Magazine of historical studies and archaeology

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan placed the United States in front of security and economic challenges. After the invasion, the United States did not have a clear strategy for how to respond to it, and when Ghulam Farooq visited the United States, a prominent member of the "Najat Milli" front and Afghan Minister of Education under Burhan Uddin Rabbani and met with officials in Washington, he concluded from his meetings that the United States feels Worried that the Soviet Union would not stop in Afghanistan and perhaps continue its expansionist policy towards Pakistan, did not hide its concern about its interests in the region, but she did not find the appropriate way to address this issue. All they knew was that the Afghans were ready to fight the Russians and that the Americans were ready to help them. At the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, US policymakers underestimated their uncertainty in the future, as they made political choices regarding Afghanistan. They believed that they had more control over the events than they actually enjoyed, by providing financial and military support to the Afghan Mujahedeen, they will be able to control the Mujahedeen either directly or through Pakistan, and reduce any potential problems with them, which may arise as a result of their financial and military assistance. At the same time, they have failed to understand "the ethnic and linguistic division, social, and religious ideology of Afghans", which are important factors for understanding Afghanistan and its people. In addition, policymakers in Washington were unable to look outside the scope of their experience and wanted to see things positively. Their optimism misled their perceptions and thinking, which simplified the complex nature of the Afghan jihad. In other words, the United States believed that if it provided money and weapons to the Afghan Mujahedeen, they would fight the Soviet Union and the communist regime, causing the regime to collapse in Kabul, and then the situation would return to what it was before the invasion. On the contrary, not only did matters return to normal, but after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Communist regime, it ended in a civil war. This failure may be due mainly to the United States' misunderstanding of the social and religious structure of this country, and perhaps also to Pakistan's deliberate attempts to mislead the US vision that in one way or another influenced US foreign policy toward developments in Afghanistan.