Al-Daleel

The question of free will-occupying a central place in the structure of religious and philosophical anthropology-has preoccupied human thought since antiquity. Within contemporary Islamic principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), subtle and significant positions have emerged in addressing this problem; yet it has not received sufficient attention from theologians, philosophers, or scholars of anthropology. By \\\\"contemporary usuli thought,\\\\" we refer to the Usul School founded by al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani and subsequently developed by his students and followers. In this article, we seek to analyze and assess these views, with particular focus on the thought of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who expanded al-Muhaqqiq al-Na\\\\'ini\\\\'s theory, offered a critical evaluation of it, and introduced new conceptual elements. From the results I have reached, it has become clear that al Sayyid al Sadr distinguishes between the theological dimension and the philosophical dimension of the problem of determinism and free will. He does not regard the principle of prior necessity as a demonstrative principle, but rather as an experiential one. He further maintains that it does not encompass voluntary actions, and that we must introduce a new element-namely, the sovereignty of the self-alongside the three philosophical premises. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the study first presents and evaluates these positions, and thereafter, following critical discussion, delineates the preferred solution to the problem of free will.

This article explores the dialectic between religion and philosophy by tracing the various patterns through which this relationship has historically taken shape in both Islamic and Western intellectual traditions. It further clarifies the epistemic configurations that emerge from these patterns, as reflected in each traditions methodological orientations and research aims. Employing an analytical-comparative methodology, the study critically examines the three dominant approaches that have framed the classical and modern discourse on the relationship between reason and revelation: the harmonizationist model, the conflict model, and the model of methodological autonomy. The findings indicate that Islamic philosophy has developed an epistemic paradigm that effectively surpasses the conventional dichotomy between reason and revelation. This paradigm is grounded in a method that investigates being as such, thereby enabling a structural integration between rational cognition and scriptural disclosure, and affirming the intellect as a faculty capable of uncovering the truths of existence while remaining oriented by divine guidance. By contrast, the analysis reveals that modern and contemporary Western philosophy-shaped by profound epistemological and methodological shifts-has increasingly gravitated toward models that either exclude metaphysics or reduce it to a marginal status. These shifts have reconstituted the human-world relation in light of new conceptual frameworks, including: scientism, which restricts knowledge to empirical experience; atheistic existentialism, which denies any pre-human normative ground; and post-religious approaches, which treat religion primarily as a socio-cultural phenomenon rather than a cognitive authority. Collectively, these developments entrenched a substantial gulf between philosophy and religion within the Western intellectual landscape.

The relationship between archaeological evidence and religious stories constitutes a pivotal and intellectually contested field. It has long attracted the sustained interest of scholars across eras, disciplines, and geographical contexts. Although Western scholarship has historically taken the lead, interest in this subject gained momentum in the East only after it had already achieved prominence in Western academic debate. Archaeology itself emerged in the West, in part, as a reaction to the Churchs intellectual dominance, a development shaped by a variety of accompanying historical conditions. The trajectory of interaction between archaeology and Quranic stories differs significantly from that in the Western Christian sphere. Certain Arab Enlightenment thinkers appropriated the perceived discrepancies between archaeology and biblical texts in the West as a methodological lens for interrogating the Quran, seeking to negate the historical dimension of religious narrative as a whole and projecting this negation onto the Quranic account-despite knowing that elements they dismissed in earlier scriptures often have analogues in the Quran. The historical engagement between archaeological inquiry and religious storytelling has been complex and frequently marked by tension, producing recurring episodes of debate and contestation. Re-examining this relationship through a contemporary epistemological framework is therefore essential for understanding its nature and for assessing the epistemic status of archaeological evidence; specifically, the extent of its validity and the limits imposed by its empirical domain. Adopting an analytical, descriptive, and critical methodology, this article traces the development of the archaeology-Quran discourse in both Western and Arab contexts, critically evaluates archaeological evidence, and engages a range of scholarly arguments and perspectives.

This study investigates the defining characteristics of the Islamic Shariah and the methodological instruments of ijtihad through which Islamic law acquires its adaptive dynamism in the face of evolving socio-historical realities. The purpose of this study is to repudiate the assertion that Islamic law has become an archaic or outworn system, and to demonstrate that Islamic legislation retains both normative authenticity and enduring relevance across temporal contexts. To address the recurrent objection-namely, how a finite corpus of scriptural texts can accommodate the proliferation of novel circumstances and unprecedented human experiences-the study adopts a bifurcated methodological approach: a textual-theological method (manhaj naqli) to establish the law\\'s elasticity for Muslim audiences, and a rational-inductive method (manhaj aqli wa istiqrai) to articulate its coherence and viability to non-Muslims. The analysis proceeds by foregrounding two structural dimensions that distinguish the Shariah: 1- its inherent, self-contained principles and value-laden foundations 2- the robust methodological mechanisms of Islamic ijtihad, which endow the legal system with the capacity to assimilate emerging realities without compromising its essential moral and doctrinal core. The study concludes that the Shariah is fundamentally dynamic-capable of absorbing significant contemporary transformations and of providing principled responses to the unprecedented questions arising from modern life-even though its explicit textual sources appear limited in number.

The study of the propositions of Practical Reason is beneficial for several cognitive fields, such as Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence), Practical Wisdom, and the philosophies of human sciences. Before embarking on the presentation of a new theory in this domain, the researcher must review and analyze previous intellectual efforts, either to continue the path with minor or fundamental modifications, or to deviate entirely from the traditional trajectory. Within this framework, this article seeks to present Shaykh Mesbah\\'s view regarding the nature, foundations, and implications of the propositions of Practical Reason by analyzing the texts disseminated throughout his works, utilizing a rational methodology to review potential critical observations concerning this perspective. The study concluded that his propositions of Practical Reason are descriptive (khabariyya) propositions, as they report the real relationship between action and end (goal), following the philosophical concept of necessity by comparison (al-dharura bil-qiyas). Their principles, however, rely on certain (yaqiniyya) propositions, whether they are self-evident (axiomatic) or theoretical. Human reason may sometimes be unable to prove specific particulars of the propositions of Practical Reason due to the complexity of factors and variables, compelling it to resort to Revelation as a complementary epistemic source. Thus, Revelation becomes one of the sources for these propositions. Regarding the implications of these propositions, the research addressed the following results: 1- The demonstrative nature (Burhaniyya) of the propositions of Practical Reason. 2- The quality of being true or false (veracity) in the propositions of Practical Reason. 3- Practical-reason propositions in themselves (nafs amr) are anchored in external states of affairs. 4-The existence of a relationship between the propositions of Practical Reason and reality. 5- The inference based on the propositions of Practical Reason is the demonstrative syllogism (Qiyas Burhani). 6- The existence of an inferential relationship between what ought to be (ma yanbaghi) and what is (ma huwa kain). 7- Ethical realism. 8- The permanence of the propositions of Practical Reason and the non-relativity of ethics.

Dr. Salih al-Waili examines Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadrs criticisms of the Aristotelian principle-The contingent is neither majoritarian nor permanent-across three main points, defending the Aristotelian school: 1- The Problematic of Unknown Quantity (Numerical Anonymity): This concerns the quantity required to define the boundaries of the principle. Dr. Al-Waili addresses this by considering the states (or cases) of nature in induction, rather than its individuals, arguing that these states are often limited. Thus, the majoritarian element is achieved when exceeding half of the total cases, eliminating the anonymity. He distinguishes between induction, defined as surveying individuals, and experience, defined as surveying the cases encompassing the principle. 2- The Analysis of Contingency: He analyzes the contingent as that which is not necessitated by the nature of the subject but arises from an accident (or external factor). What is contingent is minoritarian in occurrence. He highlights the rationality and necessity of the principle, rejecting Al-Sadrs account, which traced contingency back to an unspecified general knowledge. 3- The Gap of Generalization: Using the previous two points, he counters Al-Sadrs objections, paving the way for the objective justification of generalization. He objects to the alternative treatment based on the accumulation of probabilities, followed by resorting to the postulate of the design of human knowledge to transition from high confirmation to certainty. He questions: Why do we neglect the opposing probability on the other axis whenever probabilities accumulate on one axis? He concludes that the only answer is belief in the Aristotelian principle in its rational essence. The research concluded that what is considered valid in induction are the individuals of nature, not its cases, because the latter does not reflect the intention of the Aristotelians nor does it resolve the problem of anonymity. Furthermore, Dr. Al-Wailis account of the contingent and the transition to minoritarian occurrence is an unsupported inference, lacking a necessary connection. It also concluded that any account of the contingent ultimately leads to general knowledge due to its lack of specific formulation, and that Al-Sadrs attempt to justify generalization is more coherent and grants rational certainty (Yaqin Uqalai), unlike the Aristotelian principle, which demands a strict certainty that its premises cannot fulfill.

The profound technological transformations of the contemporary era have exerted a marked influence on educational theory and practice, particularly following the advent of generative artificial intelligence (AI); systems capable of producing novel, human-like creative outputs. Although this technological leap offers significant pedagogical opportunities, it simultaneously raises concerns regarding the preservation of learner identity. These concerns become especially salient in the case of the Muslim child, given that generative AI systems are largely developed within Western epistemological and axiological frameworks that propagate values and conceptual orientations potentially at odds with Islamic references. In light of this challenge, the present study investigates how generative AI-now a pervasive component of educational environments-may be pedagogically leveraged in the upbringing of Muslim children without compromising their identity. The central research problem is articulated as follows: By what mechanisms can the identity of the Muslim child be safeguarded from the ideological and cultural influences embedded in generative AI, while enabling its constructive and ethically appropriate use in learning contexts? Methodologically, the study adopts an integrated tripartite approach-descriptive, analytical, and comparative-to address this question. The findings demonstrate that Islamic educational philosophy offers a holistic and value-centered framework for the formation of the Muslim childs identity across cognitive, moral, spiritual, and social dimensions. Furthermore, the research concludes that generative AI can indeed be incorporated into child education without jeopardizing Islamic identity, provided that deliberate safeguards, evaluative criteria, and pedagogical protocols are implemented to ensure that AI functions as a culturally aligned instrument for strengthening-rather than destabilizing-the childs Islamic identity.