Abstract
This study examines the problem of deficiencies in the Iraqi legislative framework that counter offences against external security, with particular attention to the structural tension between the requirements of protecting State sovereignty and supreme national interests, on the one hand, and safeguarding constitutional liberties, on the other. The study proceeds from a central hypothesis: the defect does not lie merely in the weakness of the criminalization will to such conduct, but rather in the uncontrolled expansion of criminalization, the ambiguity of its concepts, the fragmentation of its legal sources, and the absence of a precise legislative standard for assessing danger. These shortcomings render criminal provisions susceptible, at times, to broad security-oriented interpretation, while leaving them, at other times, incapable of accommodating contemporary threats. A group of offences against the external security of the state under Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 was formulated within a traditional legal context primarily concerned with treason, unlawful communication with foreign powers, espionage, and direct military aggression. By contrast, the contemporary security environment has generated complex patterns of threat, including cyberattacks, electronic espionage, the financing of transnational networks, targeted information campaigns, and the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence to influence public affairs, collect sensitive information, or disrupt vital facilities. The study reveals that the overlap between the Penal Code, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and security-related legislation and institutions, together with the absence of a unified national security law or a specialized framework for digital and intelligence-based evidence, leads to duplicative legal characterization, jurisdictional conflict, and inconsistency in procedural safeguards. It further argues that the criminal protection of external security acquires constitutional legitimacy only when it is governed by the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and effective judicial oversight. The reason is that any expansion of criminalization, surveillance, or secrecy beyond these limits may transform security from a legitimate public interest into an instrument for restricting freedom of expression, communication, privacy, and the right of defense. The study concludes that the required reform must be both legislative and institutional. It should include a precise definition of external security, foreign entities, and security-related danger; a reconstruction of the material and mental elements of relevant offences; a graduated system of penalties; the regulation of digital evidence and classified information; and the establishment of specialized judicial mechanisms capable of balancing deterrence with the protection of rights.