the distribution of positions is obvious in all government and private posts. Most of the senior administrative positions in the KRG institutions are held by people belonging to the ruling parties (KDP-PUK). Which was led to control of bureaucratic apparatus by the cadres of these parties. A very small number of these posts will be given to other parties as electoral shares.
4. The political dividing (KDP-PUK) led to disintegration and discoordination between ministries, which was serious problem to combating inequality. This statement of the disconnection between the units of the organization is also true.
5. The dominant rule of the game for governing the KRG institutions, which was invented by the two dominant parties, is fifty by fifty, was formed since 1992, and worked as path dependency in any next generation of institutional design in KRG.
6. Control of revenue resources by the ruling parties in each zone, rather than by government institutions, caused the waste of the resources or the tragedy of the commons and distribution among themselves and their loyalties.

7. Regional interference in decision-making and control of borders and entry into the territory, led to decrease of the government power and institution-capacity building in KRI.
8. The main cause of corruption is the inequality in distribution of the wealth, posts, and services, which per se produced untrust in government institutional works.
9. the decrease in quality of services in public health, in accordance to the lack of devoting a reasonable share of public health, forced citizens to go to private health sector, which the latter exploited them in some way.
10. The lack of public budget in KRG for ten years affects distributional justice. Every sector in budget has specific share of money. The criteria for distribution of shares of amount also affect the work of that sector.
11. The lack of constitution in KRG led to arbitrary distribution of power and positions the parliament, executive, jurisdiction.
12. In the context of KRI, tribalism emerged because of weak governing institution, simultaneously the former itself empowered the later.

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6. Salih, Ali Hama, Parliamentarian (2023-01-07);
7. Smaghaey, Ayub Anwar Hamad, assist prof., In (2024-01-24);

Online Links:

1. Bakhtiar, Mullah (2023): On the emergence of gangster capitalists. The Enlightenment Center. Vision Media. On (7/1/ 2023). Site visit: (9/2/2023). ((5 Facebook).
2. Baziani, Bashdar (2023): Dear Assos, let me serve you with data and numbers. Site visit: (16/2/2024). <https://t.me/ramalin24/5>.
3. Mohammed, Zhyar (2023): Increasing tax rates in the Kurdistan Region. Interview with (Ali Mohammed: Former Deputy Director General of Taxes of the Kurdistan Region; Dr. Mohammed Ali: Economist; Zanyari Mahmoud: Former Director

- General of Taxes and Real Estate of the Kurdistan Region). Voice of America. On (13/12/2023). Site visits: (15/01/2024) (<https://www.the.com/a/7398691.html>).
4. Mohammed. Lawi (2024): The absence of boycotting teachers will create a bigger crisis on (6/2/2023). Site visit: (14/2/2024): "Absence of striking teachers creates bigger crisis" – Khalk Media (xelk.org)
 5. Political Press (2020): People's confidence in the parliamentary institution is declining. On (6/10/2020). Site visit: (16/2/2024): "People's confidence in parliament is declining" – Politic Press.
 6. XanmPage (2023): Who are the millionaires of Kurdistan? A media report from the social media channel (). On (19/7/2023). Site visit (17/2/2024). (6) Video | Facebook. To connect with Facebook.
 7. Baqeri, Khosrow (2023): Educational Justice. Date (29/ 9/2023) at: <https://t.me/khosrowBagheri>.
 8. Kurdistan24, Satellite Channel, Wednesday, February 14, 2024, 8:25:24 AM; see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4pmaQY1stg>.
 9. About 30 cancer cases were registered daily in southern Kurdistan last year. See: <https://www.rudaw.net/sorani/health/040220253>. At: 04-02-2025.
 10. The conflict between the parties over the distribution of posts. See: YouTube. kurdistan24.net/so/basiroj. At: Mar 13, 2019.

Research Margins

- ¹. Hewa.omar@su.edu.krd; <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-3588-485X>.
- ². Mahdi.qadir@su.edu.krd; <https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1573-3254>.
3. Bakhtiar, Mala talked about the obstacles to the emergence of capitalism in South Kurdistan, he mentioned the appearance of new strata of about 400 millionaires which benefited from the public commons. Mala Bakhtiar's speeches at the Sulaimani Enlightenment Center. Vision Media (7/1/2023). Visiting Site in (9/2/2023).
4. Muhammad, Zhyar (2023) interview with (Ali Abdulrahman, Dr. Muhammad Ali, and Zanyar Muhammad) by VOA Kurdish, at: (<https://www.dengiamerika.com/a/7398691.html>). Visiting site: (15/01/2024).
5. Some social media reports, indicated to statement of head of investor union in Sulaymaniyah (Mala Yasin). See (XanmPage, in (19/06/2024); NAS nifo, in (15/08/2023).
6. Originally, equality comes from the religious traditions which declared that all human being is equal before God. For example, the Quran say: "'O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female, and have made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Indeed, the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted" [Quran 49:13]" [Equality in Islam \(islamweb.net\)](https://www.islamweb.net).
7. The Interviews in Erbil, are: 1. Ali Hama Salih, Parliamentarian (2023-01-07); 2. Goran Abdulkhaligh Abdulghadir, member of presidency of Erbil court of appeal-court of first instance (2024-01-08); 3. Dr. Ayub Anwar Hamad Smaghaey, assist prof. In (2024-01-24); 4. Dr. Snur Ghdr Mahmood, the consultant in health committee in parliament (2024-01-31); While in Sulaymaniyah, are: 5. Abdulghdir Salih Abdul, legal Counselor (2024-01-26); 6. First (LTG)

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- Lieutenant General Jabar Yawar Manda (2024-02-05); 7. Mala Bakhtiyar, former top leader in PUK (2024-02-05).
- ⁸. Kamaran Mantk, prof. in political sciences, Salahaddin University; and Hama Ali, specialist in education system.
- ⁹. For the first time in the Kurdish history, to create new order with the Kurdish spirit (Kurdayati), the election was hold in 1992 to elect Kurdish Parliament and the president of Kurdish Regional of Iraq (KRI).
- ¹⁰. According to Informal statistics, 4000 villages was destroyed.
- ¹¹. Baray Kurdistan
- ¹². Diwankhane: in Kurdish tradition, is a big house for sitting and discussion the social and political problems.
- ¹³. Bakhtiar, talked about the obstacles to the emergence of capitalism in South Kurdistan, he mentioned the appearance of new strata of about 400 millionaires which benefited from the public commons. Bakhtiar's speech at the Sulaimani Chwder Center. in Vision Media (7/1/2023). Visiting Site in (9/2/2023). To confirm this, the issue was discussed again, when I interviewed Bakhtiyar in Chwder center in Sulaymaniyah (2024-02-05).
- ¹⁴. Muhammad, Zhyar (2023) interview with (Ali Abdulrahman, Dr. Muhammad Ali, and Zanyar Muhammad) by VOA Kurdish, at: (<https://www.dengiamerika.com/a/7398691.html>). Visiting site: (15/01/2024).
- ¹⁵. Draw Media Organization