Abstract
This study investigates the complex relationship between cyber warfare and international humanitarian law (IHL), focusing on whether cyberspace is legally ambiguous or overlooked by states with advanced cyber capabilities. Utilizing a dual approach, it emphasizes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s affirmation of IHL's adaptability. It examines the legal criteria outlined in the Tallinn Manual regarding when cyber operations qualify as armed conflict. The findings indicate that while customary IHL principles can apply in the digital realm, significant data protection, civilian targeting, and attribution ambiguities hinder effective enforcement. The paper argues that major cyber powers often reject IHL applicability, not due to legal gaps, but as a strategic choice disguised as ambiguity. In conclusion, the study offers original proposals, including the recognition of "critical civilian datasets" requiring protection and the introduction of a legal standard called "functional lethality," advocating for a proactive regulatory framework to enhance humanitarian protections in cyber warfare.
Keywords
Armed Conflict
Civilian Protection
Customary Law
Cyberattacks
Digital Infrastructure
Digital Warfare
International Humanitarian Law
Legal Accountability
Military Objectives in Cyberspace
Tallinn Manual
Abstract
This study investigates the complex relationship between cyber warfare and international humanitarian law (IHL), focusing on whether cyberspace is legally ambiguous or overlooked by states with advanced cyber capabilities. Utilizing a dual approach, it emphasizes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s affirmation of IHL's adaptability. It examines the legal criteria outlined in the Tallinn Manual regarding when cyber operations qualify as armed conflict. The findings indicate that while customary IHL principles can apply in the digital realm, significant data protection, civilian targeting, and attribution ambiguities hinder effective enforcement. The paper argues that major cyber powers often reject IHL applicability, not due to legal gaps, but as a strategic choice disguised as ambiguity. In conclusion, the study offers original proposals, including the recognition of "critical civilian datasets" requiring protection and the introduction of a legal standard called "functional lethality," advocating for a proactive regulatory framework to enhance humanitarian protections in cyber warfare.
Keywords
Armed Conflict
Civilian Protection
Customary Law
Cyberattacks
Digital Infrastructure
Digital Warfare
International Humanitarian Law
Legal Accountability
Military Objectives in Cyberspace
Tallinn Manual