Abstract
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.
In this research, we will analyze and discuss the issue of the extent to which legal persons can be compensated for moral damages, trying to answer the following question: Does the legal person's submission to the law, as a natural person, give him the right when this legal person is a victim of damage to claim compensation? In fact, the centrality of this question appears in two directions: the first is related to finding the legal basis for ruling compensation for damage that many dispute over the legitimacy of a moral person’s entitlement to it, while the second is represented by mixing the concept of moral harm for a moral person with economic harm, and then the difficulty of proving the independence of moral damage away from economic damage accompanying or mixed with it. These difficulties had fueled jurisprudential and judicial disputes regarding the moral person's entitlement to moral damage, especially with doubts about the inability of this judgmental person to feel what necessitates his entitlement to compensation. All of this we will review with a statement of the images that the judiciary has compensated for, the problems associated with proving and evaluating moral damage, and the position of the judiciary and jurisprudence in the countries under comparison.