Al-Daleel

The research on the truth of religious faith and how it is formed is one of the topics that have drawn the attention of thinkers for a long time. In recent decades, this topic has received a special interest by scientism philosophers. Some of these philosophers, who presumed that man was nothing but a materialist being –along with his characteristics, such as faith and awareness– have tried to find natural explanations of religious faith. In this paper, I will explain this from two dimensions: a neurobiological explanation and a socio-psychological explanation. I will then analyse and criticise these explanations. I have argued that they are not compatible with scientific standards. Finally, I give a religious-oriented explanation of the reality of faith and how it is formed. In this explanation, faith is classified into true faith and false faith, whether or not the thing believed in is real. It is emphasised on that any kind of explanation of truth and how faith is formed would be incomplete when this classification is not taken into consideration.

The development and prosperity brought about by the laws and decisions legislated by the Western modernist mind have brought about many misconceptions and problems. Under the complexities and challenges faced by modern man, adhering to true religion and divine revelation – which had been the authority of legislation and codification for a thousand years – has led to abandonment of rationalism, especially modernist rationalism. On this basis, this paper, using an analytical-critical approach, sheds light on this misconception by addressing the modern mind with its implications and consequences. A comparison is also made with Islamic rationalism in its high position, characteristics and dimensions that uncover the falsehood being fabricated against the adherence to the divine revelation. Among the results we have reached in this article, the modernist mind has been plagued by serious problems caused by its own Western modernist followers themselves who had sought another form of rationality. Moreover, Islamic rationalism, in general, does not oppose the consequences of modernist rationalism after revising its epistemological and practical problems.

This article discusses one of the contemporary topics that have been associated with modernity and post-modernity studies. It is the historicism of reason, in light of some viewpoints of Arab modernists who have tried to make use of this Western viewpoint in the Arab and Islamic intellectual arena. That which is meant by the historicism of reason is the changing and altering nature of reason; given that reason is not an absolute or abstract thing secluded outside of time and place, but rather, it is something completely associated with specific conditions and circumstances.The viewpoint undertaken by the followers of historicism of reason is based on a special view to reason, derived from Western thought, and it was set to be applied to language, the Quran, and Arab and Islamic thought. It is also based on a set of epistemological and ontological foundations. Following a descriptive and critical approach, the article discusses this viewpoint, trying to show its defects at both definition and foundations levels.

This article attempts to study, with a critical analytical approach, an important topic related to the question of the reality of religious faith. Faith is a voluntary heart inclination and belief, flowing from man’s knowledge and awareness. In spite of the close relation between faith and knowledge, its essence is still different from the essence of science and knowledge.This look to the reality of faith in the Islamic awareness differs from what is said about it in the Christian awareness. In the article, two viewpoints on faith are discussed in light of Christian culture. The first is the viewpoint of the faith in cases, represented by Saint Thomas Aquinas, and the second is the viewpoint of the Will Doctrine represented by William James. As for Islamic culture, the viewpoints about the reality of religious faith, adopted by the Mu\'tazilites, the Ash\'arites and the Twelver Shia, have been talked about. However, the Islamic look to religious faith came to be different from that in Christian awareness; hence, the two should not be considered the same in both cultures.

In the past, all sciences came within a single philosophical framework. It was this framework that defined the ruling principles of each science. It was so until the advent of new science. However, with the appearance of experimental schools, that believed in no value but the data based on the senses, philosophy – and especially metaphysics – was removed from the circle of science. Yet, with the appearance of different schools in the philosophy of science in the second half of twentieth century, it became clear that we do not face nature with an empty mind, and that scientists make their efforts and develop their theories while having in mind some general (metaphysical) assumptions. Furthermore, experimental sciences cannot answer some questions raised within those sciences themselves. In order for those questions to be answered, they need a higher reference.In this article, and through showing the possibility and how metaphysical viewpoint would affect physical theorizing, we will point out that ruling principles over sciences can be taken from different philosophical schools, or from religions. In this concern, monotheistic religions can provide these principles in the easiest and most comprehensive way.

This study deals with the foundations that help understand [religious] texts from the viewpoint of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. At first, an explanation is given in discussing the problem of understanding [religious] texts among Shiite scholars of Usul al-Fiqh, and among some Western hermeneutic scholars, in order to explore the most important fundamentals that they have set and the problems they have faced. After this, we turn to Shahid al-Sadr to see the rules he has put as a key to solving the problem of understanding [religious] texts. I have avoided lengthening, detailing and examples, especially when explaining the problem of understanding [religious] texts. Thus, I have followed an intensive manner in writing, referring readers to the sources I relied on, so that they might find whatever details and examples I have briefed. I did not assign a certain chapter for explaining the fundamentals of the West concerning the topic, but rather I referred very briefly to them here and there, because the goal of this article is to shed light on the rules of Sayyid Muhammad Biqir al-Sadr especially, mentioning six rules all together. I referred, in the footnotes, to some of their applications as mentioned in his own sayings.

This study tries to show the ranges and limits of reason concerning religious knowledge in Islamic thought from the viewpoint of the Islamic philosopher Sheikh al-Ra’ees Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna). The study attempts to give an answer to a basic question: What are the ranges and limits of reason in religious knowledge? According to Avicenna’s viewpoint, is it absolute or limited? If it is limited, are its limits divinely or humanly? The study gives answers to these questions, following the descriptive approach through showing a set of concepts related to conceptual principles. We also have followed the analytical approach, based on the divisions of knowledge and reason according to Avicenna, in order to define the kind of reason he had meant, and to know the ranges and limits of reason in the field of religious knowledge. Besides, the spurious arguments raised against this approach have been discussed and answered according to Avicenna’s principles. It has become clear, through the article, that reason has a basic position in the exploration of religious knowledge that comes within the limits of reason.

One of the most important sources on which human beings rely on for cognitive construction is rational argument. This argument has been the subject where a large number of scholars and researchers debate on. Some of them deny it, whereas others believe in it and rely on it in their works. As a result, this argument has become the subject of continuous deliberation among Muslim scholars, whether or not to make use of it for deriving the legal sub-rulings. Sunni scholars depend on it, although it would not lead to certainty. However, they reso
rt to analogy, approval and public welfare, whereas Twelver Shiite scholars deny the probable rational argument with all its sub-divisions, following the true traditions transmitted to them from their imams. Yet, they differ on that which leads to certainty (concerning rational argument). So, some deny it, like the Akhbarites (traditionalists), and others take it as one of the sources of legislation for deriving legal rulings, such as the Usulites.Because of the importance of the topic, we have tried, in this study, to shed light on this argument and show the point of disagreement between Twelver Shiite scholars, quoting the sayings, arguments and discussions of both parties, and then, getting to the right conclusion due to our own opinion. In all that, we have followed the inductive analytical approach. We have extrapolated the sayings of the scholars of both fundamentalist school and Akhbarite school as possible due to the limitation of the article, and then to judge between them.